

Scientific Conference with International Participation

# FRESKA


Future, Research and Expectations in Science,  
Knowledge, and Aspirations

# БИОНСИС

Будућност, истраживања и очекивања у науци,  
сазнањима и стремљењима

CONFERENCE PROCEEDING

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November 2022.  
Banja Luka



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**БИОНСИС**

Conference Proceeding  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY IN  
MULTIPOLAR WORLD - CURRENT STATE, CHAL-  
LENGES AND PERSPECTIVES



November 2022. Banja Luka

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## INTRODUCTORY WORD

We present to the domestic and foreign public the Conference proceedings from the Scientific Conference with international participation “Future, research and expectations in science, knowledge and aspirations“ (FRESKA). The theme of the Scientific Conference was “International relations and security in a multipolar world - current state, challenges and perspectives”.

The scientific papers presented at the FRESKA Scientific Conference not only observe the current state of international relations and security in the multipolar world, they also indicate the challenges that the world faces in the effort to maintain a unipolar world order. In the scientific papers, new perspectives were pointed out in order to more fully understand the problems of defining international relations and security in the fields of politics, law, sociology, history, economy, cyberterrorism as well as other areas of modern society.

Scientific research, practical experiences, and conclusions that are presented in the scientific papers form a quality basis for improving the vision of this currently very actual theme, and offered a scientific approach in identifying and solving this problem. At the same time, scientific research has also provided guidelines for future themes that should be discussed and researched in more detail.

The papers presented at this Scientific Conference are divided into three parts: International relations – current state, challenges and perspectives, International relations from a spatially-functional aspect and International security. Authors from seven states and panelists from four states took part in the Scientific Conference FRESKA.

The Scientific Conference FRESKA was organized by the Independent University Banja Luka in cooperation with the Institute for Scientific Research and the Center for Quality of Teaching at the IUBL. We hope that these Conference proceedings will contribute to a better understanding of certain issues or resolution of dilemmas and that it will open up space for wider scientific and professional discussion and cooperation as a good basis for analysis and discussion at the next scientific meetings.

We would like to thank all the authors and participants for their efforts and contribution to make this publication the desired form. Professors and scientific researchers from the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia), the president of the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Alexey Vasiliev, as well as professors from the University of South Africa, headed by rector Francis Petersen, made a great contribution to the scientific conference FRESKA. We also owe special thanks to prof. PhD Hussein Solomon (University of the Free State, South Africa) and PhD Sergey V. Kostelyanets, Leading Research Fellow (Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences) for their support and cooperation. We would also like to thank Mrs. Gordana Valcic for her selfless help in establishing contacts with foreign institutions for cooperation. The Independent University Banja Luka would like to thank the Academy of Sciences and Arts of the Republic of Srpska for the support it provided to this Scientific Conference.

Organizing Committee

## УВОДНА РИЈЕЧ

Домаћој и иностраној јавности представљамо зборник радова са научне конференције са међународним учешћем „Будућност, истраживања и очекивања у науци, сазнањима и стремљењима (БИОНСИС). Тема научне конференције била је „Међународни односи и безбједност у мултиполарном свијету – стање, изазови и перспективе“.

Научни радови представљени на научној конференцији БИОНСИС, не констатују само садашње стање међународних односа и безбједности у мултиполарном свијету већ указују и на изазове са којима се свијет суочава у настојању да се одржи униполарни свијетски поредак. У научним радовима се указало и на нове перспективе у циљу што потпунијег сагледавања проблематике дефинисања међународних односа и безбједности на пољима политике, права, социологије, историје, економије, сајбертероризма као и других области савременог друштва.

Научна истраживања, практична искуства и закључци који су представљени у радовима чине квалитетан основ за унапрјеђење виђења ове тренутно веома актуелне теме, те су понудили научни приступ у идентификацији и рјешавању ове проблематике. Истовремено, научна истраживања су дала и смјернице за будуће теме о којима би се требало детаљније разговарати и истраживати.

Радови представљени на овом научном скупу подијељени су у три дјела: међународни односи – стање, изазови и перспективе, међународни односи са просторно - функционалног аспекта и међународна безбједност. У раду научне конференције БИОНСИС учествовали су аутори из седам држава и панелисти из четири државе.

Научну конференцију БИОНСИС организовао је Независни универзитет Бања Лука у сарадњи са Институтом за научно-истраживачки рад и Центром за квалитет наставе при НУБЛ-у. Надамо се да ће овај зборник радова допринијети бољем разумјевању појединих питања и ријешавању дилема, да ће отворити простор за ширу научну и стручну дискусију и сарадњу као добар основ за анализу и дискусију на сљедећим скуповима.

Захваљујемо се свим ауторима и учесницима на уложеном труду и доприносу да ова публикација добије жељени облик. Велики допринос научној конференцији БИОНСИС дали су професори и научни истраживачи из Института за афричке студије Руске академије наука (Русија), председник Института за Афричке студије Руске академије наука Алексеј Василиев, као и професори са Универзитета Јужне Африке, на челу са ректором Францис Петерсеном. Посебну захвалност дугујемо и проф. др Хусеину Соломону (University of the Free State, Јужна Африка) и др Сергеју В. Костелианетсу, водећем научном сараднику (Институт за Афричке студије Руске академије наука) на подршци и сарадњи. Захваљујемо се и госпођи Гордани Валчић на несебичној помоћи при успостављању контаката са иностраним институцијама за сарадњу. Независни универзитет Бања Лука захваљује се Академији наука и умјетности Републике Српске на подршци коју је дала овој научној конференцији.

Организациони одбор



**WELCOMING SPEECH OF  
ACADEMICIAN DRAGO BRANKOVIC  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF ASARS**

Dear Rectors,  
Dear participants of the scientific meeting,  
Ladies and gentlemen

I have a pleasant obligation to greet you on behalf of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of the Republika Srpska (ASARS) and wish you successful work in the scientific deliberations of such an important topic, which in its formulation includes all important aspects of international relations and security in a multipolar world. I congratulate the rector of the Independent University Banja Luka (IUBL) because, with his scientific potential, he managed to choose well a contemporary scientifically relevant and socially current topic well. I would certainly like to express my gratitude to all the authors of the papers, who are well-known and recognized authorities in this field, who invested intellectual efforts to prepare very interesting papers for this scientific meeting.

The ASARS, as the highest scientific institution in the Republic of Srpska, is charged by law to monitor, analyze and coordinate the development of scientific work in our Republic of Srpska. The IUBL, as an important higher education institution, has been making efforts and achieving significant results in recent years, not only in the education of highly skilled personnel (staff), but also in the development of science and scientific research. In recent years, the IUBL has held several important scientific conferences, published several collections of scientific works, and regularly publishes its own scientific journal. In this way, the IUBL in the Republic of Srpska contributes to the affirmation of science, the affirmation of the city of Banja Luka and the affirmation of the Republic of Srpska in the wider European and world space.

We believe that the topic of the scientific conference “International relations and security in a multipolar world - current situation, challenges and perspectives” will arouse the interest not only of the scientific community but also of the wider social public. Critical reflection on the current situation of international relations, which is contained in the majority of scientific papers, will show where international relations are in the first years of the third decade of the XXI century, burdened by war conflicts, refugee columns, threats to international law and the reduction of the role and importance of international organizations such as are also the UN. We believe that in your scientific papers you will point out these challenges and try to search for possibilities and ways of overcoming the current general international war, political, economic and every other crisis. The perspectives, which you also indicated in the title of the topic, represent for all sciences, including those dealing with international relations, which are currently the most significant challenge. The search for the perspectives of a multipolar world represents the search for peace, the search for the further development of civilization and the survival of nature in the broadest sense of the word.

In the name of discovering these and such perspectives, I wish successful work for this Scientific Conference and certainly the publication of a collection of scientific papers that will historically testify to our significant efforts to make the world better, fairer and more successful in the coming decades and centuries.

**ПОЗДРАВНА РИЈЕЧ  
АКАДЕМИКА ДРАГЕ БРАНКОВИЋА  
ГЕНЕРАЛНИ СЕКРЕТАР АНУРС-А**

Уважени ректори,  
Поштовани учесници научног скупа,  
Даме и господо,

Имам пријатну обавезу да вас у име Академије наука и умјетности Републике Српске поздравим и жажелим успјешан рад у научним промишљањима тако важне теме која у својој формулацији обухвата све битне аспекте међународних односа и безбједности у мултиполарном свијету. Честитам ректору Независног универзитета Бања Лука што је са својим научним потенцијалом успио добро одабрати савремену научно релевантну и друштвено актуелну тему. Свакако изражавам и захвалност свим ауторима реферата који су као познати и признати ауторитети из ове области уложили интелектуалне напоре да припреме веома занимљиве реферате за овај научни скуп.

Академија наука и умјетности Републике Српске као највиша научна институција у Републици Српској законом је задужена да прати, анализира и координира развој научног рада у нашој Републици. Независни универзитет Бања Лука као значајна високошколска институција посљедњих година улаже напоре и постиже значајне резултате, не само у образовању високо стручних кадрова, већ и у развоју научног и научно - истраживачког рада. Независни универзитет Бања Лука одржао је протеклих година неколико значајних научних скупова, објавио више зборника научних радова а редовно издаје властити научни часопис. На тај начин и овај Универзитет у Републици Српској доприноси афирмацији науке, града Бања Луке и Републике Српске у ширем европском и свјетском простору.

Тема научног скупа „Међународни односи и безбједност у мултиполарном свијету – тренутно стање, изазови и перспективе“ вјерујемо да ће побудити интересовање не само научне већ и шире друштвене јавности. Критичко промишљање тренутног стања у међународним односима, што садржи већина пријављених реферата, показује гдје се у првим годинама треће деценије двадесет првог вијека налазе међународни односи, оптерећени ратним сукобима, избјегличким колонама, угрожености међународног права и смањивањем улоге и значаја међународних организација какве су и Уједињене нације. Вјерујемо да ће те и ви у вашим рефератима указивати на те изазове и покушавати трагати за могућностима и начинима превазилажења садашње опште међународне ратне, политичке, економске и сваке друге кризе. Перспективе, које сте такође назначили у називу теме, представљају за све науке, па и оне које се баве међународним односима, тренутно најзначајнији изазов. Трагање за перспективама мултиполарног свијета представља трагање за миром, даљњим развојем цивилизације и опстанком природе у најширем значењу те ријечи.

У име откривања тих и таквих перспектива желим успјешан рад овом научном скупу и свакако објављивање зборника научних радова који ће историјски посвједочити наше значајне напоре да учинимо свијет бољим, праведнијим и успјешнијим у наредним деценијама и вјековима.

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PANEL





# GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE MULTIPOLAR WORLD AS REALITY OR IDEOLOGY

**Mirko Tripunoski<sup>1</sup>**

American University of Europe-FON Skopje

Globalization is not a new phenomenon, but its intensity is new, especially with greater regionalization and globalization in the period after the Second World War and the development of the world economy, technology, means of communication and war potential. The level of interaction and interconnection within countries and societies is constantly developing, so goods, capital, people and knowledge easily cross national borders. Global economic systems, finance and production are interconnected, while modern communication networks and information technologies are changing the very nature of communication.

The process of globalization, unlike other processes, also brings certain problems. The biggest problem, when it comes to highly developed countries, is related to the issue of inequality, which is divided into two dimensions, both within the countries themselves and between them. The reason for the increase in differences is specific. In developed countries, the need for skilled workers has increased, which has widened the wage gap. Among some countries, especially the newly industrialized ones in the Far East, the gap between urban and rural wages has grown, confirming the thesis that knowledge is not the only factor in development.

The above remarks do not exhaust the phenomenon of the globalization process, but only reveal knowledge about the global system that represents a new challenge for globalization analysts. The modern attempt to map the global system boils down to five components, and each of them is elaborated in more detail in the offered versions, and in this part they are only briefly explained.

**The first component** is the emergence of states with loose borders, bearing in mind that in the world of high technology, the economic base of the nation is collapsing, because the most dynamic sectors of the economy are no longer national. The national market has less and less importance than the local, regional and global. At the same time, when underdeveloped countries insist on sovereignty, the most powerful and richest countries lose their sovereignty, and their governments and banks are not able to control the exchange rate of their currency at the global level, in the conditions of the movement of electronic money, just as they are not able to control their borders. Because restricting imports or stopping migrants is quite complicated and produces consequences.

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**The second component** is the emergence of regional «technopolises» in circumstances where transnational companies establish networks that transcend the structure of nation states. «Areas such as Orange County in the US, Osaka in Japan, the Lyon region in France, or the Ruhr area in Germany are considered to be gaining predominant socio-economic status. The real forces that will decide will be transnational companies in alliance with city-regional governments with the possibility of forming an archipelago of high technology».

**The third component** of the global system are transnational corporations whose power is constantly developing and their influence exceeds the sphere of economic globalization. Corporations like IBM, Siemens, British Petroleum simply cannot be considered national companies. According to UN data, today in the world there are more than 63,000 transnational corporations with 690,000 member companies, whose combined turnover covers 25% of world trade.

**The fourth component** of the global system is made up of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Today, there are over 4,000,000 registered transnational interest associations and citizens' organizations in the world, 95% of which are in developed countries. These are non-profit and volunteer organizations that represent autonomous subjects in the economy, science, religion, culture, and education that are not subject to the monopoly of the state government. The basic principles of these organizations, which exclude the voluntarism of personal power, the pyramidal organizational structure, the principle of uniformity and maximization, are the rule of law and the promotion of initiatives aimed at a greater role in the development of democracy and pluralism, strengthening the role of the rule of law, the fight against poverty and the improvement of state administration and markets.

**The fifth component**, but not in importance, are international organizations whose meaning is of key importance for the functioning of the international community and which gradually take over activities that were in the sphere of interest of national states.

The basic goal of the global system structured in this way is to reshape the world order and neutralize conflicting oppositions and turn them into creative energy for the creation of global economic and social balance. Achieving that goal is not a simple process because within each of the components of the global system, and especially between them, there is a degree of interdependence and hyper-connection. As societies become more heterogeneous, they export and import more, communicate, exchange information with other parts of the world, and create joint ventures, consortia, and associations.

When these circumstances come together—the differences in the components that make up the global system and the processes they cause—a major transformation occurs that makes the global world difficult to recognize in the future. The positive feedback loop multiplies - that is, the once-moving process continues to live on by itself and, far from being stable, introduces more instability into the system. Ethnic vendettas generate ethnic conflicts which in turn generate more ethnic wars than a particular region can bear and lead to the collapse of the system.

Hence the interpretation that the global system is anything but rational. It's actually more random than ever, which means it's harder, if not impossible, to predict its behavior.

Globalization as a process causes many contradictions and serious problems in many national policies, but in recent times, and most often, it is processed and confirmed as a positive economic phenomenon. The basic assumptions, and therefore the basic reasons, are in the increasing global integration of production, in the world markets of goods, services, capital, technology and labor. This approach to all processes of globalization achieves quality effects on the growth and development of economic laws in an increasing number of countries from all continents. All the major characteristics achieved by globalization are confirmed in management systems, strategies, micro and macroeconomic policy models in societies that realize the demands of the global economy. Every process of globalization strives for standards imposed by information technology, but at the same time it chooses the quality of work and the realization of profit in the realized processes. However, in the world context, it is still not possible to talk about the integration of all countries in the global processes of production, trade, investment, and technology.

Openness, clarity, liberalization, integration and cooperation are the main motives for the increasing interdependence of the states that form a chain of a global view of the future and an open economy in a world where knowledge, not raw materials, is increasingly incorporated. and human effort. With the growth of knowledge-based production, the distinction between the traditional and the global economy will be increasingly blurred.

Therefore, the openness of each country towards world markets and their changes means the country's willingness to accept the international standards of that market, its rules of conduct and communication in activities that have international regulations. The removal of national barriers to ensure equal treatment of goods and services on the world global market, regardless of their origin, is the result of existing liberalization and confirmation of free flows of capital, labor, technology,

Integration shows the size of the global market and its need to connect different subjects, institutions, sectors, industries, activities, and its goal is to respond to the growing needs of the global market and to the globalization tendencies of changes in societies. This connection with the growing needs and tendencies of globalization creates interdependence and closeness of one production sector with another, one market with another. This approach increases the efficiency in the development of a country, which becomes dependent on the efficiency of the network it belongs to and the connections it builds with other countries.

The primary quality factor of globalization time is cooperation. The degree of its development depends on the speed of integration into the global economy. Through each collaboration, direct and indirect effects are realized, knowledge, values, experiences, attitudes, ideas are transferred, through it one learns and learns how to connect with global processes in the world and how to perfect the already established communication. «States face a serious challenge of how to establish a balance between national competitiveness and international relations.» Those with the highest degree of integration have the strongest influence on the direction of international relations. They were the first to become competitive states, responding to the aforementioned challenge through a new policy of international competition. This new policy replaces the traditional foreign trade policy.

Basically, globalization processes in the economy are viewed through financial integration, increased diversification, global companies, global competition, etc. Fi-

financial integration basically sets the condition for the realization of national policies according to international changes. That is why every country that participates in the processes of globalization should fulfill the basic conditions for macroeconomic stability, achieving external and internal balance, efficient financial institutions, an efficient banking system and free movement of financial capital. Globalization of financial integration achieves a quality dynamic approach that contains a serious degree of compliance and changes in international financial standards.

Diversification or the introduction of new changes in behavior, strategy and policy in production, factors of production and consumption in a global framework. Each participant in the process of globalization needs to develop a sense of flexibility and adapt to the diverse needs of the market with a uniquely flexible organization. Such a system corresponds to a decentralized management and leadership model. It is necessary for every participant in the globalization process who accepts the rules of global competition.

Global competition basically removes the limitations of national markets and adapts them to the criteria of world markets. The quality of many non-price factors becomes decisive in the price. The winners are held by those who meet the quality criteria of the competition. Such are the countries with accelerated growth of knowledge and dictate the competition.

Global companies. Becoming a global company is a challenge for every management, but for the government it is another indicator of a new attitude towards the rules of international competition. The success of these firms is completely influenced by the network of international flows. Global firms are more interested in international competition policy than in national foreign trade policy.

Technological globalization is defined as the internationalization of science and technology, which goes in the direction of a rapidly growing level that moves towards the legality of global sources of creation and use of technology from the creation of innovations, their application in all spheres of life, but also from the dependence of the functioning of info-technical and telecommunication systems as carriers global markets.

Innovation is a serious condition for survival in any global market. They are the driving force of development and the central axis in the economic policies of every social organization of the state.

The internationalization of production is the result of competition between countries that want to transfer through the diffusion of production techniques and products from countries with the most developed techniques and technology based on knowledge from the economy. The internationalization of engineering techniques, activities and maintenance are the result of the global market. Global firms must embrace engineering activities in countries in whose markets they operate. Internationalization of research and development is becoming fundamental in every global market. The opening of laboratories, research centers and the development of the appropriate base and infrastructure is a reflection of the imposed needs of the global market, which sets structural and other requirements in the country in which it operates.

And the state today is increasingly becoming an object of globalization. Although the state, as the most effective instrument for establishing sovereignty in a certain territory, remains resistant to globalization, this process continues to threaten sov-

ereignty. The increasing integration of the economy is deeply connected with the political globalization of the state, which reduces the power and efficiency of governments that cannot control the flow of ideas and goods, so the instruments of internal politics become ineffective. The increasing growth of transnational ties is coordinated on an international and intergovernmental basis through the increasing importance of international organizations, thereby creating a system of global governance that continues to reduce the influence of state power.

For 50 years, the global community of states has been in fear of a new world war and security disruption as a result of the bipolar competition between the two powers, the USA and the USSR, during the Cold War. But 15 years after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the new security order is still unclear. New dangers, such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, national and religious forms of extremism, economic and ecological crises, etc., represent a threat to the entire civilization. In the era of globalization, states are not the only threats to world security, and the universal nature of the threats themselves makes it even more difficult to create a security order.

Globalization is not a finished process, nor will its realization easily be final. As long as there are forces opposing the process, globalization will not be fully achievable, but will be more decisive. If globalization represents the achievement of economic growth and progress, then by definition that process should refer to all countries, as a global community, and not lead to an increase in the gap between countries. For this reason, post-globalization as a term does not necessarily mean that some process has ended, in order for some other process to begin, but that the process is deeply rooted in everyday life, from which there is no return, no stopping. What is important for post-globalization is the growing increase in countermeasures as a response to the process, that is, the development of a global target society, one of the goals of this scientific work is to present the level of exposure of the Republic.



# THE NEW COLD WAR, AFRICA, AND THE ISSUE OF FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE

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The current intensification of geopolitical tensions has overshadowed many other threats to international security, which may have dire consequences, and in this regard it is instructive to look at the African continent as a showcase of this.

Despite all successes of the continent, its steadfast pursuit of integration agenda and the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area, at the moment more than half of African countries are still embroiled in conflicts with armed opposition groups or religious extremist organizations. A number of territorial and resource disputes between neighboring African states, engendered by the colonial legacy, but today potentially leading to large-scale armed clashes, also remain unresolved. The problems associated with conflicts include crime and piracy, uncontrolled migration and socio-economic instability, opportunism of external actors and mendacity of local politicians, disinvestment and food insecurity, etc.

Climate change, which was discussed in Cairo at the Climate Change Conference this November, may destroy the livelihoods of millions of people in Africa; the social effects of HIV/AIDS epidemic, COVID-19 and other diseases are still very much underestimated, just like the growth of African population, which is accompanied with increasing economic inequality.

International terrorism, more precisely Jihadism, sometimes referred to as Islamism, stands out as a present and clear danger for most of the countries of the continent from Egypt to Mozambique. What happened in Syria and Iraq, where the Islamic State at its apex controlled a territory approximately equal to four Bosnia and Herzegovina's, could very well happen in Africa. There, Islamists have already been very close to occupying whole countries – in Somalia and in Mali. They held large territories in Egypt, Nigeria and Libya and are still on the offensive in the Sahel. The porous nature of borders, especially in the Sahara/Sahel region, weakness of state institutions and agencies, and proliferation of transnational crime networks facilitate exchange of fighters, resources and know-how between terrorists operating on the continent.

At the same time, counterterrorist cooperation between NATO countries and Africa, which was rapidly developing after September 11 attacks and the start of the War on Terror, is now under question. The case in point is France, which has just recently ended the Operation Barkhane. Admittedly, despite dozens of training programs, hundreds of joint exercises, exchange of information agreements,

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and even increased Western military presence in Africa, international terrorism has been quickly spreading on the continent. The claim that the war on terror and other foreign interventions have not just failed to reduce or contain terrorism in Africa or in the world at large but actually generated additional terrorism and instability seems to be more and more accurate. While the examples of Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq present immensely stronger cases, Africa has been catching up from Libya to the Sahel to Somalia.

Historically, the expansion of international terrorism has served as the justification for a number of open interventions of Western countries in Africa. In the 1980s and the 1990s there were relatively few cases: the 1986 Berlin attack led to an American bombing campaign against Libya; the US also bombed Sudan after terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Since the early 2000s and within the context of the War on Terror, there began a rapid expansion of Western, primarily American, military involvement on the continent. Anti-terrorist operations of the US have focused on the key strategic regions: the Horn of Africa, the Sahara/Sahel region, and the Gulf of Guinea. These, however, have failed to contain the spread of destabilization and terrorism throughout the continent, but have served the purpose of setting up US military infrastructure – drone bases, cooperative security and forward operating locations and various other types of presumably jointly controlled military installations – in over a dozen of African countries.

International terrorism, which for roughly two decades eclipsed its domestic variety in terms of global attention, may lose its urgency as the current world order dominated by the Western countries evolves into a multipolar or bipolar world system. Just as attacks on the interests of the West and its allies around the world become less exigent for Islamists, so will the West refocus its attention on countering China, Russia, Iran and other challengers, and African governments may lose substantial portion of international support for their war on now more localized and less global Islamists, with immediate negative effects on their regime security. Will then these governments be presented with a choice of retaining Western support critical for their regime security in exchange for supporting US policies aimed at curbing Chinese and Russian influence? That is quite likely, and this will happen at the expense of their own agency, economic development and citizens.

The conclusion is that the precondition for Africa's stable, long-term development is the minimization of foreign political and military influence on the continent. In view of the growing global competition for the resources of the continent, the main goal of the Africans, just like of residents of other developing parts of the world, should be to become the ones who set the rules of the game in their home region. And for that they need to strive for achieving fair and equal partnerships with the leading countries of the world, and while maintaining cooperation in military sphere, develop their own national, regional and continental security mechanisms.



# THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A STRUCTURAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE<sup>1</sup>

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Throughout modern history, the international-political system has proven to be remarkably stable. For all the upheavals of centuries past, ranging from the development of new thought systems, ideologies, weapons, technologies, processes of decolonisation, and such like, the structure (or framework) of international politics has changed but twice. Nearly three centuries of multipolarity (i.e., a system marked by four or more great powers) ended with the German and Japanese military defeat bringing World War II to a close. The ensuing bipolar system (i.e., a system marked by two great powers), in which only two great powers (to wit, the United States and the Soviet Union) were left standing, lasted nearly half a century and was brought to an abrupt end following the implosion of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, some five hundred years of international-political history has yielded but two changes in the international-political system. A third structural change is now evident – or has been evident for a few years at least. The consequences – theoretical and practical – are real, impacting issues ranging from war and peace, the management of international politics, to the fates of lesser powers.

China's rise to great-power status, once a speculative endeavour but now an enduring reality, has once again thrust us back to the bipolar world of old. The rise of China and, concomitantly, the end of US hegemony was always expected. As nature abhors a vacuum, so the old realist adage goes, international politics abhors unbalanced power. The anarchy (not chaos, but lack of formal organisation) of the international-political system accounts for the repeated formation of balances (or the repeated rise of great powers) in international politics. Irrespective of the ideological bearings and inclinations of the units of the international-politics, the anarchy of the international-political system constrain states to compete relentlessly with one another and to emulate the practices of the most successful competitors. The enduring competition of states – especially, the states of greatest capabilities (great powers) – thus stems from the harsh reality that there exists no overarching higher authority in international politics to settle disputes between states or to come to their aid when threatened. International politics is – and, unfortunately, remains – essentially a self-help system. Competition for power and a zero-sum outlook on international politics mark such systems. Because international politics remains marred by an-

<sup>1</sup> The author would like to acknowledge the inputs of my colleague, Dr Eben Coetzee, in writing this paper.

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archy, certain debilitating continuities persist. War always lurks in the background, something that Europe has, unfortunately, recently rediscovered. The prudent state arms for war, even though the clouds of war might seem distant. Those who fail to keep up (in economic and military terms) do so at their own peril. Thus we see China pretty much acting according to the same realist logic as the United States – i.e., desiring to become overwhelmingly strong in its own region; constructing a blue-water navy to protect its ever-expanding interests; desiring to lead in every possible field, from science to advanced technology; and fashioning an international system according to its liking and interests. Structural forces, not unit-level ones, drive the ensuing Sino-US competition.

Bipolar systems promise a greater measure of peace than multipolar systems do, for the great powers at any rate. For great powers then, distinct advantages, if measured principally in terms of national security, accrue from bipolar systems (Waltz, 1979:161). Two things are discernible today and with an eye towards the future: one, the anarchic structure of the international-political systems remains intact, which suggests the possibility of war remains large, competition will remain rife, and power will remain the pre-eminent currency; two, we are witnessing a return to bipolarity. Concerning the latter point, we know from structural realist theory *and* history that such systems tend to be inherently peaceful yet highly unstable ('stability' here relates to how well a system endures). The 'peace' of great-power systems is, however, confined to those at the centre of international politics, with bipolar systems hardly being more peaceful for lesser states. With two great powers with extensive (perhaps even global) interests, the interests of each great power leads them to be concerned with whatever happens anywhere in the world. Alliances emerge, easily solidifies, and the world is increasingly seen in terms of rival 'camps'. One great power's gain spurs relentless effort by the other not to fall behind, with the rest (i.e., states of lesser capabilities) either joining the effort or suffering the consequences.

In a bipolar world, with each state becoming the obsessing danger of the other and with competition inordinately close, each of the principal units of the system cannot remain indifferent to the behaviour, strategies and capabilities of the other. Any event anywhere in the world is bound to be worrisome for both great powers if it involves significant gains or losses for either party (Waltz, 1979, pp.170-171). With the fate and fortunes of each intimately tied to the other, the responses of the one great power are inextricably tied to the actions of the other one and vice versa (Waltz, 1979, p. 171). All of this tells us something about how bipolarity constrained great-power war (along, of course, with the peace-inducing effects of nuclear weapons). While bipolar systems tend to be more peaceful, the ensuing Sino-American great-power rivalry are likely to be somewhat different from the old US-Soviet one, with the possibility of a shooting war a distinct possibility (although war at low levels). Why should this be the case? For starters, China is already closer to the US in terms of latent power than the Soviet Union ever was. China is likely to transform its economic power into even greater military capabilities (as recently stated by Chinese president Xi Jinping), thus giving Beijing the military capability to challenge the US in various theatres of operation. Chinese behaviour is also deeply affected and driven by "nationalism". As with other great powers in earlier eras, China sees itself as the pick and flowers of the nations, destined to lead, destined to fashion the international environment according to its fashion and interests. Another fac-

tor possibly leading to a less peaceful bipolar world is the fact that China – unlike the Soviet Union – has ambitions to change the status quo in East Asia. All of this point towards the possibility of war, although the possibility of full-out conventional war is highly unlikely (owing to both bipolarity and nuclear weapons). We should, however, expect increased competition between the two principal powers of the system, increased hostility, increased skirmishes, increased involvement in the affairs of lesser states. Where managing international affairs becomes easier in bipolar as against multipolar systems, China's revisionist aims will surely complicate any attempt to manage transnational issues.

While bipolarity will undoubtedly induce structural constraints for great powers, understanding how the changing structure of international-politics will affect particular states requires paying attention not only to structural forces but also domestic ones. Structural realism – and different international-political structures specifically – can tell us some big and important things about international politics, but they cannot explain every move that every state makes, let alone how the future will unfold for individuals within states. To explain particular behaviour or moves of particular states, engagement with bipolar structures should be supplemented with a theory of foreign policy. Importantly, a theory of international-political structure should not be confused with a theory of foreign policy – in explaining particular outcomes, we need to engage with causes at both the structural and unit levels.

We can, nonetheless, draw some very limited conclusions about how the unfolding bipolar world could influence flesh-and-blood humans. Again, any such engagement falls outside the scope of structural realist theory and thus requires engagement with multiple theories and multiple causes located at different levels. With rival camps forming in a bipolar world, we can expect that the politics of the everyday *within* societies will become increasingly polarised. Middle grounds are likely to disappear. The politics of reason will be displaced by fear-driven identity politics – either you join us, or you are against us. Intellectual space for engaging with issues of the day will narrow – some epistemologies and ontologies will carry the day, with the rest destined to be decried as against the interests of the people. A more autocratic world could follow and, as technology such as artificial intelligence spread across the globe, the rise of surveillance states (not only in the East, but also in the West) could emerge.

In conclusion, the following pertinent points follow from this analysis:

- The structure of the international-political system (anarchy) remains intact. This induces various debilitating continuities. The problem is a systemic one, something apart from the intentions and actions of the units of international politics;
- Because anarchy endures, war remains likely, competition is rife, and zero-sum outlooks prevail;
- International-political outcomes vary as the number of great-power in the international-political system changes. Bipolar systems are more peaceful yet more unstable than multipolar systems; multipolar systems are more stable yet less peaceful; unipolar systems promise nothing good;
- Unipolarity is over. We are witnessing the rise of a bipolar system. Although not included in the analysis, bipolarity could in due time give way to a multipolar world. This is, however, only a possibility in the very distant future;

- Because structure does not determine (but only constrains), the new bipolar system is likely to have some new features;
- While great-power war (and nuclear war) remains unlikely, the new bipolar system and bipolar politics will be more complicated, with the possibility of low-level conflicts a distinct possibility;
- The vice of bipolar systems – overreaction – becomes all the more real in a bipolar world with a revisionist and nationalist China as one of the poles;
- Managing international-political issues in bipolar systems, generally something easier than in multipolar systems, is likely to be more difficult given China's revisionist aims; and
- We must brace ourselves for more involvement in the affairs of lesser states (non-great power states) and more Ukraine-like events.

# HYBRID WAR - FACTS AND CONTROVERSIES

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The history of human society is a history of conflict. Social thought and all major religions start from the position that social progress is linked to peace and non-violence. However, history confirms that both social progress and social destruction are mostly soaked in blood. Since the existence of civilization, in a period of about 5000 years, there have been over 15,000 wars and only about 300 years of complete peace on the entire planet.

The great powers have (all) powerful weapons, armies, power and much more that makes them influence global processes and events. But war as a conflict between two or all countries with the use of all kinds of weapons and the art of warfare, in Clausewitz's understanding of war, is less and less talked about and acted upon. On the scene is a hybrid war, a war with information, hacking attacks, draining the economy, sanctions, threats to use force. To subjugate the enemy without a fight is the pinnacle of war art, Sun Tzu believed. From then until today, it has been the guiding idea in the search for the most effective model of actions without the use of weapons, and to achieve the goals of the war. Basically, this means that the unarmed forms of warfare should do the most important part of the job, and only, if necessary, the final blow is struck by armed force.

Some war theorists argue that the new concept of hybrid threats first gained recognition when Hezbollah had visible military success against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Lebanon in 2006 during the Second Lebanon War. The paradox is that the definition of "hybrid" at the time was that a non-state actor demonstrated military capabilities that were originally reserved only for state actors. Multimodal threats, low-intensity threats, kinetic as well as non-kinetic threats to international peace and security include cyber warfare, asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, security resources, refraining from globalization and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such (multi)modal threats have become known as "hybrid threats".

On the other hand, the concept of hybrid war began to be applied outside expert circles after Russia's invasion of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, according to the book "Defining Hybrid Warfare" by James Witter. The Russians used special units for that operation, they influenced the election process and used economic extortion, which was labeled hybrid and set off an alarm in Western security circles, as noted by analysts of the European Center for Security Studies "George Marshall".

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Vladislav Surkov, a former adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, called that conflict “the first non-linear war”. Primitive wars were fought by two countries or two coalitions. Here we have a war of four coalitions - not two against the other two or three against one. “Everybody is at war against everybody,” Surkov noted. But, the new concept of hybrid war was preceded by a war with a slightly different name - neocortical war.

According to US doctrine, war is constant, it never stops, nor can it stop as long as one side wants to subjugate the will of the other. In the 1990s, the USA adopted the doctrine of neocortical war, with the axiom that the fact that armed actions are not permanent does not mean that the war ends. How is the neocortical war doctrine used? In the military doctrinal documents of the USA, the concept of neocortical war was elaborated as a way to defeat the enemy without using physical force. The effects of this concept of warfare are directed not only at the physiological side of the brain as a command center, but more at consciousness. It is, in essence, a cocktail method of neurolinguistic programming and the method of modern telecommunications. The term neocortical war or warfare represents a set of techniques, disciplines and methods by which the enemy is subdued without physical force, by acting on the neocortex of an organism. The neocortex is the cap of the human brain, where 80 percent of the neurons are located, which are responsible for the functioning of observation, orientation, decisions and actions. This American doctrine views the adversary (a nation or state) as an organism, and the leader or leading structures of the state are the “brain”. All actions are aimed at the “brain”. It is the manipulation of people by a group, state or ideology to work in favor of their interests, and in the end evidently to their own detriment. The main consequences are the erasure of national consciousness and the creation of a defeatist consciousness that kills every motive for resistance, both violent and non-violent (impact on culture and tradition) forms of subjugation and supremacy. It is cheaper than war, where material wealth and human resources are destroyed, by acting on the soft side of the opponent, but not more naively and destructively. When we compare the content of neocortical and hybrid war, we see that hybrid war is just an extended version of neocortical war.

According to the NATO strategic concept from 2010, hybrid threats are defined as “those threats that represent adversaries capable of simultaneously using conventional and unconventional means adapted to achieve their goals”. Having identified these threats, NATO has undertaken activities on a comprehensive conceptual framework that should provide a legal framework for the identification and categorization of such threats within a broader framework of possible responses by multiple stakeholders. Admittedly, the hybrid threat is a basic term, which includes a wide range of existing unfavorable circumstances and actions, such as terrorism, migration, piracy, corruption, ethnic conflicts, etc. NATO has perfected a system capable of dealing with the adaptive and systematic use of such assets individually or in combination against an adversary to achieve long-term political objectives. In this sense, it can be concluded that hybrid threats are not exclusively a tool of asymmetric or non-state actors, but can be applied by both state and non-state actors. Their main attraction from the point of view of state actors is that they can be used to a large extent without looking like a state, and therefore can be applied in circumstances where open action is excluded for a number of reasons.

Hybrid war has raised many dilemmas for domestic and international law, international humanitarian law, human rights, and the law of armed conflict, raising the question of how to counter the actions of hybrid war with legal means, which are remedies for losses due to cyber actions. Malicious intrusions into a computer or network are quite common, notorious and destructive. Perhaps the most common and well-known cases involving cyber-attacks against a state, such as the large-scale cyber operation against Estonia in 2007. The Stuxnet computer virus is considered the first known cyberweapon and was used in the 2010 attack on Iran's nuclear program as well as the 2017 cyberattack against the United Kingdom's National Health Service. The "Vanna Cry" computer virus attack affected 300,000 computers in 150 countries. The "NotPetia" computer virus caused losses of 300 million dollars. The COVID-19 pandemic has been marked by a significant increase in malicious cyber operations against the healthcare infrastructure of states. These include operations against hospitals treating patients with COVID-19, intelligence-gathering operations against research centers developing vaccines against COVID-19, and operations against public health services dealing with COVID-19. This causes great material and non-material losses. The problem is too complex to be fully explored at all.

The role of "cyber-space" in the concept of hybrid threats after the Cold War and the absence of the will of the great powers, primarily NATO, to agree to a joint and comprehensive approach in countering hybrid threats, created the conditions for "hybrid threats to remain on the scene". Even conventional war will have a "hybrid" element such as "cyber-attack", "bio-hacking" and even "nano-applications". Old threats, such as nuclear threats, which we are facing as the most serious threat in the context of the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, are within the reach of state actors. There have already been warnings that some university nuclear technology programs could be at risk of being exploited and misused by terrorist organizations. Future hybrid attacks will increasingly rely on technological and scientific resources to carry out operations, and one concrete example is the use of cyberspace to execute or control hybrid threats. Cyber-conflict and cyber-war serve as examples of the use of new technologies within the framework of hybrid operations. Cyber-war basically refers to a continuous computer-based cyber-attack by one state against the IT infrastructure of a target state. Western theoreticians of cyber operations cite as an example of such an action taking place in the fifth dimension of warfare, Russia's 2007 attempt to virtually block Estonia's internet infrastructure as a countermeasure and retaliation for Estonia's removal of a World War II Soviet war memorial from downtown Tallinn. Government and political party websites as well as corporate websites were severely obstructed by cyber warfare action when Russian military operations were supported by cyber operations against Georgia in 2008. Multimodal threats, asymmetric terror and war supplemented by terrorist and (dis)information campaigns can be seen in the conflict between Israel and Gaza. Then Hamas used disinformation tools and strategies usually associated with covert psychological operations by traditional military state actors, such as sending emails and text messages with fake news updates, sending propaganda news flashes to Israeli and non-Israeli email addresses and mobile phones as and using the Internet to spread their propaganda. During the conflict, text messages were sent warning: "Gaza will turn into a graveyard for your soldiers, Tel Aviv will become a ball of fire." The Stuxnet computer virus was used to attack Iran's nuclear weapons program, pos-

sibly by Israel. These few examples illustrate the technical progress, capabilities and potential of such new means of conducting hostile operations in the fifth dimension of warfare. The continuation and intensification of the use of cyber-attacks by China against the US, NATO, the European Union and the rest of the world led the US to react by establishing a central cyber war command, the United States Cyber Command (USCIBERCOM) in 2010 with the task of “conducting military full-spectrum cyberspace operations to enable actions in all domains, secure the US by ensuring Allied security from actions in cyberspace.” Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine has fueled a new debate about the understanding of the term “hybrid war”. However, the concept of hybrid war remains as contentious as it is popular. When scholars or practitioners refer to the hybrid model of war, they do not always mean the same thing. Moreover, the definitions of hybrid war adopted by Western theorists and institutions show significant differences. So the term “hybrid war” conceals more than it explains. The conceptual ambiguity regarding hybrid war stems from two main reasons: first, the concept of hybrid warfare has been widely debated, criticized, and reformulated with new elements that were missing from the initial conception. Second, the term hybrid war is often used to refer to inapplicable phenomena. That is, the term hybrid war has been used to describe new cases that lack the essential features of the original concept. As such, the idea of hybrid warfare has been constantly subject to conceptual stretching, and today it seems a rather vague and ambiguous concept.

The current US strategy for responding to the Russian threat is based on a misunderstanding of Russia’s approach to war and exposes the United States and its allies to a high risk of strategic defeat. The 2018 US National Defense Strategy prioritizes the deterrence of major conventional major power wars. Russia also seeks to avoid such wars even as it devises a different way of waging war in order to achieve its war aims. The US generally views this Russian approach, hybrid war, as a set of activities below the level of conventional conflict. But Russia includes a significant conventional conflict in its conception and conduct of hybrid warfare.

American military experts claim that Russia is even now waging a hybrid war against the United States. On the other hand, Russia assesses that hybrid wars already dominate the conflicts of the 21st century and will continue to do so in the future. Russia believes it must adapt to win this battle, shaping the development of its armed forces in line with its assessment of the future of war.

Hybrid wars, however, involve the use of significant conventional forces in conflicts and are defined as an effort at the strategic level to shape the control and geo-strategic orientation of a target state in which all actions, including the use of conventional military forces in regional conflicts, are subordinated to informational action. Hybrid war can be defined as a type of war, rather than a set of means for conducting state policy. America’s discussion of hybrid war has largely focused on the assets that conventional forces lack in conflict.

The concept of hybrid war is much more offensive and covers the entire “adversary space”, including subversive, economic, informational and diplomatic means, as well as the use of military forces above the threshold of the “gray zone” concept. NATO and the EU characterize hybrid war as a way of achieving political goals by applying a mixture of military and non-military means, while in their official documents they remain below the threshold of traditional war. Hybrid threats combine



military and non-military means, as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber attacks, economic pressure, the engagement of paramilitary armed groups, and the use of regular forces. Hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between war and peace and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of the target population. They aim to destabilize and undermine the stability of society.

Several ongoing conflicts are openly discussed by the armed forces of the major powers as hybrid wars. They are actively perfecting and using their theory of hybrid warfare all over the world. They are using a mix of means and instruments, including conventional military forces. Designers of this form of war adjust the forces they deploy for hybrid conflicts according to their assessment of the needs of the conflict. This war includes the deployment and use of conventional military forces.

Hybrid wars are seen as the main direction of future military development and not as a temporary phenomenon. Conventional war is an inherited type of conflict that is becoming less likely in the 21st century due to technological changes and the strategic balance of power. Great powers are shaping their military and national security forces to optimize for hybrid wars not only because it is increasingly common, but also because it is now more practical and effective than traditional conventional warfare.

This is why the armed forces are adapting to improve their hybrid warfare capabilities. The great powers are no longer trying to hide their intention to wage offensive hybrid wars. Russian military theorists write extensively and openly about general strategies and doctrines for offensive hybrid wars, and additionally discuss the development of individual hybrid assets.

## CONCLUSION

We live in a time of growing risks and security threats. If we bear in mind that a large number of risks are generated by profit-making motives, it is unlikely that the future of society will be one with less risks and security challenges. The voice of reason and the channels of communication through which this voice would be transmitted are suffocated by greed and the race for profit, which is very discouraging, because the entire neoliberal concept is established on hegemony, greed, mind control, the negation of society and the affirmation of monads and individualism. The concept of education is entirely subordinated to the neoliberal maintenance of the existing state. The state, no matter how much it is suppressed by illiberal hegemony and subordinated to the logic of profit, must become aware of the synergistic effect of all forms of existing risks that push society to the highest level of security threats. The main problem with confrontation is the timely recognition of the form and source of security threats, because they are always well hidden and masked by "good intentions". We can assume that our security experts are well aware of this issue, but the number of attacks and the cooperation with other security services when the attacks come from abroad are a problem. Western intelligence agencies that have formed centers to wage hybrid war against us have the power to sabotage and block investigations. The real way of defense is to expose the attacks and expose the attackers, educate the population and operationally penetrate the centers for conducting a hybrid war against the Republic of Srpska. Do we know what those values are, the destruction of which leads to the downfall of society and civilization in general? Do we know what are the consequences of the destruction of the family, the destruc-

tion of upbringing and education, the devaluing of role models (the role models are people who got rich quickly at the expense of society), and the underestimation of the role of educators. We have a problem of educating educators.

With the strengthening of such awareness, the security risk management system must also be strengthened. This task cannot be realized by ad hoc and palliative measures, but only by systemic measures with maximum use of knowledge. The current practice of the mass use of ignorance will not bring us back from the brink. The educational system at all levels must very precisely identify existing and potential risks and the degree of security projects and prepare the young generation to oppose these trends. This ultimately requires additional reform of teaching programs and their permanent innovation in order to permeate the entire educational system and raise people's awareness of all contemporary and future threats to society. Safety culture must be a teaching content of first-rate importance.

INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS CURRENT  
STATE, CHALLENGES  
AND PERSPECTIVES



# TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES IN THE MODERN SYSTEM WORLD ORDER: FEATURES AND PROSPECTS

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**Abstract:** The modern system of the world order is a synthesis of the Yalta–Potsdam system and the onset of the Anglo-Saxon civilization after the victory in the Cold War. The pressure of the West and the resistance to this process determine the transformational character of the modern era. The confrontation between the tendency to assert multipolarity and the line oriented towards violent unipolarity needs to be comprehended. Globalization of the world under the auspices of the Anglo-Saxon center and information maneuvering by it, gave rise to the phenomenon of a given political transformation of the desired territories from centers of power. According to Atlantic political strategists, these territories are defined as nodal in the attack on the interests of a strategic enemy. In the nodal regions of the earth, new orbits of influence, plexuses of forces and interests, springs of enemy coverage are being formed. The destabilization of states created in the XX century, given spaces, territories requires not only a constant reaction of the opponent to protect their sovereignty, the necessary points of support for the stability of self-sufficient centers, but elevates the regions of the earth and individual countries to the rank of responsibility, defining them as vital territories. The tension of the international situation is revealed as a constant factor. The reality of the actors' relationships is becoming mutually exhausting actions, the consequence of which may be economic exhaustion, military-political mistakes, self-destruction, transformation of the weak in order to further absorb them. The actions of the Russian Federation to strengthen statehood taken in 2022 were a revelation for the West. They declared that the vector of offensive tactics against Russia has been put to an end. The Russian Federation has chosen an offensive position to protect national sovereignty and ensure the stability of the country in the surrounding world. The new tactic makes adjustments to the system of traditional perception of political limology, the practice of looking at the system of borders approved by international treaties. Anti-Russian political processes, which have been actively developing in Ukraine for more than thirty years, could not stop at the demarcation line. They influence not only the EU policy, but also the domestic political situation in the country. It is known that borders symbolize the socio-political practice of spatial differentiation. The whole history of Europe is the history of the redistribution of borders. They occurred when the polarity in the world is changing. The transformation of the world under the influence of the United States and NATO after the collapse of the socialist bloc is aimed precisely at this.

**Keywords:** *world order, sovereignty, transformation, region, center of power, limology*

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## **INTRODUCTION**

The analysis of the process of transformation of the modern international political system is relevant both at the theoretical and practical level. Globalism and regionalism, the absorption of countries and their struggle for sovereignty, disintegration and integration, information pressure, Western political technologies and opposition to them, confrontation and dialogue, the use of armed force and peace-making – these and other adjacent signs characterize modern international relations. The international political system is changing under the influence of a lot of factors: interstate contradictions and conflicts; the invasion of the will of new actors into the international environment; sanctions, information, hybrid wars; the pressure of united Western globalization, the establishment of growing centers of influence, etc. The confrontation between the tendency to assert multipolarity and, unequivocally necessary, international cooperation, on the one hand, and the line focused on violent unipolarity, the dominance of the collective West, on the other, - needs reflection. The purpose of our work is to identify the essence and determine the prospects for the transformation of the modern world order system.

### **THE APPROVAL OF THE US POLICY OF DOMINANCE IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

The globalization of the world under the auspices of the Anglo-Saxon center, openly carried out by the flesh until the early 20s of the XXI century, and information maneuvering by it, gave rise to the phenomenon of a given political transformation of the desired territories from centers of power. According to Atlantic political strategists, these territories are defined as nodal in the attack on the interests of a strategic enemy. In the nodal regions of the earth, in the states that have failed to date, new orbits of influence, interweaving of forces and interests, springs of coverage of the geopolitical enemy are constantly being formed. Here, at this historical period, the most sensitive impulses of influence on opponents are concentrated.

The development of the modern political process testifies to the genesis of states, increasing the importance of the region as one of the key components in the system of the modern world order, increasing its importance as an element of structuring the world community. The destabilization of the unformed, newly created states in the XX century, given spaces, territories, according to Atlantic theorists, requires not only a constant reaction of the opponent to protect their sovereignty, the necessary points of support for the stability of self-sufficient centers, but elevates the regions of the earth and individual countries to the rank of responsibility, defining them as vital territories. The tension of the international situation is revealed as a constant factor. The reality of the actors' relationships is becoming mutually exhausting actions, the consequence of which may be economic exhaustion, military-political mistakes, self-destruction, transformation of the weak in order to further absorb them.

It is clear that this process became especially relevant after the collapse of the socialist system, the collapse of the USSR. The vast territories of Eastern Europe, Transcaucasia and Central Asia have become a testing ground for the analytical centers of the West in the implementation of plans for a further offensive against modern Russia. In a broader aspect, these are: the Arctic, the Balkans, the Middle East,

the Baltic-Pontic Belt, North Africa, Central Asia. These territories have become an arena for leadership and self-assertion.

It can be stated that the international situation has contributed to this process as much as possible. On the one hand, the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation) in the 90s not only became entangled in its liberal-democratic projects, but actually lost its national sovereignty, surrendering to the power of American advisers. Russia has ceased to be a landmark in development and a center of power, has lost its civilizational attractiveness, has become a regional power [Translated by: Brzezinski, 2005]. On the other hand, the states formed in the post-socialist and post-socialist space faced problems that they had to solve for the first time. These are tests of power, and the search for new sources of strength in the struggle for survival.

The victory in the Cold War created a situation where the United States could ignore the defeated enemy. In the new conditions, it became possible for one country, from one center of power, to organize the world in its own image, based on its own interests. In the 90s, a war began not only with a specific enemy, but also against the existing world order. A new world order under the hegemony of the United States is being created against Russia, at the expense of Russia and on the wreckage of Russia. No one else but Z.Brzezinski, could so clearly define the essence of the reconstruction of the world on Atlantic principles. [Translated by: Brzezinski, 2010]. The defeated opponent was given a place. Moreover. It was necessary to transform the territory that had emerged from the influence of the USSR in order to “digest” it more comfortably, integrate it into the Western worldview system, and make “right” decisions. The Russian Federation also played an unenviable role. In order for the country not to have an impact on the world, it simply should not have been. Six or seven new subjects were to be created on the territory of Russia for more convenient involvement in the system of Atlantic values. The era of long-term international primacy of the United States was coming. This seemed to be a condition for the growth of the welfare and security of Americans, the development of freedom, democracy, open economies and international order on Earth. America was moving to direct control of Eurasia.

## **DOCTRINES AND PRACTICES OF REFORMATTING THE WORLD SPACE**

In a short time, in the strategic centers of the North Atlantic bloc, concepts of conquest, coverage of the formed conglomerate of countries, and their involvement in their orbit were developed. The implantation of the American system of world perception and interests determined the strategy of actions in this process. The concept of “proxy war” has undergone creative processing – an indirect war that is being waged between two powers through a third party - a war by someone else’s hands. Dozens of conflicts between countries in the post-socialist space, which tried to achieve their goals through military actions, are now faced with the blatant imposition of interests and the tacit presence on their territory of a third country (read – USA - V.B.), which invaded under the guise of resolving an internal conflict. Wars waged by someone else’s hands have become the most attractive means of conquering new territories, the cheapest way to achieve national goals, the cheapest insur-

ance in the offensive against the national interests of opponents. The inciting of ethnic, social, religious, military conflicts now increasingly included: attitude to the system of Atlantic values; the arsenal of massive informational influence; the restructuring of territorial managers to new centers of influence, foreign non-governmental, public organizations and private paramilitary structures, the number of which began to grow. The mercenaries always acted not explicitly, camouflaged themselves under the local protest element. According to the American expert on counterinsurgency actions E. Mumford, private military companies began to determine not only the national security policy in Western countries for the use of foreign territories, but increasingly participate in the implementation of state affairs. [Mumford, 2013]. In the new conditions, the theoretical art of the West in the field of geopolitics, conceptual doctrines and theories of the construction of the world space unfolded in full force. On the fruitful ground of the development of US geopolitical thought, theories and doctrines appeared on the destabilization of given, strategically important territories, their subordination to the Atlantic center of globalization. The previously traditional categories of power, such as: war, force, methods of coercion, sources of influence and management, indirect participation, control, etc., have undergone a new understanding. They were replaced by categories of comprehension of space and actions: transformation, mind control and the formation of a new mentality, personality traits and their management, factors of civilizational attractiveness, cultural priorities and program guidelines, network wars, cyber attacks, etc. Territories fell into the sphere of influence by spreading a new arsenal of influence. The concepts of “soft power” and “smart power”, the theory of “controlled chaos”, which became widespread in the 90s of the XX century and were the conceptual basis for the preparation and conduct of “color revolutions” in the countries of the world, had a particularly effective impact on the world. In order to more successfully “absorb” the proposed forms and value systems, methods of shocks, shock effects, and unwinding of contradictions were used to form the necessary political process based on: reproduction and formation of a system of grievances in bilateral relations; bribery of the elite and spontaneous leaders; creating artificial disorder, chaos (social and economic problems, uncontrollability, open military confrontation) in countries and regions. Scientific achievements and doctrines revealed new ways of understanding the environment, implied innovations in solving political dilemmas. Despite the desire of the emerging regional and state communities to seize on the technological advantages that could be extracted from global trends and changes, they have been adapted to instill the necessary thinking and management actions for this territory. New ways of conquering territories were approved and actively worked.

## **THE USA IS THE DICTATOR OF THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

The aggressiveness of the United States in achieving its strategic goals is pronounced. North America proceeds from the fact that the asserting contiguous signs of the development of the world system do not change the decisive role of the policy of the United States – the only superpower claiming this place permanently. The United States has been busy defending its primacy in the international arena for almost a hundred years, relying on the experience it has gained. The US National Se-



curity Strategy adopted in December 2017 on the establishment of world order and the realization of geopolitical interests states that “after the victory of free states in the Cold War, America turned into the only superpower with huge advantages and incentives in the world...”. The document emphasizes that “we will preserve peace from a position of strength ... we will compete with all the instruments of national power so that there is no one dominant force in the regions of the world... We will promote American influence because a world that supports American interests and reflects our values makes America even safer and more prosperous<sup>2</sup>.”

The “unipolar world” led by the United States “made it possible to ensure the security of the world community” based on Washington’s national interests. The American state and American society, “relying on its superior power,” wrote in his book “Choice. World domination or global leadership,” Z. Brzezinski, - act as a bastion of international stability ... have a diverse impact on the world ... facilitated by globalization, overcome national-territorial barriers and destroy the traditional social order.” [Brzezinski, 2010, p.24]. The integration of sovereign nations into the Anglo-American unipolar Empire had become the main occupation of the United States and now seemed to be a done deal. In the late XX - early XXI centuries, it seemed that nothing could prevent America’s dominance in the world. Undivided power and arrogance confirmed this. They gave rise to “a tendency to consider themselves a model for all other peoples ..., Americans’ ideas about the moral vocation of their country from above ..., the desire of the US Congress to authorize the State Department to assess the behavior of other states ... is symptomatic of the current position of the United States, which is increasingly dismissive of foreign sovereignty, ... carefully protecting its own” [Brzezinski, 2010, p.24]. In the current situation, like-mindedness, integration into the system of world perception of the United States seemed to be the only way for many countries of the world to exist. In the interval 1991 – 2017 . the number of NATO countries has doubled (from 15 to 30). The aggressiveness of the NATO bloc against dissent in the regions of the earth has reached its limit. In response to the strengthening of the sovereignty and independence of the Russian Federation in matters of international politics, the infrastructure of the North Atlantic Bloc was located near the borders of Russia. The key territories of Russia’s neighbors have become territories generating not only ardent nationalism and ethnic democracy (Estonia, Latvia), but Nazism (Ukraine, Latvia). Almost all Western countries are now following the path of the formation of ethnic democracies on the wave of rabid Russophobia. This distorts the development of the world community, escalates the international situation.

The conflict in Ukraine, which has been developing since 2004, when V. Yushchenko was installed as President by the efforts of the West and Ukraine is “embedded” in the interests of the United States, has formed the concept of “Anti-Russia” on its territory. The conflict had several stages of development and entered a fundamentally different phase after February 24, 2022. A radically new situation in the world has been created. Russia has switched to active defense. According to German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the Ukrainian conflict “has become an epochal scrap, a break with many things that were taken for granted” in world politics and the Western way of thinking<sup>3</sup>. The undivided dominance of the Atlantic community

2 URL: <https://avalon-law.ru/2018/10/15/2017>.

3 URL: <https://www.pravda.ru/news/world/1706768-germanija/>.

is now being questioned, tested for strength. This provokes the indignation of the Western world, which is challenged in the implementation of new, openly expansionist plans for the absorption of states and territories.

## **RUSSIA IN THE SYSTEM OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: WAYS OF SOVEREIGNIZATION**

Russia's relations with the united West in modern conditions are reduced to zero in almost all directions. For the Russian Federation, this creates conditions for a complete reassessment of relations with the United States and its allies. The process of the collapse of the global security architecture and the international legal system launched by the West has, as expected, led to an unprecedented increase in tension in the world. NATO's intervention on the territory of Ukraine and its partition are becoming real. Protecting its national security in neighboring territories, the special military operation of the Russian Federation thwarted the plans of the Atlantic community in a further offensive against Russia, an attempt to establish a regime under its control in the country, as it was carried out in the Baltic States, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and a number of other post-Soviet countries. Therefore, a special military operation contributes to the protection of the territorial integrity of the State.

A question arises. If the practice of internal destabilization and the "reformatting" of states according to American patterns is a fact, the restructuring of the world political system has been going on for more than thirty years, does this imply the transformation of key territories and states in the future? There is no doubt that this is so. The transformation of the world, initiated by the collapse of the world socialist system and the USSR, continues.

The actions of the Russian government in resisting the destructive pressure of strengthening the statehood of the Russian Federation, undertaken in 2022, were a revelation for the Anglo-Saxon and German-Roman worlds. These actions declared that the established vector of the West's offensive tactics against Russia has come to an end. Now the Russian Federation has chosen an offensive position to protect national sovereignty and ensure the stability of the country in the surrounding world. Fundamentally, the new tactic makes adjustments to the system of traditional perception of political limology, the practice of looking at the system of borders approved for a specific historical period by international treaties. Anti-Russian political processes, which have been actively developing in Ukraine for more than thirty years, could not stop at the demarcation line. They influence not only the EU policy, but also the internal political situation in our country. It is known that the boundaries do not represent a fixed line in space and time. They symbolize the socio-political practice of spatial differentiation. The whole history of Europe is the history of the redistribution of borders. The main repartitions took place and are taking place when the polarity in the world is changing. No state has been able to be a single center of power forever. The transformation of the world under the influence of the United States and NATO after the collapse of the socialist bloc was aimed at destroying Russia and its influence in the regions of the earth. The tasks of the actions of the Ukrainian state outlined from the United States began to directly include the European territory of the Russian Federation, exposed it to military and political danger, determined the issue of physical survival. Based on this, Russia had

to begin denazification of the territory of Ukraine, based on the idea of the inviolability of the historical space of Russia, arbitrarily transformed by the communist era. In the address of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the citizens of the country on February 21, 2022, the Ukrainian state was called “an artificial formation of the communist era.” “Modern Ukraine was entirely created... by Bolshevik, communist Russia...” the President noted. “At the same time, the Soviet government, forming the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, annexed Russian lands to it and recognized the rights of sovereign states for the Union republics, which predetermined the collapse of the country” (WG, 2022).

The process of disintegration, in the territories of modern Ukraine formed under socialism, could not exist when forming a peaceful policy towards the Russian Federation, the unity of the economic and political space of the two countries. However, the efforts of the United States and the Atlantic community have led to the opposite result. With an established hostile policy towards Russia, its sovereignty over the territories may be revised. The West logically summed up the development of the political situation to the fact that the Donetsk and Lugansk republics, which emerged on the territory of Ukraine after the coup in 2014, have a legitimate right to self-determination.

The beginning of the special operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine was the defining point, the starting point of no return in the formation of a new structure of international relations (hereinafter – the Ministry of Defense). Starting from the main key events of the XX – XXI centuries: the collapse of the world socialist system; the collapse of Yugoslavia and the USSR; a series of “color revolutions” in Europe, Africa and Asia; the special military operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, etc., which globally affected countries and international structures, we can testify to the beginning of a new stage in the development of the modern international order. The Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations is ending its existence. Many territories of the earth and, in particular, the Greater Middle East, Central Asia, North Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Baltic-Pontic region will not soon be determined as the most trouble-free.

## **THE BALKANS IN THE SYSTEM OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE POSSIBILITY OF COUNTRIES IN SELF- REALIZATION**

Modern events reinforce the negative image of “problematic” regions of the earth, such as the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans have been treated as the “powder keg” of Europe, and “Balkanization” is perceived as synonymous with fragmentation. The term has become an integral part of political vocabulary, and the concept of “Balkans” is designated as a category opposite to the West in terms of culture, customs, and standard of living. The United West proceeds from the fact that the Balkan countries have a low political culture, are divided and in conflict with each other, are not able to independently solve the essential problems of their own region. A series of bloody wars on the territory of long-suffering Yugoslavia only reinforce this idea. From a single state, six were created by the efforts of the West: Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Slovenia. There is also a

seventh subject – Kosovo, as a bulwark and regulator of NATO's activities, the fruit of the policy of aggression, a modifier of the separation of the Balkan countries. It is clear that the United States, NATO, and the EU have always acted and are acting according to a single rule in relation to undesirable countries: to divide an "inconvenient" state into "digestible" entities, to create non-viable (without their participation) organisms, to dictate their own conditions to each of them and to control their implementation. Moreover, young states, entangled in thousands of problems, will themselves seek help from their conquerors for the sake of survival. This happens with young states formed on the territory of Yugoslavia. They want to do this with the Russian Federation.

The Balkan peninsula has always been under the close attention of the North Atlantic Bloc, and after the collapse of Yugoslavia, no discussion of the security problems of the region took place without the participation of NATO. In 1994-1995, NATO forces conducted a number of operations on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 1999 Yugoslavia was subjected to the most severe bombing by NATO, conducted without the authorization of the UN Security Council. Since this year, NATO has been heading the "International Security Forces in Kosovo". American military bases are located on the territory of the region. The region of Kosovo, the ancestral territory of Serbia, is on the political map as a fact of insulting the historical memory of the Serbian people. Western political strategists are trying by this fact to activate a new mechanism of thinking in the Balkans, which is being powerfully introduced into the society of all the opposing countries. It works according to the formula: "Obey us. It will still be as we decided." The Balkans have become one of the key zones of world politics, a testing ground for the development of Western political technologies.

Due to the complex history of the region, uncertainty in the independent evolutionary process of development takes root in the collective subconscious of many Balkan peoples. Self-consciousness is changing, yielding to the insistent introduction of the West. An increasing part of society is inclined to believe that the "civilizational" path of development can only be connected with the EU and NATO. This happens even contrary to the traditions of history and gene memory. The EU's attempts to achieve the signing of an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, which would become, if not *de jure*, then *de facto* recognition of the Kosovo separatists, are aimed at, on the one hand, clearing the way for Serbia to join the EU, and subsequently NATO, and on the other hand, removing obstacles to Kosovo's accession to Albania, which is already a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Western moderators of political processes are actively working, see opportunities and prospects in solving their problems.

The mechanical implantation of Western models and values does not always lead to the desired results. Serbia and the Republika Srpska BiH actively resist the actions of the united West. The introduction of restrictive measures by the United States and the EU against the Russian Federation violates the principles of the Serbs. The Territories themselves have lived under sanctions and know how immoral and ineffectual they can be.

The West's bewilderment about the emerging new order in the former socialist or post-communist countries of the Balkans, its true nature, is explained by the significant deviations of young democracies from the norms of Western Europe and

the United States, but most importantly - the continuing influence of Russia. The Russian Federation clearly did not pay enough attention to the region. Absorbed in her own problems, she was actually only mentally present in solving the fateful problems of the Balkans in the 90s of the XX century. The one-time steps taken could not prevent the formation of a new historical situation, the dominant penetration of the USA, the EU, China, and Turkey into the region. The current global sanctions war forms difficult-to-reverse consequences for the Russian Federation and all European countries, intensifies socio-economic problems in them, forms new stages of confrontation and transformational imperatives. The Russian Federation is trying, by virtue of its capabilities, not to destroy the fragile stabilization process in the Balkans. It is significant that Russia refrained from attempts to destabilize the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On February 26-27, 2008, an inconspicuous but important meeting of the Steering Committee of the Council for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in BiH, which includes not only Western, but also Russian representatives, was held in Brussels. A statement was unanimously adopted, in which it was emphasized that none of the constituent entities of this State (hence, the Republika Srpska) has the right to secede. At the same time, the powers of the Supreme Representative of the highest authority in this international protectorate were extended, although his activities cause dissatisfaction with the Bosnian Serbs, who are constantly oppressed by the "supreme" representatives of the West. Although this vote is indicative, it does not reflect the deep ethno-political processes taking place in BiH. It is intermediate, temporary. Today there is a steady trend towards the separation of ethnicities. The problem of generating "collective guilt" for the events of the 1992-1995 war on individual ethnic groups does not stand up to criticism. The problems of the unity of the federation are intensified due to the course of the West towards the unitarization of Bosnia. Western pressure on Bosnian Serbs is unacceptable. If the preservation of the mandate of the High Representative for BiH is an indicator of the incompleteness of the state-building process in the republic, then the West's modeling of the country's development should be carried out in the interests of all entities. This will strengthen healthy contacts between them.

It is criminal that under the pressure of the West, the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Croatia) ceased to exist. And the worst thing is that she was cleansed along ethnic lines. The same was planned for the DPR and the LPR. It is a historical mistake that the Republika Srpska (dated 9.01.1992) did not become an integral part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Such a policy was carried out only in the interests of the West.

The Russian position in relation to the Yugoslav crisis, as well as foreign policy in general, has undergone a complex evolution, which was inevitable, since after the collapse of the USSR, Russia was in thrall to pseudo-liberalism, was entangled in a network of American consultants and "celestials", faced the need to determine its new place in the world. It has become urgent to rethink the country's foreign policy and reformulate its national and state interests, including in the Balkans. Western countries skillfully used the weakness of the Russian Federation and its "narrow-minded" leadership, determined the trend of aggressive offensive policy. This was especially evident in the Balkans. The pan-Slavic conflict, like the Ukrainian crisis now, is provoked by the actions of NATO, the meaning of whose existence is to generate tension in the international situation by strengthening NATO policy. This

means a lack of confidence in the stabilization of the regional and international political situation. That is why the united West will supply weapons to Ukraine, support Croat Muslims in BiH, strengthening the factors of its presence, belittling the actions of opponents, preventing the expansion of Serbian cultural and civilizational influence and unity.

So, the self-realization of the countries of the Balkan region today is constrained by the pressure of NATO and the EU. The sovereign path of development is not only frowned upon, but in the opinion of the united West, it cannot exist. Countries twist their hands, put them on their knees, turn them into outcasts. This bitter experience has become clear. That is why the development of the situation in Ukraine in the period 2004-2022 highlighted new priorities for NATO, the United States and the Russian Federation: the civilizational space of Russia, military and political security, the insecurity of the borders of the Russian Federation from the NATO infrastructure in the Baltic States and Ukraine. The United States has identified the most vulnerable place in the offensive against a strategic enemy. The Russian Federation was forced to take radical measures to protect its sovereignty. - A special military operation has been launched, which is the impetus for the shift of large tectonic processes in world politics. The final scrapping of the old world order has begun.

The offensive against Russia is the main goal of the modification of international relations in the XX - XXI centuries. Directions in the transformation of the world political system.

The factors of transformation of international relations in the XX century were connected with Russia. The revival of the Russian Federation as a self-sufficient center was not part of the US plans. The pressure of the offensive of the Anglo-Saxon civilization on the post-Soviet space and the Russian Federation was the basic basis for the formation of the platform of a new worldview and the defense system in the XXI century. The coups d'état in the post-Soviet space carried out by the United States during the "color revolutions", the policy of NATO expansion to the East, the sanctions strangulation of unwanted opponents - revealed a new quality of peace in the global balance of forces. The formation of the concept of "Anti-Russia on the territory of Ukraine meant the fact of an inevitable confrontation between the West and the Russian Federation.

The well-established practice of the united West's offensive against Russia after the collapse of the USSR, with the declared course of the Russian Federation to defend the national sovereignty of the country, logically should have led to isolation from the pan-European institutions of power, the rupture of established economic ties. The Atlantic community is used to playing by its own rules and does not think about changing the policy towards opponents. This was confirmed by the "summit of democracies" - a forum of countries gathered by the United States in December 2021, at which there was a conceptual division of the world into those who follow in the wake of American globalization, and the rest, to whom America makes claims and demands to integrate into the system of its values. In Europe, the practical division of states has taken shape. In Asia and the rest of the continents, this process will be completed in the near future. The polarization and division of the world continues against the background of the frontal sanctions and military offensive of the Atlantic civilization.

In order to ensure real sovereignty, Russia cannot help but think about the policy of reforms. Various models of ensuring the resilience of the country are proposed. As one of them to get out of the situation for the next 10-15 years, the special representative of the President of the Russian Federation on digital and technological development Dm. Peskov proposed the scenario of “islandization”. Under this concept, the scientist assumes the creation of global, autonomous technical and economic blocks, i.e. self-sufficient development centers, which is what the actions of modern Russia are aimed at. In the future, this means the practical curtailment of Anglo-Saxon globalism in the world, the end of the security system created in the XX century, further modification of the Yalta-Potsdam structure of the world order. In the near future, there will be a “reset of global technology markets, the nationalization of technical standards, the re-localization of the production of critical goods. That is, countries, all major technological blocks will want and will produce food, medicines and all vital equipment for themselves, on their territory. Now the emphasis in commodity-money relations is shifting towards the commodity. Closed production cycles are emerging, where the main number of key enterprises will not depend on external supplies. The global dominance of the dollar is going away. Technological sovereignty (as well as, let's add, food and raw materials - V.B.) will become part of the scenario of building its own “island” on which a self-sufficient center will be able to make decisions and be responsible for them. “This is the main story for the next ten years for us, and also for countries such as the USA, China, possibly for India,” the Dm pointed out. Sands<sup>4</sup>. This point of view is relevant and deserves attention.

Thus, we can assume that the result of the transition to the post-globalist period (in an optimistic scenario - V.B.) will be the formation of several global financial systems: dollar, euro, pound, yuan, ruble. And also, - two or three. We assume that this “story” cannot but be relevant for the modern EU, Japan, and the autonomization of the modern center of influence in Latin America. Now the United States is working to prevent such plans, is engaged in rallying countries on an anti-Russian platform, creating a closed system within the “summit of democracies”, which will include: the supply of energy resources; the development of key competencies; the production of high-tech goods, etc. The EU is involved in this process. The rest of the key players, with the exception of China, are in a state of choice. Russia should increase the information explanation of such actions, but, most importantly, develop economic self-sufficiency.

For Russia and China, the new world order is associated with multipolarity, i.e. the presence of several powerful macro-states that create their own area of influence. At the same time, the orientation of other states to interact with the determining center will have to be based not on coercion, but on joint interests, partnership. At the first stage of the formation of a new system of international relations, there will be a process of absorption of weak legal actors. It is natural. The centers of power are determined, protect their sovereignty and civilizational self-sufficiency. Then, according to the logic of the development of events, there should come a period of stability in the relationship of the centers of influence.

The restructuring of the world order has always led to a change in borders. In the XX century, the global change of borders took place three times: After the First and Second World Wars, the collapse of the socialist camp and the USSR. A hybrid war

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<sup>4</sup> URL: [https://www.rbc.ru/technology\\_and\\_media/09/06/2022/62a0bb419a79471aefb3cc5e](https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/09/06/2022/62a0bb419a79471aefb3cc5e).

led to their disintegration, which has now only intensified. In the open confrontation that has begun with the united West, the issue of confrontation will be resolved radically: if the United States wins, Russia will fall under the partition. If Russia survives, the redistribution will affect Europe. – The borders in Europe, in order to ensure the security of the parties, will radically change. America will not remain unchanged either. Complex internal development processes will lead to them.

The radical transformation of the world has just begun. In 2022, an open mechanism was launched to change the world order. The situation will not end with a return to the old positions.

## **THE TRANSFORMATIONAL ESSENCE OF MODERNITY. CONCLUSIONS**

It should be noted that the policy of “islandization” in reforming the country, if it becomes the state strategy of the Russian Federation, will take into account “the island’s stay in the ocean of storms”, the presence of protective border territories and regions for possible repelling the aggression of other “islands”. American power is still second to none. The US actions are aimed at avoiding the loss of power over the planet. The power of China is strengthening, which is waiting for time to assert itself. The EU and Britain are not dropping their globalist claims. The theory of the spatial factor, conditioned by the civilizational-historical, military-political, geographical situation, should receive a comprehensive development in the new conditions. In the future system of the world order, a self-sufficient industrial and technological island should equip such political and territorial borders that would be perceived as contact points for common territorial structures of interaction. If this theory is implemented, then, in relation to the territory of Russia, a protective mechanism of development will arise. This mechanism cannot be built without solving the problems of modern Ukraine, the Baltic-Pontic Belt, repaying the aggression of the Baltic countries, the international structure of the territory of Kazakhstan, solving the problems of the Balkan Peninsula, Transcaucasia and Scandinavia. However, the main condition is the progressive, successful development of the Russian Federation, the skillful confrontation of the Atlantic civilization, which does not lead to military conflicts. Opposition from the United States will not disappear.

It is assumed that:

- the tension of the international situation is now being revealed as a permanent factor;
- the world has entered the era of strategic redistribution. The MO system, built on the superiority of Western civilization, is undergoing changes, is coming to an end;
- the current period of international relations is characterized by the identification of new centers of power claiming their rights;
- the situation in Ukraine has led to the final breakdown of the old world order. It is being replaced by a new one, connected with the restructuring of the border system, the formation of the security structure of the states – centers of power;
- in the absence of a global internal crisis, the United States will remain one of the leaders of the international system throughout the XXI century;



- the doctrines and practices of reformatting the world space are developing and aimed at improving, relying on the information, civilizational and cultural potential of nations;
- the concepts of “political globalization of the world”, “preparation and conduct of democratic revolutions”, “color revolutions”, etc., will be used for a long time due to the messianic thinking of the United States, but their negative essence will manifest, become clear to the masses, they will be considered as an anachronism of the past;
- all types of integration and hybrid wars will intensify: mental, cognitive, ideological and others aimed at changing the properties of a person, the civilizational basis of the enemy’s society;
- the civilizational and historical pillars of Russia in the regions of Europe: the Republic of Serbia, the Republika Srpska as part of BiH should rely on historical identity, expand influence, not dissolve in the information and economic pressure of the West, China, Turkey;
- Russia will be under pressure from the united West. The country will survive only in the conditions of reforms aimed at strengthening the economy and internal self-sufficiency;
- Russia can be defined as an independent, self-sufficient center (island) only by building its economy on the basis of the latest technological cycle technologies;
- Russian society, as a civilizational beacon, must be preserved from shocks. This will preserve the improving statehood of the country.

Under other conditions, a global confrontation is inevitable. The world has entered an era of change, the consequences of which should be only positive.

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# INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AS GLOBAL SUBJECTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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**Abstract.** The creation in 1993-1994 of the first international criminal tribunals (for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda) was an important destructive event in modern international law and international relations. The UN Security Council has gone beyond its powers and, thus acting *ultra vires*, has established bodies with the competence to prosecute citizens of the states of the former Yugoslavia, including heads of state and government. These tribunals, being called “international”, however, did not meet the criteria of internationality in totality. The tribunals were created without the consent of the states in respect of which they were supposed to act. This violated the basic principle of the conciliatory nature of international law. Moreover, in their activities, the tribunals began to apply the sources of international law arbitrarily, as well as to create their own “law”. This “law” also does not meet the criteria of *internationality* because it was created not by states (nations), but by judges themselves, often contrary to the existed norms of international law. The question arises: what is the place of the so-called “international” criminal tribunals established by the UN Security Council in the modern system of international relations? The main goals of the global governance bodies are: 1) Elimination of objectionable political and military leadership of any states; 2) Destruction of progressive international law; 3) Formation of repressive global law. Examples of the destruction of international law and the formation of global law are the decisions of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia against R.Karadzic, General Mladic, S.Milosevic and others. The activities of international criminal tribunals pose a serious threat to the modern international legal order.

**Keywords:** *international law; international criminal law; international tribunals; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*

## INTRODUCTION

At present, the world community is faced with a number of serious fundamental problems. First of all, these problems relate to the issues of collective and individual security of states, the implementation of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, self-determination of peoples, etc. To a large extent, these problems have arisen in connection with the emergence of new subjects of the world relations. For a long time in world relations, in fact, the only subjects were states. In the 21<sup>st</sup> cen-

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tury, along with states, the new entities arises (at times they have more significant resources than states).<sup>2</sup>

The collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam international system was caused by the results of the so-called “cold war” and the destruction of the Soviet Union. It is no coincidence that it was during this period that the formation of new supranational entities, including international criminal judiciary, began. The officially proclaimed goals of the creation of these judicial bodies was the prosecution of international crimes and the punishment of those who bear the main responsibility for their commission (Mezyaev, 2016).

The international criminal courts not only failed to fulfill their officially declared goals, but achieved exactly the opposite goals - namely, they accused the innocent of committing crimes and exclude the real criminals from responsibility.

The first bodies of international criminal justice were the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which were established by the UN Security Council in 1993-1994. As further practice has shown, the creation of these tribunals has become an essential element in the process of the destruction of the Yalta-Potsdam international system and the formation of a new *global* (no longer *international!*) system. Given the role of international criminal tribunals in this process, this new system can be fully called “The Hague” system. This article attempts to consider the essence of the ICTY and the ICTR and their real role in the destruction of the world security system within the Yalta-Potsdam international system.

## ESTABLISHMENT OF TRIBUNALS

On May 25, 1993, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution No. 827 on the establishment of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and on November 8, 1994, the Resolution No. 955 on the establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. These tribunals had received the competence to prosecute citizens of the states of the former Yugoslavia, including heads of state and governments. This decision was taken outside the powers of the Council under the UN Charter, that is, the UNSC acted *ultra vires*. These tribunals, called “international”, however, did not meet the criteria of *internationality in totality*. The Tribunal was created without the consent of the states in respect of which it was supposed to act. This violated the principle of the conciliatory nature of international law. This means that the illegal creation of the ICTY and the ICTR violated the fundamental foundations of international law on an unprecedented scale. The problem is not only of violation of international law, but that the commission of this violation by the main body of the United Nations, on the one hand, and the obligation to accept this violation by all states of the world, on the other. It is interesting to note that the creators of the tribunal were aware of the lack of legal grounds for its creation. First, one should pay attention to the fact that the members of the UN Security Council did not use the legal arguments contained in the report of the UN Secretary General on the establishment of the ICTY. Thus, UNSC Resolution No. 827 does not mention the reference proposed by the UN Secretary General to article 29 of the UN Charter.

<sup>2</sup> International Criminal Justice: Modern Issues (2009). Bassiuni M.Sh., Glotova S.V., Gritsaev S.A., Dodonov V.N., Doria J., Dremina-Volok N.V., Zaul V., Zelinskaya N.A., Ilyutchenko N.V., Inogamova-Khegai L.V., Kayumova A.R. and etc. Moscow.

And this is, in principle, the right thing the Council did. After all, article 29 speaks of the creation of not any, but only such bodies that help in the performance of the functions of the UNSC. The UN Charter does not give any grounds for establishing judicial functions in the Security Council. It is quite obvious that the prosecution of individuals is also not included in the functions of the UNSC. At the same time, the refrain to use the reference to article 29 was not replaced by a reference to any other article. The creation of an international tribunal by referring not to the article, but to the chapter (Chapter VII) is evidence that the UNSC did not have a legal reasoning for the decision (Ignatenko et al, 2020).

Secondly, a number of member states of the Council explicitly declared that there were no legal grounds for the creation of an international criminal tribunal by the UNSC. Thus, the representative of the People's Republic of China stated that an international tribunal should be established by concluding a treaty in order to provide a solid legal basis for it. Although the Chinese delegation voted in favor of Resolution No. 827, the position of the PRC was explained as follows: "Our political position should not be seen as our support for this legal approach."<sup>3</sup> Brazil also expressed its disagreement with the legal justification for the creation of the UNSC. Brazil's representative to the UNSC stated that the establishment of the ICTY solely on the basis of a Security Council resolution leaves unresolved a number of legal problems related to the powers and competences granted to the Council by the UN Charter.<sup>4</sup>

In his report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary General recognized that the proper way to create an international tribunal is to conclude an international treaty. However, he then concludes that the creation of an international tribunal through the adoption of a UNSC resolution is also acceptable because the conclusion of the treaty "will take too long."<sup>5</sup> This argument is clearly not convincing from the point of view of international law.

## COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION OF THE ICTY

The competence of the ICTY (and the ICTR) includes the exercise of jurisdiction over persons who have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as a number of powers related to the investigation and prosecution of these persons, in particular, requests for legal assistance from states, referral of cases to national courts, etc.

Special mention should be made of the inclusion in the *ratione materiae* of both tribunals of the crime of genocide. The ICTY Statute defines the crime of genocide in the same way as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. At the same time, formally article 4 of the Statute states that "an international tribunal is empowered to prosecute perpetrators of genocide, as defined" in this article of the Statute. The same applies to the Tribunal for Rwanda (art. 2). It would seem that the absence of references to the Convention and the definition of genocide in the statutes themselves could be explained by the problems of the participation of certain states (and, accordingly, the problems of succession in the

3 See the speech of the Representative of the People's Republic of China in the UN Security Council at the 3217<sup>th</sup> meeting of the UN Security Council on May 25, 1993, UN Document: S/PV.3217. P.33.

4 See the speech of the representative of Brazil in the UN Security Council at the 3217<sup>th</sup> meeting of the UN Security Council on May 25, 1993, // UN Document: S/PV.3217. P.37.

5 Report of the UN Secretary-General, submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of UNSCR 808 (1993), // UN Document: S/25704 of May 3, 1993, para 20.

case of the states of the former Yugoslavia). However, this argument does not work in relation to Rwanda, which, of course, was a party to this treaty. In this regard, the question arises: why was it necessary to grant the jurisdiction of the tribunals as it is defined in the statute of the tribunals themselves, adopted by a UNSC resolution, and not in accordance with an international treaty? We find the answer to this question in the subsequent practice of both Tribunals.

In a number of its decisions the ICTY violated the provisions of the 1948 Convention, in particular, *de facto* canceling the need to establish special (specific) intent when qualifying the crime of genocide. Recall that, according to article II of the Convention, genocide is understood as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, any national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such”. As you can see, the Convention establishes the need to establish not just intent, but special intent, that is, the question of intent is one of the essential in the Convention. However, in its decisions, the ICTY found certain individuals guilty of genocide, while at the same time applying the theory of the so-called joint criminal enterprise (JCE).<sup>6</sup> The third category of the JCE provides the tribunals with the opportunity to convict not only persons who did not themselves commit any crimes, but did not even know about the commission of these crimes by others. Such, for example, is the decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the case *The Prosecutor v. R. Brdjanin* of 19 March 2004. This decision was undoubtedly prepared in advance as a precedent for the case of S. Milosevic just at that stage of the process, when it became obvious that the prosecutor’s office failed to prove the intent of S. Milosevic to commit genocide (as, in fact, the very fact of genocide<sup>7</sup>). Such a precedent was necessary due to the fact that the accusation of genocide was proclaimed by the highest political leadership of NATO member states, primarily the United States. Being an institution dependent on these states, the ICTY tried to find any way to convict S. Milosevic for genocide, even in the absence of legal grounds for this. The creation of a precedent by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in *Brdjanin* case was a reaction to the refusal of one of the members of the Trial Chamber in the case *The Prosecutor v. S. Milosevic* to vote for the recognition of the accused guilty of genocide under the 1<sup>st</sup> category JCE.<sup>8</sup>

As we can see, the defects in the wording of the substantive jurisdiction of the international tribunals have significantly affected the activities of these tribunals in the most negative way. However, the main problem in the establishment by the UNSC of the material jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR was the exclusion from this jurisdiction of crimes against peace. Analyzing the peculiarities of certain formulations of the jurisdiction of ad hoc tribunals, it is impossible not to ask the question: war crimes are impossible without war, but no one cares who unleashed this war. Had such a question been asked, the activities of the two Tribunals would have had a completely different focus.

6 It should be noted that the application of this theory, which has no legal basis not only in the Statute of the Tribunals, but even in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, instead of the rules of liability (Article 7 of the ICTY Statute and Article 6 of the ICTR Statute)

7 The complete failure of the factual proof of the genocide throughout Bosnia is visible, for example, in the failed strategy of trying to prove this accusation in the trial of S. Milosevic. (For more details, see: Mezyaev A.B. (2006) Trial against Slobodan Milosevic in the Hague Tribunal. Notes from the courtroom. Kazan. P. 264-269). In addition, it should be noted that this accusation was dismissed by various court chambers in the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice.

8 See: Dissenting opinion of Judge O-Gong Kwon on the decision of the Trial Chamber on the *amici curiae* request to acquit the defendant under Article 98bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 16 June 2004, *Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic*. [Trial Chamber] Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Dissenting Opinion of Judge O-Gon Kwon. [http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan\\_milosevic/tdec/en/040616.pdf](http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/040616.pdf)

In the academic literature, the *ad hoc* international criminal tribunals of the early 1990s quite often put on a par with the international Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, claiming a certain succession of the ICTY to the first military tribunals of 1945-1946. However, this assertion does not stand up to scrutiny. Unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo international tribunals, the jurisdiction of the ICTY turned out to be truncated in relation to the most important issue of the armed conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia - who unleashed the war and, thus, created grounds for the commission of war crimes in the future.

There is every reason to believe that this truncation was done intentionally. At the trial against S. Milosevic and V. Seselj, convincing evidence was presented that it was the initiators of the creation of the ICTY - the United States and its NATO allies - that were the main organizers and financiers of the armed conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Thus, Russian defense witnesses, former director of the Foreign Intelligence Service E.M. Primakov and former head of the international cooperation department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General L.G. Ivashov, testified that NATO countries were preparing a military attack on Yugoslavia several years before the start of bombings in 1999. It should be noted that the ICTY prosecutor's office, which should have been aimed at establishing the truth in the case, resisted the very fact of giving these testimonies, and even made direct threats to Russian witnesses during their testimonies.

This problem also had an impact on the activities of the Commission of Experts of the Office of the ICTY Prosecutor, created to consider the advisability of conducting an investigation into crimes committed during the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. The main methodological problem in the activities of this Commission was the fact that the analysis of the crimes committed by the command and soldiers of NATO was carried out as if in a vacuum: the degree of seriousness of certain war crimes committed during the aggression was assessed from the point of view of international humanitarian law, but the aggression itself was not considered generally. The Commission eventually "concluded" that none of NATO's crimes were "serious violations of international humanitarian law" and therefore did not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICTY. But it is absolutely clear that the main crime of the NATO countries was aggression itself and every military attack, both on civilian and military targets, was an international crime.

## ACTIVITIES OF THE TRIBUNALS

The main trials at the ICTY include the trial against the former President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic; against the former Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Vojislav Seselj; against the top military and political leadership of the FRY (*Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al*); against the presidents of the Serbian states on the territory of the countries of the former Yugoslavia: three presidents of the Republika Srpska Krajina M. Martić, G.Hadžić and M.Babić, two presidents of the Republika Srpska B. Plavšić and R.Karadžić; against the leader of the Bosnian Serb army, General R.Mladić; against the chairman of the parliament of the Bosnian Serbs M.Krajišnik.

The first trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was against the head of the Serbian Democratic Party in Kozarac, Duško Tadić. Despite the fact that the first defendant occupied a very modest position and his

guilt in the commission of crimes (by others) was insignificant, his case became, in many ways, a precedent due to the fact that the tribunal first considered a number of important issues precisely in its first trial. So, it was in the case of D. Tadic that the ICTY ruled on the legality of its creation. Therefore, the appeals of all the other defendants on this issue were subsequently not considered and were decided by a simple reference to the decision in the case of D. Tadic. It was in the case of D. Tadic that the tribunal issued a decision (with a similar precedent character) on the qualification of an armed conflict and the criteria (standards) for imposing responsibility on persons for committing crimes during an armed conflict. At the same time, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia issued a decision that directly contradicts the standard established by the International Court of Justice (in the case of *Nicaragua v. USA*)<sup>9</sup>. If the International Court of Justice in 1986 formulated and substantiated the criterion of “effective control” of state responsibility for the actions of paramilitary groups, then the ICTY, in order to achieve the goal of justifying the responsibility of the FRY for the actions of such formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, declared the applicability of the criterion of “general control” (Mezyaev, 2007). It was this decision of the ICTY that the President of the International Court of Justice judge Guillaume, had in mind when he said that the activities of the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia pose a threat to the integrity of international law. Finally, it was in the case of D. Tadic that the theory of “joint criminal actions” was applied, for which there were no legal grounds for the application of the ICTY, but which was subsequently applied on the basis of the binding nature of the decisions of the Appeals Chamber.

The trial of former Republika Srpska President B.Plavsic should be noted in connection with the use of a new tactic by the ICTY prosecutor’s office to “prove” their indictments by making a “deal” with the accused. Formally, such a “deal” (plea bargaining) means that the defendant admits his guilt, signing a document prepared by the prosecutor’s office, and refusing to conduct a trial.

The first such “deal” was concluded with the accused D.Erdemovic, who, having pleaded guilty to the murder of more than 1,200 people, in return for making a “deal with justice” received only five years in prison, and then was generally released ahead of schedule. Such a mild punishment is explained by the fact that Erdemovic agreed to testify at other trials (including the trial of S. Milosevic and R. Karadzic). However, the inclusion of a new Article 62-bis (the institution of “bargaining with justice”) in the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence is in conflict with the Statute. Part 3 of Article 20 of the ICTY Statute, immediately after the phrase about the defendant’s statement on confession or non-recognition of his guilt, it says: “then the Trial Chamber sets the date for the trial.” This means that the Statute establishes the rule that a trial is ordered regardless of whether the defendant has pleaded guilty or not. At the same time, we are not talking about any hearings (for example, on sentencing a person who pleaded guilty without trial), but about “trial”. The fact is that if the accused admits his guilt, court hearings are held to determine the punishment.<sup>10</sup>

9 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Judgment of 27 June 1986

10 From the authentic texts of the ICTY Statute in English and French it is clear that we are talking about a trial, and not just court hearings on any other issues: “The Trial Chamber shall then set the date for trial”; “*La Chambre de première instance fixe alors la date du procès* “. The text of the statute in Serbian (although it is not official) also explicitly refers to a trial and nothing else: “*Pretnesno vijeće će zatim odrediti datum početka suđenja* “. The word “*sudenja*” is a term unequivocally understood as a trial, and not just any court session.



The most important trial in the ICTY was the trial against the former President of Serbia (1991-1997) and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1997-2000) Slobodan Milosevic. The first indictment against S. Milosevic was issued during the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO aircraft in May-June 1999. For the actions that NATO troops committed, responsibility was placed on the president of the country that was subjected to inhuman aggression (the main targets of NATO attacks were not military, but civilian objects). At the same time, NATO war criminals were removed from responsibility by the tribunal itself. The ICTY prosecutor refused not only to press charges, but even to investigate these crimes. Thus, the ICTY showed that it is not only an accomplice in the crimes of the NATO countries, but also one of the instruments of NATO aggression against Yugoslavia. In June 2001, S. Milosevic was secretly kidnapped in Belgrade and handed over to the ICTY. During the trial, the right of the accused to an equal position with the prosecution, failure to provide the necessary information, refusal to ensure the rights enshrined in international human rights treaties, the use of secret witnesses and secret meetings, the use of dubious evidence, and even open falsification of evidence were repeatedly violated during the trial. For example, one of the witnesses for the prosecution retracted his testimony right in the courtroom, saying that he was tortured in order to force him to give false evidence against S. Milosevic.

The prosecution failed to prove S. Milosevic's intent to commit the actions he was accused of. The initial concept put forward by the ICTY prosecutor's office was the assertion that S. Milosevic sought to seize the territories of other states in connection with his plans to create a "Greater Serbia". S. Milosevic categorically denied this statement. By the end of the trial, it became clear that the prosecutor's office had failed to prove intent and retracted their original assertion. Moreover, this was done in a very peculiar way, namely: by declaring that she had never claimed this before (although it was directly written in the text of the indictment), which caused surprise even from the judges.

During the defense part of the process, convincing evidence was presented that the mass exodus of the population from Kosovo (one of the main accusations against S. Milosevic) was the result not of the criminal orders of the FRY authorities, but of the NATO bombing. Russian witnesses for the defense also testified about this - the former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.I. Ryzhkov, the former Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation E.M. Primakov, as well as the former head of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Defense General L.G. Ivashov (Ruzhkov et al, 2005). Precisely due to the fact that the presented evidence not only completely refuted the indictment against S. Milosevic, but also showed the participation of the ICTY itself in concealing the real perpetrators of the Yugoslav tragedy, in September 2004, S. Milosevic was forcibly appointed a lawyer. This decision was supposed to radically change the course of the defense and exclude S. Milosevic from real participation in the formation of the strategy and tactics of his own defense. Only the boycott of witnesses and the actual disruption of the process forced the tribunal's appellate chamber to cancel this decision and restore S. Milosevic's legal right to defense in person.

And other decisions of the ICTY in the case of S. Milosevic contain a lot of violations of international law and general principles of law. Thus, the ICTY gave S.

Milosevic exactly two times less time than the prosecution had. At the same time, the tribunal misinformed the General Assembly and the UN Security Council, stating that S. Milosevic was given as much time for defense as the prosecution had.

When asked why the court chamber not only rejected the guarantees provided by the Russian Federation, but did not even consider them, one of the members of the court chamber, Judge I. Bonomi, said that this issue constitutes “the secret of the courtroom”.<sup>11</sup> However, even without the judge’s answer, it is quite clear that the court simply had neither legal nor factual grounds to ignore Russia’s official guarantees (Mezyaev, 2006).

Another important process was the trial against the former Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia (1998-2000), leader of the Serbian Radical Party, professor at the University of Belgrade, Vojislav Seselj. V. Seselj arrived at the tribunal voluntarily immediately after the announcement of the indictment against him. To understand everything that happened during the process, it should be taken into account that V. Seselj arrived at the tribunal not for the purpose of personal protection, but to prove the political nature of the tribunal and its real role in concealing real crimes and removing real criminals from responsibility. V. Seselj reasonably considered the tribunal as an instrument of war waged by Western countries against his people. It should be recognized that V. Seselj performed his task brilliantly. For ten years spent in the prison of the Hague Tribunal, V. Seselj, indeed, managed to provide enough evidence not only of his innocence, but of the criminal methods of the tribunal’s employees.

The indictment against Seselj was so false that the prosecutor’s office was unable to start the process for five years. All this time the accused was in the ICTY prison. After that, it turned out that many testimonies against Seselj were given under duress. More than thirty witnesses for the prosecution testified under oath in court that the ICTY prosecutor’s office threatened them and their families in order to force them to give false evidence against V. Seselj. Professor Seselj presented a detailed lawsuit against ICTY Prosecutor C. del Ponte for preparing false witnesses at his trial (Seselj, 2011).

Seselj was the only ICTY defendant who was denied the right for the presentation of the defence case (this right is provided in the article 21 of the ICTY Statute), although he was a lawyer and professor of law at the University of Belgrade. From the very beginning of the process, a lawyer was forcibly assigned to him. V. Seselj managed to defend his right for self-defence in person only by going on a hunger strike, which lasted 28 days (Mezyaev, 2007).

Seselj was the only ICTY accused who was denied the right for defence case and presentation of defence witnesses. The secretariat of the tribunal stated that Seselj should pay for his own defense. Prior to this, all ICTY defendants were recognized as indigent. Indeed, not a single individual is yet able to pay from his own funds the costs of paying lawyers, conducting investigations, paying for the arrival and accommodation of witnesses in an international tribunal. In response to the accused’s demand to indicate what means the secretariat of the tribunal had in mind, claiming that the accused had the appropriate means, the secretariat stated that Šešelj “could sell his house”. This situation clearly demonstrates the real power that the secretariat of the tribunal has, which can arbitrarily deprive the accused of the right to defense.

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<sup>11</sup> Interview of ICTY Judge I. Bonomi to the editor-in-chief of the Kazan Journal of International Law. *Kazan Journal of International Law*. No. 3 (2009-2010). P.99-101.

At the same time, even judges are not able to ensure the rights of the accused. Thus, in response to the current situation, the presiding judge of the Trial Chamber Jean-Claude Antonetti, said that V.Seselj still could pay for his defense by turning to his numerous supporters in Serbia and “urge them to fold 2-3 euros.”<sup>12</sup>

ICTY brought the main charges against the top military and political leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia, as well as the Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Separate accusations were brought against officials of a lower rank in the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Macedonia. Despite the fact that there was convincing (since they were public) evidence of guilt in committing war crimes against the President of Croatia F.Tudjman and the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina I. Izetbegovic, the ICTY prosecutor’s office did not even investigate them.

This approach reflects the policy of proclaiming only one people, the Serbs, to be responsible for the armed conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This policy was incorporated into the activities of the ICTY by the activities of the Independent Commission of Experts, established by the UN Security Council in 1992. According to the testimony of the secretary of this commission, V.S.Kotlyar, the commission was engaged only in investigating only those crimes of which the Serbs were accused. The crimes committed against the Serbs were not investigated. At the same time, attention should be paid to the fact of the sudden and early termination of the work of the commission. According to V.S.Kotlyar, this happened on the eve of the submission of materials on the crimes committed against the Serbs by the government of the FRY.

## CONCLUSIONS

Summing up the activities of the ICTY, one should consider not only those processes that took place, but which did not take place. We have already noted the clear failure of the actions of both the Commission of Experts, established to collect facts about violations of international humanitarian law, and the ICTY Prosecutor. Charges against the highest military and political leadership were made only against the Serbs. Unlike the Serbs, the authorities of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (first of all, the presidents of these republics F. Tudjman and I. Izetbegovic) were not prosecuted by the ICTY. Among those processes that should have taken place, but did not take place in the ICTY, one should name the trials against the top leadership of NATO and the member countries of the bloc that participated in the aggression, first of all, NATO Secretary General J.Solana and the top political and military leadership of the countries members of NATO.

Despite the fact that there was every reason to open an investigation into the perpetrators of the crimes during this aggression, the ICTY refused to do so. Moreover, in the midst of the aggression, the tribunal issued an indictment against the head of state who was subjected to aggression and precisely for the crimes that were committed by NATO. In order to prove his objectivity, as well as due to pressure from the international community, the ICTY Prosecutor created a Commission of Experts, whose task was to study the possibility and expediency of starting an investigation into crimes committed during the NATO aggression against the FRY. However, the

<sup>12</sup> Look into: Double standards in the protection of human rights. Case of Professor Seselj. (2009) Moscow Fund of historical perspective.

commission concluded that there were no grounds for launching such an investigation. The commission's report was made public on June 13, 2000, and ended with the following conclusion: "Based on the information available, the commission recommends that no investigation be carried out into incidents that occurred during the NATO bombings." This conclusion was explained by the fact that, allegedly, "... in all cases, either insufficient clarity of law was found, or a low probability was established that the investigation would lead to obtaining sufficient evidence necessary for a justified prosecution against accused, both higher and lower levels."<sup>13</sup>

In the decision of the Commission, five main legal defects in the argumentation can be identified: the arbitrary use of sources on the basis of which the commission made its conclusions; an erroneous method of selecting facts, according to which, the commission considered only cases related to the death of people; incorrect application of the norms of international law in connection with damage to the natural environment of the FRY; distortion and non-application of the norms of the current international law in deciding the question of the legality of the use of weapons that cause severe damage to the civilian population; distortion of facts and law in the qualification of specific crimes. Despite the fact that the commission's decision was exclusively advisory in nature, the ICTY Prosecutor C. del Ponte unconditionally accepted this recommendation. On June 2, 2000, at a meeting of the UNSC she announced the decision not to start an investigation into NATO crimes. Although the prosecutor stated that she "accepted the recommendation of the Commission", she nevertheless went much further than the commission. Thus, del Ponte stated that "although NATO made certain mistakes, I can say with satisfaction that during the NATO bombing campaign there were neither deliberate attacks on the civilian population, nor unwarranted attacks on military installations." Thus, the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia took the most active steps to lay responsibility for the crimes committed by NATO on the leadership of the country that was subjected to NATO aggression. Carrying out unlawful prosecution is itself a crime, but it is aggravated by the fact that this crime was committed to cover up another, more serious crime. The ICTY acted not only as a party to the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, but also as an instrument of war. It should be noted that the role of the international criminal tribunals, as a weapon of war, is fully manifested in the activities of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Sufhre, 2019). In 2011, during the NATO aggression against Libya, ICC issued an arrest warrant for Libyan leader M. Gaddafi.

Thus, we see that the international criminal courts and tribunals are very far from the official goals that were announced when they were created. Their activities violate not just individual norms of international law, but its foundation. Progressive international law was the legal basis of the Yalta-Potsdam international system. The resolution of international law is a necessary element for the destruction of the entire international system. This is exactly what is happening at the present time. However, the destruction of international law is accompanied by the formation of a new "legal matter" - the so-called international precedent law (international precedent law).<sup>14</sup> However, this term is not entirely accurate, because this "right" is created not

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13 Look into: Final report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Para 91.

14 Mezyaev A. (2016). International Criminal Court in The Context of Inter/Supra/Contra-national Relations. *Kazan Journal Of International Law And International Relations*. Special issue published by Russian and South African Associations of International Law. P. 24-32.

by states, but by individual judges, and, moreover, in contradiction with the current law. Thus, it is more accurate to speak not about international, but global law, which, at the same time, is openly repressive. The protection of the international legal order implies an awareness of the dangers posed by international criminal courts and tribunals not only for specific states (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan, Libya, etc.), but also for the entire international community as a whole. And such defense requires confronting these institutions and their repressive agenda.

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# GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE MULTIPOLAR WORLD AS REALITY OR IDEOLOGY

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**Abstract:** This paper revolves around the question “Is our society really short - sighted to that extent to choose the road of self - destruction?”. The analyses conducted for the purpose of this paper are trying to check two points of view providing different answers to this question. The first optimistic view is confident that it is possible to overcome the situation considering the capacity of the societies in the Western Balkans as a result of the increase of the discrepancies of the current systems and the degree of economic activity. The second, pessimistic view interprets the situation in terms of the initial insufficiency of resources that will cause reduction of the interest and motivation for changes in the society towards technological and social development. These two opposing views, two visions for the future, pose a question that we must answer if we want to understand what our future holds. Our efforts towards the answer will teach us how to create proper responses in the economic and political systems and in what manner they will influence the institutions and the population in different countries. The following questions are of essential and sophisticated nature as they focus on the way of understanding and interpreting the fast pace, world and international relations today, which as a whole represents a basis for the future growth and development of every society. How to implement the whole procedure and how to ensure overall satisfaction? How to convince the manufacturers, consumers, society in terms of finding a proper and permanent method that will enable entrance into and participation in the global economy? How to choose and create an efficient system for change of global processes, developed on the actual data bases? How to benefit from our own steps and measures taken? How to accept and how to select a strategic global economic partner? Open mindedness, public exposure, liberalization, integration and cooperation are major reasons for the growing interdependence of countries that constitute the chain of global perspective or future and the open economy of the world, where increasing knowledge is invested, rather than raw material and labor - intensive efforts. Therefore, the focus of this paper is global economy, technological and IT globalization, global culture, globalization of countries and new global order.

**Keywords:** *Globalization, self-destruction, systems, geopolitical, strategic changes*

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## INTRODUCTION

Globalization is a process that should be entered with knowledge and a sense of responsibility, courageously and decisively, because the global market and trade will be the only judge that will limit or encourage the growth and development of each country participating in that process. 50 years ago, Karl Deutsch founded the concept of the development of the knowledge-based economy. Among other things, it will indicate that creative learning is the ability of a system to accept new information and, based on its own choice, to introduce new changes that are needed to ensure stable and reliable development. Such a system makes development decisions, respecting the new development trends. The challenges of modern technological changes that pave the way for knowledge-based societies require the political system to respond with technological strategies and policies. Such strategies are creative knowledge, new changes, as creative evidence for the future and application of global economic challenges to world economic thought, anticipating the evolution of the development of human society, through a multitude of researches.

Peter Drucher, a famous researcher, follows knowledge, and therefore information, as a specific resource that changes the reality of living and the totality of knowledge about that reality. Any knowledge-based economy provides a range of answers to the character of knowledge as a non-exhaustive resource. Knowledge is capital, to which everyone should have access, and with that access, education will be available to every individual, starting from the criterion of knowledge, in his evolution of development. The prominent professor, Popovska Zlatka, in one of her studies distinguishes three periods of application of knowledge as a prerequisite for entering the global market through:

- Industrial Revolution - application of knowledge to tools, processes and products;
- Productivity Revolution - Applying Knowledge to the Workforce.
- Management revolution - application of knowledge to knowledge itself.

Such views open the question of a serious approach and the possible rich scenarios for the unstoppable move towards a knowledge society and economy, supported by a dynamic process of a globalized economy as a world process. Therefore, any knowledge-based economy is exactly the one that is directly based on the production, distribution and systems of knowledge and information, as a more comprehensive and broader characteristic of developed economies.

The globalization of the world economy, based on technological dynamism, is only a roadmap for the complete opening of the world to the new characteristics of the information society. The leap of time, and therefore of space with the help of telecommunication technologies through the fast and simply transmitted information in the written and electronic media, opens the vision which translated into a strategy for connecting the world in a global framework makes the process of globalization easily applicable and achievable.

## GLOBAL ECONOMY

Economic globalization in a broad sense implies the connection of national economies into a single world economy, whereby the connection of the national



economy is realized through the world market. All flows of international movement of capital, international transfer of technologies and demographic movements are realized on the world market. The bearers of such a movement are the states or national economies. On the other hand, the globalization of the economy in a narrower sense, according to the understanding of economists, is carried out, first of all, in the cross-border actions of enterprises through the movement of goods, services, knowledge, movement of capital in the form of foreign direct investments, while more and more moving finance, technologies or property. In such a microeconomic process, the bearers are the enterprises.

The emergence and development of the global economy was influenced by numerous factors and processes, which had an uneven, unequal and contradictory character. However, within the framework of economic globalization as a process of connecting different parts of the world into a single and integrated economy, which functions according to new economic rules, imposed by the accelerated development of technology and knowledge, it is still possible to single out those factors that refer to increase in world production, the growth of some Asian countries, the development of the world market, the strengthening of transnational corporations, the growth of foreign trade. All this affects the creation of a new economy, which is a global economy. Of course, global economy, as an inevitable phenomenon of economic globalization, it cannot evenly and uniformly cover all countries of the world, because they are not at the same level of development. In conditions of creation of new mechanisms of trade action, new economic, commercial and financial institutions, new roles of states or transnational companies in economic life, for many underdeveloped states globalization can mean colonization or assimilation.

By the middle of the 20th century, a period of European dominance ended and the world entered the “era of world globalization”. The central events of such globalization were the formation of the European Economic Community (today’s EU), the rise of Japan as an industrial power and the confrontations between the rich and the poor. However, the key features of the global economy that today has a new face took place in the period from 1870 to 1920. First, the development of transportation and communications that spatially connect different parts of the planet, second, the rapid growth of trade, and third, the enormous flow of capital (John, 1920)

However, the scale of today’s international economy is not unprecedented compared to the past 150 years, and in some ways the old economy surpassed today’s degrees of economic integration. Economic history seems to be quickly forgotten. Compared to 1993, the US spent the same amount of its income on imports as it did in 1890, making international trade not that different from 100 years ago. Keynes describes the old global economy in a very illustrative way (Rakas, 2002).

In conditions of global connection of states, peoples and nations, the concept of “new economy” as a new economic activity has replaced the old economy. Namely, the new economy is based on highly sophisticated technology, knowledge and innovation, new forms of connection and association of transnational corporations, while the activities take place on the world market. As a modern analytical category, the “new economy” is characterized by intellectual capital, modern information technology and communication technology as basic factors of economic development, in terms of new market institutions and new roles of states in economic life. This concept of the “new economy” is also confirmed by Keynes (Колодко, 2016)

The emergence and development of the “new economy” which follows globalism, leads to a number of problems that affect the connection of all its characteristics. They refer to the abolition of state control, privatization, rapid changes in production programs, convergence of multiple technologies, breaking through competition, standards that develop in market competition and are based on decisions of governments, the abolition of all distances between producers and the users. A phenomenon that follows these trends is the emergence of new types of organizations. A new organization that will speed up so-called two-way knowledge transfers, influence the integration of knowledge flows, respect the diversity of cultures and develop language skills. That is why the question arises whether the new economy will become a global economy.

## **TECHNOLOGICAL - INFORMATIONAL GLOBALIZATION**

Advances in technology and informatics affect most segments of commerce, society and governance in most regions of the world. The changes that technology and informatics bring to various aspects of life are often collectively called the “technological - information revolution”<sup>3</sup>. Most of these changes may prove beneficial over time, while some have already done so. A wide range of national and international political, economic and sociological issues are raised by these changes, both now and in the future.

Understanding the various impacts that advanced technology has and the nature of future changes, in various societies around the world and the issues raised by these changes are very important, but at the same time quite difficult. All this is important, because the technological - information revolution will change the world in the 21st century just as the steam engine, the railway and the telephone changed the world in the 19th century, just as electricity, the internal combustion engine, the automobile and the airplane, the telephone, the radio and television changed the world in the 20th century (Anton, Silberglitt and Schneider 2001). On the other hand, it is difficult, because while the technological advances that enable and drive the information revolution are more or less identical around the world, a number of factors - sociological and cultural, political and governmental, commercial and financial - shape each society's approach to them. technological changes. These factors influence each other in various ways and are subject to numerous variations in countries around the world, leading to various national or regional manifestations of the technological - informational revolution.

The effects of the technological - information revolution have been combined with those of globalization - rapid advances in cross-border integration in many economic areas and ongoing human activities and the elimination of regulatory barriers to the movement of capital, goods, services and persons have been facilitated by the advances in transport and communication systems. Globalization and the technological - informational revolution are closely related. Indeed, advances in technology and informatics are fundamental enablers of the globalization that is shaping the world in which this revolution is taking place. In most cases it is difficult, and

3 This is not the first revolution that people have experienced. The discovery of the type of movement of newspapers, in the 15th century in Europe and earlier in China, is one thing, and the discovery of writing several millennia earlier is another. There were other inventions classified as revolutions (the invention of the telephone and the telegraph). See: Dewar, J.A., “The Information Age and the Printing Press: Looking Backward to see Ahead”, Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA: 1998, pp. 1-10.

in some cases impossible, to separate the effects of globalization from the effects of the technological - informational revolution.

There is a heated debate in the world about the general remarks of the information-technological revolution and globalization especially when considering their sociological dimension at the planetary level. For the prophets of technology, for the true believers in the magic of the market, everything will be fine, as long as ingenuity and competition are set free. All that is needed are a few regulatory provisions, for the prevention of corruption and the removal of bureaucratic disturbances on the way to hyper-modernity. For those around the world who are not ecstatic about surfing the Internet, but who are affected by layoffs, lack of social services, crime, poverty and the disruption of life, globalization is nothing more than a warmed-up version of traditional capitalist ideology. According to them (Castells, 1999).

The world in 2022 will be revolutionized by the growing effect of multidisciplinary technology across all dimensions of life: social, economic, political and personal. Biotechnology will make it possible to identify, understand, manipulate, improve and control living organisms. The revolution in technological - information availability and utility will continue to profoundly affect the world. Modern materials, agile industry and nanotechnology will change the way of production if the barriers to their development are resolved in time.

The results can be astonishing. Effects may include significant improvements in the quality of life, high levels of industrial transformation, continued globalization, re-mixing of wealth, cultural integration or invasion with the potential to increase tension and conflict, shifts in power from nation-states to non-governmental organizations and individuals, mixed environmental effects, improvement in lifestyle followed by prosperity and reduction of tensions.

The actual realization of these opportunities will depend on numerous factors, including local acceptance of technological change, levels of technological and infrastructure investment, market drivers and constraints, and technological breakthroughs and advances. As these factors vary differently in globalization, both the implementation and the effects of the technological - information revolution will vary, especially in developed countries. However, the overall revolution and trends will continue throughout most of the developed world. The rapid pace of the technological - informational revolution makes prediction more difficult, but the revolution seems globally significant and quite probable (Hundley, 2000).

The downside of this revolution is the claim that technology is replacing humans with machines in almost all industries of the global economy. Around the world more than eight million workers are unemployed, and as an argument is given the initial adjustment to strong market forces that lead the global economy in another direction, promising a successful global economy and material wealth<sup>4</sup>.

This pattern is repeated in the widely industrialized world. Even developing countries are facing technological unemployment as multinational companies develop cutting edge high technologies, laying off millions of workers who cannot compete with automated production. In all three key employment sectors - the economy, manufacturing and services - labor is rapidly being replaced by machines, promis-

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<sup>4</sup> However, many people are skeptical. In the US, Fortune magazine found that corporations cut over two million jobs a year. Rifkin Jeremy, "The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era", G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1995.

ing that by the middle of the 21st century all production will be automated (Rifkin, 2003).

## GLOBAL CULTURE

What is the connection between the process of globalization and the complex human condition that we call “culture”? Increased connectivity is, in some ways, an obvious aspect of our lives. It is something we can recognize in everyday routine practices: using communication technologies - mobile phones, computers, internet - building the environment we live in, food we eat, earn a living, the way we have fun - cinema, television etc. It is increasingly evident that we live in a globally connected world. But what does this mean for culture? Are we bound together in a single global cosmopolitan culture? Is it universal or imperial?

Culture shows a great tendency of globalization and is closely related to modernization and westernization. This is especially evident in the field of religion. For many centuries, the world's great universalist religions offered adherents a set of values and allegiances that stood above the state. Today these religions are threatened or overshadowed by modernization and the growth of capital. But the emergence of the liberal-democratic state and the capitalist economic system brought liberalizing values from the state.

A globalized culture is more chaotic than ordered—it is integrated and connected, but not unified or centralized. Absolute globalization would involve the creation of a general but superdifferentiated field of values and possibilities of taste and style available to everyone without limitation. In a globalized cultural regime, Islam would not be confined to separate territorially based communities in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, but would be universally available across the planet. Closely related to this is the emergence of fundamentalism and nationalism, the former associated with religion, the latter with ethnicity. Modernization and post-modernization leading to ever-increasing globalization raise fundamentalism to a high level against those who want to be imposed by those on whom something is imposed.

A globalized culture allows for a constant flow of ideas, information, values, and tastes mediated through mobile intermediaries, symbolic signs, and electronic simulations. Through modern technical - technological achievements, the development of electronic media, satellite technology, the information that spreads at a high speed and in all parts of the country is available to every person. There are more and more media and news agencies that can be followed throughout the day, showing us the daily happenings, while forming our public opinion through their informational influence.

Many countries today find themselves in the vortex of ideological-cultural war and are under pressure from the products of cultures and spiritual creativity of a smaller group of countries (“Coca Colonization” of the world), which would represent, instead of cultural universalism, cultural imperialism or “terrible ... mono culture, a kind of totalitarianism of culture” (Tomlinson J. (1999). These fears are not unfounded. Take any index, from clothing to food, from music to film, and from television to architecture, and there is no ignoring the fact that certain styles, brands, tastes, and practices can be found virtually anywhere in the world. But what does this distribution of uniform cultural goods signify, than the power of some capitalist firms to command wide markets for their products throughout the world? If we as-

sume that the global presence of these goods signals a convergence towards a single capitalist culture, we are likely using a poor concept of culture - one that reduces culture to material goods only. If culture is the production and experience of meaning through symbolization, the thesis of global cultural convergence must include the idea that people's interaction with these goods deeply penetrates the ways in which the cultural world is constructed.

The problem with the cultural imperialism argument is that it only assumes such penetration: it makes a leap of inference from the simple presence of cultural goods to the attribution of deep cultural or ideological effects. The reason why it should be treated with skepticism is that it "ignores the hermeneutic appropriation that is an essential part of the circulation of symbolic forms" (Thompson, 1995). Culture simply does not transfer in this non-linear way. If a critical understanding of cultural globalization seems beset by a tendency to assume a utopian or dystrophic scenario, then perhaps the cultural process should be approached not through a macro-global perspective, but rather the opposite way, by understanding the effects of globalization as they are felt within in certain localities (Tomlinson, 1999)

### **GLOBALIZATION OF THE STATE**

The state, just like the economy and culture, is influenced by globalization and political activities are increasingly focused through social issues. As steps that undermine the nation-state and its eventual displacement from world governance, Held states:

- Growing economic and cultural ties reduce the power and efficiency of governments at the nation-state level; they can no longer control the flow of ideas and goods at their borders, so the instruments of internal politics become ineffective.
- State power is shrinking as transnational processes grow in scale and number.
- Therefore many traditional areas of state responsibility must be coordinated on an international or intergovernmental basis.
- States are thus obliged to surrender sovereignty within larger political units (EU, ASEAN), multinational agreements (NATO, OPEC) or international organizations (UN, WTO, GATT, IMF).
- Because of that, a system of global governance is emerging with the development of its own policy and administrative systems that continue to reduce state power (Held, 1991).

It is not absolutely necessary to show that the state is weakening in order to support the position of political globalization. The very emergence of the state is a product of globalization processes. The institutionalization of the state took place within a system of international relations in the 19th century. Nations can only survive and function within that system if they have a centralized and unified system of government that can manage their affairs and their security (McGrew, 1992).

There is intense debate about the nature and fate of the nation-state in the current era of globalization. There are different sets of widely divergent views. It is assumed that:

- trend towards the end of the nation-state;
- erosion - weakening of the state;

- forced withdrawal of state welfare, not the state as such;
- adaptation - mutation of the state - nation to neoliberal globalization;
- imperialism by the developed capitalist states towards the rest;
- neither the weakening nor the end of the state - nation; and
- The state is both a victim and a creator of globalization.

Globalization of the state began after the Second World War. The state could no longer guarantee security, trade and financial markets were institutionalized, there was a disregard for borders by drugs and crime, natural issues of AIDS and ecology, chemical and nuclear weapons. Through international alliances, the state created more danger than security by dividing the world into hostile camps.

The global order in relation to globalization consists of all global phenomena: economy, technology, culture and state. Hence, globalization not only works, but is necessary if we aspire to expand prosperity and freedom across the planet. If one analyzes the debacle of the collective experiments of the 20th century - nationalism, communism, fascism - and their profound negative effects on the wealth and freedom of nations, one will conclude that the collapse of central planning was not caused by fanatical liberal thinkers; it was a logical result of the inherent contradictions of the collective model, especially its inability to build a viable economic system and increase personal income, and its failure to promote democracy. The connection between the segments of globalization (economy - technology - culture - state) creates a basis for all liberal democratic systems; their underpinnings are ethical and practical, which in a way implies a global system. The survival of such a complex and complex system of social organization requires a strong state, but which will limit its functions to three areas: first, the provision of public goods, second internationalization of the outside, which can be understood as providing remedies for market failure, and thirdly to help people, for a number of reasons, who suffer harm from the market or are more vulnerable.

## **NEW GLOBAL ORDER**

The political aspect of globalization rests on attempts to perceive the future development of societies, search for certain specificities of certain periods and ways to connect and unify humanity. At the same time, it is pointed out that these are paths of democratic dialogue and solidarity cooperation or that they are paths on which the will of strong and powerful states would be imposed. In that sense, the dominance of the USA and its desire to rule the world is mentioned. After all, both understandings start from the fact that the modern global world needs to be arranged by creating a new world order, only they differ in how and in what way this should be done. According to one understanding, the globalized world should be organized according to democratic procedures, with respect and preservation of the national and cultural identity of each participant and with respect for equality in expressing one's own interests. According to another understanding, the globalized world should be arranged by creating a new world order in which the most economically developed and politically most powerful states would decide, headed by the most economically developed and politically most powerful state.

The lawyers of American power will say "of course". But America's inconsistency in understanding the imperial role will undermine its ability to meet this task. In

particular, although the US has the will to support a military force with a global outlook, it does so only in the name of national security. Moreover, because the US clearly wants to avoid running something like an overseas empire, it has decided not to develop something like an imperial civil service to help create and maintain domestic order in distant and dangerous places (Wolf, 2004).

Moralists do not understand that democracy and various other elements of Western culture, such as human rights, are not universal, but a product of Western specific historical and religious development. Seeking to impose or promote democracy in states that have not yet developed civil character among their citizens, or seeking to impose Western values and ideals on cultures that for millennia have defined rights differently, is likely to be fruitless and lead to a clash of cultures, and in the process to change the productive global order with economic conflict (Deepak, 2004).

The solution to this equation is honest: shut down all the ineffective multinational organizations that are supposed to uphold international order (WB, IMF, UN), recognizing that an imperial power that upholds security and order is the only real basis for increased global prosperity, and yes let the US do the work. To address this, it is necessary to divide it into three parts. First, is the claim that the imperial order is essential to growth; second is the claim that the United States is best placed to play the role of imperial protector; third is the claim that missions such as spreading democracy, protecting human rights and protecting the environment against global warming are dangerous distractions that can undermine economic growth<sup>5</sup>

The problem of imperial order is more like a “paradox of power” at the national level. Any state government strong enough to enforce order and security for its citizens is equally strong, if it chooses, to oppress them. The paradox is resolved at the national level through representative institutions and a legal system that allows the people to block or reject an overly predatory state, and that protects individuals and minorities from restrictions on their economic and political rights by the majority.

When faced with an imperial hegemony, no matter how committed it may be to the principles of free trade and equal protection, other states have no mechanism for personal protection against the day the imperial power becomes misguided or selfish leading to tyranny or oppression. Therefore, the presence of an imperial hegemony determined to maintain its predominance creates counter pressure from other states seeking an exit. German militarization and naval armaments in the years before World War I were a direct response to fears that British naval power could easily be used to wear down Germany and preserve global trade.

Because of that, and because of the need for a world system, the world in the 21st century is marked by a broad consensus around three ideas: peace as the optimal condition of international relations and the true goal of foreign policy; democracy as the best form of government; and the free market as the only satisfactory way of organizing economic affairs (Mandelbaum, 2004).

These three ideas are not firmly rooted and practiced in every part of the world. Decisive opposition to these ideas still exists, as the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 well illustrated. Even when there is no explicit opposition, some countries do not have a true democratic government or a successful market economy, such as Russia and China, which abandoned orthodox communism but did not fully and unreservedly embrace peace, democracy, and the free market.

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid

Not the whole world is peaceful, but the most powerful countries in the world approve and practice these three ideas. What is equally important for their supremacy, there are no alternative ideas that could represent a convincing basis for the organization of political and economic life. Peace, democracy and the free market is what surpasses everything else, which is impossible to ignore and which has no serious rival.

The dominance of the mentioned ideas is the result of world history in the modern age, a period that began politically with the French Revolution, and economically with the industrial revolution. In the first two centuries of that era, the 19th and 20th centuries, a battle was fought between these ideas and alternative methods of social organization. The 19th century contrasted these ideas, according to which war was a normal thing, while power was concentrated in the hands of the monarchs who inherited it, and economic activity stagnated. The forces of tradition lost their influence in the 19th century and were swept away by the events of the 20th century, the First World War, but in their place came communism and fascism as opponents of peace, democracy and the free market. Although different in many respects, both ideologies glorified war, imposing repressive authority and establishing broad control over economic life. Fascism was defeated in the Second World War, while communism in the Cold War, so that democracy was left without a significant rival for the first time (Mandelbaum, 2006).

A first similarity between democratic communities and democratic states is that, in both cases, there is broad agreement on fundamental principles. This is not to say that disagreement is unknown. On the contrary, sharp and bitter disputes are quite common among democracies. After all, democracy does not offer a formula for perfect and eternal consent, because it is primarily a way of expressing, mediating and resolving disputes. In stable democracies, disagreement is about secondary, not fundamental, principles. A second reason why a broad commitment to peace, democracy, and the free market makes the international community (or at least part of it) similar to the sovereign states that are its constituent parts is that disputes within the community, however bitter they may be, do not lead to a larger-scale conflict (war). (Ibid, p.40)

## CONCLUSION

The word globalization is known to everyone who is involved in the global media and is rapidly rising as a favorite “mantra” of political leaders around the world. It becomes clear that it is one of those modern neologisms that are frequently invoked but rarely defined with ideological implications. It refers to the major transformations in the global system that have emerged in the previous fifty years.

Although most agree that we live in a world transformed by globalization, what that term means is becoming less clear and often remains conveniently undefined. A complete exploration of what globalization means should not be a central project, but some understanding of the basic features of the “new world order” is relevant. The smallest definition of globalization emphasizes integration into the international economy. Somewhat broader definitions refer to the idea of economic changes where “the chain of causality starts from the spatial reorganization of production in international trade and the integration of financial markets” towards demographic, political and cultural changes.



There are two particularly important understandings underpinning contemporary globalization. First is the notion that the basic dimension of the current global economy is the increase in temporal-spatial narrowing in which the real speed of exchange is multiple. But equally critical, especially if we turn to questions of politics and political responsibility, is the extent to which most images of globalization are deeply infused with ideology. Emerging from the capitalist crust of states and promoted by Western conservative theorists, large corporations, individuals and foundations.

The value of economic liberalism closes economic markets as a positive sum game. Advocates of this game believe that it is necessary to align states and policies to the demands of capital accumulation. At the same time as this ideological wind gathered strength and swept the world, a fundamental global economic restructuring fundamentally altered the international division of labor. The end of the 20th century witnessed dramatic changes in the location of world production. The rapid expansion of international corporate production facilities in formerly non-industrial countries called for the reduction of tariff barriers. Meanwhile, new financial instruments and technologies led to a revolutionary explosion of financial capital through international agreements and stable currencies, overseen by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank or supranational institutions such as the WTO. Such changes—led by corporate and political elites, as well as by growing public awareness—provide the economic impetus for a consensus about globalization and its implications, leading to an initial convergence of policies around the world in the early 21st century.

Such policies have domestic and international significance. Internally, these include disengagement of the government from managing the domestic economy, deregulation, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and cuts to social welfare programs. Externally, they demand the reduction of tariff barriers, the opening of capital markets and the liberalization of restrictions on foreign investment combined with new incentives to attract them. Overall, they include a general increased confidence in market mechanisms and the private sector to increase competitiveness. Hence, fundamental principles make globalization (meaning world markets and transnational actors) stronger than the state. This promotes a widespread trend of privatization and anti-statehood. Instead of, the international market for goods and capital is seen as a supplier not only of healthy economies, but also of good governance and satisfied citizens. To be sure, various dislocations will emerge and there will be clear winners and losers, but in the end, the neoliberal process triumphs.

According to the neoliberal worldview, the primary task of the state should be to get out of the way so that the most efficient private entrepreneurs can maximize social welfare by investing resources to increase productivity. Economic development is often seen as necessary to increase social changes such as literacy and individualism, leading to the rise of a new middle class and greater democracy.

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# KOSOVO QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY

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**Abstract:** The Congress of Berlin of 1878 was of great importance for the Balkan states as Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Bulgaria gained independence. Nevertheless some of these states' claims were fully satisfied. For instance Serbia didn't manage to annex Kosovo and Metohija which under the Treaty of Berlin remained under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Serbia which thought these territories to be the «Cradle of Serbian statehood» as Serbian medieval state was located in Kosovo thought it great injustice and started to put effort to annex them. By various means Serbia was trying to expand its influence there as well as win support of the local Serbian population. As time went by some other claimants to Kosovo vilayet emerged, namely Montenegro which was ruled by an ambitious monarch who wanted to expand his territories and influence and Bulgaria which was mostly interested in Macedonian lands, which were in Kosovo vilayet, but wasn't sure which territories in the Kosovo vilayet would eventually become part of the Bulgarian state. Moreover the Albanian national movement was gaining steam and according to their programmes Kosovo would also be integrated into Albanian independent state. Austria-Hungary and Italy were not interested in occupying Kosovo but still wanted to maintain influence in the Balkan region and thus were going to use tensions over Kosovo there for their own benefit. To sum up, at the beginning of the 20th century Kosovo problem ceased to be a merely Serbian matter of interest and transformed into an international issue.

**Key words:** *the Balkans, Kosovo, international relations in the 20th century, Serbia, the Balkan states*

## INTRODUCTION

In 1878 the Great Eastern Crisis which started in 1875 finished with emergence of a few new independent states on the Balkan Peninsula. The independence of Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania and Bulgarian lands was stipulated in the Treaty of Berlin. From that moment on Balkan peoples could choose their own future. Nevertheless decisions taken at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 were not satisfactory for the new independent states as some of their claims were not fulfilled. For instance, Kosovo and Metohija which Serbia saw as an integral part of its state remained in the Ottoman empire. Montenegro and Bulgaria also expressed dissatisfaction with what they got. As for the Albanian people, their claims were totally ignored and the status of Albanians didn't change, i.e. they even didn't get autonomy let alone independence.

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There have been quite many research papers dedicated to the preparatory work Serbia was doing to eventually annex Kosovo lands. These papers pay attention to the methods which Belgrade resorted to, namely providing support to Serbian schools and monasteries asъ Serbian population in Kosovo. Moreover there are papers devoted to the relations of Serbia with other Balkan states such as Montenegro and Bulgaria at the beginning of the 20th century, in particular creation of the Balkan Union and the role of Russia in this process. Some works cover the topic of Albanian national movement. At the same time not much attention is given to the question of when Kosovo problem became an international matter as well as what factors facilitated this process. The purpose of this article is to detect when and how it happened.

## **SERBIA AS THE MAIN CLAIMANT TO KOSOVO**

In 1878 Serbia finally became an independent state. Nevertheless some territories populated by ethnic Serbs remained under the Ottoman rule. It was a heavy blow for Serbia as the Serbs thought Kosovo to be the centre of the medieval Serbian state which made them think they were rightful claimants to these territories.

According to the opinion of some prominent Serbian historians, namely Dr Slavenko Terzić, «every people has their places of respect and admiration», and for the Serbs that place is Kosovo, which is the basis of «cultural and spiritual hierarchy of the Serbian world» (Терзић 2002, p. 65), and «Serbian cultural heritage in Kosovo and Metohija are an integral part of Serbian self-identity, the basis of collective national identity and the entire folk culture» (Терзић 2010, p. 142). Another Serbian historian Dusan Bataković believed that the Kosovo myth is «a key determinant of modern Serbian identity», and that Kosovo for the Serbs is the place, which is «imbued with historic memory, religious tradition, national identity, historic right, while moral code and reflection of the state interests stem from the religious and epic heritage» (Батаковић 2006, pp. 5-6).

In fact Serbia started its activities in the areas which lay to the south of Serbia's border right after gaining independence in 1878. From that moment on Belgrade was proving financial support to Serbian school, churches and monasteries as well as Serbian population of Kosovo. This support was the following: sending books to Serbian schools, teacher training for the subsequent work at these schools, paying salaries to the teachers, providing Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries with books and church ware, as well as opening Serbian consulates in the Kosovo vilayet for the protection of Serbian population there (i.e. consulates in Skopje and Pristina).

Let us draw a few examples. For instance in 1878 Serbian Ministry of education included certain sums of money into its budget which would cover the costs of supporting schools in Kosovo, namely 12,000 Turkish kuruses. The same amount was set for the next year, and in 1880-1883 financial support accounted for 5,052 dinars (Недељковић 2012, p. 212). According to the reports of Serbian consuls in 1896 total spending on Serbian schools in Pristina and areas around it was 33,170 dinars. The money was spent on teachers' salaries, support of pupils and the construction of a new school in the village called Sirinić (Перуничкић 1985, p. 192-193). More money to provide financial aid in Kosovo was approved by Vladan Đorđević government in 1897, as the Cabinet decided to spend 49, 000 dinars on various school needs there<sup>2</sup>.

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2 Записници седница Министарског савета Србије, 1862-1898. Књ II., 479.

All these figures illustrate the scale of Serbia's activities in Kosovo and prove that Serbian ruling circles were taking this matter seriously.

In 1903 after the assassination of king Alexander Obrenović and Peter Karađorđević coming to power designated the beginning of a new era in history of independent Serbia. But one question still remained on the political agenda — future annexation of Kosovo lands.

At the beginning of the 20th century Serbian politicians strongly supported the idea that Kosovo lands have to be given back to Serbia. This idea was reflected in the programmes of major Serbian political parties.

During the period of 1903-1914 the Old Radical party headed by Nikola Pašić was a dominating force in Serbia's politics. According to Pašić only his party «could save and strengthen Serbia» and fulfil its political ideals (Шемякин, 2011, p. 37). In the programme of the Old Radical party of 1904 it is stated that their main purpose was to unite all part of the Serbian people, scattered across the Balkan Peninsula, within «its geographical borders in political and religious terms, as «free and independent Serbia can't feel happy while its kins in neighbouring states are suffering from barbaric zulum and cruel massacres», and it is the duty of Serbia «to do its best and direct all its energy at the protection of these people» (Ђурић 2000, p. 275). The key area which was supposed to be incorporated into the Serbian state was Kosovo.

At the beginning of the 20th century Serbia continued its activities in Kosovo though Ottoman authorities there were trying to hinder them by introducing laws that would prevent Serbian aid. For example on July 30th, 1910 interim head of the ecclesiastical seminary in Prizren V. Katić was informing Belgrade about the act enacted in Kosovo according to which «persons who were not Ottoman subjects could not work in local schools». All foreign teachers working there would have to pay fines<sup>3</sup>. Later this information was confirmed by a Serbian Vice-consul in Pristina M. Rakić<sup>4</sup>.

These new difficulties however didn't stop Serbia from fulfilling its plan to prepare for the subsequent annexation of Kosovo and the preparatory work continued up to 1912 when the First Balkan War broke out.

## **KOSOVO QUESTION IN THE SERBIA-MONTENEGRO AND SERBIA-BULGARIA RELATIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY**

Serbia's claims to Kosovo were quite straightforward and clear, but there were two more countries that were planning to create their own «Great» states and incorporate some lands of Kosovo vilayet into their new states. These were Montenegro and Bulgaria which got their independence in 1878. Both countries were not satisfied with the boundaries set at the Congress of Berlin and ruling circles in Sofia and Cetinje were working on plans aimed at expanding the territories. By the beginning of the 20th century Montenegro and Bulgaria gave everyone to understand what their plans were and obviously became rivals to Serbia in Kosovo.

Montenegro and Serbia had a rather intricate relationship. Montenegro's ruler Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš was very ambitious and thought that his country had

3 Документи о спољној политици Краљевине Србије 1903-1914, Књига IV. Свеска 2/1. 1./14. Јули-30. септембар/13.октобар 1910., 379.

4 Ibid. С. 400-401.

«an understandable and natural strives for expanding its territories»<sup>5</sup>. Nikola was dreaming about «making Montenegro the ‘Piemonte’ of the Balkan confederation which would encompass Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Old Serbia (Kosovo), parts of Northern Albania, Boka Kotorska, Dalmatia, Serbia and even Bulgaria (Струнина-Бородина, 2014 p. 217). According to this plan Montenegro was going to compete with Serbia who was working on subsequent annexation of Kosovo.

What’s more Nikola had very difficult relations with Serbian king Milan Obrenović. To make matters worse future Serbian king Peter Karađorđević from the rival Serbian dynasty was Nikola’s son-in-law. As a result in 1900 the relationship between Belgrade and Cetinje reached the bottom and Serbian diplomatic mission in Montenegrin capital was withdrawn (Хитрова 1993, p. 191).

The dialogue was renewed in 1903 when the Karađorđević ascended to the throne. On 17 (30) December 1903 Montenegro’s foreign minister Gavro Vuković was writing to the head of Serbia’s government Sava Grujić to remind him about the meeting that took place in Constantinople in September of the same year. During the meeting these two officials came to the conclusion that the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro was strained because of the «malign regime» in Serbia and now there was a great need in improving the situation. What’s more the state of affairs on the Balkan peninsula concerned Vuković and in his opinion posed threat to Serbia and Montenegro<sup>6</sup>. Grujić and Vuković continued their communication and on January 28th 1904 there was a memorandum written in Cetinje which suggested a few ways of responding to the situation should some unexpected events take place in the region and in the Kosovo vilayet in particular. The so-called Kosovo issue emerged in the document too. It was highlighted that the purpose of the two states would be «protection of their compatriots from outright extermination in Old Serbia and Albania till the moment when both Serbia and Montenegro would be forced by circumstances to sacrifice in the name of their common goal»<sup>7</sup>. Moreover the document had a provision covering possible activation of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. If the Dual Monarchy started «to cut a path to Thessaloniki», Serbia and Montenegro «would have to protect their existence with the use of force» because if Austria-Hungary settles in Old Serbia there will be no room there for Serbia and Montenegro<sup>8</sup>. What’s interesting the memorandum also raises the question of future border drawn between Serbia and Montenegro in case «the was is victorious for them» or if «Turkey breaks up or its European territories are divided»<sup>9</sup>.

This idea has been expressed by a Russian historian Varvara Khlebnikova, who stated that «key reason to constant tensions and hostility between Serbian and Montenegrin rulers was quite banal — they couldn’t reach agreement on “distribution of Turkish inheritance”, and the fate of Old Serbia» (Хлебникова 2016, p. 163).

In 1905 there was an attempt to sign a trade deal between Serbia and Montenegro. After lengthy negotiation Serbian foreign minister Nikola Pasić and his Montenegrin counterpart Gavro Vuković managed to reach consensus<sup>10</sup>. But in the end

5 Российский государственный военно-исторический архив (РГВИА). Ф. 2000. Оп. 1. Д. 2808. Л 15об.

6 Документи о спољној политици Краљевине Србије 1903-1914, Књ. 1. Свеска 1.29. мај-11. јун 1903 - 14-27. фебруар 1904., 805.

7 Ibid, 923.

8 Ibid, 924.

9 Ibid.

10 Документи о спољној политици Краљевине Србије 1903-1914, Књ. 1. Свеска 3/1.1/14. јануар - 31. март/13. април 1905., 340-341.

the deal wasn't signed as the parties didn't come to an agreement in future division of territories, namely Prince Nikola thought that Serbia was going to deprive him of his dream «to make Pristina the capital of his state» (Хитрова 1993: 205).

Rivalry between Serbia and Montenegro continued up to 1908 when the Annexation crisis broke out and two states' interests of which were violated sided against Austria-Hungary that occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina. However this temporary thaw between Belgrade and Cetinje actually didn't help them settle their dispute over Kosovo.

Later Montenegro started to act more actively in Kosovo and tried to establish friendly relations with Albanians. For example, according to the telegram from the Russian charge d'affaires in Montenegro N. Dyachenko sent in 1910 Montenegrins «set hopes on kinship ties» which «remained between some Arnaut (Albanian) clans and Montenegrin tribes». He also added that «generous handing out of weapons and money had to contribute to the fulfilment of a broader plan» connected with Albanians worked out by Defence Minister Martinović<sup>11</sup>.

Moreover during the Albanian riot in 1911 Montenegro supported Albanians with the aim of using «unrest in Albania for its selfish territorial gains»<sup>12</sup>. However Montenegro wasn't the only rival of Serbia in Kosovo vilayet. This administrative area was quite vast and encompassed the territories of present day Macedonia, in fact the capital of the vilayet was Skopje.

Bulgaria traditionally considered Macedonian lands as their territory and though they had a right to claim it. After the Congress of Berlin of 1878 Macedonian lands also remained under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and later were integrated into Kosovo vilayet. Thus the interests of Serbia and Bulgaria met in this area.

Serbia-Bulgaria relationship was rather complicated as both countries were fighting for the dominant position in the Balkan region. Moreover both states had an aim to annex some European territories of the Ottoman Empire, but did not manage to reach any consensus.

Serbia and Bulgaria made attempts to improve their relationship at the beginning of the 20th century when the situation in Serbia changed (i.e. new dynasty ascended to the throne and the Old Radical part came to power). In February 1904 Serbian foreign minister Nikola Pašić and Bulgarian military attache Hristofor Hespachiev started to discuss future agreement which Belgrade and Sofia intended to sign<sup>13</sup>. One of the main issues was future division of territories.

Nikola Pašić supported the idea that Macedonia is populated by Serbs and Bulgarians and thus the territories that «are more inclined» to Serbia should belong to Serbia while the rest should become part of Bulgaria. Bulgarian attache Hespachiev agreed with this<sup>14</sup>. But Bulgarian diplomat Dimitar Rizov with whom Pašić spoke earlier didn't agree with it and said that thus Serbia wanted to divide Macedonia the way that would benefit it. Pašić responded that Serbia was more interested in annexing Old Serbia which was part of Kosovo vilayet and the remaining territories would be divided between Montenegro and Bulgaria<sup>15</sup>.

11 Албанский фактор в развитии кризиса на территории бывшей Югославии. Документы. Т. I (1878–1997 гг.). С.53.

12 РГВИА, Ф. 2000. Оп. 1. Д. 2808. Л 15об.

13 Документи о спољној политици Краљевине Србије 1903-1914, Књ. 1. Свеска 1.29. мај-11. јун 1903 - 14-27. фебруар 1904., 984.

14 Ibid, 987.

15 Ibid, 988-989.

The negotiations continued up to 1905 but didn't lead to any positive results as in the end Belgrade and Sofia didn't sign any agreement. However as both Serbia and Bulgaria were preparing for a war with the Ottoman Empire it was obvious that they would have to reach a consensus in the question of drawing border. Negotiation resumed in 1911 but according to the memoir of a Russian Vasily Strandtman, it wasn't an easy process as both countries didn't trust each other (Штрандтман 2014, p. 79).

The situation was aggravated by the fact that there was no unity in the views of Serbian officials as Serbian foreign minister Milovanović thought that in the name of friendship with Bulgaria Serbia could give up its plan to occupy some territories of Macedonia while Nikola Pašić believed that Serbia could claim more vast territories in the south up to Thessaloniki which of course violated Bulgarian interests as well as Turkish and Greek (Писареv 1985, p. 87).

However on November 4, 1911 Milovanović presented his draft agreement. One of the provisions covered future division of territories between Serbia and Bulgaria. For instance Serbia had to refuse from occupying «Adrianople vilayet and parts of Kosovo to the south of Šar-planina» while Bulgaria had to cede «Scutari vilayet and Kosovo vilayet to the north of Šar-planina» to Serbia (Штрандтман 2014, p. 85).

Eventually the treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria was signed on February 29, 1912. The parties managed to reach consensus in the majority of matters. However the question of division of the lands between Šar-planina, the Rhodopes and Ohrid lake remained unsolved<sup>16</sup>.

To sum up, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria whose interests met in Kosovo vilayet had very complex relationships at the beginning of the 20th century as they couldn't find common ground on the number of problems the most crucial of which was the division of territories.

## **ALBANIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND ITS PLANS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY**

At the end of the 19th century another force started to emerge in the Balkan region — Albanian national movement. This movement began in 1878 when the Albanian (Prizren) League was formed. Its delegates addressed European diplomats at the Congress of Berlin in order to draw their attention to the problem of recognition of Albanians as a nation with subsequent autonomous status within the borders the Ottoman Empire. The delegates' claims were rejected and the status of Albanians remained unchanged.

However it didn't discourage Albanian nationalists and they continued their activities up to 1881 when the League was dissolved. What's interesting the Albanian League even had a document called «Kararname» which included some provisions dedicated to the creation of the Albanian state. It was stated in the document that the Albanians «would fight to the bitter end against any annexation of Albanian territories» (which already were claimed by Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece), and that they would strive for unification of «all lands inhabited by the Albanians», that is Kosovo, Scutari, Janina and Bitola vilayets (Искендеров 2013, p. 13). Albanian national movement which first emerged on the territory of Kosovo, in Prizren, clearly stated its plans to incorporate Kosovo into its new independent state.

<sup>16</sup> Документи о спољној политици Краљевине Србије 1903-1914, Књ. V. Свеска 1. јануар - 14/27. јули 1912, 376-378.



After the dissolution of the League Albanian national movement didn't come into the spotlight much. Although in 1902 one of the Albanian national leaders Ismail Qemali said that he was against violations of national and cultural interests of Albanians, but at the same time he didn't believe that the right moment for gaining independence had come as at that moment «the surrounding was hostile and the great powers were also planning to divide the Balkans among themselves» (Искендеров 2013, p. 31).

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 marked the new stage in the development of the movement. In November 1908 the Pan-Albanian Congress took place in Bitola. During the Congress delegates discussed create of the Albanian alphabet and what's more important the programme of the development of Albanian lands and their government (Искендеров 2017, pp. 391-392).

Moreover Albanians started to express their negative attitude to decisions taken by local Ottoman officials and even rebelled against them. The centre of these riots as well the national movement was Kosovo. The riots took place there in 1910, 1911 and 1912.

According to the reports of Russian envoy in Belgrade this situation bothered Serbia as Albanian «rebellions were organised in Kosovo which was the sphere of influence of Serbia» (Искендеров 2013 (2), p. 663).

Albanian national movement reached its apogees in 1912. Russian journalist from the newspaper «Rech» («Речь») V. Viktorov had a conversation with a leader of the Albanian rebellion Riza-bey who said that their struggle «was just at its first stage» and that he and his supporters demanded «special rights for four vilayets, namely Scutari, Janina, Bitola and Kosovo» (Искендеров 2014: 246). It meant that in 1912 along with Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria there was another claimant to Kosovo, i.e. Albanian national movement which considered it as an integral part of its future independent state.

## **AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S AND ITALY'S INTERESTS IN THE BALKANS**

Technically Austria-Hungary and Italy cannot be considered as claimants to Kosovo, but their involvement in all Balkan matters also contributed to transformation of Kosovo issue into an international issue.

It is a well-known fact that Austria-Hungary didn't want Serbia to become too influential. Vienna succeeded a lot in this sphere when Milan Obrenović reigned in Serbia. The Dual Monarchy forced Serbia to sign a trade agreement in 1881 which was not beneficial for the latter. Knowing that Serbia had no access to the sea Austria-Hungary manipulated Serbia in questions of export of Serbian pigs and other agricultural products by closing the Serbia-Hungary border when it wanted Serbia to change its behaviour.

The situation started to change when the Obrenović dynasty was eliminated and the Karadžević family which was less friendly with Austria-Hungary took the throne. Serbia immediately became more active and aggressive in its foreign policy.

At the same time Austria-Hungary was quite concerned about Serbia's plans to expand its territories and to get access to the sea and to finally break away from its dependance on the Monarchy's mood swings. The shortest cut to the Adriatic Sea was through the territory of Kosovo and North Albania. With this access Austria-

Hungary lost one of its most important and beneficial trading partners which provided the Monarchy with cheap meat and in exchange bought Austrian industrial products. For example, in a conversation between Serbian ambassador M. Vujić and Austrian foreign minister Agenor Gołuchowski which took place at the diplomatic reception in Vienna on January 6, 1905, the latter expressed his concern about some «backroom dealing» that was going on in Belgrade the aim of which according to the foreign minister was aimed at expulsion of Austria-Hungary from Serbia's new trade deals<sup>17</sup>.

This situation illustrates that Austria-Hungary knew that things are going to be very different and Serbia is not going to obey to Vienna. As a result Austria-Hungary that was aware of Serbia's plans concerning Kosovo started to provide support to Albanians who were to become a counterforce to the Serbs (Словић 2010, p. 286).

A well-known Serbian Social Democrat Dimitrije Tucović stated in one of his articles that Austrian foreign minister Alois von Aehrenthal openly offered Albanians to rely on Austria-Hungary (Шемякин 2010: 435-436). What's more Vienna was trying to build friendly relationship with leaders of Albanian clans (Стојанчевић 1976, pp. 555-556).

The Dual Monarchy focused its efforts on proving support to Albanian Catholics and through its missionaries distributed religious books and helped them to fulfil other needs. But Austria-Hungary wasn't the only state that supported the Catholics there.

Italy which underwent the process of unification only in the last quarter of the 19th century was trying to strengthen its position in Europe and to expand its influence on the Balkan Peninsula. A Russian military agent Potapov wrote in one of his reports that for Italy it was very important to entrench itself in the Adriatic Sea in order not to become a «second class power» in Europe (Потапов 2003: 246).

It is believed that Italy made its first step to expanding its influence in the Balkan region after the Young Turk Revolution on 1908. Rome exhibited its strives to become more influential in the Balkan region (ЯХИМОВИЧ 2004: 640). As for Albania in 1904 Italian foreign minister T. Tittoni said that Albania itself had no importance but it had harbours on the Adriatic coast possessing of which meant «unhindered domination over the Adriatic Sea» (Искендеров 2017: 394).

Serbian consul in Skopje J. Jovanović wrote about Italy's increase in activity on the Balkan peninsula on September 14, 1910. In his letter to Serbian foreign minister M. Milovanović the diplomat said that when he worked in Cetinje he noticed rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy in Albanian lands and that Italy was trying hard to force Austria-Hungary out of the region by means of Catholic propaganda. In Jovanovic's opinion for Italy it was easier to succeed in this because of the Young Turks' religious freedoms policy, and because France refused to protect Christians in Turkey. The diplomat also noted that Italy's policy became more aggressive not only in Albania but in Kosovo vilayet too as there were Italian consulates in Skopje, Thessaloniki and Prizren. Moreover Jovanovic reported that Italy used lack of activity by Austria-Hungary in the region for its own benefit. For instance he drew an example of an exam at a Catholic school in which a pupil couldn't answer where Austria-Hungary was situated while a Catholic priest couldn't recognise Austrian national anthem when it was played by the Austrian consul. To cap it all this school

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17 Документи о спољној политици Краљевине Србије 1903-1914, Књ. 1. Свеска 3/1.1/14. јануар - 31. март/13. април 1905., 142-143.

as well as the priest's parish are funded by Austria-Hungarian consulate. Joavnović comes to a conclusion that Italy works more effectively in this region and in general Catholic priests tend to address Italians more often<sup>18</sup>.

## CONCLUSION

Considering all the facts mentioned above it's possible to say that by the beginning of the 20th century Kosovo question, which was a merely Serbian matter of concern at the end of the 19th century as it was the only and the most likely claimant to Kosovo territories, transformed into an international matter. At the turn of the 20th century some more states showed their interest to this region and started their activities there. Nascent Albanian national movement also couldn't remain unnoticed as its leaders made themselves clear and declared that they considered Kosovo as an integral part of their future independent state. Austria-Hungary and Italy didn't express desire to occupy these territories very openly but they were planning to use them as political currency to reach their own goals.

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# THE ARAB SPRING AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN AFRICA: FROM DECOLONIZATION TO NEOCOLONIALISM

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**Abstract:** North Africa and the Sahelian zone have experienced the emergence of terrorism such as Boko Haram since 2011, the presence of Daesh in Libya and insecurity in the Sahel. The emergence of insecurity in the Sahel was facilitated by the weapons delivered to the Libyan rebels by France in 2011 during the battle of Tripoli led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the aim of overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi. The Arab revolutions were supported by the United States and Europe with the aim of recolonizing the Arab world for the benefit of the Western bloc by seizing oil resources, particularly in Libya. The hopes expected during the popular uprisings have not been realized, the situation is disappointing for people who saw in the Arab Spring a possibility of emancipation of peoples who lived under authoritarian regimes. The United States and Europe share responsibility for the chaos and general insecurity orchestrated by the Arab Spring. It is the result of the imperialist policy of Europe and the United States towards nations possessing enormous natural resources and challenging the Western order. The idea of democratization of the Arab world has become for Europeans an element of colonization.

**Keywords:** *Arab spring, insecurity, Sahel, Libya, neocolonialism*

## INTRODUCTION

The Sahelo-Saharan space has long been experiencing problems affecting the security of individuals, whether it is the crisis of legitimacy of the regimes, the absence of good governance, ethnic tensions, poverty or rebellions against the central authorities due to the marginalization of peripheral regions and the political exclusion of large segments of the population. These crises have worsened with the rise of religious extremism and the appearance of violent terrorist groups claiming jihadist tendencies which seriously threaten the stability of the entire Sahelo-Saharan region. These perils, in particular the terrorist threat linked to drug and arms trafficking networks and illegal migration, transcend the borders of the States of the Sahel and require not an individual response from the States but dialogue and increased and constant coordination. Of all these states. The Arab Spring led to the destruction of stable political regimes to give way to generalized chaos and a migratory situation difficult to control, the goal of the West being to recolonize Africa for the benefit of the Western bloc, the disintegration of formerly stable States namely Libya. Added to this is the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, the fall of states such as Mali and

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the rise of insecurity in the Sahelian countries: Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, Burkina-Faso, Niger. The results of the Arab Spring are quite mixed. The situation is disappointing for all those who saw in the Arab Spring of 2011 a possibility of emancipation of peoples who lived under authoritarian regimes (Croix & Dieckhoff, 2016). Europe and the United States have perpetuated the chaos through the prism of the democratization of Arab regimes. The idea of democratization of the Arab world has become for Europeans an element of colonization (Benantar, 2015)<sup>2</sup>. This work on the Arab Spring and security challenges in Africa is a way to assess Western intervention in Libya and its consequences on the rise of insecurity in the Sahel. In view of this, it is important to take stock of the Arab Spring in Africa, particularly in terms of security and its actors, in other words, what are the consequences that the Arab Spring has generated in Africa? Who benefits from the security vacuum in the Sahel? These are all questions that we can legitimately ask ourselves. The rise of jihadists in Mali, the emergence of the Islamic State and warlords in Libya, the rise of Boko Haram in the far north of Cameroon, in Nigeria, in Chad and in Niger, are the consequence of Western interventionist and imperialist policy in Libya. This chaotic situation marked by insecurity began with the fall of Muammar Gaddafi and the absence of the state in Libya. Then, the role of the United States and Europe is clearly defined in the security crisis that followed the Arab Spring: delivery of arms to Libyan terrorists, participation in the destruction of once stable regimes.

## APPLIED METHODOLOGY

The research method and methodology we use covers approaches, the use of sources, techniques and tools for collecting data in the field, as well as data processing and analysis techniques. This is about data collection and documentation.

### The Approach

In the study of the feasibility of this theme on an evolutionary analysis over time of phenomena related to the Arab Spring, namely the situation of post-revolution states, the revolutionary heritage and the global consequences, we also proceeded by direct observation. And indirect facts on the ground, on the different actors who lived and those who participated in the Arab Spring, then to a systematic analysis. This approach is based on monographs and sampling. Interdisciplinary also has an important place in our methodological approach (sociology, anthropology, geography, economics, political philosophy, political sociology, religion, etc.). We first adopt an approach that has identified a set of resource people, for some having participated in the Arab Spring, for others having experienced the horrors of the Arab Spring. These people provided us with necessary and viable information.

### Types of Sources

The sources of several natures are the subject of our research. Particular emphasis is placed on primary sources (oral sources, archives and iconographic documents) through field visits. Thus, we focused on resource people in our study area, namely North Africa and the Sahel. In the same vein, our methodological approach to data collection also relates to the observation of facts. Several theories are mobi-

<sup>2</sup> Consulted on September 10, 2020 at 8:30 a.m. URL: <http://journal.openedition.org/cdlm/7710> DOI: <http://doi.org/10.4000/cdlm.7710>

lized to understand the attitude of the West in the destruction of stable regimes and in the expansion of insecurity: realism, imperialism, colonialism.

### **Data Processing and Analysis Techniques and Tools**

At the end of the investigations, observation, documentary research, as well as the exploitation of the other different sources, we proceeded to the confrontation of these, especially with regard to the oral sources, in order to get closer from the veracity of the facts, to the synthesis of the data collected, to their processing and their interpretation. After presenting the methodological markdown, it is wise to make a presentation of the results obtained.

## **THE ARAB SPRING**

When we look back in history, we realize that the Arab Spring did not begin in 2010 with the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia. The Suez Crisis in 1956 and the nationalization of the Suez Canal marked the victory of Arab nationalism over the colonial Suez expedition. Indeed, decolonization had a significant geopolitical impact on the Third World, which won an unprecedented victory. It's the Arab Spring. The speech given in Alexandria by Gamal Abdel Nasser on July 26, 1956 was an opportunity for him to announce his intention to nationalize the Suez Canal. The Suez crisis therefore ended in defeat and a diplomatic fiasco for the former colonial powers, while Colonel Nasser set himself up as a defender of the Arab cause and a champion of decolonization.

## **THE ORIGINS OF THE 2010 ARAB SPRING**

In the Arab world, protest networks have been in place since the end of 2010. Activists specializing in protests have been trained in the United States since 2009. Behind these Arab protest networks, we find the Arab activists trained in Belgrade and the United States by the Otpor network and the Center for Applied of Non Violent Actions Strategies (CANVAS).

From 2010, a wave of protests ignited the Arab world. Begun in Tunisia and Algeria in December of the same year, it continues in almost all Arab countries, with specificities. The term uprising, rather than that of revolt, too linked to the Arab revolt is that driven by Lawrence of Arabia (Mechin, 2007). The events of what is known as the Arab Spring are essentially geoeconomic in nature and not geopolitical, even if, in the long term, they will be led to produce some (Berg, 2013, p. 207-221). OTPOR, directly funded and supported by the CIA and Georges Soros's networks, is directly behind the Arab revolutions (Normand, 2017). From forms of development of the productive force that they were, these relations become obstacles. Then begins an era of social revolution (Marx, 1859).

## **HOW THE WEST WANTED TO CORRECT HISTORY!**

The Arab Spring was six decades ago that of the defeat of the West, it was "the spring of revolutionary Arab nationalism" (Mechin, 1959). The desire to correct history is one of the obsessions of the West. Precisely in the case of the Arab Spring of 2011, it was a question of erasing the Arab victory of 1956 during the colonial

expedition of Suez. And if we speak today of the “Arab Spring” in connection with the revolutions in the Maghreb and the Middle East, it is also because they also echo this vision. The reversal of the term Arab Spring in 2011 illustrated the Western victory over the heirs of this same Arab revolutionary nationalism, Muammar Gaddafi, Bashar-Al Assad, Ali Abdallah Saleh. Western interference in these revolutions is remarkable. It obeys the specific logic of the empire, given that Washington exercises a global, planetary power, although in decline, it would be absurd to think that he and his European allies will remain with folded arms in the face of the countries which today have the largest oil reserves on the planet, greater than those of Saudi Arabia. US Senator John McCain’s analogy “You can’t blame Washington for hiding its imperialist agenda (Meysam, 2010).

## **THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARAB SPRING IN AFRICA: SECURITY CHALLENGES AND NEOCOLONIALISM**

### **Security challenges: The situation in Libya and the Sahel**

Before the destruction of Libya by the West and NATO, Libya and the Sahel were stable and economically prosperous. This destruction favored the rise of the Islamic State in Libya, the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon, the recent crises in Libya and Mali exacerbated the multidimensional insecurity of populations living in the Sahelo-Saharan region and highlighted not only the weakness of States, but also the need for regional cooperation (Daguzan, 2011, pp 78-97). NATO and France delivered arms to Libyan terrorists<sup>3</sup> with the aim of supporting Colonel Gaddafi and stealing Libya’s oil resources, weakening the Sahel states in order to deploy troops there to exploit the gold mines and weaken the armies of the Sahel countries and perpetuate the neocolonial military dependence. The crisis in Libya, which has become an immense arsenal of open-air weapons used by militias and other terrorist groups. 800,000 to 1 million small arms are supposed to circulate freely as well as 80,000 Kalashnikovs in addition to the existence of 100 militias made up of 125,000 fighters. Number of these weapons from the military arsenal<sup>4</sup> is in the hands of terrorist groups operating in the Maghreb and Sahel region and the Algerian press has reported numerous arms seizures by the security forces during the discoveries of caches used by terrorists on the borders of the Sahara. The dissemination of Libyan military arsenals towards the Sahel, via the Libyan Sahara and the arming of insurgent groups, is certainly one of the most crucial geostrategic phenomena with which the sub-region has been confronted since the beginning of the Libyan conflict. The Islamist settlements in northern Libya and their role in the anti-Gaddafi uprising as well as the establishment of large-scale arms trafficking are essential in the analysis and understanding of the strengthening of terrorist groups in the Sahel since 2012. From April 6, 2012 to January 2013, an Islamist coalition took control of towns in northern Mali (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013).

3 The Prime Minister of Mali Choguel Maiga accuses France of having formed and trained a terrorist organization in Kidal, In an interview with the Russian agency RIA Novosti, 10.10.2021 <https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/mali-choguel-maiga-accuses-france-of-having-formed-and-entered-a-terrorist-organization-%C3%A0-kidal/2387933>

4 French arms in Libya: this support that Paris can no longer hide? [https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/armes-francaises-en-libye-ce-soutien-que-paris-ne-peut-plus-cacher-12-07-2019-2324181\\_3826.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/armes-francaises-en-libye-ce-soutien-que-paris-ne-peut-plus-cacher-12-07-2019-2324181_3826.php)



### **Smuggling networks**

More and more than traffic arms and human beings in the Sahel are linked to terrorist groups: some have control of the terrain and benefit from local complicity (traffickers), others (terrorist groups) have arms and money from ransoms acquired in exchange for the release of hostages, in particular (Scheele, 2011). These trafficking networks of all kinds threaten public order in the border regions located in the East (Tunisia and Libya), in the West (Morocco) and on the Saharan borders (Mauritania, Mali and Niger), and disrupt the economy. The Arab Spring accentuated this with the porosity of the borders because of the state vacuum linked to the destruction of Libya. The processes of territorial fragmentation currently underway in Libya extend throughout the Sahel region. , it is the scene of interventions by external powers in the context of the fight against terrorism and, finally, it is home to populations who do not always recognize themselves in the regimes resulting from independence (Tisseron, 2011, p. 98-107). This crystallization of the split has its origins in a long recomposition of politics, the absence of a tangible response to Tuareg claims in Niger and Mali, as well as in the role played by the informal economy.

### **Illegal migration**

If previously, small-scale migratory flows from the sub-Saharan region to Europe were less significant, the number of several hundred thousand migrants arriving in this country in recent years has increased due to insecurity in Libya, Mali and Boko Haram in other Sahelian countries. Indeed, illegal migrants are fleeing the horrors of Boko Haram, the Islamic state in Libya. In 2011, in the midst of the NATO bombardment of Libya, Colonel Gaddafi said in a message that he would fill Europe with refugees. This migration is the result of the consequences of the Arab Spring.

### **The sahel under the influence of neocolonialism**

Mali, like almost all the countries of French-speaking Africa, is still under neocolonial domination and linked to France by the colonial pact (Sylla, et al, 2021). The French army is an army of occupation and the desire of the Malians to appeal to the Russians is an act of resistance against the occupation. Where this army of occupation is present, the state collapses. The Central African Republic is an example. Added to anti-colonial sentiment is the loss of minds and hearts. At the heart of the revolutionary war, Barkhane's failure was total, as revealed by the anti-French demonstrations in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. On militant sites, Barkhane is described as an occupying force. Despite Western disinformation on anti-French demonstrations, particularly in Mali, this hatred is very real and irreversible. The fear of Paris in the face of this anti-French anger among the African masses, especially in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Another element marking the fear of France is the conflagration of all French-speaking countries and the arrival of the Russians. France is trying to discredit the Russian group through an intense media campaign, claiming in particular that it is responsible for abuses, summary executions and torture. The most abject situation that these media do not talk about are the war crimes committed by the French occupation troops in Africa: violation of boys in the Central African Republic by French soldiers from Sangaris homosexual (because this practice is animal, barbaric and infamous in African values). These guilty soldiers were cleared by French justice, unfair justice rendered by unfair judges, economic plun-

der, theft of resources. Added to this are the crimes of the French army in Cameroon (Bamiléké genocide), the crimes of the Algerian war. These crimes are denied and the French colonial state plays the card of arrogance in the recognition, the compensation of the victims, the restitution of the stolen colonial loot, the implementation of the policy of reparation. Moreover, the French media do not speak of the war crimes committed by the French occupation troops in Mali during the Bounti massacre<sup>5</sup> which cost the lives of 19 Malian civilians, or even the distribution of arms carried out by France to the terrorists in Libya in 2011 and the crimes of the French colonial army in Libya. Those responsible including Sarkozy for France's crimes in Libya, Macron, his defense minister and the soldiers who carried out the massacre of civilians for the Bounti bombing in Mali must go to the International Criminal Court (ICC). These scenarios are totally ignored by the French media in their media propaganda. If France trembles in the face of the Russians, it is because it is afraid of losing one of its colonies, namely Mali. This situation in Mali could spread to other French-speaking countries and France will have everything to lose, particularly through its multinationals (total, Bolloré, Lafarge, etc.) specializing in the economic plunder and impoverishment of these countries.

### **Evaluation of means and capacities to fight against security threats**

#### **Military means**

The deployment of the security forces of each State, as well as the formation of an African coalition with credible partners is an appropriate solution to eradicate terrorism, trafficking and banditry in the Sahel. The deployments of foreign troops such as the French occupation troops from Barkhane have weakened the States. In 13 years they have not stabilized the states of the Sahel, rather they have maintained chaos. The Russians, on the other hand, have done a remarkable job in less than 2 years. This is why the choice of credible foreign partners for military cooperation is a great asset. The fallout from Russian military cooperation with Mali is bearing fruit and is helping to strengthen the fight against terrorist groups and trafficking and smuggling networks. Allocate more funds to the development and implementation of good national security policy in Mali (Arieff, 2013).

#### **The drying up of sources of support for terrorism**

The security forces of the Sahelian countries must, as a matter of priority, fight against networks of support for terrorism within the population, in particular those involved in supplying terrorist groups with foodstuffs and logistical means, as well as foreign support such as payments ransoms, the collusion of foreign troops to deliver arms to terrorists, the adoption of the principle of non-negotiation with these groups in the case of hostage-taking and ransom demands or prisoner exchanges for their release.

#### **The political solution to conflicts and Inclusive dialogue**

"We know how wars start, but we don't know how they end". The disastrous consequences of NATO's military intervention in Libya are palpable in the Sahel.

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<sup>5</sup> Bombardment of Bounti: Minusma accuses France of having killed Malian civilians <http://lignesdedefense.blogspot.com/2021/03/30/bombardement-de-bounti-la-minusma-accuse-la-france-d-avoir-tue-des-civils.html>

To avoid the uncertainties of a military intervention and an all-security solution, the leaders of the Sahel States must find political solutions based on an inclusive dialogue and national reconciliation capable of resolving the conflicts in a fair and lasting manner. At the level of political entities, strengthen the rule of law, respect for collective and individual freedoms, ban electoral fraud and fight effectively against corruption and bureaucracy, reduce social inequalities, fight against unemployment and promote the regions. Fight against injustice in order to restore public confidence in the state. It is also necessary to strengthen justice in all sectors. Strengthen institutions to deal with different challenges such as poor governance and its roots such as corruption, lack of accountability and of transparency. This could help to gain trust of the people to their government.

## CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to identify the consequences of the Arab Spring and the challenges that threaten the security of the Sahel in an unstable and sometimes violent context. The Arab Spring, supported by the United States and Europe, has created the greatest dangers for the Sahel, dangers linked to the delivery of arms to the insurgents by the West and the absence of the State in Libya. Insecurity in the Sahel and the disintegration of the state in Libya are the ultimate proof that, exactly a decade after this uprising linked to democratic aspirations as Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkosys and other architects of chaos in the Sahel said, nothing 'is resolved. The Sahel also faces a problem of fragmentation, due to the interruption of the ambitious African policy led by Colonel Gaddafi, who probably disappeared with him and leaves a great void in the region.

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# COLD WAR ADAPTATION MECHANISMS OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1960S-1980S

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**Abstract:** In the wake of independence in 1950s-1960s, the States of West Africa faced the need to choose a foreign policy course under the regional confrontation between Western and socialist countries. For the newly independent countries key issues were relations with their former colonizers, willingness to cooperate with them or the desire to escape their influence, as well as a military and political presence. In addition, West African countries had to choose the degree and format of cooperation with the socialist bloc, depending on the ideological orientation towards the USSR, the United States or the non-alignment policy. Matters of regional and sub-regional leadership ambitions were also highly important. Conversely, despite the commonality of development and independence issues, West African countries chose very different strategies in the context of the Cold War. The chosen course depended on the conditions of independence, as well as the availability of resources and regional ambitions. Ivory Coast and Senegal preferred to maintain close military, economic and political ties with France and enjoy its support in regional leadership ambitions. This limited their ties with the USSR and other socialist countries. Liberia in its turn pursued consistent pro-US foreign policy in the 1960s and 1980s, acting as a regional ally in the struggle against communist influence. Guinea, having gained independence before the rest of the French colonies in 1958, found itself in a confrontation with France so its leadership chose to closely cooperate with the USSR. Ghana also actively cooperated with the USSR in the 1960s to promote pan-Africanism and its own regional ambitions. Sierra Leone, on the other hand, pursued a course of pragmatic cooperation and receiving assistance from all major international players, in practice implementing the principles of non-alignment. In general Cold War strategies relevant to small countries used in West Africa attracted presence of external powers and determined their further development and security risks.

**Keywords:** *West Africa, Cold War, adaptation mechanisms, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana, Ivory Coast.*

## INTRODUCTION

The decolonization of African countries, which began in the second half of the 1950s, led to the emergence of new independent States with significant resources and borders inherited from colonial empires, infrastructure, organization of social and political structure. The entry of these states into the system of international relations in the context of the Cold War was accompanied by a struggle for their involvement between the Western and socialist blocs. These international conditions have become one of the main factors that influenced the formation of the

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foreign policy of the newly independent African States, their strategy of expanding independence, ensuring development and the opportunity to take their own place in global politically significant processes. The showcase of a particular subregion, West Africa, presents an array of ways in which African states have adapted to this global environment, characterized by diversity and even various degrees of polarity. In the given paper the author seeks to examine the basis for such diversity and reasons why states in similar geographic and economic position pursued drastically diverging foreign policy. The author relies on typical historical methodology and the use of archival material, in part personally extracted.

## **FUNDAMENTALS OF THE INTERACTION OF AFRICAN STATES WITH THE PARTIES OF THE COLD WAR**

The interaction of African states with the two blocs was dictated to a large extent by the raw orientation of their economies, the need to strengthen and re-create key public and state institutions and overcome established forms of dependence on former colonialists, which is rightly emphasized to supporters of neo-Marxist and postcolonial approaches to the study of African history (Amin, 1968, pp. 208-209; Taylor, 2020, p. 50; Kassae, Ivkina, 2020, p. 28). In this situation, African countries faced a fundamental choice of a model of interaction with the outside world in an environment of confrontation between two systems (Shipilov 2019: 208). One of the possible options was to maintain relations with the former colonizers and join the world economy and the system of international relations on the terms that were mainly determined by France, Great Britain and smaller European powers. An alternative to this could be priority cooperation with the United States, which is ready to take into account the interests of the African side to a greater extent, to promote its development and the formation of independent institutions, but on condition of maintaining political loyalty and a model of economic relations that is most beneficial for American business (Rothermund, 2014, p. 23). In these cases, the possibility of political and other interaction of African countries with the States of the socialist bloc was sharply limited<sup>2</sup>.

Along with this, some African countries were interested in cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. For them, it seemed to be an alternative to the colonizers and a source of help, thanks to which it would be possible to overcome the previous forms of dependence in a short time. The declared commitment of this group of countries to the principles of a non-capitalist path of development is often explained by modern researchers mainly for pragmatic reasons, and their access to the support of the socialist bloc countries is perceived as a way of material support for actual decolonization (see, for example, Mazov, 2020, p. 71).

Nevertheless, not all countries in the region have chosen the path of unambiguous foreign policy orientation towards one or another camp within the framework of the ideological confrontation between the two blocs. The countries of Asia and Africa, which had already gained independence or were preparing for it, demonstrated their isolation from the poles of the Cold War in the framework of the Bandung Conference of 1955, which laid the foundations of the non-Aligned movement.

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<sup>2</sup> In addition, the countries with a significant white minority controlling power, mainly in Southern Africa, refrained from contacts with the USSR and other socialist countries (Filatova, Davidson, 2012, p. 47), however, this category of countries is outside the scope of our analysis.

Such a foreign policy position, which did not bind these countries with strict political obligations to the great powers, allowed them to cooperate with both camps and receive assistance from both sides (although not always in such volumes as those of the decolonized countries that decided on the camp) and at the same time maintain a greater degree of independence (Rothermund, 2014, p. 23). For all their political heterogeneity, representatives of non-Aligned countries mostly adhered to this line (Luthi, 2014, p. 97). Despite the nominal equidistance of this movement from the two camps, in general, since the Bandung Conference, representatives of the United States and other Western countries have treated it rather with caution, while socialist countries have approved of it. This happened within the framework of broad support by socialist countries for the desire for decolonization, even if non-communist forces predominate in anti-colonial movements. The support of the national liberation movements of Asia and Africa, as well as the organization of their interaction, was part of the policy pursued by the Comintern since the late 1920s, therefore, these countries were considered in the USSR rather as potential allies in solving at least part of international tasks<sup>3</sup>.

Realizing the possibility of such a convergence of interests of the “second” and “third” world, the American administration of the 1950s (President Eisenhower) treated this movement with distrust. Nevertheless, on the issues of decolonization, the United States maintained a more open position than the European countries – former metropolises. Unlike the latter, the American administration did not seek to preserve colonial privileges and formal inequality in the relations of the “first” and “third world”. Instead, the United States was ready to cooperate with the new leaders of independent countries in order to prevent Soviet influence in them, as well as to displace the interests of former colonial powers and provide advantages to its own capital. Even during the Eisenhower administration, in 1956, this position was expressed in diplomatic support for Egypt during the Suez crisis, and after the election of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in 1960. Kennedy’s key element of his policy was to promote the economic development of the decolonizing countries of Asia and Africa in a direction acceptable to the United States (Rothermund, 2014, p. 23, 26).

Thus, the competition of the USSR, the USA and related blocs in providing economic and other assistance to non-aligned African countries has become an important element of the global confrontation. At the same time, for the liberated countries, access to the resources of the great Powers made it possible to partially solve the socio-economic, institutional and infrastructural problems that they had faced since the 1960s. At the same time, the policy of both socialist and Western countries pursued in relation to the decolonized countries of Africa during the 1960s and 1980s was not constant and fluctuated depending on external and internal circumstances. Thus, the African policy of Jimmy Carter was more focused on the promotion of human rights, including in politically close countries, while during the Reagan administration, the most priority was the support of declaratively close political regimes ready to fight the penetration of Soviet influence in the context of the Cold War<sup>4</sup>.

Soviet policy on the African continent was characterized by a competition of ideological and pragmatic attitudes. The first approach required more active assis-

<sup>3</sup> For example, in the framework of the Brussels anti-Imperialist Conference organized by representatives of the Comintern in 1927 (Miscovic, 2014, p. 2)

<sup>4</sup> *Bright, N.O.* Interview with Jimmy Carter. PBS, Global Connections, Liberia. 1997. URL: <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/globalconnections/liberia/film/jimmycarter.html>

tance to countries that had chosen a non-capitalist path of development, as well as containment of Western influence in the region, which also implied some support for conditionally non-aligned countries. The pragmatic approach to the realization of Soviet interests in Africa consisted in conducting profitable trade and economic activities in the region (with access to its mineral resource base, fish and agricultural resources) even with cooperation with ideologically distant forces, as well as providing them with assistance based on the limited capabilities of the USSR and other socialist countries (Mazov, 2020, pp. 66-72).

As a result, in many cases, Western States had more funds available to send aid to African countries. However, this could be offset by the qualitative features of aid from the socialist bloc, its concentration in the most important sectors for African states (for example, education, medicine and the development of the agricultural sector), as well as lower reporting requirements for allocated funds (Filatova, Davidson, 2012, pp. 281-282).

Thus, even African countries that did not declare their commitment to the socialist orientation were generally interested in maintaining contacts with the Soviet Union and the rest of the countries of the socialist bloc. The context of the Cold War, despite the increased regional risks associated with peripheral conflicts, has given the independence gives African countries the opportunity to use the resources of the warring parties to solve the most pressing problems of state-building, as well as, maneuvering between the great powers, to defend their own interests and increase their independence and importance in the international arena. At the same time, in the writings on the policy of the “non-aligned” during the Cold War, the interests and motivations of the largest or most influential countries claiming leadership in their own region are most often considered (see, for example, Miscovic Fischer-Tine Boscovska, 2014). The logic and principles of interaction with the outside world of small, de-facto non-aligned countries with less resource capabilities and regional political or economic ambitions are reflected to a lesser extent. This paper aims to assess what small West African countries were primarily interested in in the framework of cooperation with the poles of the Cold War and their respective allies.

## **SPECIFIC WEST AFRICAN CASES OF ADAPTATION STRATEGIES**

West Africa is a subregion that has tried a variety of models of foreign policy interaction with both the former metropolises and the poles of the Cold War. Thus, the main part of the francophone countries of West Africa, primarily the Ivory Coast, gained independence from France in 1960 on the terms of maintaining its military presence to ensure the security of new political regimes, regulating the monetary and monetary policy of the countries of the region through the CFA franc tied to the French franc, as well as maintaining close political ties with France (Richter, 2011, p. 235)<sup>5</sup>. Privileged relations with Paris became the basis for the Ivory Coast for rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s thanks to the development of cocoa bean production with French assistance and investment, as well as the justification for claims to political leadership in West Africa during the reign of Felix Houphouët-Boigny (Chauveau Dozon, 1985, p. 68, 71; Fauré, 1982, pp. 96-97). Such a foreign policy course also determined the restrained attitude of the leadership of the Ivory

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<sup>5</sup> Banque Centrale de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. URL: <http://edenpub.bceao.int/>.



Coast to the development of diplomatic relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, which were established only seven years after the country gained independence and with the approval of France, which pursued a more independent policy towards the socialist camp in comparison with other Western countries. Moreover, Soviet-Ivorian relations were severed already in 1969 due to the dissatisfaction of the Ivorian side with the policy of selecting students to study in the USSR and their possible ideological indoctrination. Diplomatic relations were restored only in 1986. At the same time, in addition to France, the leadership of the Ivory Coast maintained close economic and political ties with the United States, Germany and other representatives of the Western bloc, which is generally characteristic of those African countries that, after independence, chose a foreign policy orientation towards the former metropolis.

Liberia has become an example of a West African country that has chosen the path of political orientation towards the United States and the formation of a different, “decolonized” type of relations with Western countries. Nominally independent since 1847, it was only after the end of the Second World War and in the conditions of the beginning processes of decolonization of the continent that it began to establish active relations with the outside world. The interconnectedness with the USA was explained by the dominance since 1926 among the Liberian economic counterparties of the American firm Firestone, which displaced Great Britain as the country’s key trading partner, and the economic assistance that the country began to receive from the United States with the beginning of the presidency of William Tubman (the importance of the country as a military transshipment base on the Atlantic during the Second World War increased dramatically) (Dalton, 1965, p. 580)<sup>6</sup>. At the same time, in the 1950s, attempts began by the USSR and Liberia to re-establish bilateral relations (which existed with the Russian Empire from 1899 to 1917), which were crowned with success in 1956<sup>7</sup>. Nevertheless, the unambiguous foreign policy orientation of Liberia towards the United States during this period hindered the development of these relations and led, in particular, to the avoidance of the head of Liberia from full-fledged contacts with the Soviet side (the very establishment of diplomatic relations with the Liberian side was dictated by the desire to enlist Soviet support in the UN)<sup>8</sup>. Only when William Tolbert came to power in Liberia in 1971 did the situation change somewhat: the embassies were opened in 1972 in parity, as well as the development of economic relations with Cuba and Libya (Obi, 2009, pp. 122-123). In general, during his rule, Liberia adhered to a more neutral position on the key issues of the Cold War, and cooperation with the United States in the field of security was seriously limited (Kieh, 2012, p. 176). This lasted until 1979, when the embassies of the USSR and Romania were suspected of instigating anti-government protests, the so-called rice riots, which led to a reduction in the size of diplomatic

6 Papers Relating to the foreign relations of the United States. (1926). VOLUME II 882.51/1877 The Chargé in Liberia (Wharton) to the Secretary of State Monrovia, February 24, 1926. No.336. URL: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1926v02/d339>.

7 Note “On the course of negotiations of the Soviet government delegation with the Government of Liberia on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Liberia.” January 24, 1956 / The History of Africa in documents, 1870-1960. Volume 2./ Ed. A.Davidson, 2005. p. 596.

8 J. Roberts to N.S. Khrushchev. Request for financial assistance in the construction of a clinic and school in the settlement of Virginia. May 20, 1961 / Russia and Africa – documents and materials of 1961 – early 1970s, p. 405; Note of the II African Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on trade relations between the USSR and Liberia. July 23, 1962, Russia and Africa – Documents and materials of 1961 – early 1970s, pp. 409-410.

missions. Deposed in April 1980 In order to strengthen his personal power and under the pressure of increased Liberian debts, Samuel Doe chose a strategy of unambiguous foreign policy orientation towards the United States and close ties with the Reagan administration, offering himself as the main ally in the fight against the communist threat on the African continent<sup>9</sup>. This led to the complete severance of diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1982. Later, in 1987, they were restored due to difficulties in obtaining new volumes of American economic aid by Liberia, as well as in connection with the beginning of perestroika in the USSR, but in general, the pro-American course of Liberia remained until the end of the Cold War and the beginning of its own civil conflict in 1989 (Kieh, 2012, p. 180).

Guinea has become the most characteristic example of a West African country that has chosen the path of socialist orientation and priority cooperation with the countries of the socialist bloc. It stood out sharply from the majority of the Francophone countries of the region and the former French colonies by the fact that in 1958 it became the only one of them that chose independence from France in a referendum instead of expanded autonomy with the preservation of the sovereignty of Paris. This choice led to a sharp break with the former metropolis and the search for other sources of financial and economic support, the development of new institutions and infrastructure (Adamolekun, 1976, p. 56). This was one of the main reasons why the regime of Ahmed Sekou-Toure, who was in power in Guinea, chose a course of rapprochement with the USSR and receiving various types of assistance from the countries of the “second world”.

Ghana became the most influential country that claimed regional leadership and actively participated in the development of the African and world agenda of decolonization and non-alignment. It was the first in Africa to free itself from colonial rule, declaring independence in 1957. Its leader, Kwame Nkrumah, was one of the key ideologists of pan-Africanism and in 1955, representing it in the status of the British Gold Coast, took part in the Bandung Conference, and in 1963 became the main initiator of the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Nevertheless, with formal active participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, Ghana, under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, was politically very close to the USSR, which was expressed not only in the Soviet economic assistance it received, but also in sending political advisers there (for example, Vladimir Aboltin, who contributed to the composition of the country's economic development program, as well as the OAU) (Mazov, 2020, pp. 66-72). In general, before the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 Ghana was one of the key political and economic partners of the USSR in Africa, and also claimed regional leadership, given Ghana's institutional capabilities within the framework of the OAU. In contrast, Sierra Leone can be attributed more to small non-aligned countries, devoid of large-scale ambitions of regional expansion and interested primarily in solving key issues of their own existence and development, building more even relations with both the USSR and the United States than the government of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana.

Sierra Leone presented a rather peculiar case of co-opting into the Cold War international context. The economic model inherited from British colonial rule, based on the export of mineral and agricultural resources, also influenced the interna-

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<sup>9</sup> Remarks of the President and Head of State Samuel K. Doe of Liberia Following Their Meetings. Reagan Presidential Library. August 17, 1982. URL: <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/81782d>.

tional situation of Sierra Leone, one of the poorest countries in the region (Zotova, Smirnov, Frenkel, 1994, p. 221; Keen, 2005, p. 36). By the end of the 1970s, the vulnerability of the country was partially compensated by the formation of common mechanisms of military and political support with neighboring Liberia and Guinea, which focused on different poles of the Cold War, but were interested in the stability of their own regimes<sup>10</sup>. In general, Sierra Leone was of rather limited interest to major world powers, mainly related to the country's resource capabilities, and it was this that significantly influenced the formation of national foreign policy in the 1960s and 1980s, and, in particular, relations with the countries of the socialist bloc.

The foreign policy of postcolonial Sierra Leone was based on relations with the former metropolis. Britain, having granted Sierra Leone independence, retained great political influence in the country, including in the military-political sphere, and the development of the most critical infrastructure of the young state depended on British assistance (for example, the construction of the capital's Lungi airport). Significant volumes of trade, economic and infrastructural assistance linked Sierra Leone with other Western economies, primarily the United States, Germany, Canada, France and Japan, which was also facilitated by the experience of cooperation between the country's first leaders with the outgoing colonial administration. Nevertheless, the internal political contradictions determined by ethnic and regional competition, did not lead to the polarization of the foreign policy courses proposed by the two opposing groups. This applied, among other things, to the socialist countries. Unlike the Ivory Coast or Liberia the leadership of Sierra Leone as early as the 1960s did not limit ties with the "second world" and immediately after gaining independence in 1961 established diplomatic relations with the USSR and other socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Bilateral relations with the USSR intensified in 1965, when a mission was initiated to establish trade and good-neighbourly relations - the Government of Sierra Leone approved the signing of a trade agreement with the USSR, a Protocol on the supply of machinery and equipment, an agreement on technical and cultural assistance. In February 1965, a proposal was initiated to send a Sierra Leone trade mission to the USSR<sup>11</sup>. Within its framework, the Government decided to explore the possibility of opening an embassy of Sierra Leone in the USSR (the USSR Embassy in Freetown had already been opened by that time). During the mission, it was discussed receiving Soviet aid for the development of agriculture and natural resources, as well as for the modernization of railways. Representatives of Sierra Leone also visited Germany and Czechoslovakia, where they agreed on the terms of trade and the provision of technical and other assistance, regardless of the ideological attitudes of the counterparties<sup>12</sup>. Such cooperation further intensified in the 1970's and early 1980's as a one-party regime was established by Siaka Stevens that distanced itself from Britain. Overall this example is representative of small regional states pursuing non-alignment in order to promote primar-

10 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES. - Freetown, 29 May 1981. URL: [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3827~v-Protocole\\_d\\_Assistance\\_Mutuelle\\_en\\_matiere\\_de\\_Defense.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3827~v-Protocole_d_Assistance_Mutuelle_en_matiere_de_Defense.pdf)

11 PROPOSED SIERRA LEONE TRADE MISSION TO THE U.S.S.R. Extract from Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held on 31<sup>st</sup> Dec., 1964. Sierra Leone Public Archives office. Box 655. RG 4/ IA1162.

12 REPORT BY THE MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY ON THE TRADE AND GOODWILL MISSION TO WESTERN GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND U.S.S.R. Cabinet Conclusions CP (65) 284 on 27<sup>th</sup> May, 1965. Sierra Leone Public Archives office. Box 655. RG 4/ IA1162. Pp.8-19.

ily economic and social development goals rather than pursue regional leadership ambitions like Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah regime.

## CONCLUSION

Thus, a variety of approaches to the development of foreign policy in the context of the Cold War were practiced among the states of West Africa, which also influenced their relations with socialist countries. These approaches depended to a great extent on the colonial past of such states, the policies that their former colonial powers pursued and the particular manner in which they got decolonized. Other important aspects that contributed to the foreign policy choices made by West African states were the size and specialization of their economy, needs and limitations of their economic and social development and, rather importantly, their regional political ambitions. Hence it is important to note that despite the heavy influence that external players had on states of the region during the Cold War era, countries and their elites have obtained enough agency to make independent choices on their foreign policy preferences and use the resources provided by cooperation with great powers of the time to advance their own unique agenda, ranging from overcoming economic dependency and most pressing social issues to raising a particular country's regional political profile.

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INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS FROM  
SPATIALLY  
FUNCTIONAL ASPECT  
INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY





# THE AFRICAN EXARCHATE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH (ROC): REASONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND PROSPECTS OF FURTHER EXPANSION

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**Abstract:** The article examines the recent (12/29/2021) establishment of the African Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The setting up of the ROC's African Exarchate is related to the situation in Ukraine and was, particularly, was driven by the decision made by the Alexandrian Orthodox Church (AOC) to recognize the autocephaly (independence) of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (PCU), and by the subsequent rupture of relations between the AOC and the ROC. An analysis of the events preceding the establishment of the ROC's African Exarchate, the positions of the AOC and the ROC, as well as the expansion strategy may shed light on the prospects of the African Exarchate of the ROC.

**Keywords:** *the African Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), the Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa, the Alexandrian Orthodox Church (AOC), the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU).*

## INTRODUCTION

The African Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) was created late 2021 in response to the decision of Patriarch Theodore II, the Head of the Alexandrian Church, to recognize the autocephaly (independence) of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) (Tsargrad TV, 2021) in November 2019. By accepting the autocephaly of the OCU, the Alexandrian Orthodox Church followed the suit of Constantinople, which recognized OCU's autocephaly in January 2019 (Khomenko, Denisov, 2019) and the Hellenic Greek Orthodox Churches, which did it October 2019 (Marchenko, 2019). The ROC labelled the recognition of OCU by Alexandria as schism. As a response to this move of Alexandria, ROC took a number of African Orthodox communities, which used to be under the jurisdiction of Alexandria, to its own jurisdiction and established the African Exarchate to manage the new coming African Orthodox communities.

The AOC considers the entire African continent, with the exception of the territory of the Sinai Peninsula, as areas under its jurisdiction. So, the establishment of

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the African Exarchate of the ROC was characterised by the AOC as a decision that caused “deepest sorrow” (Konstantinova, 2021).

## BACKGROUND

Early 2019, Ukrainian Orthodox Churches had been under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate for more than three centuries, starting from the 17th century. Apart from these “canonical” Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which were subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, there were “non-canonical” churches, that is, not recognized by the ROC. Among these “non-canonical churches” are the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (established in 1992) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (established in 1917, dissolved in 1930, resumed operations in 1989) (Kosenok et al., 2017; Kuzio, 1997; Soldatov, 2020). In 2018, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church merged into one church, which is known as the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). This merger was administered with the support of the Orthodox Church of Constantinople. (RBC, 2018).

On January 6, 2019, the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Patriarch of the OCU in the Istanbul Cathedral had a joint service together. Following the service, the Patriarch of Constantinople signed a tomos (decree) on the autocephaly of the OCU (Khomenko, Denisov, 2017; Butler, 2019). P. Poroshenko, who was then the Ukrainian President, attended the signing ceremony and called it “the victory of good over evil, light over darkness”. Several months before this event P. Poroshenko described the religious unity of Ukraine and Russia as “a direct threat to the security of Ukraine” (Deutch, 2019).

The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill commented the tomos giving the autocephaly to OCU as follows: “It is not on his own that the Patriarch of Constantinople did what he did, by while being led by other people’s thoughts and from other people’s words<...> and while being under pressure from powerful political forces associated with one of the superpowers”. In October 2019, the Greek Orthodox Church supported the decision of Constantinople (Marchenko, 2019). In November 2019, AOC’s Patriarch Theodore II also recognized the autocephaly of the OCU (Tsargrad TV, 2021).

The penchant of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches for autocephaly/autonomy derives from the political process unfolding in post-Soviet countries. ROC’s Patriarch Kirill commented on this process as follows: “They try to involve the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in a deep conflict that divides society, and make it a hostage of this conflict <...> There are violent seizures of churches, court decisions are ignored, a slanderous information campaign against the church is being conducted, bills are being proposed in the Ukrainian parliament, the purpose of which is to discriminate and put the country’s largest religious community in the most difficult conditions <...> Our Church will never leave its brethren in trouble in Ukraine and will not abandon them” (Kosenok et al, 2017).

2020-2021, AOC’s Patriarchate maintains its relations with the OCU. As a response, the ROC began its advancement on the African continent. The first steps were taken in December 2019, when ROC took “Russian-speaking” African Orthodox parishes, where parishioners are citizens of Russia or Russian speakers), to its

jurisdiction. Before that these parishes, like all other Orthodox parishes in the African continent, were under the jurisdiction of AOC.

As the ROC's priest Maximov claims, from this moment on other Africans Orthodox churches are trying to get under the jurisdiction of ROC (Maksimov, 2022). At first ROC's leadership was not ready to consider these applications as it took effort to improve relationships with AOC, but to no avail.

In August 2021, AOC's Patriarch held a joint service with the Patriarch of the OCU (Rossaprimavera, 2021). This joint service was heavily criticised by ROC as ROC considered it as further approval of "schism". Following that ROC conducted research and by December 2021 was ready to accept under ROC's jurisdiction those African Orthodox communities which had applied before. To coordinate these new-coming African Orthodox communities, ROC decided to establish an exarchate on December 29, 2021. On the same day, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church received 102 clerics from 8 African countries under its jurisdiction (Patriarchia, 2021). By the end of July 2022, the number of African clerics who had joined had doubled (Exarchate-Africa, 2011).

According to the "Internal Regulations on the Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa" dated March 24, 2022, "The Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa is a canonical division of the ROC, created in order to coordinate the liturgical, religious and educational, publishing, social, educational and missionary activities of the dioceses and other canonical divisions of the ROC" (Patriarchia, 2022). The African Exarchate included two dioceses - North African (31 countries) and South Africa (23 countries) (ITARTASS, 2022). Metropolitan Klinsky Leonid Gorbachev was appointed head of the exarchate, who stated that the African Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church is "an absolutely new powerful structure on a continental scale that requires scrupulous, detailed study and elaboration" (RIA News, 2022).

Importantly, Metropolitan Klinsky was not chosen by accident as the Head of ROC's African exarchate. For almost 10 years he has been ROC's envoy to AOC. During his service, he visited many African countries, which enabled him to get first-hand knowledge about AOC's policies in Africa. Since the establishment of the African Exarchate, its head Leonid, Metropolitan Klinsky, regularly reports repeatedly on his progress in his telegram channel as well on his official site.

## **THE POSITION OF THE AOC**

AOC reacted painfully to the decision to create the African Exarchate of the ROC and the withdrawal of more than 100 clerics from their jurisdiction in one day.

On January 10-12, 2022, AOC's Holy Synod held an urgent meeting, calling the establishment of the African Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church as "immoral interference by the Russian Church" (Orthodox Times, 2022) which is against the rules of Orthodoxy (Gall, 2019). The AOC's statement published after this meeting stated that "this anti-canonical <...> intervention of the Russian Patriarchate <...> is dictated by motives, which are far from Christian", and that African clergy who come under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church would be severely punished (Gall, 2019).

At the same time, the AOC does not take any responsibility and considers its acknowledgement of OUC's autocephaly as purely legitimate. While explaining its position, AOC points to the fact that the Orthodox Churches of Constantinople and

Hellas acknowledged the autocephaly of the OCU even earlier, in 2019. Moreover, representatives of the Church of Alexandria consider the recognition of the OCU to be lawful in connection with the conflict unfolding in Ukraine after 2014. On its official website, the OCU condemns the creation and expansion of the African Exarchate of the ROC, and also reports on meetings with Orthodox leaders from different countries to clarify its position and motives of the ROC.

A number of Greek, British and American media supported the position of the OCU, and also welcomed the recognition of the autocephaly of the OCU by Fener.

Greek researcher Georgiy Gamakopolous from the Fordham Institute (Fordham) emphasised in an interview with the Atlantic publication that the recognition of Ukraine's autocephaly is a major geopolitical defeat for the Russian Orthodox Church (Deutch, 2019). An article in the American newspaper *The New York Times* states that the Patriarch of Constantinople is the "spiritual leader" of the Orthodox world, and his decision is not subject to dispute (Doroshenko, 2018). According to *Ukrainian Week*, the recognition of autocephaly is a "threat to Russian imperialism" (Tucker, Menhard, 2018).

Employees of the Swedish Institute for Security Policy and Development believe that "for the Kremlin, the Russian Orthodox Church is just a tool <...> for transforming the post-communist geopolitical space in the interests of Russia" (Ukrinform, 2022). An article citing the BBC *Ukraine* argues that the recognition of the autocephaly of the OCU by Patriarch Theodore of Alexandria is a signal to other Orthodox churches, many of which can follow the example of one of the oldest Orthodox churches (Sereti, 2018). The head of the Centre for Ecumenical, Missiological and Natural Research (CEMES), Professor Petro Vasiliadis, said that "most Ukrainians view Russia as an aggressor country, and the Moscow Patriarch as *persona non grata*" (Sherwood, 2019). H. Sherwood, a journalist for the British newspaper *The Guardian*, wrote that the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) accused the Moscow Patriarchate of being a "weapon of the Kremlin" (Interfax, 2022).

## THE POSITION OF THE ROC

The position of the ROC is that the recognition of the autocephaly of the OCU is non-canonical, schismatic and dictated exclusively by political reasons, while the creation of the African Exarchate of the ROC was only a forced reaction to the appeals of Africans who did not want to be associated with the split initiated by Alexandria (Gorbachev, 2022). The head of the African Exarchate, Metropolitan Leonid of Klin, emphasised that the approval of the autocephaly of the OCU was made by Patriarch Theodore alone, without convening the Holy Synod and without consulting the episcopate, which contradicts established rules.

Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church have repeatedly stated that until 2019 they considered Africa a territory under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Alexandria (Patriarchia, 2022). In response to the statement of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church on January 12, 2022, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church responded 10 days later that the decision to establish the African Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church was made only after "the Alexandrian Patriarchate recognized the independence of the Ukrainian schismatics", and that the Russian Orthodox Church does not "claim to be a canonical territory of the ancient Church of Alexandria", but simply "provides canonical protection to those Orthodox clerics

of Africa who do not wish to participate in the lawless legitimization of the schism in Ukraine” (Drevo, 2016).

The ROC sees its task in Africa as helping the Orthodox in their striving not to be involved in a church schism. The question of schism and schismatics is a painful one for the church environment. After the autocephaly of the OCU, which was recognized by the AOC, Orthodox Russians on the African continent could no longer attend the AOC churches, as this is equated with support for the Ukrainian “schismatics”. And the Orthodox priests sent by the Russian Orthodox Church to Africa were no longer ready to mention the Patriarch of Alexandria during the service.

As it says in the second canon of the Council of Antioch, “<...> let it not be allowed to have communion with those who are excommunicated <...> If any of the bishops, presbyters, deacons, or any of the clergy turns out to be communicating with those who are excommunicated, let him himself be out of communion ecclesiastical as producing confusion in the church order” (Maximov, 2021). That is, one who enters into communion with schismatics becomes a schismatic himself. Thus, following the second canon of the Council of Antioch, it is permissible to take under one’s jurisdiction clerics who would like to save themselves from schism (Mikolenko, 2022).

Some representatives of the ROC express the point of view that the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church in Africa is not unconditional and that the Russian Orthodox Church is simply restoring its canonical presence in Africa. According to the priest of the Russian Orthodox Church and a member of the Expert Council under the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on countering religious extremism, Georgy Maksimov, who at the same time is most probably the second person in the Exarchate, highlights that until the 20th century the Patriarchate of Alexandria did not claim the entire African continent as its canonical territory. The generally recognized canonical territory of the Patriarchate of Alexandria was the area of modern Libya, Egypt, and Ethiopia (Maximov, 2019).

Closer to 1930, Patriarch Metaxakis of Alexandria decided that the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church of Alexandria should extend to the entire African continent and began to call himself “Patriarch of Alexandria and all Africa” (Maximov, 2019). The decision of Metaxakis was of a one-man nature and was not coordinated with other churches.

De facto, the expansion of the Alexandrian Throne on the African continent has only been undertaken in the second half of the 20th century. For a long time, other Orthodox churches neither criticised nor supported Alexandria’s activities in Africa. Only in 2001 did Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople issue a tomos recognizing the jurisdiction of the AOC in Africa.

At the same time, the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa has its own history. Even before the decision of Patriarch Metaxakis, parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate were established on the African continent: in 1914 in Egypt (1914); in Bizerte, Tunisia (1920); in Algeria (1922); in Rabat, Casablanca, Morocco (1927) (Mikolenko, 2022).

Thus, according to G. Maksimov, since the Church of Alexandria chose the path of schism, the ROC undertook efforts to restore its jurisdiction on the African continent, the history of which goes back more than a hundred years.

### **Reasons for Active Transition of African Churches to the ROC**

The reasons why many African clerics readily come under the jurisdiction of the ROC have raised many questions. In December 2021, during the creation of the African Exarchate, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church accepted a petition from 102 African clerics. According to ROC Priest G. Maksimov, on January 14, 2022, about half of all Orthodox clerics in Africa filed a petition to transfer to the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church (Maksimov, 2022). At the same time, the African clergy are well aware that the transition is fraught with serious consequences for both the African churches and their priests who made such a decision (Kulchytsky, 2019).

Exarch Metropolitan Leonid identifies the following reasons: disagreement with the recognition of the autocephaly of the OCU for “canonical reasons”; social problems ignored by the AOC, and “weak care for the flock” (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2019). Whereas this opinion may be considered biased and one-sided, let’s look at some of the reasons in more detail.

Firstly, a number of African clerics agree with the ROC that the recognition of the autocephaly of the OCU by the Alexandrian Orthodox Church is a non-canonical schism associated with political reasons. At the end of December 2019, 102 African clerics expressed their disagreement with the recognition of the OCU in open and several closed letters to Alexandria (Maximov, 2019). When the African clergy sees that Constantinople is interfering in the politics of Ukraine, they may begin to wonder if the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople might one day interfere in the political life of African countries? Even now, the Patriarch of Alexandria did not involve the African clergy in any way in the discussion of the issue of the autocephaly of the OCU (Maximov, 2019). According to Metropolitan Leonid, when the Patriarch of Alexandria arrived in an African country, when asked by the clergy about the autocephaly of the OCU, he answered: “It’s none of your business, it’s between me and Patriarch Kirill” (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2019).

Secondly, African clerics are not satisfied with the attitude of the AOC towards its clergy. G. Maksimov, a priest of ROC who visited many Orthodox parishes on the African continent, mentions the lack of career growth for priests as one of the reasons. With a population of more than 1 billion on the African continent, about 10 million in Greece, about 1 million in Cyprus, out of 37 bishops of the AOC (bishop is the highest rank in the “white” clergy), only 5 are Africans, 1 is an Arab and 31 are Greek (Pew Research Center, 2001). The bishops of the Orthodox Church do not live in Africa permanently: they live in Greece and visit Africa for about two weeks a year, give Greek flags to local residents, distribute humanitarian aid (including second-hand clothes), take a few photos for reports and they rush home (Pew Research Center, 2001).

G. Maksimov mentions segregation as another reason for dissatisfaction. For example, in Zambia, in one parish there are two different Orthodox churches “unofficially” for whites and for blacks and as result of such discrimination an African cannot enter a church for whites (Pew Research Center, 2001). When the Patriarch of Alexandria arrived in Tanzania, he met only with the Greeks and did not even go out to the African priests.

Among the situations in which G. Maksimov was not personally present, but which he heard about, was the case when a Greek bishop publicly reprimanded an

African cleric in the Congo, calling him a “black monkey” (Maksimov, 2022). Of course, there have been pastors among Greek missionaries who have had a loving attitude toward African parishioners and clergy, but such pastors have not reflected the overall policy of the AOC (Maksimov, 2022).

Another important fact - the Orthodox churches in Africa are completely dependent on funds coming from Alexandria (Pew Research Center, 2001). Local residents, businesses and other organisations are not allowed to make donations. At the same time, the problem of underfunding is visible. Since the remuneration of African priests of the AOC is less than \$100, they have to work after the service in the church. Priest Maksimov cites the story of a Tanzanian priest whom he knew, who died of exhaustion after the refusal of the Patriarch of Alexandria to provide him with financial assistance (Maksimov, 2022).

### **Prospect of ROC on the African continent**

While discussing the future perspectives of the ROC on the African continent, we should consider two main issues: whether the ROC is interested in expanding its influence in Africa, and what conditions are favourable and which may have a negative impact on the growth of its influence.

According to the statements of the leadership of the exarchate, the ROC never sought to challenge the AOC in Africa and decided to do it now, only when all other possibilities were exhausted. Does this mean that if the AOC suddenly abandons the OCU, the exarchate of the ROC in Africa will be disbanded? In a speech dated February 16, 2022 The head of the African Exarchate, Metropolitan Leonid, said that the exarchate would not be dissolved even in the event of normalisation of relations with the AOC: “If tomorrow the blessed Patriarch of Alexandria Theodore withdraws his decision to recognize the schismatic OCU, we will immediately sit down at the negotiating table and look for a compromise <...> But the Exarchate will not be abolished <...>” (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2019).

The high degree of interest of the ROC in strengthening its position in Africa is indicated by the goals and objectives that it sets for itself. According to Metropolitan Leonid, the exarchate has identified a number of short-term and long-term steps that are not limited to spiritual development. The strategy is related to “a wide range of areas from providing a humanitarian mission”, including humanitarian aid, medical care, infrastructure projects, to protecting the rights of Christians. Among the tasks that the exarchate immediately began to solve is helping priests and families who were kicked out of the AOC “on the street”. Among the strategic points, he mentions a special training of the African episcopate. Students from Africa have already been selected who will soon begin their studies in Moscow under the mentorship of Exarch Leonid. In addition to it the exarchate actively holds meetings with African presidents, prime ministers, heads of diplomatic departments.

Furthermore the internal motivation of the exarchate, as well as the availability of mostly state resources, it is necessary to consider external factors - the conditions in which the African Exarchate will have to implement its policy.

External factors include the growing popularity of Christianity on the African continent. In 1910, most Africans professed indigenous African religions, and only less than 20% were adherents of Christianity or Islam. By 2010, more than 85% of Africans belonged to either Christianity or Islam (Alfeev et al, 2018). As of 2018,

there were only about 500 Orthodox Christians in Africa despite the fact that the total number of Christians in Africa is about 600 million (Poznyak, 2017). Syncretic trends dominate among Christian movements on the African continent: neo-Pentecostal or charismatic churches, as well as African independent churches, which are considered non-canonical or “sects” by the ROC.

A potential challenge for the ROC in Africa is the gender issue. Churches are expected to be involved in the fight against gender-based violence and the emancipation of women in general. The African Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church should be prepared for the fact that the absence of female priests may make Orthodox churches less competitive in Africa.

## CONCLUSION

The creation of the Patriarchal Exarchate in Africa is an epochal event, more than just the restoration of the ROC's presence on the African continent or the use of “soft power” in the geopolitical struggle. Nevertheless, the significance of the creation of the exarchate lies more in the symbolic plane than in the practical one. Before talking about the large-scale presence of the exarchate in Africa, the number of African clerics who have joined the ROC should “grow” in different ways many times, which will require large resources. Successful implementation of such a large-scale project is possible only with the support of society and various government agencies.

Another possible challenge will be whether the African Exarchate will be able to adopt more flexible policy, not only to accept gender diversity among the clergy of the church, but also to speak the same language with its flock, accepting the diverse cultural and linguistic diversity of the continent.

Finally, in order to successfully spread the influence of the ROC in the long term, it is important to deal not only with solving specific pressing problems, be it difficulties with drinking water or the fate of priests expelled from their homes, but also to build a strategy for spreading traditional Orthodox values on the African continent, built on a verified compromise between respect for local traditions and culture, on the one hand, and adherence to the basic and most significant Orthodox principles, rules - on the other hand.

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# AFRICA POLICY OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES

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**Abstract:** Since the early 2000s, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been paying special attention to the development of political and economic ties with African countries. Fundamentally, Africa policy of the UAE has come to reflect imperatives of external and internal security (e.g. countering Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood movement, ensuring food security) and commercial interests of the ruling elite (servicing trade and financial flows between East, West and South). Economic cooperation between the UAE and Africa is already comparable in scale with that of other major partners of the continent – European countries, China, India, and the United States. For some countries in Africa, the UAE has become a leading trading partner. The UAE also increasingly began to act as a direct investor in Africa. Transport, port infrastructure, airports, telecommunications and tourism have become the main areas of application of Emirati investments. The UAE also developed military ties with Africa. In particular, the UAE engaged in military construction on the Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden and also intervened in the conflict in Libya. Africa policy of the UAE is characterized by a bold combination of economic and military-political cooperation. The intensive use of mechanisms of soft and hard power by the UAE in Africa has dramatically strengthened the position of Abu Dhabi on the continent, but has also significantly increased political risks as the country has become entangled in Africa's conflicts and domestic politics.

**Keywords:** UAE, Africa, foreign policy, investment, military relations.

## INTRODUCTION

In 2021, the United Arab Emirates celebrated its 50th Anniversary of Independence. On December 2, 1971, six of the seven emirates of the British protectorate of the Trucial States announced the establishment of an independent federation called the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The seventh emirate, Ras Al Khaimah, joined the federation on February 10, 1972. The independent development of the UAE was accompanied by notable economic growth and social progress, but little political change. Just like at the beginning of its independent history, 50 years later, the UAE is still a union of seven absolute monarchies. The general policy of the UAE is determined by the Federal Supreme Council, which consists of the heads (emirs) of the seven emirates. While major decisions are made by simple majority vote, only the emirs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai have veto power. The federal government is responsible for dealing with issues related to defense, foreign policy, immigration, citizenship, health care, justice, and education (“United Arab Emirates’s Constitu-

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tion,” p. 25-26). The state is traditionally headed by the head of the richest emirate – Abu Dhabi, while the government is led by the emir of the second most important member of the federation – Dubai. In fact, these two emirates control the UAE and its foreign policy. After Abu Dhabi provided a \$10 billion loan to Dubai in 2009 to prevent the bankruptcy of the latter, the role of the richest emirate in political decision-making in the UAE has become exceptionally high (“Constructing Commercial Empire,” 2019).

For 33 years (1971–2004) and until his death, the UAE was presided over by Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, Emir of Abu Dhabi, an influential and charismatic leader who was guided by the principles of Arab and Muslim solidarity and contributed to the emergence of the Emirates as an important player and mediator in conflicts in the Gulf region. In 2004, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, son of the late Zayed bin Sultan became Emir of Abu Dhabi and, accordingly, the president of the UAE. Under Khalifa bin Zayed, his brother Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan Al Nahyan, as well as Emir of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, became the main decision-makers of UAE foreign policy (Almezzaini, 2012, p. 45). During this period Africa became a significant foreign policy vector for the Emirates. After Khalifa bin Zayed suffered a stroke in 2014, Mohamed bin Zayed became the *de facto* ruler of Abu Dhabi and the entire UAE. In May 2022, Khalifa bin Zayed died, and Mohamed bin Zayed formally ascended the presidency and consolidated his grip on the UAE and its foreign policy.

## APPLIED METHODS

Methodologically, the study drew on primary (state and corporate) and secondary (scholarly and media) sources to identify and analyze fundamental processes and forces of change within the overarching paradigms of International Relations. The author applied various methods – analysis (including media content analysis), concretization, generalization and grouping of information, functional and comparative analyses – to critically assess information and achieve results. Furthermore, the application of the principle of historicism allowed the author to evaluate the UAE’s Africa policy as a holistic historical process, to highlight the patterns of its development, and to identify key drivers of change. Accordingly, the study employs an integrated approach to the processes and phenomena under consideration.

## FINDINGS

It will be argued that the Africa policy of the UAE closely intertwines the issues of external and internal security of the state (countering Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood and ensuring food security) and commercial interests of its ruling elite (servicing trade and financial flows between the East, West and South). As far as security issues are concerned, the UAE responded preventively, greatly increasing its military footprint in North and East Africa and adjacent maritime areas and interfering in internal African matters on a number of occasions. As for the economic dimension, on the one hand, the UAE used its companies to strengthen Emirati soft power in Africa; on the other hand, diplomatic channels and political pressure endowed national (often family) Emirati businesses with a competitive advantage in a number of African countries. Overall, over the past two decades, the UAE has become one

of the key political and economic foreign actors in Africa. The UAE's Africa policy has been increasingly assertive and multidimensional, with the Gulf state simultaneously becoming a top investor and trading partner of the continent and establishing there an unprecedented (for a non-Western actor) military presence. In Africa, the UAE has effectively conjugated its two main foreign policy goals – countering the rise of political Islam and emerging as the principal financial and logistical gateway between all parts of the Old World.

## **DISCUSSION: THE UAE'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES**

Under the new leadership since 2004, the foreign policy of the UAE has undergone major changes. In an attempt to strengthen its international position, in 2007 the UAE joined an alliance of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan (the so-called “Arab Quartet”), whose activities were primarily aimed at containing – with the support of the West – the influence of Iran and Shiites in the Middle East. In 2010, Abu Dhabi joined the sanctions against Tehran, despite the importance of trade with Iran for the Emirati economy and close Arab-Iranian cultural ties. At the same time, the territorial dispute between Abu Dhabi and Tehran over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, located at the mouth of the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz, which had been occupied by Shah Iran back in 1971 and historically had been part of the Persian Empire, escalated noticeably. The location of these three islands has long been strategically important, but at the present time their importance has especially increased, since a third of the world's seaborne transportation of oil and over a quarter of the world's exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) are carried out through this area (“The Strait of Hormuz,” 2019). In general, the main characteristics of the foreign policy of the UAE since 2004 have included the strengthening of military-political ties with Western countries (primarily the United States and France), worsening relations with Iran, less involvement in intra-Arab affairs and more interest in Africa (Almezaini, 2012, p. 46).

Mohamed bin Zayed's personal prioritization of establishing strategic ties with the United States may be traced to the early 1990s, when the “favorite son” of Zayed bin Sultan convinced his father to transfer \$4 billion to the US treasury to cover some of the costs of the 1990–1991 Gulf War. In 1991, shortly after the end of the war, the prince arrived in Washington as Commander-in-Chief of the UAE Air Force to acquire US-made attack helicopters and multi-role fighters in such numbers that the US Congress expressed fears that the deal would completely destabilize the Gulf region. A representative of the US State Department had to convince congressmen that the UAE “would never become a threat to stability and peace in the region” (“The Most Powerful Arab Ruler,” 2019).

According to Western diplomats, Mohamed bin Zayed is obsessed with the fight against Iran and the Islamist movement Muslim Brotherhood (“The Most Powerful Arab Ruler,” 2019); Tehran is considered to be dangerous to the UAE as a potential hegemon in the Gulf and a sponsor of Shiite parties and groups throughout the Arab world, so mostly poses an external threat to the security of the Emirates, while the Brotherhood is seen as an internal, direct threat to the state structure of the Emirates, since the Brothers seek to win the support of the main part of the Emirati popula-

tion – Sunni Muslims. The political goals of the Brothers run counter to the internal policy of the UAE leadership, which is aimed at further strengthening of the monarchical system. Emirati officials have publicly stated that the Muslim Brotherhood is destroying the “integrity and sovereignty of states”, poses a “serious threat to the security of the Gulf”, and plans to “seize power in all states of the Gulf” (Braude, 2013). In the eyes of the ruling elite of the UAE, Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups have a lot in common, as they spread Islamist ideologies at the international level (“Intra-Gulf Competition,” 2019).

In addition to dealing with the Islamist threat, Mohamed bin Zayed has been facing the challenge of diversifying the UAE’s economy by reducing its dependence on hydrocarbon exports. The tactics chosen by the government of the Emirates is the establishment of the UAE as a trade and financial hub – a kind of “gateway” between various parts of the Old World, including between African countries and China. According to experts, the launch of the Chinese Maritime Silk Road project has become a catalyst for Emirati activity in the African direction (dos Santos, 2015). Since the ruling families of Abu Dhabi (Al Nahyan), Dubai (Al Maktoum) and other emirates hold controlling stakes in most Emirati corporations, the foreign policy of the UAE in Africa has become, in fact, a derivative of the commercial interests of the tribal aristocracy. It is also important to note that Africa has become one of the most important sources of food products for the Emirates, which is dependent on the continent for 90% of its food imports.

## **A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

Africa, especially its East Coast, served as an important trade direction for historical Oman (the territory of modern UAE and Oman, or eastern Arabia) even in the ancient period. Arab navigators used the steady seasonal winds to navigate towards the African continent in December and return to the coast of Arabia in March. A significant proportion of the goods they purchased in Africa – ivory, rhino horn, tortoiseshell and palm oil – were then resold to India. Later, during the Islamic period, Omani traders began to establish trading posts on Africa’s East Coast – in Malindi and Mombasa (modern Kenya), on the islands of Kilwa and Zanzibar (Tanzania), and in Sofala (Mozambique) (Voronkov, 2012, p. 82-83).

At the beginning of the 16th century, the Portuguese carried out a swift (by historical standards) campaign to capture and subjugate ports on the coast of the Indian Ocean. In 1507, Portugal conquered the city and fortress of Hormuz (Iran) on the shores of the eponymous strait, and then a number of coastal cities of historical Oman itself, and for a long time restricted the participation of the Omanis in the trading system of the Indian Ocean. Only at the end of the 17th century, the Omanis managed to restore their trading positions in East Africa, freeing Mombasa, Kilwa and Zanzibar from the Portuguese. In the 18th century, Omani merchants once again occupied a crucial position in the trade between India and East Africa, successfully competing with the British East India Company. However, already at the beginning of the 19th century, as a result of British military expeditions, Oman became a protectorate of the United Kingdom, which received full control over the foreign trade of the territory, which in turn led to the practical elimination of the Omani merchant class. It was only after gaining independence in 1971 that the con-



stituent emirates of the UAE got the opportunity to independently develop maritime trade with other states (Voronkov, 2012, p. 84-85).

In the early years of independent development, the Emirates faced a number of foreign policy challenges. In addition to Iran's already mentioned annexation of the three islands, Abu Dhabi was shocked by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (the Yom Kippur War), which ended in Israeli military victory. In 1973, the UAE joined the Arab oil embargo on the United States, which provided significant logistical support to Tel Aviv during the conflict. In the 1970s, the Arab-Israeli confrontation became an important factor in the UAE's Africa policy. For instance, the central theme of the 1977 Arab-African summit in Cairo was the condemnation of Israel. The UAE and other Gulf monarchies for many years continued to provide financial assistance to African countries that severed relations with the Jewish state. At the same time, Abu Dhabi took an emphatically neutral position in another important confrontation in the region – the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war – and tried to mediate between warring states. In 1990–1991, Abu Dhabi participated in the Gulf War on the side of the international coalition, but in the aftermath of hostilities the monarchy provided large-scale humanitarian assistance to Iraq (Almezaini, 2012, p. 41).

The crisis in Kuwait has clearly demonstrated the inability of the Arabian monarchies to independently protect themselves from external aggression. In this connection, the UAE and other countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf<sup>2</sup> (GCC) started to give priority to collective forms of deterrence of potential aggressors, with a special emphasis on obtaining security guarantees from the United States and other Western states. In 1994–1996, the UAE signed defense and security cooperation agreements with the US, UK and France. Thus, under President Zayed ibn Sultan until 2004, the military doctrine of the Emirates was purely defensive in nature and was based on the military-political union of the GCC member states and security guarantees provided by leading Western countries. The economic policy also remained quite conservative and focused on the development of oil production.

The beginning of the 21st century proved “stormy” in the Gulf. Several individuals born in the Arabian Peninsula took part in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, with half of the terrorists flying directly from Dubai and the rest having visited the UAE shortly before the attacks (“The 9/11 Commission,” 2004). Financial ties between Al Qaeda and Emirati companies were widely reported in the American press (“UAE: Financial and Transit Hub,” 2017). As a result, the US government demanded from the Emirates not only tougher measures to combat terrorism, but also to reform the political system. Zayed bin Sultan, who rightly feared that large-scale reforms would lead to the end of the monarchy, limited himself to cosmetic measures, but the apprehension of Islamic radicalism penetrated all government bodies of the UAE (Almezaini, 2012, p. 42).

Despite the fact that the Emirates opposed the invasion of US troops and their allies in Iraq in 2003, they unwittingly found themselves drawn into the campaign on the side of the allied coalition. The main outcome of the war for the region was the disruption of the fragile balance of power between Iraq, Iran and the Arab monarchies: Baghdad was taken out of the game, and Tehran was steadily building up its military power and influence in the region. The aggravation of relations between

2 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Gulf Cooperation Council – GCC) was established in 1981 by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman.

the Gulf countries and Iran under the circumstances became a matter of time. The events of the Arab Spring in 2011 further complicated the geopolitical situation in the region, bringing the Muslim Brotherhood and their sponsors, Turkey and Qatar (“Hearing,” 2018), to the forefront.

## THE TRADE AND INVESTMENT DIMENSION

On February 9, 2020, in Addis Ababa, Reem Al Hashimi, the UAE’s Minister of State for International Cooperation, spoke to representatives of the member countries of the African Union about a new Emirati project for Africa. Called the *Consortium for Africa*, the project involved a \$500 million investment in digital technology and youth (“UAE Consortium for Africa,” 2020). The initiative was no coincidence: the UAE had become one of the largest investors in Africa. Although trade and economic relations between the Emirates and African countries began to develop in the 1970s, their explosive growth took place at the beginning of the 21st century. Indeed, this has been also facilitated by the UAE’s rapid economic development: whereas in 1999 the country’s GDP stood at \$84 billion, in 2014 it surpassed \$400 billion (“United Arab Emirates GDP,” 2022).

Just in 2002–2013 non-oil trade between the UAE and African countries increased by 700% (dos Santos, 2015). A significant part of it was for re-export, but the UAE has increasingly begun to act as a direct investor. In 2016, the Emirates took the 2nd (after China) place in the world in terms of annual investment in Africa – it invested more than \$11 billion (“EY’s Attractiveness Program,” 2017), and the volume of accumulated investments by 2018 exceeded \$25 billion. In terms of trade with African countries in 2018, (about \$48 billion) the UAE was in the 5th place in the world (after the EU, China, India and the USA) among non-African players. By 2020, trade turnover fell to \$46 billion due mostly to COVID-19 restrictions, yet the UAE became the second largest market in the world after China for African products (over \$28 billion in annual value) (“Bilateral Trade,” 2020). For some countries in Africa, the UAE has become a leading trading partner (Kostelyanets, 2014, p. 33). Transport, port infrastructure, airports, telecommunications and tourism have become the main areas of application of Emirati investments.

The UAE purposefully developed transport and logistics infrastructure, becoming a key hub connecting Asia and Europe with Africa. In 2000, DP World, one of the world’s largest port operators, came to Africa, taking control of a terminal in Djibouti. In 2012, DP World completed the construction of a container terminal in the port of Dakar (Senegal), which became the most productive and modern container terminal in West Africa. As of 2020, DP World operated seaport terminals in Africa in Dakar, Djazair (Algiers) and Djen-Djen (Algeria), Sokhna (Egypt), Berbera (Somaliland), Maputo (Mozambique), Luanda (Angola), as well as dry ports in Komatipoort (South Africa) and Kigali (Rwanda) (“DP World,” 2020). The latter is one of the largest logistics projects in Africa, designed to expand Rwanda’s trade exchange with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi (“Dry Port,” 2019).

Etisalat, another Emirati transnational corporation, is one of the largest mobile operators in the world (more than 150 million subscribers). The African market has been a priority for the company for more than 20 years. In 1999, Etisalat bought a stake in the Tanzanian operator Zantel, and this was the company’s first invest-

ment outside the UAE. In 2004, Etisalat became a co-owner of the operator Canar (Sudan), in 2005 it acquired Atlantique Telecom (Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo, Niger, Central African Republic, Gabon and Côte d'Ivoire), in 2007 – EMTS (Nigeria), in 2014 – Maroc Telecom (Morocco). As of 2019, Etisalat owned the following shares in telecom operators in Africa: 66% of Etisalat Misr (Egypt), 48% of Moov (Benin, CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger and Togo), 48% of Tigo (Chad), 25% of Gabon Telecom (Gabon), 48% of Maroc Telecom (Morocco), 30% of Onatel (Burkina Faso), 25% of Sotelma (Mali), and 20% of Mauritel (Mauritania) (“Etisalat,” 2019). By 2021, Etisalat slightly increased its share in most of the listed African operators and also consolidated its holdings in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Mauritania under the brand Moov (“Etisalat Annual Reports,” 2022). In 2019, Etisalat joined the consortium building the Africa-1 submarine telecommunications cable worth \$600 million and 20,000 km long, which should be ready for service by the end of 2023. It will run along the northern and eastern coasts of the continent, connecting Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar and South Africa, and will also land in France, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Pakistan (“Africa-1 Submarine Cable,” 2019).

Emirates – one of the world's largest airlines, which is based in Dubai, ranked 3rd (after Turkish Airlines and Air France) in 2015 in terms of the number of destinations in Africa among non-African carriers (“Turkish Airlines,” 2014). In 2022, Emirates operated flights to 22 cities on the African continent. Approximately 10% of the airline's revenue came from the African direction (“Flights to Africa,” 2022). The UAE's second largest airline, Etihad, in 2020 had 5 destinations in Africa (“Etihad Airways,” 2020).

Other Emirati companies active in Africa include Royal Group, Shafa Al Nahda and Essar Projects (Construction), LuLu Group (Retail), Dubai Islamic Bank and Nimai Capital (Finance), Al-Dahra (Agriculture), Emirates Global Aluminium (mining), Yahsat (satellite communications), investment funds Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, The Investment Corporation of Dubai, Dubai Holding and Khalifa Fund for Enterprise Development, etc. (“GCC governments,” 2019). In addition, many African companies have moved their headquarters to Dubai or Abu Dhabi (“Constructing Commercial Empire,” 2019).

Emirati investments play an important role in narrowing Africa's infrastructure gap, which is considered one of the key obstacles to the development of national economies and the deepening of integration processes among the countries of the continent. Although companies from the UAE tend to follow the government's strategy of redirecting trade, financial and human flows between Africa and the world through the Emirati hub, a number of projects also aim at developing intra-continental transport and telecommunications links.

Experts consider the largest UAE corporations, in particular DP World, as the instruments of Emirati foreign policy. However, it seems that the relationship between Emirati business and UAE leaders is more symbiotic. For instance, the ruler of Dubai, Emirati Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum owns 80% of DP World (“Dubai Ports World,” 2020), while Emirates, Etisalat and most other major Emirati companies are controlled by public investment funds. State-linked firms are always set to capitalize on any improvement in bilateral ties, while Emirati diplomats effectuate return on investment in the broadest sense (Mason & Mabon, 2022, p. 105-106).

## **THE MILITARY-POLITICAL DIMENSION**

In the 2010s, the Africa policy of the UAE underwent significant changes: the emphasis shifted towards military-political activity. During this period, the Emirates built several military bases in the region, took a direct part in operations against Islamists in Libya, Somalia and the Egyptian Sinai (“The Most Powerful Arab Ruler,” 2019), and also contributed to the success of military coups in Egypt and Sudan. On a less controversial note, the UAE facilitated a peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which was signed in 2018.

The reason behind the intensification of foreign policy activities in Africa was twofold: on the one hand, it was the proliferation of piracy off the coast of Somalia, which threatened commercial interests of the UAE, and, on the other hand, the Arab Spring, which threatened to undermine the foundations of the monarchical regime. As Mohamed bin Zayed noted, in 2011 the UAE “suddenly found itself to be the only stable Arab state out of 22” (“Constructing Commercial Empire,” 2019). In 2010, the Emirates joined the international campaign against Somali pirates, which for many of its participants became an excuse to establish a permanent military presence in East Africa. In the context of ensuring the safety of navigation, since 2010 military installations of Italy, Japan and China have appeared in the region (see, e.g.: Kostelyanets & Okeke, 2018). The UAE has also joined the fight against the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab, which has been operating in Somalia since the mid-2000s (Kostelyanets, 2017, p. 121). The Emirates has entered into cooperation agreements with the Federal Government of Somalia and the authorities of the autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland. As part of these agreements, the Emiratis helped create the Puntland Maritime Police and built a military training base near Mogadishu to train the Somali National Army.

The events of the Arab Spring provided the Muslim Brotherhood with an opportunity to noticeably strengthen its political positions in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, which caused great concern in Abu Dhabi. Although the UAE Air Force took part in the NATO air campaign against the forces of the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the Emirates did not receive the political and economic dividends in post-Gaddafi Libya that they had expected. Moreover, in 2012, Mohamed Morsi, a representative of the Brotherhood, came to power in Egypt, which threatened to radically change the balance of power in the Middle East, weaken the Gulf monarchies, and infect their societies with a “spirit of change” under the banner of political Islam.

With the support of the UAE (and Saudi Arabia), the legitimately elected President of Egypt Morsi was removed during a military coup in 2013. The Emirates acted similarly in Sudan in 2019, where, on the wave of popular discontent, they brought to power the Sudanese military, who took on a commitment to rid the country of the influence of the Brothers. The issue of Iran’s influence in the Horn of Africa was largely resolved by the UAE and Saudi Arabia back in 2014-2015 in the course of negotiations with Eritrea, Djibouti and Sudan. These African countries, which had previously provided Tehran with the opportunity to use their ports to transport weapons to Palestine, Lebanon, Somalia and Yemen, agreed to lower the level of relations with the Islamic Republic and support the actions of the Arab coalition in the war against the Houthis in Yemen in exchange for substantial economic assistance (see, e.g.: Kostelyanets, 2016).

In 2015, in the Eritrean city of Assab, the UAE began the construction of an extensive military base, including an airfield, sea docks and a tank base. According to some reports, the total cost of the 30-year lease of the base for Abu Dhabi was to be set at \$500 million (“The UAE Joins,” 2018). In 2021, however, the base was abandoned as Emirati involvement in the conflict in Yemen was scaled down. In 2017, the Emirates embarked on another project – the creation of a naval base and a commercial port (managed by DP World) in Berbera. Under a 25-year lease agreement, the UAE committed to invest \$1 billion in infrastructure projects in Somaliland (“Somaliland,” 2017). Although the President of Somaliland announced in 2019 that the UAE base would be converted into a civilian facility (“Somaliland UAE military base,” 2019), the Emirates still face the economic challenge of linking Berbera with Ethiopia via a transport corridor in order to compete more effectively in the lucrative Ethiopian market.

In the mid-2010s, the UAE began to provide significant military support to the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, which opposed the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Coincidentally, GNA enjoyed the support of Qatar, Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2017, an Emirati air base has been operating in Libya, near the city of El Marj, from which unmanned aerial vehicles of the UAE Air Force have been supporting the LNA (“UN team,” 2018).

In recent years, the UAE has significantly stepped up its diplomatic activity in the Sahel, seeking to strengthen its position against various Islamist groups in the region, including those supported by Turkey, Qatar or Iran. As part of this strategy, the Emirates provides support to the joint multinational anti-terrorist forces of the Sahel Five (the G5 Sahel Joint Force), which comprises military units from Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. In 2019, the UAE donated 30 armored vehicles to Mali (“On the Delivery,” 2020). In the same year, rumors appeared about the creation of an Emirati military base in northern Niger (“The Emirates,” 2019), though this has never materialized. In early 2020, during the visit of the Mauritanian leader Mohamed Ould Ghazouani to Abu Dhabi, cooperation in the field of military activities and security was discussed, and the establishment of an Emirati military facility near the border with Algeria was mentioned in Mauritanian press (“Mauritania,” 2020). It seemed that these rumors were not groundless, although the discussions probably focused on granting rights to the UAE special forces to use these bases periodically.

African countries also played an important role as suppliers of manpower against the background of the unwillingness of the Arabs of the Gulf to suffer heavy losses in ground operations in Yemen and in Libya. Sudanese, Eritreans and Somalis fought on the side of the coalition against the Yemeni Houthis, while mercenaries from Chad, Sudan and some other countries of the continent participated in battles on the side of Libya’s LNA.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Although the Africa policy of the UAE may currently be characterized by a fairly effective combination of politics and economics, in many respects it is a forced response of the Emirates to security threats, which include the military-political strengthening of Iran and the general increase in tension in the Gulf; the growing

popularity of political Islam, which does not accept monarchical forms of government, in the Arab world; and the growing volatility of the global hydrocarbon market, which requires oil-producing states to make efforts to diversify their economies. At the same time, the risks associated with such an aggressive Africa policy of the UAE are very significant. The combination of hard power and economic presence has considerably strengthened the UAE's positions on the continent, yet Abu-Dhabi's disposition to interfere in domestic politics and conflicts in African countries poses immeasurable risks to the long-term viability of its Africa policy. The conflict involving the Emirates in Libya is especially difficult to resolve, and the deployment of Turkish military forces in this African country has shown that other players are also ready to raise the stakes in the struggle for influence on the continent. In fact, since then the UAE have turned toward rapprochement with Turkey and reduced its military footprint in the region. However, Abu Dhabi's interference in the internal affairs of African countries still undermines the sovereignty of the latter, increases political turbulence, and coincidentally also forms a negative image of the Arab monarchy among Africans. For example, dozens of protests took place in Sudan against the UAE's interference in the country's affairs and the sending of Sudanese mercenaries to Libya.

On the other hand, the scale of the UAE's economic cooperation with Africa is already comparable with that of other major partners of Africa – European countries, China, India, and the United States. The importance of Emirati companies, primarily DP World, which already operates over 70 ports in 40 countries of the world, for the development of the infrastructure of the continent and its integration into the world economy is difficult to overestimate. The competition of Emirati and other companies for servicing the trade and financial flows of the young and developing continent opens up more opportunities for Africans and allows them to choose the best terms, which contributes to the prosperity of Africa.

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# REASONS FOR THE INTRODUCTION, EFFECTS AND ROLE OF MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

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**Abstract:** The aim of the paper is to analyze international sanctions in the third decade of the 21st century. International sanctions are non-violent actions that individual states undertake against other states to force them to change certain foreign and domestic policy aspects that are considered unacceptable. Sanctions, introduced by one country, or an international organization are divided into unilateral and multilateral. Sanctions are usually divided into three forms: diplomatic (restriction or complete termination of diplomatic relations), economic (usually related to the prohibition of trade, usually related to weapons), and military sanctions. The aim of the paper is to analyze the current economic multilateral sanctions against the Russian Federation. The purpose of the introduction of sweeping sanctions is to try to overthrow the current government, which made it impossible to implement the policy that led to the introduction of the sanctions. Descriptive and comparative methods and scientific articles were used in the paper together with announcements by regulators, websites of relevant institutions, books, etc. Data on monthly oil and gas production, exports, inflows, and outflows of capital, mandatory financial reports of large companies, data on the monetary base of the central bank, data on direct foreign investments, and data on lending are observed. The paper shows that the general public is actually deprived of a large number of essential statistical data that was updated on a monthly basis until February 2022. Namely, one of the key reasons why there is doubt about the effectiveness of sanctions is that not enough relevant economic indicators are coming from Russia. Instead, optimistic Russian economic analyses, forecasts, and projections are transmitted. The work indicates that there are certain misconceptions among experts and the general public regarding sanctions. The conclusion is that certain sanctions, such as bans related to agricultural products and artificial fertilizers, have been relaxed. However, all sanctions are introduced to hurt the country and lead to regime change. The paper raises numerous questions arising from the fact that there is great uncertainty that has led to a slowdown in economic activity at the global level.

**Keywords:** *international sanctions, economic sanctions, multilateral sanctions, international relations..*

## INTRODUCTION

In the 20th century, and especially after the Second World War, international sanctions gained great popularity as one of the instruments of international politics. Their biggest advantage is that - along with diplomacy - they represent the most

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effective possible alternative to war as a means of resolving international disputes. Mulder notes that, after the Second World War, the reasons for sanctions multiplied. Since then, the following have come into consideration: human rights violations, pressure on dictators to democratize their countries, suspension of nuclear programs, punishment or at least extradition of those accused of war crimes, release of political prisoners, etc (Mulder, 2022). The same author points out that sanctions, as a rule, do not cost those who introduce them anything, since they do not affect their electorate.

International sanctions are political and economic decisions that are part of diplomatic efforts by countries, multilateral or regional organizations against states or organizations either to protect national security interests, or to protect international law, and defend against threats to international peace and security (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott & Oegg, 2007). These decisions principally include the temporary imposition on a target of economic, trade, diplomatic, cultural or other restrictions (sanctions measures) that are lifted when the motivating security concerns no longer apply, or when no new threats have arisen (Cortright, et. al. 2000). Proponents of international sanctions argue that they have become even more effective thanks to economic, political and cultural trends at the end of the 20th century. Thus, thanks to globalization, the economy of each country is far more sensitive to interruptions in the flow of goods, people and capital. Thanks to the increase in the number of democratic countries in the world, rulers are far more sensitive to sanctions. Exposure to global media, on the other hand, makes residents of countries under sanctions far more aware of national humiliation, for which one example is the ban on FRY participating in international sports competitions in the early 1990s. On the other hand, international sanctions as a concept have come under attack from critics who consider them an excuse for not taking specific actions against problematic states in cases where there are no immediate interests. An argument against sanctions is the fact that in many autocratic and nationalist states, sanctions serve as an excuse for increasing political repression, i.e. chauvinism, xenophobia and conspiracy theories. A frequent argument is a fact that sanctions lead to their violation, which serves as a basis for the development of organized crime and corruption.

According to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, only the UN Security Council has a mandate by the international community to apply sanctions (Article 41) that must be complied with by all UN member states (Article 2,2). They serve as the international community's most powerful peaceful means to prevent threats to international peace and security or to settle them. Sanctions do not include the use of military force. However, if sanctions do not lead to the diplomatic settlement of a conflict, the use of force can be authorized by the Security Council separately under Article 42.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Two years after the start of the pandemic, when it was expected that business would continue with the "new normal", on February 24, the crisis began in Ukraine. A few days after the crisis started, the world's stock markets showed what a tectonic disturbance it was from the aspect of the world economy. The prices of energy products, basic raw materials for the production of food, but also of money, started to experience serious jumps already in January, which is not a surprise considering

that Russia is one of the leading economies in the world. According to total production, in 2021 that country was the 11th largest economy in the world. It is estimated that the country exports between 60 percent and 70 percent of oil and gas in its total production, is the world's largest exporter of wheat, and is among the leading exporters of coal, and metals such as iron, steel, aluminum, nickel, and palladium. These resources are widely used in production - from food to cosmetics to the automotive industry.

For decades, Europe, home to 12 of the world's 25 largest economies, has been discussing dependence on Russian energy sources. An economy is an effective tool in politics, it is the best substitute for military activity. Hence the continuous fear of European politicians that dependence on Russian energy sources, primarily gas and oil, could cause economic, and eventually political, weakening of Europe. In 2020, Russia was the number 11 economy in the world in terms of GDP (current US\$), the number 13 in total exports, the number 21 in total imports, the number 70 economy in terms of GDP per capita (current US\$) and the number 43 most complex economy according to the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) (OECD World, 2022). The top exports of Russia are Crude Petroleum (\$74.4B), Refined Petroleum (\$48B), Petroleum Gas (\$19.7B), Gold (\$18.7B), and Coal Briquettes (\$14.5B), exporting mostly to China (\$49.3B), United Kingdom (\$25.3B), Netherlands (\$22.5B), Belarus (\$15.8B), and Germany (\$14.2B). Among main export items are wheat (first in the world) (\$8.4 B), semi-processed production of iron (cca \$7 B), nickel (\$4.03 B), nitrogen fertilizers (\$3.054 B), cobalt (second in the world), vanadium (second in the world), nickel, platinum, gold, diamonds, aluminum wood, magnesium, zinc, tungsten, copper, titanium etc. (OECD World, 2022). The strength of the Russian economy is best illustrated by the fact that, according to the GDP PPP parameter, this country is among the five largest economies in the world, although it is behind Italy in terms of nominal GDP. In addition, the Russian economy is characterized by extremely low public debt and an excellent trade balance (Table 1).

*Table 1. The strength of the Russian economy in comparison with the largest economies in the world*

Country	GDP (ppp)	GDP nom.	Public debt/ GDP	Trade balance (% of GDP)
China	27,31	17,73	73,3	2,60%
USA	23,00	23	132,6	-3,10%
India	10,22	3,17	86,8	-2%
Japan	5,40	4,94	263,1	2,90%
Germany	4,82	4,22	70,2	5,50%
Russia	4,79	1,78	17	9,60%
Great Britain	3,34	3,19	95,3	-1,60%
Italy	2,71	2,1	150,9	2,40%
Ukraine	0,59	0,22	49	-1,10%

Source: (World Bank, 2022; IMF, 2022)

After February 24, it became more than clear that in addition to the military-political crisis in Eastern Europe, the world is also entering a resource-energy crisis. The prices of gas, oil, metals, wheat and other goods on the world market are

increasing daily, with a simultaneous increase in the value of the money used to buy these goods, which ultimately makes the prices of resources even higher. Along with attempts to resolve the military-political crisis, realizing the seriousness of the resource-energy crisis, EU leaders quickly made a strategic decision according to which the Union will actively work to reduce dependence on Russian gas, oil, and coal in the next five years. Parallel to that process, multilateral economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Russian Federation are being introduced.

As the Russian war on Ukraine persists, the popular pressure on European politicians to ban Russian energy imports is likely to intensify. A recent study using a state-of-the-art macro-sectoral model concludes that the economic cost in Germany of a halt to energy imports from Russia would be “substantial but manageable,” reducing GDP by between 0.5%-3%. This compares with the 4.5% plunge in the pandemic (Bachmann et al. 2022).

## **THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States, the European Union, and other countries introduced or significantly expanded sanctions to include Vladimir Putin and other government members, and cut off “selected Russian banks” from the SWIFT network triggering the 2022 Russian financial crisis and a massive international boycott of Russia and Belarus, which supports the invasion. While the general public has the impression that sanctions against Russia have no effect, Foreign Policy magazine claims the opposite. In an extensive analysis of the current state of the economy of the Russian Federation, which is under severe Western sanctions, the magazine singles out several reasons why those who believe that the sanctions have not produced results are actually mistaken. Ostroukh and Winning believe that sanctions are “far from being ineffective or disappointing (Ostroukh & Winning, 2022). International sanctions and voluntary business withdrawal have had a devastating effect on the Russian economy.” (Sonnenfeld & Tian, Actually, the Russian Economy Is Imploding, 2022).

One of the key reasons why there is a dilemma about the effectiveness of the sanction is that not enough relevant economic indicators are coming from Russia. Instead, refer to overly optimistic Russian economic analyses, forecasts, and projections. The Russian government has progressively withheld a growing number of key statistics that were updated on a monthly basis before the war, including all foreign trade data. Among them are statistics related to exports and imports, especially in Europe. Furthermore, data on monthly oil and gas production, export quantities of goods, inflows, and outflows of capital, mandatory financial reports of large companies, data on the monetary base of the central bank, data on foreign direct investments, then data on crediting and issuing loans were denied; and other data related to credit availability. Even Rosaviatsia, the federal air transport agency, suddenly stopped publishing data on the number of passengers in airlines and airports (Anisimova & Koreňáko, 2022; Sonnenfeld & Tian, Actually, the Russian Economy Is Imploding, 2022). Besides that, the government has suspended the fiscal rule in response to the sanctions imposed after the invasion of Ukraine. The projection assumes an increase in discretionary spending by the amount of what would otherwise have been saved according to the fiscal rule, some borrowing, and a decline in revenues because of the projected recession.

Based on doubts about the accuracy of the Kremlin's statistics, a team of experts from Yale University, using private Russian-language data sources and direct data sources, including high-frequency consumer data, cross-channel checks, communications from Russia's international trading partners, and complex data mining of transportation data, published one of the first comprehensive economic analyzes measuring Russia's current economic activity five months after the invasion. From their analysis, it follows that the withdrawal of business from the Russian Federation sanctions collapse the Russian economy in the short and long term. (Sonnenfeld, Business Retreats and Sanctions Are Crippling the Russian Economy. Measures of Current Economic Activity and Economic Outlook Point to Devastating Impact on Russia, 2022)

Less than 10 percent of Russia's gas capacity is liquefied natural gas, so Russian gas exports remain dependent on fixed pipeline systems for gas transmission. The vast majority of Russian gas pipelines flow towards Europe. Those pipelines, which originate in western Russia, cannot be connected to a separate new pipeline network connecting eastern Siberia to Asia, which contains only 10 percent of the capacity of Europe's pipeline network. Russia exported 16.5 billion m<sup>3</sup> to China in 2021, which represents less than 10 percent of the 170 billion m<sup>3</sup> of natural gas that Russia sent to Europe. Asian pipeline projects, currently under construction, are still years away from becoming operational. Additionally, financing these expensive pipeline projects also puts Russia at a significant disadvantage. In summary, Russia needs world markets much more than the world needs Russian supplies. For starters, Europe met 46 percent of its gas needs by buying gas from Russia, and Gazprom recorded a drop in gas production in July by 35 percent on an annual basis. So, Russia suffers damage. Russia did turn to China and India, but at an unprecedented discount. Ural sells oil at a discount of \$35, although it has never given a discount of more than five dollars, even during the invasion of Crimea in 2014 (Bloomberg, 2022). Therefore, Russian oil tankers take an average of 35 days to reach East Asia, versus two to seven days to reach Europe, which is why only 39 percent of Russian oil went to Asia versus 53 percent destined for Europe (Themoscowntimes, 2019). This is a big impact on the margin and profitability of the business, where Russia used to be among the most successful. In addition, Russia's oil production industry has long relied on Western technology, which, combined with the loss of Russia's former primary market and its diminished economic strength, has caused even Russia's energy ministry to revise its long-term oil production projections downward.

Russian imports decreased by 50 percent compared to January. Imports play an important role in the Russian domestic economy. It makes up about 20 percent of Russia's GDP. In addition, it is important to Russia because of key inputs – parts and technology. K China did not enter the Russian market to the extent that many predicted. According to data from the Chinese General Administration of Customs, Chinese exports to Russia fell by more than 50 percent from the beginning of the year to April. It plummeted from 8.1 to 3.8 billion dollars (General administration of customs Ppeople's republic of China, 2022). Considering that China exports seven times more to the United States than to Russia, even Chinese companies appear to be more concerned about running afoul of US sanctions than losing positions in the Russian market, reflecting Russia's weak economic ties with its global trading partners (Sonnenfeld, 2022).

Inflation in sectors that depend on foreign supply chains in Russia has jumped to 40–60 percent. Sales volumes have become extremely small. Thus, the sale of foreign cars in Russia fell by about 95 percent, and with a large number of companies, it can be said that it has completely stopped. Due to supply problems, price jumps, and weakening consumer sentiment, it is logical that the index that measures the mood of Russian procurement managers indicates that the Russian economy is in decline. On average, about 20 percent. Such a signal is confirmed by e-commerce trends within Yandex and data on physical retail sales in Moscow. All this says the opposite of what the Kremlin announces. Rising inflation and climbing interest rates have supplanted more than a decade of muted inflation and low-interest rates in many countries. Recession concerns are surfacing and geopolitical tensions have increased further as Russia's invasion of Ukraine persists (October 2022 World Economic Outlook).

Foreign companies employ about 12 percent of the workforce in Russia. That's about five million workers. The result of their withdrawal is not only a decrease in the number of jobs, but also a decrease in the economic activity of more than 1,000 companies that make up about 40 percent of Russia's GDP. Those companies canceled three decades of building economic relations on the Russian market. We are talking about a mass exodus, which entailed the outflow of 500,000 highly educated experts.

Even the mayor of Moscow has admitted that he expects significant job losses as businesses go through a process of complete shutdown (Radio Free Europe, 2022).

The Minister of Finance of Russia announced that he expects the Russian budget to be in the deficit of only two percent of GDP this year, and not in surplus. Putin decided to harness all the mechanisms of the state in order to reduce the decline. He embarked on financially unsustainable fiscal and monetary interventions. This includes drastically increasing military spending and printing money. Thus, since the beginning of the attack on Ukraine, he has doubled the supply of money in Russia.

Putin's reckless spending is clearly putting the Kremlin's finances under pressure. All this is not happening because of high energy prices, because high energy prices were also in periods when the Russian budget used to fall into deficit. Here, the reasons for that decline are different.

Russia has a lot of capital in its accounts. Putin's rainy day funds weigh around \$600 billion in foreign exchange reserves, accumulated from oil and gas revenues. But half of that amount – 300 billion dollars is frozen and unavailable in allied countries: USA, EU and Japan, and Putin does not have access to that money. There have even been calls to seize that \$300 billion to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine. Of the remaining 300 billion, Putin has spent as much as 75 billion dollars since the beginning of the attack on Ukraine, meaning in less than half a year.

Critics point out, as stated by Foreign Policy, that Russia has an alternative. That is to accumulate additional foreign exchange reserves through Gazprombank because the central bank is under sanctions. Although this is technically correct and feasible, the magazine writes that there is no evidence to suggest that Gazprombank is accumulating any reserves. Especially because it has its own credit obligations.

Furthermore, although the Ministry of Finance planned to activate a long-standing Russian budget rule, that excess revenue from the sale of oil and gas is channeled into the state fund, Putin rejected it. Moreover, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov

proposed to withdraw a third of his assets from the National Wealth Fund this year. So, if Russia is running a budget deficit that requires the withdrawal of as much as a third of its sovereign wealth fund, while oil and gas revenues are still relatively strong, all signs indicate that the Kremlin could run out of money much faster than many estimate.

The appreciation of the ruble is not a good sign, on the contrary, it is a reflection of draconian capital control, where Russia overnight became one of the most restrictive countries in the world. Restrictions are felt not only by companies, but also by citizens. For example, citizens cannot buy dollars or withdraw their deposits in dollars.

The official ruble exchange rate is therefore misleading. It is traded in dramatically reduced volumes compared to pre-war levels, as liquidity has fallen. According to many reports, much of that former trading has migrated to unofficial ruble black markets. Even the Bank of Russia admitted that the exchange rate is more a reflection of government policy and an open expression of the country's trade balance, rather than liquid foreign exchange markets that are freely traded.

The Russian economy is seriously damaged, but it is just coming to the moment when it needs to admit it to itself. It is not true that the process of withdrawing business from Russia has ended and it is not true that Putin is still not making money from oil and gas exports. The fact that these processes continue, albeit on a reduced scale, enables Putin to maintain extravagant domestic consumption and conceal structural economic weaknesses. That's why, writes Foreign Policy, now is not the time to hit the brakes.

## **EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS AND WAR - ECONOMIC SETBACK**

Twice a year, in April and October, the IMF provides a forecast of the main economic indicators by country. The last forecast was given in April this year, about two months after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Most superficial observers of the effects of sanctions and war on economic processes believe that sanctions and war do not harm the Russian economy too much. That conclusion is quite wrongly derived from the movement of the exchange rate of the ruble against the US dollar. Those who consider this exchange rate as an indicator of the strength of the Russian economy (and they are by far the most numerous) believe that if the ruble strengthens (appreciates) compared to the dollar, then the sanctions do not affect the Russian economy, or their effect is extremely low. Such a way of thinking is completely wrong. Russia first felt the force of the G7 and EU sanctions in 2014 after the start of the civil war in Ukraine. The effects of the sanctions are also noticeable in the years that followed, and this is best seen in the negative (2015) and low growth rates of real GDP until 2019. During 1999, Serbia was exposed to aggression throughout the territory, and the aggressor destroyed both civil and commercial facilities, which, along with the imposed sanctions and a halt in economic activity, caused a decrease in GDP by 10%.

With the exception of the narrow border areas of southwestern Russia, the current war is not taking place on the territory of Russia at all. No major economic facilities were destroyed on the territory of Russia, although the shells also hit targets in the border regions of Russia. Nevertheless, although there is no destruction of Russian economic assets according to the IMF, the estimated annual decline of the

Russian economy will be enormous. In 2022, it will decrease by 8.5% compared to 2021, and a drop of that size was last registered in 1993. Therefore, sanctions are introduced with the intention of hurting.

The magnitude of this decline compared to past economic movements in Russia, the wartime Serbian economy and economic growth in the countries of the G7 group in 2022, breaks the illusion and false assumption about mild or non-existent effects of sanctions and war on the Russian economy. Economically, Russia will fare the same or worse than Serbia through 2022, even though the 1999 war was fought on Serbian soil, and this year's war is not territorially Russian. The economic tragedy, even before the 2014 war of economically destroyed Ukraine, continued at a galloping pace. For example, in 2015, the Ukrainian economy shrank by 10%, and in 2022, its real GDP is expected to decrease by about a third compared to last year's level (-35%). Russia and Ukraine are going through an economic downturn last seen in the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. For the sake of comparison, in 1994, Ukrainian GDP decreased by 23%, Russian by 13%. Neither Ukrainians nor Russians have learned anything from recent economic history. Another interesting parallel with Yugoslavia is sports sanctions. Sports sanctions are used as a way of psychological warfare, intended to crush the morale of the general population of the target country. Sports sanctions were imposed as part of the international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1992–1995, enacted by the UN Security Council by resolution 757. During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, many sporting bodies imposed sports sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The target countries are usually not allowed to host any sporting events and are not allowed to have their flag and state symbols displayed.

If they continue on the path that began on February 24, both sides will surely lose the war, even if one of them declares and achieves victory.

## CONCLUSION

Western countries and others began imposing limited sanctions on Russia when it recognized the independence of self-declared Donbas republics. With the commencement of attacks on 24 February, a large number of other countries began applying sanctions with the aim of crippling the Russian economy. The sanctions were wide-ranging, targeting individuals, banks, businesses, monetary exchanges, bank transfers, exports, and imports. The sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine are the most powerful and costly punishments imposed on a major economy at least since the Cold War. The economic sanctions imposed on Russia, serve as a tool of nonrecognition policy, by underscoring that the countries which impose these sanctions do not recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea. Having these sanctions in place prevents the situation from being treated as a *fait accompli*. As a reaction to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Western nations introduced unprecedented sanctions on Russian individuals, energy commodities, and high-tech industries with the aim to change Russia's "political behavior". According to a study by the Swedish Defence Research Agency, economic sanctions have so far failed to force Russia to change its policy towards Ukraine. The economic sanctions are generally believed to have helped weaken the Russian economy slightly and to intensify the challenges that Russia was facing.



The measures were far from normal sanctions and were “better seen as a form of economic war”. The intent of the sanctions was to push Russia into a deep recession with the likelihood of bank runs and hyperinflation. The costs of sanctions against Russia are no longer negligible even for those who introduced them, but they are significantly lower than the costs of open war. One of the main reasons why there is a dilemma about the effectiveness of the sanctions is that not enough relevant economic indicators are coming from Russia. A growing number of key statistics that were updated on a monthly basis before the war, including all foreign trade data are not published now. Among them are statistics related to exports and imports, especially in Europe. Furthermore, data on monthly oil and gas production, export quantities of goods, inflows, and outflows of capital, mandatory financial reports of large companies, data on the monetary base of the central bank, data on foreign direct investments, then data on crediting and issuing loans were not published.

Over 1,000 companies have publicly announced they are voluntarily curtailing operations in Russia to some degree beyond the bare minimum legally required by international sanctions — but some companies have continued to operate in Russia undeterred. In 2022, several local companies and businesses emerged or were proposed in Russia to replace departed foreign businesses, their products, websites banned by the Russian government, and events where Russia is prohibited from entry.

There are a lot of negative influences on the EU and on the Western Balkans. For example, trade and investment channels are disrupted, and inflation has been imported. The political and institutional instability of the EU may further reduce the dynamics of the accession of the Western Balkans to the European Union. A reduction in export capacity from Ukraine and Russia, and rising energy and fertilizer prices are pushing international food prices, thereby threatening global food security. Findings presented in this paper suggest that the total loss of Ukraine’s capacity to export and a 50% reduction in Russian wheat export could lead to a 34% increase in international wheat prices in the marketing year 2022/23. Measures that aim to increase the supply of or reduce the demand for agricultural products, oil, and gas should also be considered, but these are more effective in the medium term. Policies implemented in response to the market implications of Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine focus on different areas, with trade policies dominating in the short term. Most of these aim to insulate domestic markets from significant increases in the international prices of agricultural commodities and inputs.

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# THE FORMATION OF A MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE XXI CENTURY - REVIEW OF THE BALKANS

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**Abstract:** The formation of a multipolar world order in contemporary international relations in the 21st century cannot be considered without the geopolitical and geo-economic context in which global processes take place, but also the post-Cold War order in which the germs of world movements towards multipolarism were formed. Ever since the 70s of the 20th century, the modern capitalist system embodied in the power of the Western world has been engulfed in the irreversible process of its resignation after a series of economic, social and moral crises of the neoliberal model of development in the world. In order to avoid the irreversible processes of creating a multipolar world and a fairer world order, the response of the Western (Anglo-Saxon) elite of the United States of America and Great Britain is accordingly long-term planned to preserve the core of their own world domination in the general crisis of the capitalist system and come out even stronger and richer from all the projected processes. Hence the Great Reset - the geopolitical agenda of the World Economic Forum, "green policies" and numerous ideological matrices, which aim to dominate the full spectrum in the system of world relations.

In the world context, this means energy poverty throughout the XXI century, food crisis - increase in world hunger, removal of all forms of social control - states that will take care of their own population and manipulation based on engineering and control of media and digital technologies in the creation of a new post-liberal world order . The way out of the historical detour can be in opposing the corporate-technological dystopia and the development of a fairer and safer world order, a multipolar world order, led by the BRICS and SCO countries and the Eurasian powers Russia and China. The solutions for the Balkans are on the trail of major geopolitical transformations in the world, the economic integration of the Balkans and the geopolitical reconstruction of the post-Yugoslav Balkans.

**Keywords:** *geopolitics, multipolar order, international relations, Balkans, Great Reset, energy security, green policies.*

## INTRODUCTION

At the end of the 20th century, the previous bipolar order in the world, dominated by the two superpowers the USA and the USSR at the head of the military-political and economic and political organizations that they managed. With the collapse of the bipolar world order, the era of the Cold War ends, the Warsaw Pact

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self-abolition, the disintegration of the USSR, the SFRY, geopolitical changes resulting in the collapse of the Yalta Agreement and the Versailles Peace Treaty occur.

Since the 70s, the world capitalist system has been engulfed in the irreversible process of its economic decline. In the USA, the monetary gold base was abolished, and then the Western financial oligarchy injected a huge mass of fictitious money (without material backing) into the connected economies of Western countries. A huge imbalance has been created between the mass of fictitious financial values (securities, financial derivatives), on the one hand, and limited real values, on the other. Western countries have not stopped investing fictitious money since the 80s in their own military-industrial complex, which ensured enormous conventional military power and monopolistic control of world economic and energy trends. In the second and third decades of the 21st century, the accounting balance of the West demands that all fictitious money be finally and accounting balanced and justified by confiscation of the huge real value of the material goods of Eurasian countries, first of all the Russian Federation, but also the Islamic world, China and India.

The world in the third decade of the 21st century is not divided into two camps as it seems at first glance. It is a conflict between the West and the majority of the world, which consists of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and a circle of like-minded countries, which represents the new reality of the formation of a multipolar world order.

In the geopolitical realignments of the first decades of the 21st century, a process that has already begun, the Balkans have their foundation in the geographical positioning of "Eurasian features of fusion and interpenetration" in their history, civilization and culture. The Balkans essentially belong to the Slavic Orthodox civilization of the Byzantine cultural circle and are geopolitically located in the area between Central Europe and Russia and Asia Minor (Turkey). Essentially, the Balkans should be an independent pole of power in a geostrategic sense, not a periphery of the European Union, but an equal participant in real power and economy, a bridge between East and West, Eurasian countries, the Islamic world and Western Europe.

## **POST COLD WAR ORDER - TOWARDS A MULTIPOLAR WORLD**

The geopolitical changes that occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall were presented to the world through the construction of a better and safer world, especially on the soil of the European continent. Not long after, everything was turned into an anti-American mood that flared up in Europe in the mid-nineties of the 20th century. The fact that the United States has always been an empire, whose ultimate goal is the gradual assumption of hegemony in world politics and international relations, has been overlooked. From the fall of the Berlin Wall to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States undertook ten major military interventions, one every fifteen months. (Hiro, 2010) At the same time, Noam Chomsky believes that Great Britain is the main American partner in building a new world order according to Western Anglo-Saxon standards (Chomsky, 2007).

From a strategic point of view, the United States of America, ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, is completing the first part of its strategic plans. They impose a model of economic transition on the former countries of the socialist bloc, which will put those countries in a neo-colonial position in relation to Western multinational corporations. With that model of economic transition, the energy sector in

Russia found itself in the hands of powerful oligarchs, through whom Western corporations spread their own strategic interests. State giants for oil and gas exploitation in a short time become the property of private capital, while the military capacities of the Russian Federation have been brought to the lowest level since the beginning of their construction. This opened the possibility for the United States to eliminate the agreement on the non-expansion of the NATO alliance to the east of the European continent, which was reached before the unification of Germany and the dismantling of the eastern socialist system.

The second part of the American plans refers to the isolation of Russia, which is the main strategy of the Western bloc led by the United States during the Cold War. The plan is to eliminate Russia, even though post-Cold War Russia was no longer an ideological opponent of the Western bloc. The new post-Cold War order was not envisioned as a society of free nations, which realize international relations in accordance with international law and United Nations documents, but as a global order with Anglo-American hegemony and total control of all countries of the world.

NATO's military encirclement of Russia continues with open interference in Ukraine's internal relations, through the Orange Revolution organized by American services and the seizure of power in Ukraine by pro-Western structures. The goal is to introduce Ukraine into NATO, and to turn Russia to realize its geostrategic interests in Asia and to confront China and India. The Western plan under the leadership of the American nomenclature was implemented according to the precisely established geopolitical rules of British and American strategists. Even in the Great Chessboard of Zbigniew Brzezinski, it was defined that Ukraine represents a geopolitical pivot and the key that determines the character and size of Russia as a Eurasian power (Brzezinski, 1999).

No less important step of the American nomenclature in weakening Russia is its neutralization as a nuclear superpower. The nuclear capabilities of the Russian Federation from the time of the USSR are in excellent operational condition and show the image of Russia as a military superpower. The nuclear potential of the USSR was preserved and moved to the territory of Russia, which is the legal successor of the vanished Soviet state (Primakov, 2010). At the same time, the construction of an anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe is an attempt by the US-NATO to neutralize Russia as a nuclear superpower, with which the construction of a new post-Cold War order by Western Anglo-Saxon standards could begin. The American administration in the first decade of the 21st century ignores the fact that there is a strengthening of new powers on the world political stage, first of all Russia, China, but also others. In Munich in 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the return of Russia to the stage of world politics as a military superpower. The United States of America is accused of building a unipolar world, which is the result of American unilateralism in international relations, disrespect for international law and the norms of the United Nations.

The great economic crisis of 2007 shook the United States and the whole world. By abolishing the last forms of regulation in the financial sector in the 90s years of the 20th century, American Wall Street became a place beyond any control of the American state. Financial derivatives were created from stock exchange shares, new financial derivatives from old ones, insured packages of shares with falsified data, as well as mortgage loans, which increased the total turnover of the financial sector and

enormously enriched the already rich owners of Wall Street and their main business managers. The financial system, which David Harvey called capital accumulation by extortion, had a devastating impact on the American economy (Harvey, 2010). In 2008, the financial system began to collapse, and the culmination of the fall was marked by the bankruptcy of one of the largest Wall Street banks, Lehman Brothers. The financial system of America, as the bearer of the model of neoliberal capitalism, was saved by measures that most closely resembled the measures of socialist states. The invisible hand of the first economic theorists like Adam Smith, which according to the Chicago School of Economics was supposed to self-regulate free markets, became the visible hand of the Washington administration and then-President George Bush. Thousands of billions of dollars of government money are directed to save the financial sector, thereby shifting the debt to taxpayers, while moving the debt limit of the American government.

The entry of the Russian army into Georgia represents the second event that irreversibly shifted American power, a country that had already taken a place in the priorities of American military armament (Filimonović, 2010). Along with Ukraine, Georgia represented levers for confronting Russia in the post-Soviet space. Russia intervened in the protection of two Georgian provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thus putting the Georgian government on the verge of a *fait accompli*. The reaction of the United States and Western countries in the conflict in Georgia was absent. Russia returned to the stage of the great game of global power and politics in the world, and on the other side, the end of American hegemony was evident (Hiro, 2010).

## **GEOPOLITICAL AGENDA OF THE GREAT RESET**

At the World Economic Forum in 2020, the concept of the Great Reset was announced, starting from the “UN Sustainable Development Strategy 2030” and its goals, such as a sustainable solution to climate change. Added to this are covid 19 - experiences of the fight against the pandemic, that is, the “reset” of the labor market, the way of doing work - online work from home and retraining of the workforce in accordance with the current economic situation. One of the creators of the concept of the Great Reset, Klaus Schwab, at the 50th conference of the World Economic Forum, presented three basic components of the Great Reset, which relate to creating the conditions for a “share economy”, whatever that means, building an economy in a more “sustainable” way based on on more “green” public infrastructure projects, while the last component of the Great Reset agenda is about fusing automation and robotization in modern industry with new technologies and network communications.

In the book “Covid 19: The Great Reset” by Klaus Schwab and Thierry Malleret, the specific methods of the proposed general reset are not analyzed, but a theoretical elaboration of sustainability is given by considering the current crisis processes, before the Covid 19 pandemic. Composed of three parts, three reset levels are analyzed in the book. The “macroreset” that has already taken place under the impact of the Covid 19 pandemic during the first half of 2020, the areas of economy, society, geopolitics, technology and the environment are analyzed in the first part of the book. In the second part - “microresetting,” the analysis of the consequences of “lockdown” on individual companies, economic branches, industrial systems, as well as the abil-

ity to withstand crisis shocks, is carried out, while the third part of the book refers to the individual level of resetting (Schwab & Malleret, 2020).

The concept of the Great Reset caused different reactions in the public, from affirmative to extremely negative, and the main Western media New York Times, Guardian, BBC actively implement the agenda of the Great Reset, while liberal-minded intellectuals lined up for its operationalization. On the other hand, intellectuals of the illiberal ideological profile of Western provenance exposed the concept of the Great Reset to criticism, calling the concept of the Great Reset a project of the World Economic Forum, which, with the help of the corona virus, works to make the rich in the world even richer, and the poor even poorer. Eurasians see the Great Reset as a new globalist course that includes: control of public consciousness on a global level - the "culture of cancellation", which is an introduction to the control of networks under the control of globalists, the transition to an ecological economy - the rejection of the industrial structure, the replacement of the workforce with cyborgs and the global application of advanced artificial intelligence. (Dugin, 2021).

In this regard, the post-industrial models of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, ecologically sustainable production in the developed world, are being pushed, while the model of deindustrialization (destruction of industry and its development), giving up resource extraction or paying huge taxes for carbon emissions - decarbonization - is being imposed on developing countries. That model predicts that carbon taxes will further burden developing countries and, crucially, stop their development. It follows that if developing countries want to transform themselves post-industrially, they are forced to buy clean technologies from Western companies for large sums of money (which they do not own), thus creating a new debt slavery in the world. It also follows that whoever cannot pay carbon taxes or buy permits for its emission cannot burn fossil fuels. Whoever does not burn fossil fuels for the needs of the population and the economy, must import expensive energy from renewable sources. The concept of the Great Reset and the implementation of green policies is creating energy poverty in the world. The planned post-industrial model of development, i.e. the realization of the concept of the Great Reset, developing countries will be particularly affected, which returns them to colonial subjugation.

According to the geopolitical agenda of the Great Reset, the formation of a "world government" composed of unelected experts, technocrats and business magnates, gathered from supranational forums and global international organizations is planned. Governments of sovereign states should be under their domination and limited in their own decision-making.

The current unipolar order under the domination of the United States of America should replace the global form of government and at the same time not allow the construction of a multipolar order in the world. The building of supranational structures of groups of states with common values and interests is being promoted, and those values are western, postmodern and postliberal - globalist. According to the geopolitical agenda of the Great Reset, the formation of the "Great Concert" of the powers of the XXI century is planned, which represents a more flexible form of cooperation than existing international organizations, with the aim of preventing the possibility of vetoes in the existing system of international relations, especially in the United Nations.

The new American administration (under Joe Biden) is completely on the line of realizing the concept of the Great Reset. The American administration, in implementing its own foreign policy, starts from the following assumptions, that global interests are above national ones, strengthening the structures of the World Government and its supranational structure (political and economic), the expansion and strengthening of NATO, the deepening of democratic changes in the world (which practically means the worsening of relations with all power centers in the world that are against globalism and that are looking for their own paths of independent development).

Essentially, the Great Reset represents the reanimation of globalism, which is a kind of ideology of postmodern capitalism, with certain modifications adapted to the current times. It is a project of the Great Reset - a double update of global plans in the West and its re-projection to the rest of the world, and in fact it is a consequence of the failure and concealment that this modernist project is in irreversible stagnation.

### **ENERGY SECURITY - A KEY ISSUE**

Energy security is a key issue of modern international relations, considering the available quantities of the world's energy reserves and their consumption. In overall world relations, energy has a strategic dimension and cannot be understood only as an attempt by an individual country to achieve self-sufficiency in energy supply. According to the definition of the World Energy Council, energy security includes "the state of availability of energy in the quantity and quality necessary for existing economic conditions" (Institute of Energy Strategy (Russia, 2001). Energy experts, geopoliticians advocate the point of view that the energy transport infrastructure and the strengthening of ties and relationships in the relationship producer-consumer are irreplaceable conditions in achieving energy security.

The essence of contemporary geopolitical realignments in the world probably throughout the 21st century is the continuous energy crisis, which will mark the fourth technological revolution at the global level, but also affect the regional and world positioning of individual countries, regions and entire continents. A time of energy poverty is coming in Europe and the world, which will last throughout the 21st century, with the fact that countries that do not properly and timely respond to the energy and geopolitical challenges in the coming decades will be particularly affected.

There is no responsible energy policy in Europe and the European Union, and the main reason is that the European Union - European countries do not lead an independent energy policy in their own interest, but the European energy market is in a chaotic state. The characteristics of irresponsible energy policy in the European Union are:

- does not gradually switch to alternative energy sources,
- the problems of climate change are dealt with by speculation in the European Union,
- energy problems are underestimated in reality,
- investments in the extractive branches of the industry are reduced by design,
- unbalanced decisions are made in the energy policies of the European Union.



The first phase of the start of the green transition in the European Union has just been completed, and according to the prices of electricity and gas in 2021 and 2022, the energy policy of the European Union is unsuccessful. Analyzes by numerous experts from universities and scientific institutes, as well as the Production Gap Report, a document of the United Nations Environment Program - UNEP, indicate that fossil fuel production in the world will continue to grow for at least another twenty years. According to Russian analyses, the share of oil and gas in the world's energy mix will be reduced from 85 to 65 to 70 percent, and not to 20 to 30 percent as predicted by some experts. Russian analyzes are aligned with the analyzes of the Saudi oil giant Aramco and OPEC, which estimates that oil and gas will dominate the world by 2050. According to these analyses, natural gas will begin to record more significant growth between 2035 and 2045, when the demand for oil is expected to stabilize (Balkan Magazin, 2021).

On the world stage, a global conflict has been taking place between the Western bloc - NATO led by the United States and the majority of countries in the world, led by Russia and China. Western power centers want to maintain their dominant position in the world, i.e. that developed Western countries (and their leading elites) become even richer after the resignation of neoliberal capitalism, while countries and peoples who do not belong to Western civilization sink into even deeper poverty.

The green agenda represents a new ideology of large Western multinational capital, by which Western countries that have completed their industrial development using coal and oil and cheap electricity, are now preventing underdeveloped countries from using these energy sources for their own development. Those who polluted the planet with carbon dioxide during their own industrial development in the 19th and 20th centuries present their ideology - the Green Agenda, that there has been enough industrial development, that this development based on fossil fuels is not allowed to other, non-Western countries. Western developed countries that used their own natural energy resources, "emptied" their mines, created new green technologies that are much more expensive and are trying to force other countries in the world - non-Western - to buy, use and produce expensive electricity with these green technologies .

In the European Union, the parties that promote and operationally create the Green Agenda are the green parties, which at the same time create a more political and less environmental dimension of green politics (Sloat, 2020). In Germany, the Green Party comes out of classic "green policies", which relate to the economy or energy. They stand for the programs and ideas of liberal democracy and human rights, which are the ideas and values of neoliberal capitalism that grew on the foundations of the victory of large Western capital over the traditional system of socially established states in the 20th century. The way out of this can be a rethinking of the sovereignty of states and peoples in the global world of the 21st century, which especially applies to countries that do not belong to the Western civilization circle, and which are particularly exposed to various types of pressure from large Western capital.

## **BUILDING A MULTIPOLAR ORDER - NEW FACTORS OF POWER**

The concept of power in the theory of international relations as a prerequisite for the realization of political goals is defined by different interpretations, starting from the fact that "politics is essentially determined by the search for power" (Simić, 1999,

p. 225) to the fact that “power represents the prospects that within the framework of social relations carry out one’s will despite resistance, regardless of what those prospects are based on” (Simić, 1999, p. 225). The imposition of will is the essence of power relations. The power of states in international relations is manifested by traditional factors of power (population, size and characteristics of the territory, economy, army, culture) and factors of “soft power” contained in the national will, diplomacy and support that the government of a country has among its people. The most important indicator of a country’s power when considering the traditional factors of power is its total gross domestic product, which includes the number of inhabitants and the technological-production level of the national economy. Military power is essentially determined by the total gross domestic product of each country as its most concise expression.

The world of the 21st century does not mean only a return to old concepts, when the power of states was based on the control of the land or the ocean, but in modern times it is based on the control of the flows of energy, people, goods, money, data and the roads through which their movements take place and are created. Great powers are creating new geopolitical maps, ie maps of the control of the mentioned flows - a kind of terrain of power that prevents other competing forces from realizing them. In the international arena of world relations, the world is criss-crossed by networks through which great powers exercise influence, and the key areas of power of great powers (and other countries) are: economy, technology, potential for possible climate change, population, military, health capacities and cultural dominance. The most important spheres of interaction with the military potential and the size of the population of the great powers are the economy and technology.

The great powers face each other not only in the military sphere, in which the dominant power is held by the United States of America and Russia, but also by China, but also in the economic sphere. It is about a new geo-economic era, where states for geopolitical reasons set conditions for access to their own market and use instruments (tariffs, quotas, fines) in not accepting equal conditions for market actors (Hackenbroich, 2021). The new geo-economic era of international relations in the world is characterized by placing the economy at the center of strategic plans. Trade agreements are created to contribute to economic efficiency, but also to the connection of countries through their value systems, which enables diversification from the markets of countries with which there are no geopolitical relations.

Significant influence on geopolitics is exerted by technology and technological changes, bringing those who manage science and technological engineering not only development and progress, but also give them the power to influence other actors of international relations. Before their global spread, all technological revolutions lead to a critical asymmetry of power in the world and inequality in global social relations. New technologies are tightly linked to the sovereignty of states, the technological capabilities of great powers to project their own spheres of influence, and the attraction of other states into their technological and civilizational systems. Between the great powers (primarily America, China and Russia) there are complex disputes and competitions in mastering modern technologies: digital infrastructure (5G underwater cables), rare raw materials, industry (artificial intelligence - semiconductors), control of data flows and storage, definition of standards for new technologies. Technologies are at the basis of a vertical (divided) world, from 5G to

virtual computing, which is contrary to what was believed in the past few decades, that technology will bring the world and countries closer together.

A large population represents the foundation of state power and its capacities. A large population does not make a country itself a great power, but in the modern world it is impossible to maintain the status of a great power if it does not have a large population. In many domains, technology has reduced the need for human labor, but population - human capital is still an essential determinant of a state's industrial and military capabilities and its position in the international system of relations. Countries with a large population have a greater opportunity to increase the gross domestic product through internal trade and the specialization of industrial production.

The liberal international order projected by economic globalization and the Internet, governed by Western liberal democracies and free market capitalism, is irreversibly going into the past (Brown & Carother, 2022). National and global processes of developing the foundations and principles of a new, fairer and safer world order in the world, which represents an alternative to the unipolar world order at the end of the 20th and the first decades of the 21st century, are underway. A new phase of world history is beginning, a new era of building a multipolar order that cannot be stopped (Kliment'ev, 2022).

## **THE BALKANS - GEOGRAPHICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS**

The Balkans represent a geographical area which natural-geographical predispositions and complex internal and surrounding anthropogenic structure have determined geopolitical dynamics as a basic identifying feature. The paradigmatic sense of the Balkan space is characterized by division, antagonisms, border problems, spheres of interest, national, religious and political exclusivity, mixing of great powers, economic polarization, a kind of dualism of "joining and permeating" and "isolating and separating" (Cvijić, 1991).

The Balkans are separated from the neighboring continental mass (Asia) by narrow and surmountable geographical barriers - the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the small Sea of Marmara and a multitude of islands that have a potentially great intermediary role (Ilić & Spasovski, 1992). The intermediary position of the Balkans, the transit role and the geographical position of the intermediate space conditioned the complex national, religious, economic, socio-political and overall civilizational structure of the Balkans. Another factor identifying the uniqueness of the Balkans is its openness to the north, a wide connection with the European continent and variable borders that depend on the applied criteria, historical time, needs, and principles of delimitation. The non-existent physical barriers of such borders allowed for two-way, favorable and unfavorable influences.

The Balkans, both qualitatively and structurally, and territorially, has a dominant geopolitical and geostrategic determination. The Western European and Central European stereotypical and interest-focused focus on the Balkans sees the Balkans as its periphery and a space prone to the chaos of national, religious, political, border and social antagonisms, and as a zone of unstable state-territorial constructions, which are open to external influences from non-Balkan power actors.

The Romanian and Croatian ethno-spatial realities play a cross-border and bridging role in the building relationship between the Balkan Peninsula and the Balkans, but they are the key transforming phenomenon of the Serbian country. Serbian countries indirectly determine the importance and define the position of other Balkan and neighboring areas due to their own transit, intermediary position on the key routes that connect those areas with other parts of the world.

In the Balkans, transformations of the relationship between the factors of global and continental power are being projected, changing their geopolitical and geostrategic position and wider importance, but also producing a feedback effect (Matić, 1994). According to Rustem Vahitov, the Balkan countries are not part of Europe, but enter the Mediterranean or, more narrowly speaking, the Balkan place of development. This results in the unnaturalness of the entry of the Balkan countries into the European Union and NATO, as well as a kind of artificiality of the European Union in its current form, since from the Eurasian point of view it integrates European countries and countries that are outside the borders of European local development (Vakhitov, 2016).

## CONCLUSIONS

On the threshold of the third decade of the 21st century, a global conflict is taking place between two opposing conceptions of the reorganization of the world, the Western and the multipolar – majority part of the world led by the Eurasian powers Russia and China. The global process of dividing the world into opposing economic and geopolitical blocs is being accelerated by the war in Ukraine. There is an ongoing conflict between the West and the majority of the world, on which it imposes its own discriminatory rules for all other participants in the trade and political process and changes those rules at its own discretion. The policy of double standards is being replaced by unilateral actions, which in European countries are justified by democracy, while the rest of the world is not given any explanations other than sanctions.

The processes of creating new horizons of the future, from energy security to food security, are unstoppable and historical. The political and economic dominance of the West is coming to an end, and the world is moving unstoppably towards multipolarism, in which the BRICS countries, along with the United States, will decide on future world processes. Europe is on a downward trajectory as the strength, power, authority and influence of Western civilization fades. Western countries are losing control over energy sources and no longer possess sufficient quantities of raw materials or energy sources.

The Balkans has historically been confirmed as an indicator of major geopolitical transformations and a crisis region due to the Euro-American induced fragmentation of the post-Yugoslav space. The solutions can be in the economic integration of the Balkans, the reconfiguration of the post-Yugoslav space, the reaffirmation of true national identities and the spaces assigned to them, and the consistent application of the principle of delimitation in the geopolitical reconstruction of the post-Yugoslav Balkans.

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# THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA'S SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION IN UKRAINE ON THE ARAB WORLD

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**Abstract:** In this article, the author considers the Arab reaction to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and studies the economic consequences of these events. In the course of his work, the author separates politics and economics and also divides the Arab countries into several groups. In the political aspect, the Arab countries are divided into allies loyal to Russia, those states that want to sit on two chairs and countries that want to distance themselves as much as possible from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The study revealed that Russia has few loyal allies in the Arab East and most countries try to maintain neutrality in order to maintain ties with all participants in the international system. In the economic sphere, the author also sees three groups, but he divides them in a different way. The article highlights rich countries, a state with a weak economy and prone to crisis, as well as Arab countries whose crisis has been aggravated by cattle since the beginning of this conflict. The scientific article reflects that the consequences of the embargo on the export of grain from Moscow and Kyiv created an extremely negative situation in North Africa and the Middle East, from which many countries are actually facing a threat to food security and an increase in the number of hungry people. In conclusion, the author comes to the conclusion that this conflict is extremely unfavorable for the Arab East. In fact, in the interests of the country of the Arab East, the peaceful coexistence of Russia and the European continent would not force individual countries to take sides and become someone's enemy.

**Key words:** *Russia, Ukraine, Arab world, food crisis, security problem, neutrality.*

## INTRODUCTION

Local conflicts on the European continent had a limited impact on the Arab countries, which did not always understand the essence of the problem and tried to distance themselves from them. However, the Arab East is sometimes forced to react when it comes to a conflict involving global powers. In recent years, the Arabs have been able to diversify their contacts and focus not only on an alliance with Russia or the United States. In the modern international system, it is beneficial for them to conclude political and economic agreements with each participant in the global world. In this regard, global conflicts are unprofitable for them, since they do not want to lose their existing contacts and become an enemy for one of the strongest powers.

Undoubtedly, the intensified military conflict in Ukraine with the introduction of Russian troops began to be perceived in European countries as a threat to na-

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tional security, as Moscow's behavior became very aggressive and unpredictable. Moreover, according to international standards, Russia violated the sovereignty of Ukraine, but the Kremlin claims that it is conducting a special military operation to protect the Russian-speaking population and rid Ukraine of the fascist regime. For internal discourse, Moscow argues that war would be inevitable and in this case "you have to strike first." In this context, the world began to split, following the example of the bipolar confrontation during the Cold War (Klalb 2015). In connection with the imposed sanctions against Russia and the actual destruction of the Ukrainian economy, the world will face a sharp drop in global GDP.

Taking into account the existing challenges, the Arab countries did not express open support for one of the parties to the conflict. They tried to maintain favorable relations with both Western countries and Russia as much as possible. Of course, this position cannot be called stable if the scale of the current conflict in Europe escalates into a larger war.

In the course of writing a scientific work, the author tried to use a number of scientific methods that made it possible to analyze the current situation in the international system. To study the economic component, statistical data on trade turnover were required, as well as data on inflation and GDP of several countries. To study the political situation, such methods as normative-value, dialectical and system-historical methods were used.

## **POLITICAL IMPACT**

Conflicts that have a global effect usually divide the world into two sides, or a number of states strive for neutrality. In the event that countries not participating in the global confrontation are themselves tied up in a regional conflict (Ashton 2007), they try to find an ally who will provide them with assistance (military, financial and diplomatic) and will have a negative attitude towards their enemy. In the post-Cold War period, many middle power states can influence conflicting countries by offering their mediation to resolve the conflict (Henrikson 1997). From the very beginning of many conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in 2014, many Arab countries tried to distance themselves from the conflict, wanting to preserve the established trade, economic and political relations with all participants in the global system.

However, the events of February 2022 presented them with a choice: to side with Moscow or against it. A vivid example of their positions could be considered the UN vote on Ukrainian resolutions. Russia was actually able to get support from Syria, which voted against, Algeria, Sudan and Iraq, which abstained from voting, and Morocco, whose representative left the room during the vote. None of the Arab countries began to support sanctions against Russia (Congressional Research Service 2022).

In my opinion, relying solely on the UN voting, it is difficult to separate the supporters of the Russian military campaign and the camp supporting it. In this case, it is important to study the behavior of the Arab countries in this difficult period for the international system.

Taking into account that there are no countries in the Arab East that would explicitly criticize Moscow, I propose to divide them into two groups: "loyal friends" who want to "sit on two chairs" and countries that distance themselves as much as possible from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.



### **“Loyal Friends”**

The first group includes Syria, Palestine and Algeria. An important fact is that the way of making important political decisions in Algeria, Syria, Palestine is similar to the Russian one. The concentration of power is not in the hands of a small group of people who, in the first place, came from the military elite and special services.

The behavior of Damascus is most understandable on the international platform. Undoubtedly, the regime of Bashar al-Assad is grateful to Moscow for significant diplomatic and military assistance in the fight against the opposition and ISIS, existing agreements in the oil and gas industry, and food supplies. Syrian streets controlled by the ruling regime paint a picture of true friendship between Damascus and Moscow. Images of Putin and Assad are hung on the streets; in recent years, learning Russian has become prestigious and even necessary. Syrians who received education in the USSR and Russia are proud of their higher education diplomas. Syria's behavior is more reminiscent of the position of paying the debt and willingness not to leave a friend in trouble. In the context of economic sanctions against Russia, Damascus even became interested in connecting the MIR payment system, which would facilitate financial flows between civilians.

It is important to note that Algeria has its own view of current events. The current leadership of this country is extremely suspicious of Western countries. The main reason is that during the civil war between the US and the EU, Algeria was called upon to include the Islamists in the political discourse and hold elections. In turn, Russia supported the military-political elite of this North African country. Moreover, there was no revolution in Algeria during the Arab Spring, just as it did not happen after the 2019 demonstrations when European countries emphasized the right of citizens to protest. A number of representatives of the political elite perceived this as a “Western conspiracy” against the sovereignty of Algeria. The Algerian authorities constantly imagine that the West is conspiring to carry out a coup in this country. Suspicious and extremely distrustful forms the immunity of Algerians to an open dialogue with Western countries. At the same time, this North African country is one of the leaders in the purchase of Russian weapons on the world market. Even in the face of sanctions and turbulence in the international arena, Algeria purchased military equipment from Moscow for \$7 billion.

One of Russia's longtime allies in the Middle East is the Palestinians, since the USSR helped the rebel movement for a long time and Russia was perceived as the heir to the socialist empire. In addition, Moscow tried to participate in the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, and moreover, it never recognized Hamas as a terrorist organization. However, intra-Palestinian perceptions of the war in Ukraine were mixed. Some residents of the Gaza Strip tend to identify themselves with Ukrainians, and Russian actions with Israelis. As a result, they are in favor of Hamas, in fact, being in solidarity with the West, which, however, from the point of view of the Palestinians themselves, does not support their claims enough. Musa Abu Marzuk, a Hamas Politburo member, said the lesson from the current events is that “the era of US unipolar domination is over,” as “the US has failed to declare war on Russia, and those who cannot declare war will not set the international agenda”. The head of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas and his entourage, are primarily motivated by the fact that they do not want to undermine the dialogue with Moscow. they still hope that it will implement the initiative of a peace conference

with the involvement of mediators in the person of the UN and the EU, that is, it will actually revive the classic Middle East Quartet (Ben Menachem 2022).

### ***“Sit on two chairs”***

This group includes Arab countries that already have established diplomatic and economic contacts with Russia and also do not want to provoke its “vindictive behavior” in the context of ongoing conflicts. For such states, the main priority is to ensure their own interests.

Considering the behavior of Morocco, many Western politicians expected that Rabat would take the side of Western countries and support Ukraine, since it was to many obligations of US diplomacy, which contributed to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the kingdom and Israel, and Washington recognized the western part of the kingdom. Given the orientation of Morocco towards cooperation with Spain and France, and, moreover, the desire for democracy, it was worth counting on the condemnation of the Russian military campaign from Rabat. However, Moroccan diplomacy took into account the support of the Polisario Front and Algeria by Russian diplomacy. Rabat has carefully avoided making statements about the conflict in Ukraine and chose not to take part in the UN vote.

Egypt found itself in a rather difficult position before the UN vote. In early March 2022, Kyiv demanded from Egypt support and solidarity in the provision of medical and humanitarian assistance, as well as recognition of Russia’s violations of international law. The ambassadors of the G7 and the ambassador of the EU Delegation in Cairo called on the Egyptian government “to take the side of Ukraine in the fight against Russian armed aggression.” A number of sources close to the Egyptian government reported that the United States exerted direct pressure on Egypt, demanding that it support Ukraine, even if this support was purely political. It is possible that this is why Cairo voted for Ukraine, while Moscow expected its neutral position (Eruygun, 2022). For Egypt itself, the conflict in Ukraine would be extremely unprofitable since it had established contacts with Moscow and Kyiv in the economic sector. Moreover, after A.F. Al-Sisi in 2014, the United States refused to provide military assistance to Cairo and sell weapons. Then Egypt began to buy military equipment from Moscow and then agreed on the construction of the El Daab nuclear power plant by the Russian Rosatom and its subsidiaries. At the same time, while Egypt announces the continuation of cooperation with Russia, and since September 2022, it has been negotiating the connection of MIR payment cards. At the same time, Cairo has not yet issued a full permit to Rosatom for the construction of a nuclear power plant, fearing a negative reaction from the European countries and the United States, as well as the introduction of secondary sanctions. So far, the Egyptian authorities are trying to develop a neutral line in order to maintain established ties with all participants in the world system and not be subjected to “punishment and condemnation” (Salah 2022).

### ***Maximum distance***

Most of the Arab countries are trying to distance from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is also sometimes seen as a confrontation between Russia and NATO. Each country has its own view of the ongoing events that are related to their internal problems.

The confused domestic political environment in Iraq has become one of the key reasons for the lack of a clear position of Baghdad on the Ukrainian problem. Iraq voted in favor of the Arab League statement on Ukraine, which did not hold Russia accountable. Iraq abstained in the UN General Assembly vote on March 2 condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine and simply expressed “regret” at the “deterioration and escalation of tension between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.” Despite these official statements, political opinion in Iraq about Russia’s actions is divided along partisan and factional lines. The imposition of sanctions against Russia has complicated its energy investments in Iraq and alleged arms purchases from Moscow, and could have long-term negative consequences for the Iraqi economy. In line with existing political divisions, Iraq’s response to the war in Ukraine has been polarized (Kebret and Ryder 2022). Hashd al-Shaabi or Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella organization of 40 predominantly Shiite militias, is the bloc most sympathetic to Russian policy in Ukraine, as it regularly engages with Moscow on Syria and the fight against terrorism. in Ukraine. Other figures in the Iranian-linked militias have been more reserved in their take on pro-Kremlin narratives. Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, secretary general of Kataib Hezbollah, acknowledged that the US forced Russia into war, but also stated that Russia was “no less bloody” than Europe and the US and stated that it would take miracle. Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the al-Sadr movement that won the most seats in Iraq’s October 2021 parliamentary elections, was initially more critical of the war. Al-Sadr declared that the war between Russia and Ukraine was “absolutely useless” and added that “I am still waiting for the principle of dialogue between the two Christian countries.” However, by March 4, al-Sadr’s position coincided with that of al-Hamidawi, who said that the war in Ukraine broke out “because of the American policy pursued there.” Iraqi Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani strongly supports Turkey’s efforts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. The Iraqi public also disagrees with the merits of the war in Ukraine. A poster reading “We support Russia” surrounded by large portraits of President Vladimir Putin has appeared outside the Asaib Ahl al-Haq pro-Iranian militia base in Baghdad. The removal of the poster by Iraqi security forces has exacerbated divisions over Ukraine, especially on social media. Supporters of Tehran-linked former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki have generally sympathized with Russia due to their continued antagonism towards the US over the 2003 Iraq War, while al-Sadr’s supporters have tended to maintained strict neutrality.

The Russian Embassy in Lebanon was surprised by the statement of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, which condemned the Russian military operation in Ukraine. And Hezbollah expressed its disagreement with this position. If you look at the essence of the issue, then such a reaction of the Lebanese authorities is caused, first of all, by a clean economy. Or rather, an economic disaster. Lebanon has been mired in a devastating economic crisis since 2019, when the financial system collapsed under the weight of decades of state corruption, waste and mismanagement, paralyzing the banking system. Despite growing poverty, Beirut has yet to develop a financial recovery plan to cover losses or other steps that are considered vital to finding a way out of the crisis and making progress towards reaching an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The IMF deal is seen as the only way for Lebanon to recover from the financial crisis that plunged the country into its most destabiliz-

ing crisis since the 1975-1990 civil war. Hence the position of Beirut regarding the events in Ukraine.

Official authorities in Tunisia tried to refrain from commenting on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In the context of one of the deepest economic crises in the modern history of this country, President Kais Said, having monopolized power, is waiting for the approval of a loan from the IMF. In this situation, for him, the development of a position comes precisely from this problem. Even after the UN vote, Tunisia assured Moscow of its readiness to continue cooperation. However, the opposition represented by the Islamist movement Ennahda yesterday condemned the Russian military invasion of Ukraine. The party called it “a flagrant violation of international law and the people’s right to self-determination within the framework of freedom, democracy and security”.

For Jordan, neutrality has long been the basis of its foreign policy. The Kingdom joined most Arab countries in condemning Russia’s actions through the UN resolution, but, like Amman’s regional partners, stuck to neutral language, excluding even the mention of Russia in its statement. Jordan’s condemnation of Russia “was not strong”. Like other countries in the region, Jordan is forced to try to balance its relations. Among some other Arab countries, Amman feels trapped in this conflict. The Kingdom cannot go far from the United States, its strongest and most strategic ally. In addition, the Kingdom is one of the largest recipients of foreign aid from the United States. But Jordan cannot risk our relationship with Russia. In an October 2021 public opinion poll, 80% of Jordanian respondents said they would prefer to remain neutral if there was a conflict between the US and Russia. About 65% of respondents said they want Russia to play a “much larger role” or “somewhat larger role” in the region. When asked to name the country “most responsible for the instability and violence in the region,” the US came in second after Israel and ahead of Iran. Only 1% of respondents called Russia a source of instability in the Middle East. In Jordan, they are particularly negative about the way the US is handling what the poll called the “Arab-Israeli conflict.” An overwhelming majority of respondents, 83%, said they were “very dissatisfied” with Washington’s role. As the world order is being reshuffled, the countries of the Middle East may no longer be willing to put all their eggs in the American basket.

The military-political situation in Libya is still far from being resolved, and Moscow, represented by PMC Wagner, previously relied on the Field Marshal of the Libyan National Army, Khalifa Haftar, and also fawned over his new political allies, Fathi Bashaga, who tried to carry out a coup in Tripoli. Bashaga urged the US to confront Russia by setting up a base in Libya and, as interior minister, accused the Wagner group of using chemical weapons in the country. In turn, the Russian media accused Bashaga of “kidnapping” political workers Maxim Shugalei and Samer Seifan, who were released in December 2020, and Prigozhin’s Federal News Agency called Bashaga “the leader of the Libyan terrorists.” On the UN mission were representatives of Libya from the Government of National Unity, which is headed by Abdel Hamid Dbeiba. In the current situation, it is more important for him to stay in power and maintain the loyalty of Western countries and the UN. In this situation, the political position was developed on the basis of this consideration.

Yemen, which has been in a state of civil war since 2014, is actually far from a conflict in Europe. It is important to note that many Yemenis believed that Russia,

being an ally of Iran, supported the Houthis. In fact, a number of Russian academicians had meetings with them, and representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry met with them. It is important to note that the ambassador representing Yemen at the UN worked for the government of Hadi. For a long time, he also sought to find tools to resolve the Yemeni conflict in his favor. In this context, the Russian-Ukrainian war was one of the playing cards up his sleeve for him.

The Arab countries of the Persian Gulf - Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman - tried to avoid clear positions in relation to the Ukrainian problem. The UAE abstained in a February 25 vote on a draft UN Security Council resolution condemning Moscow's invasion of Ukraine. Saudi Arabia did not respond to the invasion, as did the UAE, Bahrain and Oman. Kuwait and Qatar only condemned the violence, without ceasing to criticize Moscow. For more than seven decades, the United States has played a key role in the Middle East, acting in particular as the protector of the oil-rich Persian Gulf monarchies, but in recent years Washington has begun to limit its military activities in the region. The Gulf states understand that they need to diversify their alliances to compensate for the perceived withdrawal of the United States from the region. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two US allies, are aware that their ties with Washington have changed over arms deals and human rights issues. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the KSA consulate in Istanbul in 2018 strained relations between Riyadh and Washington. "Russia is seen as an ideological ally, while American human rights issues related to their support are becoming an increasingly serious problem. Not the last argument for such a position of the KSA and the UAE was the fact that the United States appointed their main regional opponent Qatar as the main non-NATO ally, which neither the KSA nor the UAE still have, allegedly "due to the unique role of Doha in promoting the interests Washington in the Middle East and beyond." Arab members of OPEC are in a difficult diplomatic position as maintaining the OPEC+ deal, which controls production, is clearly at the forefront of their considerations. The Gulf states fear damaging this relationship and seek to keep Russia's participation in OPEC+. If Russia leaves the group, then the entire agreement is likely to collapse. Silence about Russia's actions in Ukraine is probably the best course for this at the moment. But this pragmatic position may become untenable if Western leaders insist on their position.

## **ECONOMIC IMPACT**

A lot of scientific literature is devoted to the consequences of wars, both local and world. Many focus on the economic impact, noting the growth in GDP during the war years for individual countries, considering military spending as social (Edelstein 2000). Other economists try to calculate military costs separately (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2008), including the wounded, the dead, the possibility of terrorism, the destruction of infrastructure, the provision of medical care, and others. It is noted that in such a situation, the redirection of funds to the social sector would reduce the tax burden on citizens and make the country more prosperous.

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, many economists point to a significant deterioration in the global economy. Namely, an increase in global inflation by 6%, failure of supply chains, rising prices for energy, industrial and agricultural goods. In examining the current situation, it is important to note that academic research

on the economics of war will change. The modern picture of the world has changed dramatically compared to the world wars, the conflict in Vietnam and Afghanistan, as well as the Cold War between the USSR and the USA. The sharp difference lies in the fact that the launched full-scale war between Moscow and Kyiv turned into not only the polarization of the world, but also the introduction of economic sanctions against one of the important participants in the global economic system (Russia is a member of G20). With imperialist ambitions, Russia is still an important supplier of hydrocarbons, industrial and agricultural goods.

The Arab world, which is a participant in global trade, has experienced a significant effect since it had a number of contracts with Russia and Ukraine. At the end of 2021, the trade turnover between Russia and the Arab countries reached \$18 billion. Undoubtedly, this figure is much less compared to the trade of China and the United States with the Arab countries. However, the consequences of the war were significant (Rogoff 2022).

The war between Russia and Ukraine had a strong impact on the food security of the Arab countries. Russia is the world's main grain producer and, together with Ukraine, has become a key supplier of this product to the Arab countries. For a detailed study of the situation, I propose to divide the Arabic into three categories. The first category will include rich Arab countries with a stable political situation. The second category will include states with a relatively stable economy and political environment but with average or below average incomes of citizens. The third category will include states that are in a protracted political and economic crisis or in a state of civil war.

### ***No impact***

The Arab countries of the Persian Gulf are distinguished by their high incomes due to the export of hydrocarbons to the world market. As a result, they have economic access to food security during times of crisis and can diversify supplies.

The United Arab Emirates found themselves in a risky position in the light of the active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war. This country imported about 50% of grain from the Black Sea region. In order to prevent shortages, the country's authorities decided to suspend the export and re-export of durum wheat. With sufficient financial resources, Abu Dhabi decided to diversify its grain suppliers and agreed with Indian suppliers to fill in the gaps.

The Sultanate of Oman faced the potential risk of a shortage of grain, buying up to 70% of grain from Russia and Ukraine. The country found itself in a vulnerable position after the start of the military conflict and began to look for new suppliers. Muscat wanted to conclude an agreement with India on the supply of grain, but New Delhi announced an embargo on the export of goods. Australia, Canada and the USA were considered as promising partners, but they had high purchase prices. In September 2022, Oman was able to receive a contract for the purchase of wheat for half a year from Ukraine through the mediation of the UN and Turkey.

Qatar felt the turbulence in the world market because it found itself in a dual position. On the one hand, it is 50% dependent on grain imports from the Black Sea region. On the other hand, since the 2017 blockade, Doha has diligently diversified food supplies for the civilian population. Qatar began to consider India, Canada and the United States as alternative suppliers. After the conclusion of an agreement

between Moscow and Kyiv on the export of grain, Doha announced the prospects for purchasing from each of the parties to the conflict.

Saudi Arabia predominantly imported and grain from Poland and the Black Sea region provided 10%. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict did not affect the food security of Bahrain, which buys grain mainly from Australia. A similar situation is typical for Kuwait, as its key wheat import partners are Australia and Canada.

### ***Threat of economic turbulence***

Moscow and Kiev imposed an embargo on grain exports (Russia until June 30). A strong blow was felt by Egypt, which is the largest net importer of grain in the world and bought 80% of the goods from Moscow and Kyiv. During the first weeks after the start of the war, the Egyptian pound fell by 11% and the price of wheat rose by 44%. Shortage of dollars led to blockades of Egyptian ports after importers were unable to obtain the foreign currency they needed to process letters of credit. In March 2022, grain reserves in Egypt could only be enough for 4 months, in addition, large obligations fell on the state because the authorities subsidize bread baladi. Cairo, in an attempt to cope with the shortage of grain, decided to conclude deals for the supply of this product from Germany, France, Brazil, Lithuania and Bulgaria. At the same time, private entrepreneurs sharply increased purchases and overtook General Authority for Supply Commodities by 60%.

The rising cost of food has become the main challenge for the internal political situation in Algeria. Basic food prices have risen by at least a quarter since the start of the Russian campaign. The authorities have decided to impose a complete ban on the export from Algeria of all basic consumer goods, including sugar, pasta, olive oil, as well as wheat and all products made from it. At the same time, according to the order of the President, manufacturers and operators do not have the right to export processed products made on the basis of imported materials. The entire range of socio-economic consequences after COVID-19 and the Russian-Ukrainian war also affects the food situation in Algeria. Mainly, it is gaining momentum in the global increase in prices for cereals, the annual increase of which amounted to 27% and which is one of the main items of Algerian imports. Algeria imported over 30% of grain crops from the Black Sea region and was forced to purchase expensive French wheat to reduce food security risks.

Ukraine was a key exporter of grain crops to Tunisia (47%) before the war. The escalation of tension between Kyiv and Moscow found Tunisia in a difficult period, in an era of long-term unresolved economic challenges and transition to an authoritarian regime. The situation is complicated by the post-COVID period, climate cataclysms - the prolonged drought that has gripped the region and the lack of rains undermine the ability of the local economy to increase domestic agricultural production in order to somehow compensate for the threat of an external deficit. At the end of March 2022, a new law was issued in Tunisia, which provides for a criminal penalty of 10 to 30 years in prison for any "speculation regarding food", including cartel collusion and arbitrary speculative price increases by producers and major players in the food market for food products. A real "hunt" for small and medium-sized farms began in the country with police raids to locate and seize food stocks, especially wheat flour, vegetable oil and sugar.

Against the backdrop of the alarming situation in Algeria and Tunisia, the Kingdom of Morocco was in a better position, since grain imports from the Black Sea region amounted to 36%. For a long time, Paris was the main partner in this area for Rabat. Immediately with the onset of the crisis, the Moroccan government issued a statement that it managed to purchase “significant lots” of wheat in January and February 2022 and therefore nothing threatens the national grain market. Citizens felt relief, including in connection with the growth of domestic production of grain crops that can be consumed on the domestic market. In the light of rising world prices for cereals, the country’s authorities decided to subsidize bread in order to try to eliminate the possibility of an increase in the deficit. At the same time, the cost of flour and flour products will only increase in the near future, including due to the increase in the cost of hydrocarbons and fuel on the world market.

In Lebanon, economists sounded the alarm in connection with the threat of stopping the supply of wheat from the zone of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and an unprecedented increase in purchase prices. Until February 2022, Lebanon purchased 96% of wheat from the Russian and Ukrainian grain markets. The problem also lies in the weak potential of the Lebanese economy and its limited ability to pay for these supplies due to the shortage of cash in the banking system. In practice, this means that in the context of the unfolding global food crisis, international suppliers are not very interested in supplying scarce and expensive wheat to Lebanon, whose solvency in competing markets leaves much to be desired. In the context of the crisis around Ukraine, now Western manufacturers require an advance payment of 25-30% of the total cost and within 1-2 days. Such conditions for Lebanese importers are not feasible. In addition, the purchase prices from this group of suppliers, including taking into account the growing demand and increased transportation costs, are much higher and reach \$550-600 per ton, while in February Lebanese suppliers purchased wheat from Russia and Ukraine at the price only 350 dollars per ton.

Among all the major net food importers in the Middle East, Jordan was one of the most prepared for the threat of a global food crisis due to the threat of cutting off the supply of wheat and other strategic food raw materials from the Black Sea region. By the time the Russian-Ukrainian war began in the active phase, Amman had grain reserves for a year, while imports from the Black Sea region amounted to 20%. This circumstance is reinforced by another important factor. Jordan has managed to insulate its economy from the current spike in fuel prices by arranging long-term contracts in advance to purchase fuel at already fixed prices. Thus, the first direct consequences of the Ukrainian crisis on the local economy turned out to be neutralized thanks to the preventive, proactive measures of the Jordanian government.

### ***Aggravation of the crisis***

Active hostilities in Ukraine have greatly affected Northern Sudan, which imports 50% of food from the Black Sea region. Failures in logical supply chains began to lead to food shortages, higher fuel prices and logistics. As a result, food inflation has doubled since 2021. The main center of poverty and hunger has become two regions - Darfur and the Blue Nile.

In the conditions of being in a prolonged political crisis, Iraq felt the rise in world food prices after the start of the Russian military campaign. Baghdad imports 50% of food, while Ukraine and the Russian Federation are the main suppliers of corn,



sunflower oil, barley and grain. This is the basis of Iraq's food security. The rise in prices and the blockade of supplies from Ukraine and the Russian Federation forced the Iraqi authorities to look for alternative suppliers. In the course went such measures as the removal of all restrictions on food imports for 3 months, the issuance of loans to local farmers, the purchase of their products at a 30% markup. The Iraqi parliament has allowed the government to redirect about \$17 billion allocated to other sectors to pay for food imports.

Libya, which previously imported about 75% of grain from the Black Sea region, found itself in an extremely difficult situation. Despite the high income from the sale of oil to the world market, Tripoli cannot count on food security due to the ongoing civil war and the intensified struggle for the capital. At the same time, even though Libya had stocks of flour for half a year, citizens still face an acute problem of food security due to problems with logistics by land. Food inflation, combined with the lack of a single governing body, has endangered the lives of even residents of coastal cities (EIU, 2022).

A more difficult situation has developed in Yemen, where the population was in danger of large-scale starvation. This country imported 45% of grain from Russia and Ukraine. The problem was spurred on by the ongoing military conflict and the resulting massive flow of internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as the degrading financial and economic situation in the country against the backdrop of rising prices for energy resources and fuel. Given the lack of its own hydrocarbon resources and Yemen's heavy dependence on external food supplies, the country has no real leverage to counteract the unfavorable situation that is unfolding. Rising prices for fuel and fertilizers are progressively reflected in the local market and, given the steadily declining purchasing power of the population, increases the risks of large-scale famine in Yemen. The proportion of the population in Yemen that is food insecure has risen substantially to 50%, the highest since February 2018. Since the beginning of 2022 alone, this figure has grown by 10%. The situation is difficult in all regions of the country, but in some provinces it is close to a humanitarian catastrophe. In particular, the main regions of mass famine in Yemen today are located in the provinces of Jawf, Amran and Hajja. The United Nations estimates that in the second half of 2022, the risks of famine will increase significantly in the province of Hajja, as well as in the provinces of Abs and Hairan. The areas around the port of Hodeida are in a more prosperous situation, however, even there the threat of famine cannot be ruled out in the event of a general deterioration in the economic and military-political situation in Yemen.

The Syrian problem has become one of the protracted ones in the Middle East. Undoubtedly, its difference was that the head of state was never removed as a result of revolutionary movements and the offensive of ISIS. Damascus has become an ally of Moscow and continues to support it in many areas. Food was diverted to Syria after seizing Ukraine's grain regions, but Russia denies that the grains were stolen. At the same time, the leadership of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions declared their readiness to send grain to Syria. In this case, the formula "my friend's friend is my friend" worked.

## CONCLUSION

Taking into account the complexity of the Arab countries' perception of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, it is important to note that none of them became a fan of Kyiv or Moscow. From a political point of view, it is clear that there are countries that gravitate more towards Russia because they have established channels of communication with it on security issues and the supply of weapons. Part of the Arab countries formally condemned the actions of Moscow, but this was done mainly because of the desire to maintain strong contact with Western countries, especially in the context of civil wars and the expectation of loans.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has caused quite a lot of damage to the weak economies of the Arab countries, which are struggling to cope with the food crisis. The blocking of grain exports from the Black Sea region dealt a heavy blow to those who could not compensate for the high prices for bread. In this situation, only rich oil-producing countries have been able to meet this challenge by buying more expensive wheat from other countries.

In the foreseeable future, the Arab East will continue to try to distance itself from European and Russian problems, wanting to maintain contacts with everyone and ensure the stability of its economies. It is important to point out that they are focused on their own interests and will continue to make decisions on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict based on their national interests.

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# THE BALKANS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD - PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES

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**Abstract:** The international relations of the 20th century were largely characterized by the balance of power, and it could be said, a balance of fear, of two opposing alliances. Precisely these two centers of power, the USA and the USSR led to division within the system of the entire international community. However, the breakup of the USSR, the emergence of new states, the end of the Cold War also led to the end of bipolarity and the emergence of unipolar world. The only remaining hegemon the USA, using all its available resources as well as the resources of their “followers” disrupted the system of power balance in their favor. That disruption of the power balance system was most bloodily manifested in the Balkans as part of the European continent and a kind of connection between worlds. Regardless of the large resources available, both the “hard” and the “soft” powers, the USA could not completely bring the Balkans under their control. Changes in the international relations we live in, question the current order based on globalization and one hegemon. However, this very hegemon, using all resources selflessly, is trying to preserve its order by enabling itself and its followers to play the role of “the master of the world” and assigning itself eternal world policeman role. Throughout the globe, questions are being raised about the value of global order and the USA’s power as the sole global power. By shifting the economic flows to the East, e.i. to the Asia-Pacific part of the world, Western hegemons are slowly becoming naked in their imperialistic interests. Re-questioning the power of the “world policeman” is reflected on those parts of the world that are at the junction of “different worlds”. One such part of the world is certainly the Balkans. Therefore, the theme and the aim of this paper is to point out the importance of the Balkans in terms of power projection of key global and regional factors of international relations at the beginning of the new millennium. By analyzing influences of global and regional factors of international relations, it can be stated that peoples on the Balkans already live in a multipolar world, which is characterized by great instability due to undefined zones of influence of global and regional players. Defining those areas of interest becomes an imperative for the human civilization survival.

**Keywords:** *Balkans, Russia, China, Turkey, the USA, NATO, European Union*

## INTRODUCTION

Starting from the premise that any attempt to investigate phenomena and processes in international relations must and should begin with the question of world

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order as the state of the international system in a given historical period, looking at the current state of world order, it is possible to decisively influence the world order tomorrow. That is, based on what happened, we could see what will happen. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate in detail the world orders that have existed until now during the human civilization development. Based on that, we can have certain scientific and expert assessments and forecasts of what “tomorrow’s world order” will look like. Current world order, based on the postulates of the neoliberal theory of international relations is characterized by globalization, unipolarity, realignment of global actors of the world order, attempts of establishing a “world government” and global governance and universal conventions.

Mutual relations in the modern world order can be viewed on the basis of the role of the international relations key factors, and one of the most significant among them is the re-emergence of nation- state which, in the time of intensive globalization processes, under the influence of new global players of international relations, were excluded from the flow of global processes. Relations in the modern world order can be observed through the return of the nation-states. Such order has been known since the time when the world order was based on the foundations of the realistic theory of international relations, where states were the most important factors of international order based on their mutual relationship.

However, the world order based on the neoliberal theory of international relations is slowly coming to an end, and as the winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, Joseph Stieglitz, states, it is already dead and we live in some postmodern society where nation-states are re-profiled as one of the key factors of the future world order. Large nation-states (economically, politically and militarily) will be the future bearers of a world order based on multipolarity.

The separation of parts of the world into individual power centers and regions does not mean that in the future world order, there will be no connection into a single whole, which will simply be called multipolar global geopolitical system with its subsystems. In the coming period, when the scientists and professionals speak of multipolar global order, it is highly likely to imply a sharp contrast between centres of world power and peripheries. However, analyzing the social orders that have developed and built up over the course of human civilization, it can be said that whenever there were many centers of power ,there was a very turbulent situation on the peripheries of those centers , and throughout history, one such periphery has been the Balkans, i.e. the Balkan Peninsula.

## **BALKAN PENINSULA**

Observing the history of the Balkan Peninsula (hereinafter the Balkans), it can be concluded that the Balkan Peninsula had changed its name several times, but for some reason the Balkans has survived and is still used.

The name change was more frequent than in other European geographical entities. These names were borrowed either from the civilizations that developed on it, or from the names of the great empires that alternated on it. Some of those names are related to the way the relief of the Peninsula was understood in the Classical and Renaissance periods.

From a geographical point of view, the peninsula is defined as a continental surface surrounded by water from three sides. Since the Balkan Peninsula is bounded

by the sea from the East, South and West, the northern border remains to be defined, which is already the subject of dispute among certain experts in the field and science. The Sava and Danube rivers, whose valleys are cut along the southern rim of the Pannonian basin, represent a natural border in a geographical terms. However, from the mouth of the Kupa to the Sava and further to the West, it is more difficult to determine the northern border. Generally speaking, it is often stated in the literature that that border continues along the Kupa river and then extends linearly across the Dinaric hills to Rijeka on the Adriatic Sea. The border drawn in this way is an administrative creation, and as such, does not fit either with the relief, ethnographic or political facts.

The exact natural-geographical borders of the Balkans have not yet been established. Cvijić's attitude towards the Balkan Peninsula was "...that first impression one gets after a general survey, is one of the reality. The Balkan Peninsula is a geographical and geological intermediary between Europe and Asia, with several special features of its own" (Cvijić, 1922, p. 9), but also the Balkan Peninsula is not the only land link between Europe and Asia. On the contrary, Europe is widely connected to Asia with the Russian platform. However, the Russian surface continues towards Siberia and the desert of Central Asia, which makes it difficult to access even outside the centers of ancient civilizations. Whereas the Balkan Peninsula is closely connected by the Aegean Sea, a very accessible link with Asia, and through Asia Minor further towards China and India, or across the Mediterranean towards Egypt and further to Africa.

The Balkans were not written about only by professionals and scientists from the Balkans, but many others as well. Defarges, describes the Balkans as a place located on the border, the edge of the empire. As such, this area is related to the constant activity of foreigners, e.i. the others. The peoples of this area are unique, but also very different. These differences lead to large and difficult conflicts in this area. They live in a community, mixed, but still separated. In addition, Defarges notes that the Balkans "are torn between Rome and the Hellenistic world, Rome and Carthage, Rome and Byzantium, and in between Christianity and Islam" (Defarges, 2006, p. 24).

If we were to proceed with further elaboration of the professionals and scientists views, both domestical and those from other areas, this paper could become one huge study on the Balkans, which is not the aim of it, therefore the view of Dafarges will be stated at the end which says "..., Balkan Peninsula- the Balkans, that peninsular land mass between the Adriatic, Mediterranean and Aegean seas, is just one in a series of numerous worldwide zones - joints, i.e. regions that are located between many civilizations and systems of political organization. Located on empires border or more or less divided among those empires, this and similar regions do not cease to be disputed. The population is both local and has arrived due to successive migrations; which causes eternal conflicts over the division of territories between peoples who mix, but still remain separate".(Defarges, 2006, p. 24).

## **THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE KEY FACTORS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TOWARDS THE BALKANS**

The Balkans are, speaking freely, in one of the key geopolitical and geostrategic places we have all over the planet, and as such represents an area where almost all

key religions of the modern world meet. These differences, in aspect of contemporary theory and practices of international relations as well as other humanities can be viewed from at least two standpoints . The first one is usually highlighted when one wants to state how such diversity in ethnicity, religion, culture and every other social field is visible. That is, it is good from the aspect of mutual respect and further cohesion, because according to the supporters of such standpoint “differences attract”. The second one has a more realistic view which states that different customs, beliefs, peoples and culture bring many conflicts and violence. Reinforced nationalism and awareness of the other and different, can cause anxiety and fear. Such feeling further escalates into animosity, which can eventually lead to open hostility and armed conflict.

Looking through history, it can be seen that the Balkans had very turbulent periods of war and conflict, e.i. periods of disintegration and fragmentation, but also integration. Disintegration and fragmentation periods alternated cyclically with periods of peaceful coexistence, which were marked by key periods of integration processes. Cyclical periods of solution and desolution of the Balkans have already begun in the period of Ancient Greece, through Rome and Byzantium, the Ottoman period, the Balkans wars, the World War I, the World War II, and the war that occurred with the breakup of Yugoslavia. Those periods have left visible consequences on the territory of the Balkans even today, the ones that will torment the Balkans peoples for decades to come. As it has been the case throughout history, it can be said it is the same today. Currently, the Balkans with its peoples are in a period of dissolution, which is still not complete ,but the outlines of the coming period of solution and construction, can already be seen .The current state of dissolution is not only the fault of the West or the East, or the “international community” that has its own legitimate goals in this area, but primarily the Balkans peoples themselves are to blame, who have not experienced the renaissance of their ethnic and national being unlike other peoples of Europe, and therefore tend to be the subject of interest of major players in international relations, both global and regional. Therefore, the following part of this paper is precisely dedicated to the relations of key global and regional players towards the Balkans. The classification of global and regional players was carried out as follows, the western ones: the USA, the European Union, NATO and the eastern ones : Russia, China and Turkey.

## **THE BALKANS IN THE SPHERES OF INTERESTS OF THE EAST**

Of the three key states from the east that project their interests on the Balkan Peninsula, two of them have a history of their relations with the Balkan peoples, while the third one (PR China) has yet to create its history of relations with the Balkans. The first review will be on China's relations with the Balkans.

Looking at China's historical relationship with the Balkans, one realizes that this relationship has been negligible. However, the success of Chinese communism, which has built a modern economic giant from one average country with numerous economic, political, religious and ethnic problems, which, according to already determined estimates, became number one in the world. In other words, it has enabled great economic power to flow naturally into other fields of power such as political and military, leading to the possibility of PR China changing its foreign policy. These changes made it possible for the People's Republic of China to become one

of the leading powers in the world order. China's influence on the Balkan countries in the past, could be characterized as economic one, until 1999 and the bombing of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Belgrade by NATO. This was the point that allowed the People's Republic of China to express more specific views on events in the Balkans during the last decade of the 20th century.

At the beginning of the new millennium, the People's Republic of China thanks to its economic power, began to expand primarily its economic, then political and military power to other parts of Asia, Africa, Europe and Balkans as an integral part of the European continent. One of the most significant models of projections of China's influence on the European continent, and thus the Balkans, is an initiative that was created in 2012 under the name "17+1 initiative". In addition to the Republic of China, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are included in this bilateral cooperation program.

It is interesting to point out that "Platform 17+1" succeeded to bring together the countries that historically belonged to different geopolitical spheres, around one common interest, trade and investments. During historical period the Chinese presence in the members of the previously mentioned initiative was negligible, but now it has changed drastically. This proactive action of China becomes one of its own characteristic of the recent era "China that is not afraid to take a more proactive role in the international community and global development." (Ivanić & Savović, 2020, p. 14).

The next project but not less important is from 2013. Namely, 2013 represents the year when China adopts "One Belt, One Road", more precisely the document called the New Silk Road. The strategy based on many projects and ways of cheaper and faster production of goods which is primarily directed towards the West and the Western market. However, by adopting this document, China is gradually entering the Balkans. This highlights the importance of the position of this area, as well as the possibilities it has as a transit region. China's entry into the Balkans, additionally strengthens the thesis about the Balkans as a bridge between the East and the West. "The Belt and Road is aimed at six economic corridors that pass through very complex geographical areas, but simultaneously resource-rich areas: New Eurasian land bridge – which includes railway to Europe through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Poland; Economic corridor of China, Mongolia and Russia; including railway connections and a steppe road - will connect with the land bridge; Economical corridor China, Central Asia, West Asia: connects with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey; China economic corridor, Indochina Peninsula - including Vietnam, Thailand, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, Myanmar and Malaysia; and China-Pakistan economic corridor, which will face the challenges of strained relations between India and China." (Ivanić & Savović, 2020, p. 15).

The projection of China's influence in the Balkans is primarily reflected in the millions of infrastructural projects in Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia. It is a fact that infrastructural projects, whose construction is extremely demanding and difficult, are mostly implemented by companies from China. Its goal is clear, it is the Western market. The region of the Western Balkans is one of routes towards that goal. However, it should be emphasized that the Western Balkans are therefore of a great value for China. "China's interest in the Western

Balkans should be viewed mainly through economic prism, as some Balkan countries will eventually become part of the EU –for this reason China uses its firms to fill infrastructure gaps, which will enable China to ship goods from Greece via the Western Balkans to the huge market of the European Union.” (Ivanić & Savović, 2020, p. 18).

Investing in the infrastructure construction projects in the Balkans is not the only possibility of investment from foreign investors from the People’s Republic of China. On the contrary, Chinese investments in technologies and technological development in the Balkans, begins to be observed with great concern from the West. A growing concern can be seen in the West, where Western actors consider Chinese investments inadequate, which they consider contrary to European rules and norms, so the western part of the international community advocates the termination of close cooperation between some Balkan countries and China. However, the rise of Chinese influence in the Balkans indicates the impossibility of West itself to stabilize this region, so by all possible prospects in the Balkans in the future period, the influence of China will be felt increasingly.

When it comes to Turkey’s influence on the Balkans, it is necessary to mention a couple of facts, among which ,the focus would be on the following:

- 3% percent of Turkey’s territory belongs to the Balkan Peninsula
- Turkey has a long history of ruling the Balkans
- Demise of Kemal Atatürk’s achievements and the return of the neo-Islamic perception of society building

Observing Turkey today, it can be said that it has grown into a significant regional power which wants to expand its influence. Projection of state power in international relations is additionally reinforced by its membership in the NATO alliance, its actions in accordance with principles and norms of NATO. In addition to membership in the NATO alliance, which officially began in 1952, Turkey has made significant efforts to become a member of the European Union, which indicates its desire to become a European state, the state that is part of a civilized, unique identity ,European identity. “Turkey applied for associate membership in 1959 in the European Economic Community (EEC), and in 1963 an agreement ,a.k.a “Ankara agreement”, about association formation between Turkey and the European Economic Community ,was signed. (Blagojević, 2014, p. 9).The engagement of modern Turkey in the Balkans is justified by the deep connection with the Ottoman Empire, through political, economic, military and cultural sphere of life of these two regions. One fact in favor of Turkey wanting better cooperation towards the development and prosperity of the Western Balkans, is a large number of Turkish officials visiting the politicians of this region. “At the end of 2009, the Turkish president Abdullah Gul visited Serbia. That visit initiated interstate cooperation on political, economic and cultural level. The practice of one-month meetings of foreign affairs ministers of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey, was agreed “ (Blagojević, 2014, p.7).

However, Turkey’s actions towards the Balkans can be divided into two parts: foreign policy engagement of Turkey during the conflicts in the Balkans until 2000 and engagement of Turkey in the Balkans after the 2000s. In the first part, until 2000, Turkey followed the well-known mantra of the West, in its foreign policy activities, which was primarily reflected in logistical support to the Islamic population during



the conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. No matter how much Turkey was involved in the logistical support of the Islamic population during the war in former Yugoslavia, after 2000, Turkey begins the process of changing its policy towards the Balkan countries. During this change, special attention was paid to Serbia and Serbian people, because Turkey used its historical heritage which showed that without the support of Serbia and its people as a key nation in the Balkans, its policy towards the Balkans is of no great success. Along with this change, there was also a change in Turkey's own policy, both externally and internally, where the achievements of Atatürk's reform of Turkey were suppressed and a new model of internal governance is introduced, which implied the merging of a new democratic one with the legacies of the Ottoman Empire. However, regardless of the degree of Islamization that has taken place in Turkish society, where this movement, along with other factors, highlights the "fraternal Islamic connection" in the Balkans, it is not so radical as to exclude the possibility of coexistence with other non-Islamic religions. This attitude of the new Islamic movement in Turkey was created on the basis of vast historical experience of coexistence with other denomination in Europe and especially on the Balkans.

According to Blagojević, "the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans and its surroundings is presented on five general principles, which allow a wide maneuvering space for peacekeeping actions:

1. If security and democracy are not balanced, Turkey stands no chance of establishing influence in its surroundings
2. Zero political problems with neighbors enable Turkey to successfully act towards the surroundings. It is an "active setting in relations with neighboring countries, in order to eliminate all the problems that exist in them which burden bilateral relations and limit the room for maneuver of Turkish politics on the regional and global level.
3. Developing relations with neighboring regions and going beyond that
4. Commitment to a multidimensional foreign policy;
5. Framework action as a principle of "Rhythmic diplomacy" (fast adaptation diplomacy to given conditions and circumstances)" (Blagojević, 2014, p. 12).

In addition to the economic and military rise of Turkey, and its influence in the Balkans, it also contributes significantly in the field of culture and education. Its influence in the field of education is noticeable in the increased number of students who attend Turkish language faculties, but also the culture of its people. With the support of the Turkish government, the "International Burch University" was founded in 2008 in Sarajevo. In Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey offers scholarships for undergraduate and postgraduate studies, as well as those for language learning." (Blagojević, 2014, p. 17) Also, a significant influence is achieved in tourism, which makes destinations throughout Turkey, attractive for the Balkans people. Although Turkey's influence is most pronounced in the economy and military, the one through culture, education and tourism is increasing. It indicates serious intentions of this country and its ambitions to expand on European soil.

When it comes to Russia's influence on the Balkans, an overview can be made through three epochs:

- The epoch of the relations of Imperial Russia towards the Balkans and its peoples
- The epoch of the relations of the Soviet Union towards the Balkans
- The epoch of the relations of modern Russia towards the Balkans.

The epoch of the relations of Imperial Russia towards the Balkans and its peoples, can be viewed from the aspect of help that Imperial Russia provided primarily to Serbs and Bulgarians to free themselves from slavery of the Ottoman Empire.

In the next part of the paper, there will be more details about the influence of the Soviet Union towards the Balkans and later on the influence of Russia as an independent state. After the Second World War, international relations were characterized by bipolarity, i.e. by clearly defined spheres of influence from the East (Warsaw military alliance) and Western (NATO). The bipolar division of the Balkans was completed at the conference which was held in Yalta from 04.-11. February 1945.

At the conference, in which the “big three” Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt participated, the division of the sphere of influence in the Balkans according to the 2+2+2 model, was agreed, i.e. two countries to be part of the aforementioned two bloc alliances and two states to be outside the blocs. Such sphere of influence with minor oscillations lasted until 1989, e.i. until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

With the end of the Cold War, the power that the Soviet Union once had, was lost, and thus Russia becomes a weakened state whose future, at that time, was uncertain and difficult to forecast. Many analysts of international relations at that time, saw the possibility of complete subjugation of Russian Federation to the West, given the hegemonic US diplomacy. However, with the arrival of Vladimir Putin in 2000, Russia began its recovery. In that period, Russia has an increasing influence on certain countries of the Balkans.

Western leaders, driven by power and profit, could not see the colossal importance of offered discourse in the foreign policy of post-Soviet Russia. Namely, the colossal feature of Russian post-Soviet debate on foreign policy was an almost simultaneous appearance of two interwoven and empowering discourses: the discourse on geopolitics and the one on the Eurasian security concept.”Despite plenty of competing ideas, plans and ideologies, only the discourse of geopolitics/Eurasianism represented Russia’s most comprehensive attempt to come to terms with the Soviet collapse and the international order it created” (Morazova, 2009, p. 681). The same author states that it is important to mention that the process of Eurasian integration practically begins after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and thus a unified security, political and economical system. It turned out that the emerging states were not able to independently reach the new e.i., higher standards. “In such circumstances, on December 21, 1991, the Community of Independent States was formed, within the framework of which several agreements have been signed that mostly concern security and economy. The main initiator for the signing of the aforementioned security agreements was precisely Russia.” (Morazova, 2009, p. 683).

During Vladimir Putin’s mandate from 2000-2004, which was characterized by a very bad situation in economy, politics, army, security, the gradual revival of the Russian state began. Putin implemented major changes in the government structure, and had to reach out for difficult measures in order to improve the situation,

in which he succeeded as much as it was possible. The foreign policy of Russia at that time was based on the enormous wealth in natural resources, primarily in oil and gas, which almost half of the world's population depends on. Thanks to natural resources, primarily natural gas, the overall economic picture of Russia, which suffered enormous damage during the crisis, was improving.

Russia's foreign policy was based on stable principles. Russia was moving towards creating its own identity and position as a regional and global actor e. i. a cooperative partner which can establish a relationship with countries with very different interests and prospects. "Essentially, Russia's foreign policy priorities are oriented towards security. Foreign policy itself is more focused on key bilateral relations. Aggressive confrontational foreign policy has not become the result and consequence of the growth of authoritarianism in Russia. It is important to emphasize that no matter much room there was for Western cooperation with Russia in many areas of common interest, the West could not convert Russia into its value system. It was believed that it would not come true in this mandate, nor for many years afterwards" (Lo, 2004, p. 7-8).

The economic strengthening of Russia enabled it to use both "soft" and "hard" power and diplomacy. That exact combination of soft and hard power with defined foreign policy goals, has clearly proved to be successful in the Balkans. Consequently, now the interests of Russia are represented in the Balkans, from political, economic, geostrategic to trade through investments in infrastructure to social ones such as tourism, which is most pronounced in the area of the Western Balkans. In addition to these interests, it is much more important to point out that Russia's ties with the Balkans peoples are historically deeply rooted. Sharing the same dominant religion, and very similar language with many Balkan countries, Russia represents a significant player in the region. Also, Russia had an important role in resolving the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as it was part of most of the international initiative to end the conflict in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Serbian people in Serbia and Republic of Srpska, due to their common past, Orthodoxy, but also their bad experience with NATO alliance, cooperate bilaterally with Russia, thus expressing their desire for Eurasian integration and cooperation. Russian influence in this area is strong, intertwined with the past, with a tendency to continue in the future.

## **THE BALKANS IN THE SPHERES OF WESTERN INTERESTS**

In aforementioned text on the Balkans in the interests of the East, the relations of three key factors that exert their influence on the Balkans had been mentioned. The realization of their influence has been primarily guided by the historical context that Russia and Turkey have with individual nations and states in the Balkans, to a purely Chinese influence which is primarily based on economic interests, as the construction of the "Chinese economic bridgehead" in the Balkans will enable further penetration into the European continent. It is much easier to talk about the Balkans in spheres of interests of the West, as opposed to the East because it is the same approach, only with two different aspects of military and economic, and both of them have the same method of leadership and performance, which is the "stick and carrot method".

Before any further explanation, it should first be stated that Western players in the Balkans are primarily considered as the realization of the influence of the United

States of America, which pursues its own interests directly through various bilateral or multilateral forms and initiatives of cooperation and through the North Atlantic Alliance - NATO and the European Union. In addition to the aforementioned, similar interests are also shown by other western players, such as Germany, France or Great Britain, but due to constant dominant role of the USA in the Western Hemisphere, they aligned their interests with the American and currently do not show different forms of behavior.

After the “tectonic” changes in international relations at the end of the 20th century e.i., the disappearance of the bipolar world and the emergence of a unipolar world under the leadership of the USA, western players took advantage of the vacuum space and disrupted the system that was based on the balance of power . During that period, Western actors, using already well-established method of “carrot and stick<sup>33</sup>” in conducting their neoliberal diplomacy, extended their influence in the Balkans.

With the breakup of Yugoslavia, the European Union and the NATO alliance were making considerable efforts to the Balkans an area under their complete control. Although there is sometimes an impression of a lack of harmonious coordination of actions among these bodies. One of the visible influences is precisely in changing the name of this area, so the Balkans became the Western Balkans, and through a further process integration becomes Southeast Europe. These changes implied the renunciation of certain peoples identity and accepting something new they themselves did not know what they were accepting. That was done with the aim of becoming part of the alliance and the opportunity to make a profit for individual nation-states.

Serbian people, led by their leaders, decided to retain their autonomy, which resulted in imposing collective guilt on the entire nation for the war crimes committed in this area, although these wars were more focused on spatial fragmentation and the weakening of the former SFRY, which was becoming a fast-growing economic country in the middle of the Balkans.

“The US has a permanent interest in peace in the Balkans, because the instability in this area poses a threat to peace throughout Europe and threatens American allies and the established balance of power that corresponds to American interests.” (Kostić, 2019, p. 353) Truthfully said, the involvement of the West, more specifically the USA, is based on military issues and the stabilization of the region through military cooperation. On the other hand, the European Union strives to create stabilization through good governance, democratization and the rule of law. The European Union’s activities concern the economic and political spheres of life in the Balkans. The interests of the European Union defined in this way are trying to eliminate the increased Chinese influence on the Balkan countries. Given the strong desire, as well as the will and hope of the Balkan countries to be part of Europe, to belong to a single union, “the USA has consistently emphasized that the path to the European

3 The head of the European Union delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Johan Satler, told BN TV on October 1<sup>st</sup> 2021, that the European Union has various mechanism, and financial aid can easily lead to sanctions. He pointed out that the EU is doing its part when it comes to BiH’s candidate status , but on the other hand, political blockades in BiH represent a big problem. When it came to EU financial support, Satler used the terms “carrot” and “stick”. Carrot would mean financial support and incentives, while the stick would represent sanctions. “Of course we have various instruments at our disposal. We perform with a “carrot”, with an incentive. We have shown this on the example of the vaccines donations during the pandemic. The citizens see that. I confirm that we also have a “stick” available. If it comes to that - we will use it,” he said (<https://www.rtvbn.com/4013678/satler-ako-dodje-do-toga-koristicemo-sankcije-u-bih>).

Union leads through NATO and that all countries became NATO members before becoming members of the European Union. The balance of power in this region, according to the American concept, means a balance in favor of those countries and peoples who support the US and thus increase its global power and breadth extent of their expansion.” (Kostić, 2019, p. 353). Generally speaking, current balance of power within the Balkans is de facto on the side of American and European interests. The desire for the USA dominance, as well as the pursuit of the title of the only world power, can be seen through engagement in this area. “The geopolitical practice of the modern world, clearly shows the USA aspirations to establish a new world order of a unipolar world, implying absolute control of the geographical space of the Western Balkans and the Balkans in general.” (Živković, 2020, p. 87)

The Balkans once again occupy a special place in the USA foreign policy. The reason for this may be the desire to regain its former glory as a world hegemon, or simply because this space is not under complete control, thus contributing to damaging the reputation of Western players on the global stage. The USA is investing significantly in this region, primarily through the NATO alliance, but also with the help of other foreign policy and diplomacy actors. In an attempt to re-establish control over the Balkans, one of the main tasks of both the USA, NATO and the EU is to keep Serbia, and areas where Orthodox people live, in their vicinity. If these efforts are to succeed, in addition to using various forms of “soft power”, it is necessary to influence the change in the attitude that Serbia and Serbian people in the Balkans are solely to blame for all the events of the past three decades.

Serbia as a country and Serbian people from the Balkans do not represent any destabilizing factor in this area. On the contrary, throughout history, it was Serbian nation that had played the greatest role in the integration processes of creating various forms of state communities with other peoples in the Balkans, that, throughout history, have never had a state-forming role.

The USA has the possibility of complete dominance in the Western Balkans, of course together with the European Union if they find mechanisms to influence the disruption of relations between Serbia and Russia. One of the ways to undermine Russia's influence in the Balkans is to establish good relations with Serbia and Serbian people. Therefore, “the USA will strengthen its role in two directions - firstly, it will encourage and elevate Serbia (for example, by recalling the Serbian-American friendships achieved during the two wars, thereby attempting to establish and revive “traditionally” good relations; support for “demarcation” as a way of solving the status of Kosovo), secondly, if such strategy fails, a harsher approach will follow, with possible increased military presence in the region and the isolation of Serbia.” (Kostić, 2019, 356). The approach, action and engagement of the USA in the Balkans are of vital importance for further development and progression of this area. This is evidenced by the Atlantic Alliance from 2017 report, which clearly states that the USA involvement in the Balkans is unquestionable and that development is possible with the USA leadership. The report is entitled “Balkans Forward: New US Strategy for the Region”. Through this new strategy, the US hopes to consolidate the cohesion of the Balkans in its interest zone.

In the eyes of the USA and its allies, the establishment of institutions and centers on the territory of the Balkans is aimed at the complete destabilization of the region, as well as the freezing of conflicts. More precisely, the expansion of Russia

and Russian influence in the Western Balkans leads to a shift in the balance of power in this area. It has also been shaken by the constant "cultivation of hatred" towards the NATO alliance and the USA, due to the bombing of Serbia that took place on March 24, 1999. It is necessary to point out that on the territory of the bombed country, there is a large amount of depleted uranium, the presence of which makes a huge number of the population sick. The topic of bombing, but also other topics related to the position of the Serbs in the Western Balkans, increasingly turn Serbia towards union with Russian Federation. In order to turn the matter to their advantage, in 2001, the West founded the Committee of Depleted Uranium, as its "ad hoc" institution.

In addition to the USA/NATO alliance, the European Union exerts a significant influence in the area of the Western Balkans. As we have seen the expansion of US influence in the Balkans, it is more strongly motivated by hard methods of power, the European Union has a different approach to stabilizing this region. Of course, the security of a certain area is a matter of military forces, but stabilization is achieved by other means and principles. The European Union is turning to stability through the principles of good governance. It actually advocates democratization, the existence of civil society, as well as the rule of law. It is necessary to extend the rule of law and democracy to a region that has lived for years in a closed society and regime that did not have freedom of the press, sometimes even freedom of speech. Such closed society, after the breakup of a federation, needs to be led towards a better, fairer and freer arrangement. According to the European Union, such an arrangement is democratic one. The European Union has been working for years to stabilize the Balkans through the building of institutions, the rule of law, a freer and stronger civil society. The European Commission strategy that dates back to February 2018, "A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans", is precisely about the importance for "candidate countries for membership to have priorities, and they must reflect rule of law, justice and fundamental rights. A possible membership in the European Union is political, security and economic interests of the Union, whose fundamental objective is a stronger, more stable and united Europe, based on the common values." (A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans, 2018).

## CONCLUSION

An analytical review of the events in the Balkans reveals that it represents a diplomatic, military and ideological battlefield as a region at the crossroads of worlds and whose control enables further power and influence expansion. It may be said that the Balkans peoples are already living the New World Order, multipolarity, which aims to create a balance of power within international relations. That would balance the world's leading powers. The age of hegemony and bipolarity should be a thing of a past. New actors are coming onto the international scene. Players whose actions diminish the dominance of former rivals, the USA and Russia. Creating new actors, strengthening their power in international relations, is also reflected in the Balkans countries. Excluding the influence of historical actors from the Balkans will lead to renewed tensions and conflicts.

As previously pointed out, history abounds in frequent conflicts between the Balkans people. In more recent history, conflicts have moved to a higher level. Namely,

even though there is no fire or war, conflicts of interests of the great powers are flooding the Balkans. The points of interest of major international actors are intertwined within the region. Political elites, considering that their countries are worth more than others, try to get the best for themselves. Thus, military troops and bases, embassies, institutions and offices of international actors, great powers, are visible on the territory of some countries. Their actions, work and stationing in this area sometimes lead to worse, i.e. negative consequences for the prosperity of the Balkans. The reason for this is that the interests of the great powers differ, thus causing even more friction within the region.

In today's multipolar world order, the Balkans occupy an important place. However, in addition to various peoples living in this area, the Balkans are a meeting point for different world powers and their actions. The Balkans are the host to many international organizations, major world and regional powers. The influences of external actors in this area are very visible. However, divergent interests and goals of the great powers, international organizations, and the Balkans countries themselves, lead to even greater complexity and division in this region.

The Balkans remain one of the main foreign policy issues of many great powers of today's multipolar world order. First of all, in the Balkans, two of the world's strongest powers, the USA and Russian Federation, have existed with their interests since the Cold War. After the Berlin Congress, there was no wider constitutional-legal conference on the Balkans. Perhaps it is time to finally settle this issue in a conference format, it is necessary to have an agreement to constitutionally and legally resolve the issue of all peoples in the Balkans with clear guarantees of three European countries (e.g. Germany, France and Italy), Russia and Turkey. It is also very important that the USA is not involved in this because this is an exclusively European issue.

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# THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE PROCESS OF CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF POWER RELATIONS

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**Abstract:** Military interventionism is a risk with unforeseeable consequences for the international order and its security. Catastrophic potentials, primarily military power, generated in foreign policy by major powers in order to realize their national interests are a great danger of permanent militarization of international politics. The war in Ukraine initiated significant changes that will remain as building blocks of the future defense role of the European Union (EU). It may gradually increase the EU's ability to intervene in complementarity with the NATO alliance, which is a long-standing ambition that has largely remained an aspiration until now. Also, the war accelerates transformations in EU foreign policy because Brussels is forced to adapt to the new geopolitical reality. This could reinforce the trend in Europe to emphasize a strong EU as a protective factor for European countries. Bearing in mind that it is a geographically inseparable part of Europe, the Balkans, and especially the area of Serbia, conveniently served to absorb a multitude of externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations that stem from tensions and contradictions inherent in regions and societies outside the Balkans. Also, it is very important to highlight the place and role of the Balkan countries in this reorganization of the power relations of the great powers. From concrete European, Eurasian and global centers of geopolitical power, the Balkans are viewed from a different geographical perspective. Bearing in mind that it is a geographically inseparable part of Europe, the Balkans, and especially the area of Serbia, conveniently served to absorb a multitude of externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations that stem from tensions and contradictions inherent in regions and societies outside the Balkans.

**Keywords:** *European union; Russia; The process of geopolitical recomposition; The power relationship.*

## INTRODUCTION

International relations are a dynamic and changing category, without final solutions, which at certain historical moments manifests itself as an international order. From the perspective of the influence of the so-called of great powers on international relations, the international order, most often, is named as unipolar, bipolar and multipolar. The European Union, as an idea, has existed for several centuries, and

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significant forms of its organization were evident only after the Second World War. The official name European Union was created in 1992, when 12 European countries finalized a stage in the development of European integration. After its formation, the Union carried out several expansions, but it is also evident that one country left its membership (United Kingdom, 2020), so that today there are 27 member states.

The European Union primarily developed as an economic community of states, and at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century it tried to grow into a global political power. But there is no political influence without military force. In this sense, the EU tried to get rid of American influence in the field of defense and exert a more significant influence on peace and security in the world. However, the war in Ukraine since February 2022 has strengthened the influence of the US and NATO, especially in Europe, to the extent that the question arises – what is the EU's influence on the security situation of the old continent?

By applying the methods of content analysis, case studies and comparative methods, this paper analyzes the position of the EU in the creation of the latest international order. As part of that analysis, consideration of the position and perspective of the Western Balkans is also included.

## **GLOBAL SECURITY POSITIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

The security threats in contemporaneity have changed substantially, and yet, as Schopenhauer argued, we live in a „worst of all“ world, and given that „God Mars still continues its apocalyptic march“, all these facts must not stop the struggle of the democratic world in changing the driving forces, dimensions, forms and procedures, and mechanisms of operational-strategic processes of global security protection (Vukonjanski & Sekulović, 2019). The first forms of organizing European countries, as the forerunner of today's European Union, began in 1951 with the formation of the Coal and Steel Community, and continued in 1957 with the formation of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Those three European communities, with the Treaty of Rome from 1957 (entered into force in 1958), are practically the forerunner of the European Union (*The Treaty of Rome, 1958*).

Before the formation of the first communities on European soil, the question of defense arose, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In this sense, in 1948, the Western Union (France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) was formed as a barrier against a possible new attack by Germany (*The Treaty of Brussels, 1948*). In the years that followed, several attempts to establish a European Defense Community failed. Therefore, in 1954, the Western Union was expanded and renamed the Western European Union (*The Treaty of Paris, 1954*). However, with the formation of NATO in 1949, the Western Union and later the Western European Union could not find their place in the defense system of the future European Union.

The „European Twelve“, in Maastricht (Holland) in 1992, formed the European Union as a three-pillar structure, where the so-called second pillar was the Common Foreign and Security Policy (*The Maastricht Treaty, 1992*). The formal emergence of the EU in Maastricht comes after several significant processes, named as *the end of the Cold War*. The key processes of that period were: The demolition of the Berlin Wall (1989), as a symbol of the division of the world into East and West; Unification

of Germany (1990); the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (VP) and the collapse of the USSR (1991); the breakup of the former SFR Yugoslavia, which has not yet been completed, and the survival of NATO. In the aforementioned conditions, two strong integration processes are beginning in the North Atlantic area: 1) EU expansion and 2) the survival and expansion of NATO to the east (Forca, 2018).

Since Maastricht in 1992, the EU has been moving towards a union of European states, as the „Fathers of Europe” said, from the beginning of the first economic integrations. Thus, one of the „fathers of Europe”, the French politician Jean Monet, said: „Europe must not remain dependent on the community for coal and steel. It must grow into a union of political influence” (Forca, 2017). Taking advantage of the situation in Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the USSR, the EU was the first to begin expansion and already in 1995 it accepted Austria, Finland and Sweden as members. Aware that they have economic strength, but that there is no political influence without military power, the leading countries of Europe, primarily Germany and France, are undertaking initiatives to strengthen the EU’s military capabilities for defense, as well as preparations for a more significant contribution to security, globally. Those initiatives culminated in the adoption of the first *EU Security Strategy* in 2003 (*European Security Strategy, 2003*) and the preparation of the draft EU Constitution. At the same time, since 2003, the EU has been involved in peacekeeping missions and operations with its own forces. The first civilian-police *mission* (EUPM) begins in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the first military peace *operation* (Concordia) in Macedonia.

However, the ideas of self-defense, advocated by Germany and France, are opposed by Great Britain and some other members of the Union, considering that NATO is a sufficient guarantor of EU security. Thus, in terms of security and defense, the EU moves „on two tracks”. Disagreements in the EU culminate in the rejection of the draft Constitution (2005), which is blocked by France and the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic also joins. These disagreements arise just at the time when the EU is making the largest expansion of its membership (2004) by admitting 10 new countries („enlargement burst”). In such conditions, the EU receives two more countries (Romania and Bulgaria) in the year in which it prepares and implements the summit in Lisbon (2007), which results in the adoption of the most reforming treaty – *the Treaty of Lisbon*. After the summit in Lisbon (2007), only one country was admitted to the EU – Croatia (2013), but Great Britain left the Union (2020) (Sekulović, 2021).

Some of the ideas of the failed draft of the Constitution were incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon, and the main novelties in the document are: the three-pillar structure of the Union was deleted and the EU becomes a single legal entity, which is not fully adequate to international subjectivity; the position of the President of the European Council was introduced, which is elected for 2.5 years; The European Security and Defense Policy was renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy, as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; the European External Action Service was formed, with the introduction of the function of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; the possibility of the country’s withdrawal from the EU was introduced (Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon); the foundations from the former so-called of the third pillar – judicial and political cooperation and others (*Lisbon Treaty, 2009*).

Within the framework of the Joint Security and Defense Policy – CSDP (Lisbon Treaty, Art. 42-46), a number of novelties were also introduced, the most significant of which are: since the so-called pillars of the EU, the common foreign and security policy has become an integral part of the Union's external action; the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was introduced; the tasks from Perersberg, which refer to participation in peace operations and missions, have been expanded; the joint defense clause was introduced; the clause on permanent structural cooperation and the clause on solidarity were introduced, as well as the arrangement of positions on the European Defense Agency (Ateljević, Forca, Župac, 2015).

As stated, in the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 42) a clause on common defense was introduced, which is mentioned for the first time in any of the Union's treaties. However, common defense is not the only way to defend the Union. Namely, in order to reconcile all currents within the Union, in the Treaty of Lisbon, defense is defined in three ways: 1) common defense, 2) NATO remains as the guarantor of the Union's defense and 3) the right of (military neutral) states to determine their own defense (Forca, 2021).

The defense of the EU and its participation in peacekeeping missions and operations, as two key CSDP issues, remained insufficiently precise in the Lisbon Treaty, and thus in practice, primarily due to the great influence of the US and NATO, which requires a slightly broader analysis.

NATO, which was formed in 1949 as a defense alliance of two North American and 10 Western European countries, and in the context of the East-West conflict, overshadowed the formation of the Western and then the Western European Union, to the extent that this union was absorbed into the EU and ceased to exist in 2011. years. The outcome of the Cold War, in addition to the formation and expansion of the EU, also resulted in the survival and expansion of NATO. Namely, the USA, as the only superpower, managed to convince the official UN of the need for NATO to survive in the fight against the spectrum of new challenges, risks and threats, primarily terrorism. Essentially, however, in observation, NATO has survived as a lever of US power to rule the world.

After Austria, Sweden and Finland were admitted to the EU in 1995, it was the turn of the European socialist states: 1) the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, as former members of the former Warsaw Pact, 2) the states created on the territory of the former USSR and 3) states formed on the territory of the former SFR Yugoslavia. The EU established new rules for the admission of those countries, but the key and unwritten principle became – first in NATO and then in the EU. That rule, without exception, applies to this day. That is, all the socialist countries of Europe on their way to EU membership first became NATO members (Table 1).

*Table 1. Admission of the socialist countries of Europe to the EU and NATO*

COUNTRY	ADMISSION TO NATO	ADMISSION TO EU
Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary	1999	2004
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia	2004	2004
Romania and Bulgaria	2004	2007
Croatia	2009	2013

Albania	2009	Candidate
Montenegro	2017	Started negotiations
North Macedonia	2020	Candidate

*Source: Editing by the authors*

In order to preserve its leadership position in the world, the US relies on NATO and undertakes numerous military interventions in many countries of the world. The pinnacle of NATO's armed engagement, for the first time outside the Euro-Atlantic area, was the aggression against FR Yugoslavia in 1999. That aggression was carried out without the mandate of the UN Security Council, contrary to the provisions of Article 5 of the Washington Agreement on the formation of NATO and contrary to the constitutions of the member states of the Alliance (Forca, 2021). The US and NATO military engagement in Afghanistan (2001-2021), Iraq (2003-2014), the African Spring (since 2011), Syria, Yemen and other countries continues the aggression against FRY. How much did the US and NATO undertake armed activities and the so-called hard power, so the EU turns to peace missions and operations using the so-called soft power. This is, on the one hand, understandable, because most of the EU members are also members of NATO. In 2022, NATO will have 30 member states, of which 21 are also EU members.

In the first, and especially in the second decade of the last century, the US and NATO became more and more mired in armed conflicts, while Russia returned to the world stage and China grew stronger. According to numerous analysts, the world is becoming multipolar. Seeking to neutralize Russia in Europe, America is asking EU members to invest more in defense and reduce economic relations with Russia. The „first ally” of the US in Europe – Great Britain – responded to that call, along with some other reasons, and in 2016 voted to leave the EU in a referendum. Great Britain's exit from the EU formally ended in 2020. The EU was left without one of its militarily strongest and most economically developed members. It will be difficult for the Union to recover from that.

In the first question, we will look more broadly at the global positioning of the European Union, primarily from a security perspective, analyzing the EU remaining in the shadow of the US (NATO) and the fact that the United Kingdom left the Union.

In the second question, the focus is on the attitude of the EU towards the war in Ukraine, from the aspect of the complete loss of the Union's compass and submission to the goals of the USA.

A special aspect is looking at the position of the Western Balkans on the way to the EU, especially the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and the Republic of Srpska, because their position will depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

## **THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION**

After the dissolution of the VP and the collapse of the USSR, the absorption of countries from the created buffer zone between the EU and NATO, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, began. Although the Union was the first to begin enlargement, NATO gained primacy. The leaders of the USA and other Western countries practically deceived Soviet President Gorbachev that NATO would not expand to the east (<https://hr.rbth.com/povijest/80983-kako-je-obmanut-gorba%C4%8Dov->

objavljeni-zapisi-zapadnih-obe% C4% 87anja-o-ne% C5%A1irenju-natoa-na-istok), and they trampled on that promise after the collapse of the USSR in 1999 and in the following years.

In the first years after independence and separation from the USSR, Ukraine declared itself as a neutral country. At the summit in Budapest in 1994, for the sake of guaranteeing territorial integrity, it agreed to denuclearization (*Memorandum on security assurances, 1994*). However, with the encouragement of the West, Ukraine is turning to the EU and, in particular, NATO and establishing a strategic goal – membership in the Euro-Atlantic integration. Thus, at the NATO summit in Bucharest (2008), along with Georgia, Ukraine received an invitation to join the Alliance (*Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008*). Unrest is emerging in Ukraine and a conflict between pro-Western and pro-Russian forces. Russia, after militarily attacking Georgia and recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states (2008), is turning to Ukraine. Thus, in 2014, Russia returned Crimea to its composition. Since that (2014) year, Lugansk and Donetsk, as parts of Ukraine, have sought to go the way of Crimea, leading to violent unrest and civil war in Ukraine. Tens of thousands died in those conflicts, and over two million emigrated, mostly to Russia.

Russia constantly warned the UN and the world about the events in Ukraine (Dombas), while the West condemned Russia for all that. Several peace summits fail, especially the Minsk II Agreement, which, in addition to Ukraine (Poroshenko) and Russia (Putin), was signed by the Chancellor of Germany (Angela Merkel) and the President of France (François Orland) as EU guarantors (Duncan, 2020).

Sensing the danger of NATO's expansion into Ukraine and considering the situation in Dombas (Luhansk and Donetsk), Russia recognizes the Luhansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic as independent states and on February 24, 2022, it will start a „special military operation” in Ukraine, which the General Assembly The UN characterized it as aggression (*Resolution GA UN, 27.02.2022*).

On February 24, 2022, the Cold War really ended, which was thought to have ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the USSR. A „hot war” has begun in Ukraine, which is wholeheartedly supported by the „collective West” Thus, analysts agree that a „proxy war” is underway, in which Russia and NATO clash through Ukraine.

The European Union was unprepared for the war in Ukraine, for several reasons: 1) It does not have its own armed forces and is powerless to confront Russia without NATO, primarily the USA; 2) It is extremely dependent on the import of energy and fossil fuels from Russia; and 3) After leaving, Great Britain is not unique in any respect. In such a position of the EU, at the head of the „collective West” in support of Ukraine, and against Russia, the powerful USA is placed, partially shaken by the shameful exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Seemingly, all the „trouble” within the EU and beyond – in Western countries, was canceled by Russia with a military attack on Ukraine. The collective West is homogenized, but everyone is in a position to listen to America.

Following (listening to) the US, the EU is reacting to the war in Ukraine in several ways. First, all EU countries condemned Russia's aggression against Ukraine and imposed sanctions on Russia. Secondly, sanctions against Russia were introduced successively, and the so-called packages. As many as seven packages of sanctions, unprecedented in history, were introduced. Third, most EU countries, in addition

to their declarative support for Ukraine, have started donating weapons and military equipment to that country. As expected, the biggest proponents of support for Ukraine and condemnation of Russia, when it comes to the EU, are Poland, the Baltic States and Germany. On the other hand, some countries, such as Hungary, do not accept all EU measures and sanctions, do not deliver weapons and military equipment to that country, and even propose the lifting of some sanctions, such as the import of oil and natural gas from Russia.

In parallel with the introduction of sanctions against Russia and the donation of weapons and equipment to Ukraine, there is an accumulation of military personnel of NATO member countries in Eastern Europe, primarily in the countries bordering Ukraine. Therefore, the USA and NATO are taking the situation into their own hands. The European Union has lost both its compass and its identity. Few pay attention to the messages of Chancellor Scholz (Germany), the President of France (Macron), and the President of the European Commission (Ursula von der Leyen). Mostly, they listen to the American president and the British prime minister.

In order, as much as possible, to match the military efforts of the US and NATO, the EU publishes a document called the *Strategic Compass (A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense, 2022)*. That document, in essence, is an announcement of the formation of ready-made EU forces (initially 5,000 soldiers) that will be able to be activated „where needed”. The projection of those ready-made forces (battle group) is completely unclear, because they come precisely from countries that are also members of NATO. Thus, EU-NATO dualism, as well as the weakness of the Union, once again comes to the fore in Europe. And if it wasn't clear until now, now it's increasingly clear: the USA doesn't need the EU, but NATO. In this sense, „NATO Europe” is being created according to the USA, not the European Union. In other words, the EU was tasked by the USA to „dig a trench” towards Russia and permanently expel that country from Europe, with which geopolitics, for the umpteenth time, „cuts geography”.

## **THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN BALKANS IN THE LIGHT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE**

The policy of destabilizing the Balkans, this important European region, serves to legitimize the presence and existence of the largest and only military alliance in the world – NATO in the region, which practically justifies its existence, but also its further expansion. The end result is the control of European states and European borders by a single military alliance, the subordination of the EU to a rigid and dangerous Leviathan, behind which, of course, are the interests of the global Hegemon (unlimited master) – the USA, which has a primary role in decision-making in this military alliance (Sekulović, 2018). The term *Western Balkans* is gradually introduced into the diplomatic-political dictionary, first in a colloquial and informal sense. It soon became an oft-mentioned official name, which is also used in international documents. At the same time, its use in scientific literature in the field of geopolitics, security and international relations begins. The consequences of the breakup of SFR Yugoslavia and European integration processes can be considered as the cause of this term. The Western Balkans, as a territorial entity designated by the international community for its specific political, economic and security char-

acteristics, includes newly created states in the former SFRY with Albania, but excluding Slovenia and Croatia. The principles that the Western Balkans left aside are controversial! The first possibility is that it is a regional-integration area where countries that have been marked by war conflicts for the past decades are located. Second, that the Western Balkans is a syntagm – a remnant composed of a „desperate” state, that is, it is an arbitrary artificial construction of „Brussels” for an unstable area in transition and a specific position in relation to its environment (Sekulović and Jakovljević, 2020).

The term *Western Balkans* is a geopolitical coin launched by the EU and NATO at the end of the last century and at the beginning of this century, initially implying a region that includes new states on the territory of the former SFRY, without Slovenia, (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, now North Macedonia and Serbia) plus Albania. With Croatia's entry into NATO (2009), and especially into the EU (2013), its place within the Western Balkans, according to the West, is „taken” by the territory of Kosovo and Metohija (KiM), which the West (in the majority) names and recognizes as independent Kosovo. Thus, the Western Balkans gets the symbol WB6 (Western Balkans six). Considering that Serbia does not recognize independent Kosovo, in the talks between EU and NATO leaders and officials from Serbia, the symbol WB5+1 is used for the Western Balkans.

After the collapse of the SFR Yugoslavia, and especially after NATO's aggression against FR Yugoslavia (1999), all Western Balkan countries, including Slovenia, strategically opted for membership in Euro-Atlantic integration (NATO and EU). An exception to this approach is Serbia in relation to NATO membership. Namely, after the separation from Montenegro (2006), the National Assembly proclaimed the military neutrality of Serbia in 2007 (*Rezolucija Narodne skupštine, 2007:t.6*). That declarative decision of the National Assembly on military neutrality will be explicitly incorporated into the Serbian security documents in 2019 (*Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti, 2019; Strategija odbrane Republike Srbije, 2019*). Also, the attitude towards NATO has been changing in B&H for the past few years. Namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina was oriented towards NATO and the EU, and even established a „road map” towards the Alliance. But, since a few years ago, following the example of Serbia, the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska adopted the Resolution (*Rezolucija o zaštiti ustavnog poretka i proglašenju vojne neutralnosti Republike Srpske, 2019*), according to which military neutrality is proclaimed. Thus, RS blocked B&H's road map towards NATO. The RS resolution is opposed by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose leaders point out that the road map to NATO is included in the Law (*Zakon o odbrani, 2005: Čl. 84*). After the enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria (2007), but even before that, „enlargement fatigue” is becoming more prominent in the EU, which divides the member states into *those* for and *those against* enlargement. The Western Balkans, which since 2003 have been formally put in the focus of EU enlargement (*EU-Western Balkans Summit, Thessaloniki, 2003*), remains on the sidelines. Thus, since 2007, only Croatia (2013) has been accepted into the Union. There are numerous reasons for putting the Western Balkans outside the focus of EU enlargement, which have the character of problems in the Union itself, but also in the countries of the Western Balkans. The key problems that deter the Union from enlargement are: the great global financial crisis, starting in 2007; conflicts with Russia since 2008 (war in Georgia), and especially since 2014, when



Russia annexed Crimea; the consequences of the war in Africa, Syria and the Middle East, in which the EU countries are involved, and which results in strong migration precisely towards the developed countries of the Union, which leads to the so-called migrant crisis and the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU. The key problems in the Western Balkans, as seen by the West, were: the dispute between Macedonia and Greece over the name „Macedonia”; the problem of resolving the status of Kosovo and Metohija and dysfunctional institutions in B&H and constant efforts to revise the Dayton Peace Agreement from 1995, i.e. the aspiration towards the unitization of that country, to the detriment of Republika Srpska.

In the conditions when they are left aside from the EU, the countries of the Western Balkans, formally and essentially, fall under the influence of other power centers in the world, primarily Russia, China and Turkey. Given that all the countries of the Western Balkans, with the exception of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, are becoming NATO members, Russia’s influence is growing stronger in Serbia and the Republika Srpska. Serbia and Russia signed the *Declaration on Strategic Partnership* (2013). China, in addition to the development of the „Belt and Road” initiative, and as part of it, is strengthening the China+17 initiative, which strongly develops economic and other cooperation with the countries of southern, central and eastern Europe, which are or are not members of the EU. Viewed from its own interests, Turkey is strengthening its influence in the Western Balkans, primarily in BiH, Kosovo and Metohija, and Albania. Some analysts link such performance of Turkey to Davutoglu’s *Strategic Depth* (Davutoglu, 2014), with which Turkey tries to „revive” its influence in the wider geospace of the former Ottoman Empire.

Realizing that other influences are strengthening in the Western Balkans, the EU is trying to return to the region with various projects and strategies. Important initiatives of the EU, in this sense, are: *the Berlin process*, since 2014; *Strategy for the Western Balkans*, from 2018; *The new model for the Western Balkans*, from 2020, as well as the initiative of the French president (Macron) on the *Political Union* (2021). In addition, resolving the issue of normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina from the UN is placed under the jurisdiction of the EU, specifically specified in the *Brussels Agreement*, from 2013 (*Brussels Agreement, 2013*). Also, with the wholehearted help of the USA, the EU influences Macedonia and Greece to agree on the name of the country and with the *Prespa Agreement* from 2018, Macedonia gets the name North Macedonia (*Prespa Agreement, 2018*). However, despite these initiatives, the admission of the countries of the Western Balkans to the EU is slow and takes place through membership in NATO, so that three countries have become members of the Alliance, and none of the Union (Table 2).

*Table 2. Status of the countries of the Western Balkans in relation to NATO and the EU*

COUNTRY	NATO	European Union
Albania	Member since 2009	Candidate for membership
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Undefined status due to RS relations	A potential candidate
North Macedonia	Member since 2020	Candidate for membership
Serbia	Military neutrality	Began accession negotiations in 2014
Montenegro	Member since 2017	Began accession negotiations in 2012

*Source: Editing by the authors*

In Table 2, the position of Kosovo and Metohija is not listed for a reason, because it is a territory and not an internationally recognized state, although the so-called independent Kosovo was recognized by 22 of the 27 EU member states. The unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo was not recognized by the following EU members: Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece and Cyprus.

### ***Kosovo and Metohija and Republika Srpska***

Kosovo and Metohija and Republika Srpska are two extremely important issues for the Serbian people, on the one hand, as well as key problems in the Western Balkans, as seen by the so-called Western experts, on the other hand. Thus, Danijel Server saw three key problems in the Western Balkans: 1) the conflict between Greece and Macedonia over the name Macedonia, 2) the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and 3) the non-functioning of BiH institutions (Server, 2018). Given that Macedonia and Greece „resolved” the issue of the name of the country (North Macedonia), according to Western analysts, the burning problems in the Western Balkans are those generated by the Serbs. Therefore, there is a need to briefly review the issues of KiM and the Republic of Srpska, without going too far back in history.

Kosovo and Metohija, as an integral part (autonomous province) of the Republic of Serbia, is a decades-long problem of Serbia, both during its existence in other state entities, and especially since its independence in 2006. Strong intensification of the „issue” of Kosovo and Metohija, with the whole-hearted support of the West, occurred during the break-up of the SFR Yugoslavia. Prompted by the disintegration of the SFRY, separatists in Kosovo and Metohija embark on a „final” fight for their own independence. Insurgent activities in Kosovo and Metohija intensified in the period from 1995 to 1998, to which the then FR Yugoslavia responded with security forces (Army and Police).

However, under the pretext of a humanitarian disaster and excessive use of force in Kosovo, the West, led by the US, after quasi-peace negotiations (Rambuje), and using a staged situation (the village of Racak), he undertook aggression against FR Yugoslavia in 1999. NATO's aggression against the FRY was stopped by the Kumanovo *Military Technical Agreement* of June 9, 1999, (*Military Technical Agreement, 1999*) and the next day (June 10, 1999) the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution no. 1244, which introduced the UN protectorate in Kosovo and Metohija (*Resolution SC UN 1244, 1999*).

With the Kumanovo Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the UN peacekeeping mission – UNMIK began in KiM and the multinational forces – KFOR were deployed, and many issues were regulated, among which the following stand out: the security forces of the FRY must withdraw from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija; the return of hundreds (not thousands) of members of the security forces to K&M is allowed; the security forces that allow the return to Kosovo and Metohija are expected to perform the following tasks: cooperation with the UN civilian mission in Kosovo and Metohija; demining the area; preservation of Serbian cultural heritage and control of border crossings; international security forces in K&M will demilitarize the former KLA and all armed paramilitary formations and guarantee the safety of everyone in the region; a land security zone (5km) and an air security zone (25km) were established from the administrative line between

Kosovo and Metohija and central Serbia. The key provision from the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is: „Political process aimed at establishing an agreement on a temporary political framework that will ensure essential self-governance for Kosovo, fully taking into account the Rambouillet agreements and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FR Yugoslavia and other countries in the region, as and the demilitarization of the KLA. Negotiations between the parties in the direction of reaching a solution should not delay or hinder the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions” (*Resolution SC UN. 1244, 1999:Annex 2*).

The security forces of the FRY withdrew from Kosovo and Metohija, a land and air security zone was established, the UNMIK mission was established and KFOR forces were deployed to Kosovo and Metohija. Since then, practically, the support of the West for the creation of an independent Kosovo began. Surrounded by the support of Western countries, the Albanian side is terrorizing the Serbs and other „disloyal” non-Albanian and Albanian populations. A great pogrom of Serbs took place in 2004, which KFOR failed to prevent. After the failure of Ahtisaari’s plan for Kosovo and Metohija, the separatists unilaterally proclaimed independent Kosovo in 2008. Very soon, this independence was recognized by the majority of countries in the world, led by the USA and leading EU member states (Germany, France and Great Britain). Kosovo’s independence was not recognized by China and Russia, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as by a large number of countries in the world.

Logically, Serbia did not recognize the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo, protested strongly, and through the UN General Assembly sent a question to the International Court of Justice in The Hague: „*Is the unilateral declaration of independence of the temporary institutions of self-government in Kosovo in accordance with international law?*” (Hrnjaz, 2022).

The International Court of Justice in The Hague stated that the above-mentioned declaration of the temporary authorities on the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence is not in contradiction with international law. It was an additional impetus for the separatists in K&M to move more decisively towards the final goal – an independent Kosovo.

Under the existing conditions, the Serbian authorities, in cooperation with the EU, propose a UN General Assembly Resolution transferring the issue of Kosovo and Metohija from the UN to the jurisdiction of the EU (<https://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/762580/usvojena-rezolucija-o-kosovu.html>). It was the second strategic mistake of the Serbian authorities. Thus, *de iure*, the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina are placed under the monitoring of Brussels (EU). In this sense, the *Brussels Agreement* was signed in 2013. The key issues from that agreement relate to: the formation of the Community of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo; solving some issues of the judiciary and the organization of the police, as well as ensuring that the parties will not be hindered on the way to European integration.

It is precisely the attitude of non-interference by the parties towards European integration that is characterized by part of the Serbian public as recognition of Kosovo’s independence. By the way, Kosovo is moving towards the Union and signed the *Stabilization and Association Agreement* in 2016, thereby gaining the status of a potential candidate for membership. All provisions from the Brussels Agreement have been implemented, except for the formation of the Union of Serbian Muni-

palities in Kosovo. The Kosovo side, with the strong support of the West, behaves exclusively in accordance with its own interests and constantly undertakes activities to strengthen its statehood. In addition to the Constitution and other regulations that are passed in every independent state, the Albanian side in Kosovo is starting to form the Kosovo Army (2018), which does not encounter strong resistance from those who should prevent it – KFOR (NATO) and the United Nations.

The European Union, although neutral in the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, sides with the provisional authorities in Kosovo. It was illusory and it was to be expected otherwise, because the key EU countries and most of the members recognized independent Kosovo. But only when the USA is more strongly advocating for Kosovo's movement towards independence and EU leaders are pressuring Serbia to recognize an independent Kosovo, i.e. mutual recognition of Belgrade and Pristina. It is legal *nonsense* to demand that a sovereign state recognize the independence of its part. But the power of God does not beg.

The actual situation in K&M is far from the provisions of the Constitution of Serbia and closer to the actual independence of Kosovo, regardless of whether Serbia will recognize (accept) this independence and whether Kosovo will become a member of the UN. Kosovo is lost to Serbia. The final act of losing Kosovo will be the pressure of the West (USA) on the Pristina authorities to form the Association of Serbian Municipalities, which will „gain something” for Serbia, i.e. it will be put before the *fait accompli* (Forca, 2020).

According to the Dayton Peace Agreement (*Dayton Peace Agreement, 1995*), Republika Srpska is one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton peace agreement stopped the war in BiH, but peace did not come! Since its adoption until today, that agreement has been constantly violated to the detriment of Republika Srpska, all for the sake of creating a unitary BiH. The key forces that support unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina are the USA, leading EU countries, Great Britain and Turkey.

The outlines of the agreement that will be signed in Dayton (USA) in 1995 have been visible since 1994, when the representative of the Bosnian Muslims, Alija Izetbegović, and the Croat, Franjo Tuđman, were invited by the then US Vice President, Bill Clinton, to Washington in 1994 to sign the agreement that were initialed before that (March 1, 1994) by Haris Silajdžić and Mate Granić (<https://balkans.aljazeera.net/opinions/2017/12/3/od-karadordeva-do-haga-suocavanje-s-istinom-probudit-ce-nadu>). Then the Muslim-Croat Federation (Federation of B&H) was formed, which will wage war against Republika Srpska with the combined forces of Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

The Dayton Peace Agreement established the institution of the High Representative for the implementation of that agreement and determined its competences (*Dayton Agreement, 1995: Annex X*). Those competencies were supplemented at the Bonn Conference of the *Peace Implementation Council* in 1997. Those „subsequent” competences („Bonn powers”) will be constantly directed and implemented by all high representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the disavowal of the competences of the RS and the transfer of powers to the central level. Different interpretations of the Dayton Peace Agreement by the entities and constitutive peoples in B&H, and especially the view of the position of the High Representative, the Peace Implementation Council and the „Bonn Powers”, called into question the survival of B&H as

a sovereign state. Certain authors have established in their works that Bosnia and Herzegovina is an „impossible country” (Kecmanović, 2007). The fact is that numerous legal experts are of the opinion that the „Bonn authorizations” are based on the Dayton Peace Agreement and that they have no legal basis, as well as that they are, in fact, evidence of the use of force in international relations, and that Bosnia and Herzegovina is located in ) to the protectorate implemented by the High Representative. Differently interpreting the so-called „Bonn powers”, high representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina are interfered in all branches of government, passed laws, replaced high officials in several hundred cases and, practically, „exercised power from above”, denying the organization and functioning of that state established by the Dayton Agreement and the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The culmination of that action against the RS is the appointment of the last High Representative (Kristijan Schmidt) in 2021, despite the decision of the UN Security Council, which is an obligation established in the Dayton Agreement.

The war in Ukraine, since February of this year, has brought an additional rift among the Western Balkan states and additionally burdened internal issues in both B&H and Serbia. All the countries of the Western Balkans, with the exception of the RS and Serbia, have imposed sanctions on Russia and are wholeheartedly helping Ukraine, in accordance with the demands of the USA, NATO and the EU. This led to additional pressure on Serbia and the RS, which is reflected in the request that Serbia recognize the independence of Kosovo, and that the policy of the RS (Milorada Dodik) be sanctioned. There is no shortage of war-mongering rhetoric, which once again makes the Western Balkans a latently dangerous region. As merged courts, the situation in Ukraine and the Western Balkans (Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) are directly linked to the projections that the outcome of the war in Ukraine will also determine the processes in the Western Balkans. Those processes will primarily be focused on putting pressure on Serbia to impose sanctions on Russia and recognize independent Kosovo. On the other hand, the pressures on the Republika Srpska will go in the direction of the unitization of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The bearer of pressure on Serbia and the RS will essentially be the USA, and formally the EU, Great Britain, Turkey and neighboring countries. A new „iron curtain” is coming down from the Atlantic to the Baltic and the Black Sea. This time the USA and NATO are bringing down the curtain. Serbia and Republika Srpska are inside that curtain.

## CONCLUSION

International relations are a dynamic category without final solutions. International relations are primarily influenced by great powers, regardless of the establishment of a system of collective security in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. After the Second World War, the key world powers were the USA and the USSR, which entered the Cold War until the last decade of the last century. The USSR and the Eastern Bloc did not withstand the conflict with the West.

The formal winner of the Cold War – the USA, with the preservation and support of NATO, established a unipolar world order after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the USSR. The USA, with the help of NATO, maintained its leadership position in the world, most often, through the use of force. There are numerous military interventions by the US and NATO in the countries of the world with and without the mandate of the UN Security Council. The pinnacle of the il-

legal „establishment of order” in the world is the NATO aggression against FR Yugoslavia in 1999.

Formed after the Cold War, the European Union, as the second „Western integration”, fails to grow into a global power, because the USA and NATO do not allow it. And in its enlargement since 1992, the EU fails to manage the situation in Europe. Namely, NATO is imposed, so admission to the EU is based on previous membership in the Alliance.

The European Union established the term Western Balkans and tried to establish dominance in the region. However, by constantly removing the Western Balkans from the focus of enlargement, the Union allowed the influence of Russia, China and Turkey to grow in the region. The European Union tried with numerous initiatives and financial aid to tear the Western Balkans away from other influences. However, the real power in the region is the USA and NATO.

The war in Ukraine, which formally began in February 2022, is essentially a *proxy war*, which, through Ukraine, is being waged by the „collective West” led by the USA against Russia. With that war, the latest world order is being created, the outcome of which is difficult to predict. However, it is obvious that America dominated Europe, in which sense the EU is increasingly losing the position of „global player” that it intended for itself.

The position of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Srpska is unenviable, because they remain inside the „iron curtain” in Europe, which is being lowered by the USA and NATO. The hope that there will be no spillover of the conflict from Ukraine to Serbia in the Western Balkans lies in the fact that the security regime in Kosovo and Metohija was imposed by the UN, no matter how we look at the role of the international community in the new conditions. When it comes to B&H, that is, Republika Srpska, the situation is a little more difficult, because the security processes are led by the EU, which means NATO. Therefore, the pressures of the West will first start on Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, Republika Srpska, and then continue on Serbia.

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# THE ROLE OF CONTEMPORARY RADIO AS A MEDIUM IN SOCIAL PROCESSES

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**Abstract:** Radio is present everywhere. We hear him: in a car, in a shop, offices and factories, on the street, in the park, on the mountain and on the beach; and at any time of the day: morning, noon, at night ... During his entire history, he worked successfully to prove that he possesses an extraordinary ability to adapt to new social, economic and media conditions. The subject of research in the paper is whether the radio stations will survive, in the flood of “new media”, or will they quit? The key advantages of radio, compared to other media, are usually related to information programs that are faster, cheaper, more accessible at all times of the day and night, at any place (transistor technique). In that sense, radio did not have any information in the sphere of information, and today there is no point, especially when it is able, besides facts, to offer and gain the impression of presence or participation in the event (live broadcasts).

The aim is to show that professional and high-quality change of program contents can survive on the media sky. In contemporary radio programs, documentary, informative, educational, dramatic and artistic, musical and entertainment elements are intertwined. That's why modern radio becomes “radio for everyone,” not just “radio for everyone”. On the future of the radio, however, there is no decisive influence on technology that enables communication by means of radio waves, but there is a “society”, ie, listeners who search for a radio station on the radio.

*Key words:* radio, society, media, listeners, social processes, ..

## INTRODUCTION

The quantitative development of radio in the Republic of Srpska was not accompanied by qualitative changes in that medium. On the contrary. Fragmentation, material and personnel poverty and the fact that anyone could establish a radio station resulted in a situation in which radio lags behind what this medium entails in developed environments in the 21st century. That is why the social role of contemporary radio in the Republic of Srpska is significant, but insufficient. There are fewer objective and more subjective reasons for this. Radio, as a medium, has, among other things, the task of covering the entire territory of the Republic of Srpska with its signal, acting in accordance with the constitutional and legal order of this entity. In addition to the political role, the role of radio is also economic, educational, social, in a word - social... Any change in the constitutional structure of BiH will affect the position, possibilities and destiny of Radio of Republika Srpska. As a public medium, radio has the task of satisfying the interests of the public with

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various programs, respecting professional standards, editorial principles and rules of the Communications Regulatory Agency (RAK). It happens that the interests of the public and the rules conflict. Within the Public Broadcasting System, Radio has a dual role. It first develops its basic comparative advantage (speed of information, adaptability to different situations, accessibility to everyone, even an illiterate listener...). The radio program then complements the television program and vice versa. Both electronic media form the whole of the public media service. Radio, therefore, acts both as part of a functional media unit and as an independent unit. The social values that the radio program promotes are partly regulated by legal norms (Law on RTRS, Law on JRTV System of BiH), and partly by international law, while partly they arise from the sphere of civil society. The way all these different interests and values will be harmonized depends on the editorial ability. As a public medium, radio functions in a complex process of two-way communication from the media to the public and back (feed back). Selected representatives of the society have the legal and democratic right to influence the program in various forms (suggestions, remarks, adoption of the program scheme, public debates, criticism, adaptation of shows to certain groups of listeners, active participation in the program - involvement...). The influence of the media on the public and the influence of the public on the media impose a new practice in the analysis and evaluation of programs, as well as in the type and quality of shows, genres, program blocks. Radio of Republika Srpska is conceived as a compact and programmatically elastic entity that can change in the process and adapt to new situations, (not) questioning editorial principles and professional standards. Radio-television of Republika of Srpska (RT RS) is one of the three equal broadcasters within the Public RTV system of BiH, whose function is to inform about events, primarily in Republic of Srpska, placing in its programs all relevant information of interest to citizens. The population of the Republic of Srpska, which by paying the RTV tax also finances Radio RS, should have a greater role in the creation of the program. The radio program should be arranged in such a way as to encourage competition in the creation of the highest quality and not the greatest number of shows. In reality, the program is created as if the main motive is quantity, not quality. Therefore, it can be concluded that the quantitative development of radio in the RS was not accompanied by the expected qualitative changes.

Modern radio, as a public broadcaster, implies the creation and broadcasting of diverse and balanced programs. The same applies to contents that are marketed via the Internet, and to other modern methods of disseminating information. The assumption is that radio programs would have to meet high professional ethical standards, as well as the expected quality standards of the represented media genres. It is expected that employees, at a modern radio station, that is, in a public broadcaster, produce programs in accordance with the highest professional criteria. It is up to them to protect media freedom and exercise the right to comment and criticize. Their personal preferences, or belonging to certain social groups should not affect their objectivity in reporting. This means that editors and editorial bodies should respect the creative and artistic freedom of journalists and authors. Editorial policy in the modern radio program of a public broadcaster, that is, editors, journalists and authors should be independent from the interests of political parties, political authorities and their holders, as well as social groups. Modern public radio programs should be based on democratic principles that represent all parts of society. "The

simpler a society is (small number of parts), the smaller the possible relationships between them. And on the contrary, the more developed society is, the more complex it is in terms of the number of parts and relationships that can arise between them.” (Čupić, 2002:15) According to the documents on the functioning of the radio and the realization of programming principles, journalists and editors of the public contemporary radio should respect the following professional standards: accuracy (of data), impartiality (of media representatives), independence (of media), fairness (of all actors of media communication), diversity (respect for the right to it), the right to answer (in accordance with legal provisions), decency and civility (in dealing with interlocutors, listeners, among themselves)... employed at Radio of the Republic of Srpska (Radio RS) is currently (according to internal records) around eighty people, of which 56 are permanent journalists and 19 are fixed-term journalists. It is evident that the number of journalists in Radio RS is too high compared to other radio stations, especially compared to private radio stations. “Journalism is one of the professions in which there are the most worried and disaffected people, rebellious or cynically resigned to fate, a profession in which everyone (of course, especially those subordinates) feels anger, nausea and discouragement before the reality of work that continues to be lived and which is still valued as “a job that is not like all the others.” (Burdije, 2000:55) Owners of private radio stations are not forced to respect high editorial and legal criteria like Radio Republika Srpska. They can, at their own will, reduce the scope and quality of the program. The number of journalists engaged in Radio of Republika Srpska, however, seems disproportionate in relation to the volume and quality of programs that this medium produces and broadcasts. Through the program and editorial policy of Radio Republika Srpska, numerous interests, principles and factors confront and permeate each other. It is necessary to identify and analyze good, mediocre and bad program contents, as well as to profile the programs - in terms of content, personnel, structurally, according to the way of leadership, organization, functioning - which will enable the researcher to define the overall production by pointing out the most important programmatic, personnel, and technical elements problems. Regarding the social role of contemporary radio.

## **THE SOCIAL ROLE OF MODERN RADIO**

The role of the media is to convey what is happening in society in general, what is happening in the immediate and wider environment, what is the influence of whom, how power is distributed and the like. The media influence the formation of public opinion according to how it unfolds, whether public opinion is formed according to some events, actions, decisions, political attitudes, the attitude of the Government, the development of some problems in society, the progress of society. Also, the media has the role of being an intermediary in the transfer of information and knowledge between whoever produces that information and the audience, as well as being an intermediary between all events and the understanding and understanding of that event. One negative function of the media is evident, and that is that the media is often manipulated. Different centers of power in the Republic of Srpska, especially political parties, political leaders, and some other centers of power such as various tycoons, economic centers of power, private companies carry out manipulation by presenting things differently than they are. The most prominent role of the media is to convey what is happening in politics. The media has completely devoted its

role to politics and it has become one-sided. In all media, one only listens, reads or watches politics, political events, political leaders and political debates. The matter has become simplified and complicated to such an extent that it is enough for journalists to follow a politician, a political action, a political party or a political event and it becomes news for them. Of course, such a situation is not good because too much time and space has been taken up by politics and political events, and everything else that is very important in society has been suppressed. In the Republika of Srpska, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the social role of the media is not well understood or they have not understood it well. The media are becoming less and less free channels for the flow of information, and more and more a tool in the hands of the political or economic powerful. The media can never get rid of its two biggest enemies: politics and money. The life of modern societies is impossible without the media, and the fact that the media “gets out” from under the control of society is the fault of society itself, which is becoming disinterested in this type of control. The social role of modern radio should be:

- true, complete, impartial and timely “informs the public about political, economic, social, health, cultural, educational, scientific, religious, environmental, sports and other events in the country and the world;
- encourages democratic processes, ensures appropriate representation of unbiased news and programs on current events;
- the highest quality program will be available to the public of Republika Srpska;
- ensure a diverse and balanced program, which meets high ethical and quality standards, respecting human life, dignity and physical integrity of the person, and promoting democratic freedoms, social justice and international understanding and peace;
- respects the national, regional, traditional, religious, cultural, linguistic and other characteristics of the constituent peoples and all citizens of BiH; ([http://www.rtrs.tv/comp/zakon\\_rtrs.php](http://www.rtrs.tv/comp/zakon_rtrs.php))
- affirms the cultural and other needs of national minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- “The functions that the information and communication system has in the global society were systematized by Harold Lasswell. He basically defined three such functions:
  1. supervision of the environment;
  2. connecting parts of society and directing their reaction to the environment;
  3. transmission of cultural heritage from generation to generation.” (Radojković, Stojković, 2004, p.218)

In addition to performing several functions for society as a whole and for one or several subgroups, radio also meets the needs of smaller groups and individuals. Society often uses media to gain new experience or to verify what it thinks it already knows. Radio is a term that can mean:

- radio station for communication via radio waves;
- apparatus for listening to sound via radio waves;
- mass media that uses radio waves.

## **SOCIETY AS A MIRROR OF THE MEDIA**

The media is a mirror of society - theorists said for a long time ago. This assessment is very close to the reality to the extent that the society is democratic and ready for openness, to that extent the public media are versatile and open. Vice versa. But that doesn't mean it's always like that. It would be disastrous if the media could not be different from the general climate of society, so that one had to wait for a change in the general climate for the media to become more professional. It is certain that changes in the state of society contribute to changes in the media, but it is no less true that changes in the media can often help change in society. This is the secret power and (in)power of the public word. The exchange of information, ideas and entertainment in words and images, achieved through the press, radio, television and the Internet, only became important with the development of radio. "In fact, it was only in the radio era that scientists began to understand how important oral communication was in ancient Greece and the Middle Ages." (Briggs, Burke, 2006:10). It is precisely in this double role of the media that the complexity of modern radio as a medium lies in. Speech, words and voices are present in all radio programs. The program of a radio station contains almost only words. In other stations, there is an equal mixture of speech and music. Even in the shows of music radio stations without established rules, disc jockey interventions, news, exact time, weather forecast and traffic reports are inserted. Speech serves to organize the program and represents the context within which music appears as entertainment with a specific purpose. The music features are arranged around the correct time broadcasts, newscasts, traffic and weather reports, interviews and disc jockey stories. Without such program editing, music radio would not only lose its meaning but also its form, and the identity of radio programs and radio stations would be unclear, because it would be determined only by music (eg classical music, rock, country music, jazz, etc. ). One jazz radio station would sound the same as another jazz radio station, whether national or local; a classical music radio station would work like any other radio station of its kind. The whole day's program would be the same from start to finish: jazz in the morning, afternoon and evening, only with a change of tempo to differentiate the time of day. Such a program would, without a doubt, be complete, but it would also be meaningless and spiritless.

In recent years, the role of speech in radio programs has become increasingly important. In the 1980s and 1990s, the main trend was the increase in the number of broadcasts based on speech, especially those with the involvement of listeners. One of the reasons is that music programs are becoming more and more expensive, and there is a need to save. It is a fact that shows with phone-in listeners are among the cheapest, because participants in the show who call in by phone are not paid any fee. However, these shows are often on the program for reasons that have nothing to do with savings. For example, on all radio stations they agree that broadcasts with telephone connection allow them to establish close and mutually active relations with listeners. At the same time, the frequent broadcast of listeners' voices allows radio stations (especially local and regional ones) to establish clearly defined identities that correspond to the communities they broadcast to. Speech is a key element for realizing the recognition of a radio station and its special image. It can be used to create a radio station's identity and help it attract a certain type of audience. Listeners may choose to listen to a particular radio station or program because of the type

of music it broadcasts. But even then the speech is important and perhaps decisive for the choice of the radio station. All radio stations have realized the importance of speech in winning over listeners. Most radio station directors today are fully aware of the need to carefully monitor the use of speech in radio programs and to make well-measured decisions about its content, style and manner of use. Program editors and directors of radio stations pay special attention to the content of the speech on the radio. The type of audience and its values and beliefs have a decisive influence on what is considered a suitable topic for discussion on a radio station's show. The decision to talk about certain topics in the show largely depends on the needs and interests of the station's listeners. Youth programs are one example of how the use of certain words and phrases can contribute to gaining or losing a target group of listeners. The same applies to shows whose goal is to attract certain groups, because all these groups have a special language and style of expression, which radio stations that make specialized shows should take into account. As radio strives to attract ever more compact market segments, its choice of means of expression and type of communication with listeners becomes ever wider. After determining the content of its speech broadcasts and the way of expression in them, the radio station must also pay attention to the realization of the speech, especially whether a certain way of speaking corresponds to certain types of broadcasts. A news show will usually require a different speaking style than a rock music show, a phone-in show, or a cooking show. Since each show obviously requires a different way of speaking - different in terms of tone, pitch, speed of speech and accent - the goal of the radio station is to establish a general style of speech that will be used, to a greater or lesser extent, by all presenters while working for that station. This, of course, is not easy to achieve completely. The presenters have to use their own speech style to express their special personalities, and at the same time impose the speech identity of the radio station they work on. Speech on the radio is, compared to ordinary speech, "more fluent, precise and organized, with fewer words and no tautology". (Krisl, 1992:58) Consideration of the power or (lack of) power of the media is very complex. A plus or a minus does not have to have the same weight in all circumstances: something not yet achieved in another's environment could mean long ago overcome, while one's own long-passed step could for another mean a desired goal not yet reached. The impossibility of absolutizing the concept of power or (lack of) power of public speech is also discussed in the Report. The UNSECO International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, the essence of which is contained in the title: "Many voices, one world!" - "Means of communication have such a strong social influence that they can make their audience think and behave in a certain way. There is no doubt that the means of mass communication, the press, radio and television, really have the ability not only to maintain, but also to form opinions, and to play a role in the formation of attitudes. Many observers think that these means produce an unreal image of the real world instead of offering him a wide range of knowledge and a choice in understanding things." (Tadić, 2002:11) In a situation where for many citizens a television screen, a radio program or a certain printed media ( newspaper, magazine) the only source of information, the influence of public media is not negligible in the least. There is still an opinion that something is so just because it was written in the newspaper or broadcast on radio or television. Therefore, better evidence of the importance of public media and its impact on

listeners, viewers and readers may not be necessary. Without the opportunity to be timely and fully informed about everything and without the conditions to feed back on events with his word, the citizen is, regardless of the proclamations, condemned to be an eternal episodist and passive observer. Things would be very different if there was criticism, both from the media and from the public - society. "Even when it's good, it's never so good that something couldn't be repaired and refined." (Tadić, 2002:39) Relationships between people are a living organism, constantly changing, full of contradictions and conflicting interests, a complex being that requires continuous checking and airing. Daily criticism of practice, with a wider and freer introduction of fresh ideas and visions, can only benefit, but this is exactly what is missing in lagging societies. This knowledge is neither new nor epoch-making, but it should be remembered again and again. This is exactly the area where the media is kindly forgiven for not adhering to the proclaimed principles. If there is no engaged criticism of public speech, there can be no talk of a modern democratic society either. Nobody and nothing can be a priori exempt from criticism. In the Republika Srpska, there is a widespread understanding that now is not the time for criticism, that the situation is serious, so why make people's lives miserable by sorting them out by difficulty, which will benefit the enemy, etc. What are the possibilities for the penetration of new ideas if there is no critique of practice?

*Will the problems disappear by themselves simply because we turn our heads away from them, or cover them with a veil of self-delusion?*

*Can, and should, a sharper critical word against a phenomenon or an individual be immediately qualified as an attack on the system and foundations of this society?*

*So how can we believe the positive things that are said in the media?*

"If someone is not allowed to rebuke, then even the praise that comes from him has no value." (Tadić, 2002:40) Radio today has a significant, but insufficient, role in the territory of the Republic of Srpska in creating a civil society and mutual understanding. As at one point he had a negative role, so now he tries by all means to show and broadcast relatively objective information. The radio program is not just news. The radio program is both music and reportage, interviews, education, advertising messages... We should not forget that each of these segments can be the subject of listener manipulation. According to statistical data, today the average urban listener listens to the radio for three hours a day, and in smaller and less culturally developed areas the listening time is up to five hours a day. There is no doubt that radio as a medium will continue to exist in future times. His role in social processes will continue to be under question.

## **RADIO AS A (IN)SECURITY FACTOR**

From the beginning of radio to today, as a medium, there are several examples where the content of radio programs has affected the safety of listeners. Throughout its long history, radio as a medium was a tool that was also used for (non)security purposes. Broadcasting of certain content caused fear, i.e. jeopardizing security and a sense of insecurity among listeners. The radio drama "War of the Worlds" was so suggestive that it compromised the security of the US population. Every sixth resident, out of six million, who listened to this radio drama thought they were listening to a broadcast of a real event. It is necessary to state precisely what is meant by the term security. "In the Serbian language, safety means the absence of danger,

harmlessness, a state in which no danger is felt. As Barašin states, “dramatic social changes that in all spheres of human existence, both at the global and local level during the last few decades, have led to a situation in which events are taking place that have significance for national security.” The feeling of insecurity that oppresses a person has never been stronger, despite the fact that the security system has never been stronger and more developed.” (Barašin, 2021, p.206)



*Orson Welles during the radio drama “War of the Worlds”*

The following is the story of how the radio drama “War of the Worlds” threatened the safety of listeners in America. “Very quickly, radio stopped relying only on names shouted from movie screens and theater boards. He also started creating his own stars. One of them was remembered for all time... Voja Antonić on the pages of his book “Are there things that do not exist?” recalls one of the most exciting events in the history of radio: on an autumn evening, October 30, 1938, at exactly 8 p.m., the radio drama “War of the Worlds” began on the program of the American radio station CBS, based on the novel by the famous science fiction writer Herbert George Wells. Although in the original part the story is set in Victorian England, screenwriter Howard Koch moved the whole story in the radio adaptation to modern America, in tame New Jersey. Well, the “bad guys” in this story are the Martians: they arrived in monstrous war machines from which they slowly but thoroughly destroy not only thousands of people, but also all the living world on Earth with heat rays and poisonous gas. Tension and panic mount as the enemy approaches New York. There is every possibility that the end for the human race will be tragic, but in the denouement of the story, the Martians are still defeated and destroyed. Humans and their weapons were responsible for this, but bacteria and viruses, for which the Martians did not have a developed immune defense system. The director and main performer of this drama was, at the time, a young and ambitious actor and announcer, Orson Welles. The story was original for that time, unlike anything seen before, but all that was not enough for the restless spirit of 23-year-old Orson Welles. He tried to make the show not look like a story, but presented it in the form of radio news! The effect exceeded all expectations. Across the country, people ran into the



streets in panic and fell into despair, afraid for their own lives and for the fate of the world. Of the six million people who followed this radio drama, one in six thought they were listening to a broadcast of a real event. This means that the result of this joke was a million people scared to death! Some of them came out with weapons in their hands and shot at street lights and water towers. The police even registered suicide attempts, because there were unfortunate people who would rather die by their own hand than by the weapons of the Martians. Well, such was the suggestiveness of radio in its early days, and the "fuel" for this panic was (still widespread today) belief in the other world. All it takes is one genius, like Orson Welles, to light the fuse. A bizarre event in 1938 made Orson Welles an unprecedented star. Regardless of the series of inconveniences and lawsuits he had to endure after his historic show, the doors of fame, and soon Hollywood, opened wide for him and gave him the chance to become one of the most famous film actors and directors of all time." In Germany, the Nazis recognized the power of radio very quickly, so even before they came to power, they demanded radical changes in the program and method of financing. Joseph Paul Goebbels (1897 - 1945) was one of the most educated Nazi leaders who joined the NSDAP in 1924 putting his mind at the service of the party, especially for propaganda purposes. In 1929, Hitler appointed him as a party director of propaganda. Goebbels' idea was very simple: if the radio program is among the main means of propaganda, then the population must hear it. For the first time in the history of radio, the Nazis took advantage of all the possibilities it offers. Radio was the focal point of Goebbels' propaganda strategy. The radio program that was broadcast was a combination of "bombarding the mind" with a radio program and actual aerial attacks.

## CONCLUSION

Throughout its entire history, radio as a medium has successfully demonstrated that it possesses an exceptional ability to adapt to new social, economic and media conditions. The consideration of the power or (in)security of a radio is very complex. A plus or a minus does not have to have the same weight in all circumstances: something not yet achieved in another's environment could mean long ago overcome, while one's own long-passed step could for another mean a desired goal not yet reached. The impossibility of absolutizing the concept of the power or (un)safety of public speech is also discussed in the Report of the UNSECO International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, the essence of which is contained in the title: "Many voices, one world!" - "Means of communication have such a strong social influence that they can make their audience think and behave in a certain way. There is no doubt that the means of mass communication, the press, radio and television, really have the ability not only to maintain, but also to form opinions, and to play a role in the formation of attitudes. Many observers think that these means produce an unreal image of the real world instead of offering a wide range of knowledge and a choice in understanding things." (Tadić, 2002:11) Life in modern societies is impossible without the media, and the fact that the media "get away" under the control of the society, the society itself is to blame, which becomes disinterested in that kind of control.

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# THE ROLE OF UBUNTU IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY

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**Abstract:** This article focuses on the role of Ubuntu in South Africa's foreign policy. Since independence, African intellectuals have tried to develop their own strategies and approaches to solve problems on the continent. These ideas were aimed at rescuing the African younger generation from enslavement by Western culture, to invent new approaches and to reanimate traditional concepts that would contribute not only to the revival but also to the protection of African culture. They were designed to promote traditional values both within the African continent and globally, to be the antithesis of Eurocentrism, to carve new Afrocentric ideas from their own historical experience and current conditions, socio-economic priorities, with African interests at their center. Among modern concepts aimed at protecting Africans and promoting the African position on the global arena is the traditional philosophical system of Ubuntu. It is the ideas of Ubuntu that have been adopted by South African politicians back in the late 90s and formed the basis of South Africa's foreign and domestic policy. In 2011, the White Paper "Building a Better World: Ubuntu Diplomacy" was published, proclaiming the promotion of a multipolar, just and equitable world order and the desire for development and prosperity in Africa as one of its main theses. South Africa was the first state of the continent to base its foreign policy document on one of the main codes of African identity: Ubuntu. This gave the foreign policy document an African character. The Republic of South Africa presents a unique example of an attempt to implement into state strategy a philosophical concept that is a defining element of African identity, a significant part of the traditional culture for more than 350 million people living almost all over sub-Saharan Africa. The notion of Ubuntu is also reflected in the state documents of the Congo, the Republic of Chad, Uganda, as well as Kenya (harambei). By promoting the Ubuntu philosophy, South Africa claims the existence of African values, spreading their importance in the international space through various instruments of public diplomacy. Various magazines, radio stations and a national Ubuntu Awards have been created. All these tools are aimed at informing and sensitizing the public about South Africa's foreign policy, promoting a multipolar world and establishing an alternative model to the Western system of individualism.

**Keywords:** *South Africa; Ubuntu; foreign policy; Ubuntu diplomacy.*

## SOUTH AFRICA AND NEW POLICY

Changes in the global marketplace opportunities for Africa to position itself as a significant player in the global economy: the demand for natural resources is increasing as a result of the rise of new economic powers, bringing significant benefits to Africa.

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The entry of the Republic of South Africa into the BRICS in April 2011 should be considered as part of the foreign policy and economic policy to increase the country's influence both in the international arena and in the internal geopolitical space of the African region. However, the actual date of incorporation of South Africa into the BRIC should be December 24, 2010. It was on that day that South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane announced that she had received a telephone notification from Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, according to which China, the presiding country of the BRIC of that time, in agreement with other member countries of the organization, invited South Africa to become a full member of the BRIC (BRICS), and Chinese President Hu Jintao sent an invitation to South African President Jacob Zuma to take part in the BRICS summit in Sanya, China, in early April 2011.

A month later, in May 2011, the South African government released a white paper called "Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu", which became a very significant document. For the first time since South Africa's transition to democracy in 1994, a strategic document was prepared outlining the principles and actions of the country's foreign policy for the future.

The peculiarity of this document is that the leaders of South Africa made Ubuntu a key element of their strategy, thereby giving it African features. The appeal to the traditional culture of African society, one of the significant elements of African identity, has given enough impetus to Ubuntu to receive the attention it deserves from African researchers and has spread throughout the world. The developers of the White Paper aimed to introduce the concept of Ubuntu into the political, economic and social discourse not only within South Africa, but also in the African region and the global international space. In the future, the concept of Ubuntu will form the basis of key state documents of the domestic and foreign policy of South Africa, become widespread in English-language literature, become an instrument for regulating public life, enter the practice of state domestic policy and foreign policy of the country.

### **Ubuntu**

Ubuntu is a key concept of life philosophy for more than 400,000 ethnic groups living almost throughout sub-Saharan Africa. United by common traditions and languages, this group of Bantu-speaking peoples is more than 350 million people.

The concept of Ubuntu first appeared in written sources of South Africa in the middle of the 19th century. A number of researchers believe that the term consists of the prefix u-, the prefix of the abstract noun buand and the noun stem -ntu, meaning "human", which shall be translated as personhood or humanness (Kamwangamalu, 1991; Tella, 2021), that is, "humanity". The concept of Ubuntu is one of the main philosophical concepts and organizational principles of the Bantu-speaking peoples of Africa. The idea of Ubuntu has been popularized in terms of "philosophy" and "worldview" since the 1950s, through the writings of Jordan Kush Ngubane, an African intelligent thinker, writer and analyst (1917–1985). Since the 1970s, Ubuntu has been interpreted as one of their philosophical concepts, called "African humanism".

According to Ubuntu, there is a connection between all people. It is through this connection, the interaction of people with each other, that a person can discover his/her own human qualities. Ubuntu has many meanings. There is a saying

in the Nguni language: “Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu” which means “a person is a person through other people (Gade, 2011, p. 303)». South African Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu, in his essay “Ubuntu: On the Nature of Human Community”, explained this expression this way: “We need other human beings in order to be human. None of us comes into the world fully formed. We would not know how to think, or walk, or speak, or behave as human beings unless we learned it from other human beings.»<sup>2</sup>.

Desmond Tutu described a human being who, in his daily life, preaches the Ubuntu principle as open and accessible to others, supporting all members of society. “A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed» (Isike, 2021).

One of the characteristic features of the concept of Ubuntu is complementarity, which is expressed in the following relationship: “one sees the other and the other sees the one”. Kenyan philosopher John Mbiti (1931–2019), who is considered the father of African theology, said that only in relation to other people does an individual begin to realize his own being: through the fulfillment of his duties, feeling responsible towards himself and towards other people. When a person suffers, he/she does not suffer alone, but together with the general group; when he/she rejoices, he/she rejoices not alone, but with his/her fellow tribesmen — neighbors and relatives, dead or alive. The main social formula for the individual is the expression: “I am because we are, and since we are, then I am» (Tella, 2021). Ubuntu is a catch-all term for the norms and values inherent in many African traditional societies. The recognition of the necessary connection between people enables the structuring of a person’s behaviour in society, including his or her mental health (Wilson, 2013).

The principles of Ubuntu go back to the idea of communalism, an inextricable connection with the community, and consider the existence of an individual as deeply woven into a social structure based on humanism and a collectivist way of life. An individual can be realized only through interaction with the community and work for the common good, revealed only with the help of others, and therefore it is unacceptable to separate him/her from others, disregard their interests and problems. Therefore, understanding, cooperation and partnership are the binding values between the individual and the community. Ubuntu is an integral part of the South African culture, with values such as reciprocity, humanity, dignity, caring, sharing, mutual aid, compassion, forgiveness and friendship, aimed at promoting peace and maintaining harmony.

## **SEARCHING FOR IDEAS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY**

The search for an idea that would serve as the foundation for building a national strategy began from the moment of independence and was reflected in the political thinking of such leaders as Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere, Obafemi Awolowo, Kenneth Kaunda and Ahmed Sékou Touré. All of them called

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.lookingforwisdom.com/ubuntu/>, accessed 13.06.2022.

for Africanization and tried to build the main political vector on the postulates of traditional African humanist or socialist values (Gade, 2011, p.11).

Some narratives that were created within ideological and political trends can be characterized as narratives of return, as they contained the idea that a return to something African (such as traditional African socialism or humanism) is necessary for the well being of society. In this context, it is worth noting that such post-colonial rhetoric divides history into three stages: the pre-colonial stage — its characteristic feature is harmony, it is often perceived as a “golden age”; a period of decline, which was caused by the invasion of foreigners who tried to deprive Africans of their resources, dignity and culture, and a period of revival, when Africans were able to gain sufficient political power, began to restore their dignity and culture by returning to traditional, humanist or socialist values (Gade, 2011, p. 304).

In the 1990s, the concept of “African Renaissance” was born in South Africa, which for a short period took the place of an ideology aimed at uniting African society to overcome the crisis. It required Africans to recognize themselves as successors to the great civilizations of Africa, to regain respect for themselves after the suffering of colonialism and the hardships of the first decades of independence. The new ideological concept encouraged them to mobilize their potential (first of all, intellectual) to revive their former greatness. According to the idea of the Renaissance, one of the most important features of the future society should be the absence of elites with a “parasitic” character, who act exclusively in their own interests, in the power structures (Political Systems of Modern States, 550). The ideas of the “African Renaissance” reflected the growing expectations of the process of democratization in Africa and in many ways became a harbinger of the creation of the economic development program of the African Union NEPAD. However, despite its undoubted relevance and popularity, the concept developed by South African President Thabo Mbeki faced many objective difficulties and was not implemented (Ibid).

### **Securing Ubuntu in South Africa’s Foreign Policy**

At the end of the 20th century, Ubuntu became the subject of special interest and study as a result of the ongoing political processes in the territories of Zimbabwe and South Africa. After the fall of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa and the democratic reforms undertaken in 1994, the term became widely known outside the state. The idea of Ubuntu is being used for the first time as a means to unite the people against the apartheid regime — to overthrow the minority and to rule the country by majority.

During the political events of the 1990s, peacekeepers working to lay the foundations of a future free state had a vital insights that later helped them define their vision of democracy and make it the basis of key government documents in South Africa’s domestic and foreign policy (Manifesto On Values, Education and Democracy, 13).

Among the publications made at that time, it is worth noting the keynote article by Nelson Mandela (1994–1999) “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy”, which was published in the Foreign Affairs magazine in 1993. In his work, he singled out six main points on which, in his opinion, the foreign policy of South Africa should be based. In addition to the provisions on human rights, democracy, respect for international law, development of international and regional cooperation, Nelson Man-

delala spoke about the need to reflect the problems and interests of the entire continent in the foreign policy of South Africa (Mandela, 1993, p.87). The leader of the Republic of South Africa encouraged citizens “not to avoid their African fate and bring their energy to the continent itself, so as never to become a victim of the forces that brought destruction to it”. He paid much attention to the thesis of increasing economic cooperation between African countries and developing a trade network (Mandela, 1993, p. 80). These theses became the starting point for bringing the concept of Ubuntu into the emerging state agenda, the rise of diplomacy and a new strategic foreign policy vector for South Africa after the apartheid period.

The concept of Ubuntu first appeared in the epilogue to the interim constitution of 1993, which was intended to become a kind of historical bridge between the past of a deeply divided society, characterized by conflicts, suffering and injustice, and the future based on such a dominant as human rights, democracy, peaceful coexistence, equal development opportunities for all South Africans regardless of color, class, creed or gender. It emphasized that the desire for national unity, well-being of all citizens of South Africa and peace required reconciliation between peoples and restoration of a single society (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Act 200 of 1993., 1994, p.147)<sup>3</sup>. According to the constitution, it was necessary to overcome disagreements and enmity, which in turn gave rise to a gross violation of human rights, fear and hatred in society, through “... understanding, but not revenge, compensation, but not retribution, Ubuntu, but not victimization (Ibid). The main theses of the temporary document were enshrined in the subsequent constitution of South Africa in 1996, which is currently considered one of the most progressive in the world. It is based on Ubuntu and aims to develop a stable and prosperous African continent “which must not be marginalized in world affairs (Foreign Policy Journal, 2018, p. 7).

In 1997, the National Assembly of South Africa adopted the “Social Security White Paper», where among the key principles approved for the implementation of programs such as democracy, partnership, equality, there was indicated Ubuntu (Vasiliev, 2017, p.12). It was seen as a principle of concern for each other’s well-being that would be encouraged and a spirit of mutual support developed. The Paper notes that the human qualities of each person can be expressed through his/her relationship with other people, and their relationship, in turn, through the recognition of their own humanity. Ubuntu means that people are people through interaction with other people. It recognizes both the rights and obligations of every citizen in promoting individual and social welfare (Ibid).

The leaders of the state considered South Africa as part of a larger whole — Africa. They realized that the well-being of their country largely depended on the well-being of the continent. Therefore, the South African region is a priority area of the foreign policy. It is no coincidence that it was South Africa that became an active participant in the Southern African Development Community (SADC, 1992), which includes 16 states, initiated the organization of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD, 2001), initiated the formation of the African Union (AU, 2002). In addition, the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (2000) was organized in South Africa to finance projects aimed at developing inter-African

3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Act 200 of 1993. — 196 p. — URL: <https://ucdpged.uu.se/peaceagreements/fulltext/SyA%2019931118.pdf> (дата обращения 15.06.2022)

relations, strengthening democratic institutions, resolving inter-regional and ethnic conflicts, and improving social and democratic situation (Political Systems of Modern States, 2014, p.550).

In 2011, 4 months after receiving the invitation to join the BRICS, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) issued the aforementioned White Paper “Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu”. The preamble to the document refers to South Africa as a multi-faceted, multi-cultural and multi-racial nation, where the concept of Ubuntu is a way of self-defining and forming relationships with others. The inclusion of Ubuntu in South Africa’s foreign policy strategy best illustrates the importance the government attaches to Ubuntu as a strategic means. The document incorporates the thesis that, being the beneficiary of many initiatives of selfless solidarity in the past, South Africa sees its people as having the same aspirations as the citizens of the whole world. The national interests of the country are focused on people, where the main postulates are: the well-being of its citizens, protecting the planet for future generations and ensuring the prosperity of the country, neighboring regions and the continent. Achieving these goals is possible if we strive for a just, humane and equitable world order that ensures security, peace, dialogue and economic justice (Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu , 2011, p. 10).

Through the diplomacy of Ubuntu, South Africa defines its history and shapes its national identity. The White Paper states that “the fate of the Republic of South Africa is inextricably linked with the fate of the region of South Africa <...> regional and continental integration are the basis for the development and political unity of Africa and are necessary for their own prosperity and security (White Paper for Social Welfare, 1997).

After the principles of Ubuntu were included in the state agenda, it began to be actively replicated by various tools. Here is an example of the context in which Ubuntu is mentioned, taken from South African Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane’s introduction to the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) 2016/2017 report: “Our Ubuntu diplomacy requires that our participation in the life of the continent was based on humanity and collective responsibility. In this regard, ARF allocated funds for humanitarian assistance to assist fraternal countries affected by natural disasters, namely: Madagascar and Namibia. This contributed to the reconstruction of the affected countries and the elimination of human suffering (African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund. Annual report, 2017, p.11).» Ubuntu gains distribution through the content of government documents. So, in the report for 2021 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Ubuntu stands along with such values as patriotism, loyalty, devotion, batho pele (people first) and constitutional values (Annual report 2020/2021. — Department of international relations & cooperation, 2021, p. 20). It is also presented in the Strategic Plan 2020-2025 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in the Public Diplomacy section [23], in the Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy, in the Strategic (2020-2025) and annual (2022-2023) action plans of the African Fund of Revival and International Cooperation 23. Along with this, in the National Development Plan 2030, in the section devoted to fostering of constitutional values in children, the School Values Manifesto of 2002 is mentioned, which sets out the values that should permeate the education system: democracy, social



justice and equality, the absence of racism and sexism, human dignity, open society, respect and reconciliation, accountability, responsibility, rule of law and Ubuntu.

Public diplomacy means such as Ubuntu Radio, Ubuntu Magazine (Ubuntu — South Africa's Public Diplomacy in Action) and It's your voice. Ubuntu Diplomat are also named after Ubuntu. Along with this, cooperation with SABC's Channel Africa, the largest international South African broadcasting corporation, has been established for the dissemination of information. All these tools are aimed at informing and drawing public attention to the foreign policy issues of South Africa, stimulating various discussions. In 2015, the annual Ubuntu Awards were established to reward South African citizens who play an active role in creating a positive image of the state at the international level. South African politicians also actively use the concept of Ubuntu in their rhetoric [\*].

## CONCLUSION

The principles of Ubuntu are in conflict with modern Western values, which include such a thing as individualism. Competition is one of the characteristics of individualism, and its consequences directly affect values such as peace and security (Akinola, 2018, p. 93). In a sense, Ubuntu serves as a counter-ideology to Western global hegemony in the social, cultural, and economic spheres (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016, p. 424). Unlike the Western worldview, which is based on theories, each of which was developed by one person, "as is the case with Aristotelian eudaemonism, Kantian deontology or Platonic dualism", Ubuntu ethics were created in "the pursuit of ideals between the Creator, ancestors and people" (Kamwangamalu, 1999, p. 2). Ubuntu standards are developed by the community, and not by one person, and they are fulfilled by it (the community), since they are born in it (the community).

According to Ubuntu, power is exercised on the basis of consensus in accordance with the fundamental value of Ubuntu — harmony in society. Mogobe B. Ramose, a South African philosopher, one of the key thinkers who popularized African philosophy and the concept of Ubuntu, put it this way: "In the sphere of politics, the real arena for making laws, Ubuntu is confirmed as the basis of judging the areas of human life using the principle: Kgosi ke kgosi ka batho, which means: the source and justification of royal power is the people" (Ibid).

One of the greatest researchers of post-colonialism, Homi K. Bhabha, in his work "The Location of Culture" wrote about the need for the emergence of the so-called "third space", which should become an alternative to the existing social paradigms and the hegemony of being (Bhabha, 1993, p. 285). As a result of historical events and the experience of colonial subjugation, African society, and South African society in particular, has long recognized the need for such a space for itself. South Africans chose the Ubuntu, returning to a philosophy that had been engineered by more than one generation of Africans and had established itself as an effective means of community survival and prosperity. By promoting the ideas of the concept of Ubuntu, South Africa declares the existence of African values, spreading its significance in the international space through various means of public diplomacy.

South African society sees Ubuntu as an opportunity to replace, reinvent and create an alternative to the current "destructive way of growing global injustice" (Swanson, 2015, p.33). M. Ramose wrote: "In the context of economic globalization, the peoples of South Africa must <...> remain open to cooperation with all people

around the world, be determined to replace the deadly dogma of economic fundamentalism with the vivifying logic of Ubuntu, putting the preservation of human life through living together above the relentless pursuit of profit» (Ramose, 2003, p.734). South Africa is making a big bet on Ubuntu in foreign policy, wants to gather African states under the banner of Ubuntu, to become a kind of voice of Africa, a representative of the will and interests of the African people in the global market and in the system of international relations. The White Paper states that “South Africa will seek equitable representation of Africa in the UN Security Council as well as permanent membership. In doing so, South Africa will use the non-permanent membership as a strategic opportunity to advance the interests of Africa and the South, maintain relations between the UN and regional organizations, in particular the African Union» (White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 2011).

Africans know very well that the strength of the community comes from mutual support, and then the community itself is able to defeat any force. Because, as the African proverb says: “You can’t wash your face using only one finger».

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# INTERNATIONAL SECURITY



# DECOMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX: THE NEW IRON CURTAIN

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**Abstract:** The theory of regional security complexes was developed by the Copenhagen School of Security from the end of the last century and the beginning of this century. Although this theory was partially abandoned by its creators, it has received considerable attention in modern security studies to this day. The European security complex was the focus of the Copenhagen School, and it occupies a significant place in the theories created in the later period.

This paper is an attempt to analyze the European security complex in the conditions of new geopolitical turmoil in the world and Europe after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, especially on the example of the Western Balkan security sub-complex. The basic hypothesis from which the paper was based is that after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a new world order is being created, which will especially affect the European security complex and the Western Balkan regional security sub-complex, as part of it. The key claims and unique conclusion of the work is that a new „iron curtain” is being created in Europe from the Atlantic to the Baltic and the Black Sea, which will primarily determine the position of the Western Balkan regional security sub-complex.

**Keywords:** *New World Order; European security complex; Western Balkan regional security sub-complex; The Iron Curtain.*

## INTRODUCTION

The European regional security complex within the Theory of Regional Security Complexes (RSC) had a central place, especially after the collapse of the bipolar order and the end of the Cold War in the last decade of the 20th century. According to Western viewpoints, at the end of the Cold War, the „Iron Curtain” that, according to them, was established by the former USSR (and the Warsaw Pact) from the Urals to the Adriatic Sea was torn down. The Balkans, as a part (sub-complex) of the European RSC lost its relevance in the creation of a new world order and was artificially substituted into the Western Balkans or the Western Balkan regional security sub-complex.

With the military intervention of Russia in Ukraine in February 2022, the issue of creating the latest world order, especially in the area of the European RBK, became actualized. The United States of America, which after the Cold War tried to estab-

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lish a unipolar world order, placed itself at the head of the „collective West” in a new conflict with the East (Russia). Given that they have preserved NATO as a lever of power, the USA is establishing dominance over the European RBK, pushing Russia out of Europe in all aspects and creating a new „iron curtain” from the Atlantic to the Baltic and the Black Sea.

In the newly created conditions, the so-called issue is especially sensitive. Western Balkan regional security sub-complex, especially from the aspect of the position of Serbia and Republika Srpska, as an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## **CONCEPT, TYPOLOGY AND ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE OF REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEXES**

In theory, there is agreement that the creator of the Theory of Regional Complexes is Professor Barry Buzan, who was one of the leading researchers of the Copenhagen School of Security and his initial work *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Buzan, 1983). Later, in cooperation with the researchers of the Copenhagen School, Buzan will innovate that theory, especially in the work *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, which he wrote together with Ole Wæver (Buzan, Wæver, 2003). Given that there are different approaches in theory about how Buzan and Wæver defined the regional security complex, Milan Lipovac (Lipovac, 2016) in his doctoral dissertation outlined the genesis of the development of that phrase (Table 1).

*Table 1. Genesis of the development of the term regional security complex*

FOUNDER	(R)SC	DETERMINATION OF (REGIONAL) SECURITY COMPLEX
Buzan, 1983.	The first determination of the Security Complex (SC)	A security complex constitutes – „a group of states whose primary security concerns are so closely related that their national security cannot reasonably be considered in isolation from other (states)”.
Buzan, Wæver, De Wilde, 1998.	Classic determination of RSC	The regional security complex represents – „a set of states whose main security perceptions and primary concerns are so interconnected that their national security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed and solved separately from other (states)”.
Buzan and Wæver, 2003.	Revised definition of RSC	The regional security complex represents – „a set of units whose main processes of securitization and/or desecuritization are so connected that their security problems cannot be logically analyzed or solved separately from other (units)”.

*Source: Lipovac V. Milan (2016, p.124).*

In the RSC *typology*, we distinguish: *subcomplex*, *proto-complex*, *supercomplex* and *insulator*.

The *subcomplex* essentially has the same definition and characteristics as the RSC, the only difference being that the subcomplex is firmly embedded in the larger RSC. The sub-complex has different patterns of security interaction, which are nevertheless encompassed by the broader patterns that determine the RSC as a whole. Thus, Buzan and Wæver cite the Levant (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria) and the Gulf, i.e. the subcomplex of the Persian Gulf (Iraq, Iran) within the Middle East-



ern RBK as the best example of a subcomplex. When it comes to the European RSC, as a subcomplex, according to Buzan and Wæver, the Balkan stands out (Buzan, Wæver, 2003, p. 152). A *proto-complex* represents a region that has the potential to develop into a RSC (for example: East African and West African proto-complex). A *supercomplex* represents the possibility of merging several RSCs into one large one (for example: Eurasian or Asian supercomplex). The term insulator was introduced into the RSC Theory by Buzan and Wæver. Glušac, L. claims that his intellectual history certainly has something to do with the older and more frequently used concept of buffer-state. „However, there is a fundamental difference between the two terms. The buffer maintains is located in the center of strong securitization, unlike the insulator located on its border). The buffer state is located within the RSC and separates the main actors in the region, while the insulator is positioned between the different RSCs and separates their security dynamics”. Thus, Buzan and Wæver identified as insulators: Turkey, between the Middle East, Europe and the Post-Soviet complex, and Afghanistan, between South Asia and the Middle East. According to them, the insulator is traditionally a passive player, which absorbs energy from the RSC between which it is located. Accordingly, the Map of Regional Security Complexes as seen by Buzan and Wæver at the beginning of the 21st century is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Map of regional security complexes at the beginning of the 21st century  
Source: Buzan, Wæver 2003 in: (Lipovac, 2016).

Buzan and Wæver name the four variables of the essential structure of RSC as: *Boundaries of RSC, Anarchic structure (structure), Polarity and Social construction - form* (Buzan, Wæver, 2003, p.53). *The borders of RSC are shown in Figure 1. In this sense, when it comes to borders, the essence is that they are not constant, that is, that RSC is a dynamic category* (Ejdus, 2012, p.119).

*The structure of RSC, in principle, is viewed from the aspect of hierarchy or anarchy within it. We can say that two views prevail regarding the structure of RSC. The first, with a realistic approach, views the global world, including the structure of the RBK, as anarchy, i.e. the absence of a „ruling” entity. On the other hand, starting from Wendt’s position „that the world is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992), constructivists are of the opinion that a certain hierarchy can exist in RSC. For such an approach, when it comes to RSC constructivists most often cite the European*

Union. When it comes to the structure of RSC, the terms „overlay” and „penetration” are also important. These terms are directly related to the external influence on the concrete RSC. Thus, a „covering” is considered a great power that has such an influence on a certain RSC, which disturbs the internal dynamics between the actors of the region. For example, the „cover” in the European RSC during the Cold War was the USA and the USSR. On the other hand, „penetration” implies that there is an influence of major forces on a certain RSC, but which is not so dominant that it can completely disrupt its internal dynamics. For example, „penetration” refers to the influence of the USA and the USSR on the Middle East during the Cold War (Ejdus, 2012, p.119).

*Polarity* is a characteristic of RSC that is viewed from the aspect of unipolarity, multipolarity or apolarity. In principle, the polarity is mapped from the global aspect to each RSC, although there may be differences from region to region.

In the end, a significant characteristic of RSC is its *social construction*, that is, its *form*. That form, most often, is understood from the aspects: *conflict, security regime and security community*. The conflict situation, in itself, is understood as a prevailing hostile relationship within the RSC, accompanied by a constant fear of war. Buzan and Weaver viewed the Middle East as a typical conflicting RSC, but also most of Africa and South Asia. „The security regime represents a pattern of security dynamics, which still defines the possibility of the outbreak of war, with the fact that it is limited by mutually accepted rules, as well as expectations that these rules will be respected” (Buzan, Wæver, 2003). In accordance with the previously understood definition of the security regime, Buzan and Wæver included South America and Southeast Asia in that group. Finally, the security community is a phrase coined before Buzan and Wæver by Carl Wolfgang Deutsch, who distinguished between its two types: 1) pluralistic, in which states retain a certain form of independence, and 2) amalgamated, in which states surrender their sovereignty on behalf of someone common identity. In modern conditions, the EU is understood as a pluralistic community, while NATO is a typical representative of an amalgamated community (Deutsch, 1957).

## EUROPEAN REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

Buzan and Wæver analyzed Europe in a broader sense - as a supercomplex (Figure 2), which consists of: 1. Western European security complex - one great power, the European Union, around which other members of the CSTO are gathered. „The dominant role in the European Union is played by the regional great powers Germany, Great Britain and France. The Balkans is singled out as a subcomplex; 2. The post-Soviet security complex - Russia on the one hand and the so-called GUAM cooperation (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova), on the other hand. The Central Asian sub-complex stands out with its specifics in this security complex; 3. Turkey stands out as an insulator, with the ambition to become a regional power and 4. The Caucasus as a mini-complex” (Figure 2) (Buzan, Wæver, 2003, p.344).




Figure 2. European supercomplex  
 Source: (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p. 350)

After the Cold War, the borders of the European RSC become a variable category, as is the case for the borders of any RSC in general. According to Figures 1 and 2 the borders of the European RSC (unjustifiably named as Western European) are debatable only on the eastern border. Obviously, the European RSC does not include some countries that geographically belong to Europe, such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Turkey. That is, the eastern border of the European RSC is established on the western borders of the newly created states on the territory of the former USSR. But, „geopolitics constantly changes geography”. Thus, the idea of „Europe for Europeans”, which is realized through the European Union project, practically excluding Russia, is aimed at unifying Europe into a supranational entity.

More significant changes in the structure, that is, the dynamics of the European RSC, occurred at the end of the Cold War. The eastern border of RSC moves to the border of the newly formed states created on the territory of the former USSR - Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The Baltic countries since 2004, as well as Romania and Bulgaria, since 2007, are also considered part of the European RSC. Thus, the geopolitics of the great powers creates a “new geography”. The largest country in the world (Russia) is pushed out of the European RSC and forms a new RSC - Post-Soviet. Thus, from a security point of view, Russia was pushed out of the European RSC, which achieved one of the goals of the formation of NATO, as stated by its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay (Forca, 2020). In the beginning, Ukraine was included in the Post-Soviet RSC. However, according to some views, Ukraine is an insulator country, because in the first period after the dissolution of the USSR, it opted for neutrality, and it is located on the border of the European and Post-Soviet RSC. After Russia annexed Crimea (2014), Ukraine essentially turned to Euro-Atlantic integration and sought membership in both the EU and NATO. The EU avoids these efforts of Ukraine, but NATO „fuels” one of the lines of fire, with constant calls for Ukraine to join the Alliance. Essentially, the main power covering the European RSC is the USA, because the unipolar world order has been established, and only apparently the so-called emerging power - EU. Thus, America remained in Europe, which

was also one of the goals of the formation of NATO, as Lord Ismay saw it. Penetration within the European RSC occurs in the economic sphere, primarily by China (the „Belt and Road” initiative), but also by Russia. After Russia militarily attacked Ukraine in 2022, the EU, under pressure from the US, clearly and publicly expressed its intention to admit that country into its membership, giving it candidate status. Also, NATO, at the summit in Madrid (June 28 to 30, 2022), again invites Ukraine to join the Alliance (Forca, 2022).

*The form* of the European RSC is difficult to determine. According to Buzan and Wæver, it is understood as a hierarchy, and not as anarchy, primarily due to the existence of the EU, which is constantly expanding and establishing its own principles for regulating relations between member states. *The polarity* in the European RSC is also difficult to determine. Namely, despite the existence and expansion of the EU, it is unequivocal that the extremely strong influence of the USA (NATO) is still felt in Europe, in which sense that country can be understood as a cover force for the European RSC. Thus, in the European RSC one can speak of a kind of bipolarity model, taking into account the influences of the USA and the EU. However, the influence of Russia is still felt in the European RSC, especially in Belarus, Serbia and part of B&H (Republika Srpska), Armenia and Moldova, as well as the economic influence of China, and the European RBC can, conditionally, be understood as multipolar.

### ***Balkan regional security sub-complex***

The Balkan Peninsula, in a general sense, is determined by a number of geographical, demographic, historical, political, economic, traffic, religious, cultural and other factors. It is located in the southern part of Europe. The total area of the peninsula is about 520,000 km<sup>2</sup>, and with the neighboring islands and the Romanian province of Dobruja, it covers an area of 566,567 km<sup>2</sup>, which is about 6% of the total area of Europe, and is the largest after the Scandinavian and Iberian peninsulas. Marija Todorova in her widely read book *Imagining the Balkans* points out how the German geographer August Zeune, in his book from 1808, called it the Balkan Peninsula (Balkanhalbeiland). Zeune, admittedly wrongly, considered that this peninsula in the north was separated from the rest of Europe by the „Balkan” mountains, so it is analogous to the Apennine or Pyrenean peninsula, and he named this peninsula after, as he considered, the dominant mountain range (Todorova, 2009, p. 45). Although there are minor differences, most analysts, from a political point of view, count 11 countries in the area of the Balkan Peninsula, which partly or entirely belong to the region: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Romania and Turkey (Sekulović, 2018, pp. 32-33).

In the geopolitical discourse, the term *Balkan* is used instead of *the Balkan Peninsula*. The connotation of the term „Balkans” is mostly negative, implying the constant conflict between the peoples and states of that region, on the one hand, as well as the interference of world and regional powers, on the other. In this sense, the catchphrase about „the Balkans with too much history” is often mentioned (Luketić, 2013, p. 70). The most significant term derived from the word *Balkan* is „balkanization”. The term „Balkanization” appeared after World War I in the *New York Times* on December 20, 1918. Under the title „*Rathenau, the great industrialist, predicts the Balkanization of Europe*”<sup>2</sup>. In university circles, this term was used by holders

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<sup>2</sup> Walter Rathenau, the famous director of the German company AEG (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft),

of different and often conflicting political viewpoints: some equated multiculturalism with bacchanalization, some used the term to denote excessive specialization, some, again, as a metaphor for postmodernism and postcommunism (Sekulović, 2021, pp. 292-293).

### ***Western Balkan regional security sub-complex***

The Western Balkans Security Subcomplex is not mentioned in the RSC Theory, although the term „Western Balkans” was launched before 2003. However, in numerous scientific works after 2003, the term „Western Balkans” is used in all aspects (political, economic, social and other), and analyzed as a security sub-complex. Therefore, one of the goals of this work is to confirm the thesis: The Western Balkans is a coin for the subcomplex of the European RSC, which has no foundation in science, but is used in geopolitics.

There are disputes about the precise date when the term Western Balkans came into official use. Therefore, the thinking of Milan Lipovac, who says: “The Western Balkans region in this way („former SFRY minus Slovenia plus Albania”) was formally determined in 2003 in Thessaloniki at the EU Summit by adopting the so-called The Thessaloniki agenda for the countries of the Western Balkans, in which all previous EU decisions and positions were sublimated, and which at the same time confirmed the „European perspective” of the region, and determined further steps towards EU membership. Also, it is important to note that the Thessaloniki Agenda is not the first official EU document that mentions the term Western Balkans. Previously, the term was also used in the accompanying document of the Vienna European Summit (December 11-12, 1998), which talks about the „preparation of the first joint strategy for Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean region and the Western Balkans” (European Council, 1998), as well as in the decision of the Council of the European Union from December 5, 2000, where it is specified in Article 17 that „the activities regulated by this rulebook are part of the Western Balkans policy and are necessary for the implementation of the goals” (European Council, 2000), (Lipovac, 2016) :165).

Prominent Serbian geopolitician Milomir Stepić believes that the term Western Balkans is an artificial geopolitical coin coined by the EU, and that it has no support in science and points out: „The EU intended the Western Balkans to stabilize the conflict area and harmonize it with the standards prescribed for accession. In the first years after the establishment of the Western Balkans, the EU tested the so-called regional concept – collective treatment of all countries in the region. It gave up that concept with the admission of Croatia in 2013” (<https://dokumen.tips/documents/milomir-stepic-zapadni-balkan-ili-primer-geografskog-raspojmljivanja-i-geopolitickog.html>, 10.07.2022).

Also, Gigović and Sekulović deny the correctness of the term Western Balkans from a geographical point of view, especially that Serbia belongs to the Western Balkans, because in its geographical division it would form the central part (Gigović, Sekulović. 2017:90).

Denying the justification of the term Western Balkans, in the geographical sense, Sveta Jokić writes: Albania, which geographically lies entirely in the south of the Balkans, in this case was moved far to the west. „The same applies to its neighbor

Macedonia, which would therefore be more suited to the name Western than North Macedonia. And one more thing: if we have the Western Balkans, it is logical that there should also be Southern and Eastern Balkans with appropriate areas and peoples, and it would be especially interesting to know in what way and from which territories and countries the European Union would form according to its „recipe” a region that would be called the northern Balkans”<sup>3</sup>.

Proceeding from the position that the term Western Balkans is disputed in a geographical sense, in her doctoral dissertation Veličkovski Stojanovski Ivana writes: „If you look at the map of the Balkans, with the borders described by Jovan Cvijić, the Western Balkans would consist of Slovenia, Croatia and B&H, possibly Montenegro Mountain. Serbia is certainly located in the center of the Balkans, while the southern Balkans would consist of Albania and Greece, and the eastern part of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. However, never in its history, under any conditions, has the area of the Balkans been divided in this way, nor has it been recorded anywhere. What’s more, geographically it has not been completely defined exactly which area of the European continent the Balkans occupies. Therefore, the Western Balkans is first and foremost an area with specific political and security characteristics” (Veličkovski-Stojanovski, 2019, pp. 77-78).

Referring to the term Western Balkans, in her doctoral dissertation, Mirjana Milenković also claims that it is a geopolitical, not a geographical term that Western countries devised after the Kumanovo Agreement (1999). According to Milenković, this space according to Western countries is characterized by two key elements: „transitivity marked by the presence of the interests of great powers and heterogeneity which is a consequence of political-territorial fragmentation” (Milenković, 2020, p. 32).

Therefore, from a scientific point of view, the term Western Balkans is unfounded and represents a typical geopolitical coin. However, from a geopolitical point of view, the term Western Balkans is incorrect, as we will show by referring to the TRSC.

*The borders* of the Western Balkan regional security complex are undefined. In this sense, there are at least three points of view. First, he defined the Western Balkans as six countries (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and North Macedonia). Another understanding of the Western Balkans, also under the designation WB6 (or WB5+1), understands that area without Croatia, but with Kosovo as a part. According to the third point of view, that is, the geopolitical approach of Turkey, the Western Balkans includes the area made up of the states of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Albania. Therefore, neither Croatia nor Kosovo are mentioned (Jevtić-Šarčević, 2010:694).

*The polarity* in the Western Balkan RSSC is impossible to determine precisely, because: 1) NATO (USA) has the primary influence, even though the EU is committed to becoming the only covering power, 2) in some countries (Serbia and Republika Srpska), a strong influence of Russia is felt, 3) even though it is not primarily security, the strong economic influence of China is felt in the Western Balkan RSSC, which also has a political connotation when it comes to Serbia and Republika Srpska, and 4) the influence of Turkey is not negligible, especially in certain countries (in the Federation of BiH, Kosovo and Albania).

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/475604/Balkan-na-zapadu>, accessed 10.07.2022

*The social construction or form* of the Western Balkan RSSC is impossible to determine precisely because it is simultaneously a conflict situation (mutual conflicts between the states of the region) and attempts to establish a hierarchy (the European Union) and evidently existing security regimes established by acts of the United Nations and the European Union in certain parts of the region, primarily in Serbia (in Kosovo and Metohija) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## NEW IRON CURTAIN

During the Cold War, according to Western viewpoints, the USSR lowered the “iron curtain” in the area from the Urals to the Adriatic Sea, including the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans, including the former SFRY, although for most of that period it was a member of the Movement of Aligned Countries. Thus, on the European RSC there were two superpowers - the USSR (with the Warsaw Pact) and the USA (with NATO).

With the collapse of bipolarism (the end of the Cold War), the leader of the „collective West” - the USA, establishes a unipolar world order. Given that it is clear to US strategists that ruling the world from one center (state) is impossible, they manage to maintain NATO, as a lever of power, even though the Warsaw Pact fell apart. Using the prevailing influence on the official UN, the US legally wraps the preservation of NATO under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, primarily articles 52 and 53. According to these articles, the Security Council could engage international organizations, certainly officially registered with UN (UN Charter, 1945). In this sense, NATO engagement began around the world, first with and later without the mandate of the UN Security Council, starting with the civil war in the former SFR Yugoslavia. In this way, NATO left the North Atlantic area and ceased to be a defense alliance formed in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, that is, it turned into a security forum and a lever of US power (Forca, 2021).

That the goal of the USA after the Cold War was to rule the world is also indicated by the official document - the National Security Strategy of the USA from 1991. In the Introduction of that document, the then US President George Bush (senior) said: „The New World Order is not a fact; it is an aspiration and an opportunity. We have an extraordinary opportunity, enjoyed for several generations, to build a new international system in accordance with our values and ideals, while old patterns and certainties crumble around us. We must work with others, but we must also be leaders” (National Security Strategy of the USA, 1991). From President Bush Sr. (1991) to Donald Trump (2017), 16 documents called National Security Strategy have been adopted in the USA. In those documents, the basic content is the vital national interests of the USA, and among them the key one remains - for the USA to be a world leader (Forca, 2022).

Given the fact that NATO is a lever of US power, the US national security strategies were the direction for the adoption of the Alliance’s strategic concepts. From its formation until 2022, NATO adopted 8 strategic concepts, the last one at the summit in Madrid (Spain) from June 28 to 30, 2022. years. After the Cold War, the Strategic Concept of NATO from 1999 stands out. Namely, the consolidation of US and NATO dominance in the world was demonstrated in a drastic example - the Alliance’s aggression against FR Yugoslavia in 1999. It was the 50th anniversary of the formation of NATO. In April 1999, the Strategic Concept of NATO was adopted, in

which two goals are very important: 1) expanding NATO to the east and 2) engaging NATO outside the North Atlantic area, with and without the mandate of the UN Security Council (NATO Strategic Concept, 1999).

When it comes to Europe, after the collapse of the USSR and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (1991), NATO began to absorb the so-called buffer zone with Russia. These were the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the newly created countries in the territory of the former USSR and the newly created countries in the territory of the former SFR Yugoslavia. After the activation of the Partnership for Peace program (1994), the publication of the Study on NATO Enlargement (Study on NATO Enlargement, 3 September 1995), it was the turn of the practical reception of the states. The first European countries to join NATO after the Cold War (1999) were Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Since then, NATO expansion has taken place in 2004, 2009, 2017 and 2020. Thus, with 16 member states, as many as NATO counted at the end of the Cold War, by 2020 that number has grown to 30. In 2004, with the admission of the Baltic States to its membership, NATO broke out on the borders with Russia. In 2022, the admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO began. Thus, with the admission of Finland, the border between NATO and Russia will be expanded by an additional 1300 kilometers.

Parallel to the expansion of NATO, the European Union also expanded. The fact is that the first countries after the Cold War were admitted to the EU (1995) - Austria, Sweden and Finland, as militarily neutral states. However, since then, an unwritten rule has been introduced - first in NATO, then in the EU. That principle (rule) was applied to all former socialist states that became members of the EU until 2013, since when the „enlargement fatigue” has been going on in the Union. In the area of the Western Balkans, all countries except Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina became members of NATO, and Croatia was accepted into the European Union.

US and NATO strategists were not completely satisfied with the expansion to the east and the extent of pushing Russia out of Europe. In this sense, the focus is on Ukraine and Georgia, which since 2008 (NATO summit in Bucharest) have been constantly invited to join the Alliance. Russia reacted violently to the invitation to Georgia to join NATO and with a short-term military attack on that country (2008), practically, two disputed (quasi) states were created on the territory of Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Russia recognized as independent states. Since then, relations between NATO and Russia have become more strained.

The additional cooling of NATO-Russia relations occurred in 2014, when Russia returned Crimea, which had been part of Ukraine since 1954, to its composition. That move by Russia was assessed by the USA and the West as an illegitimate annexation of part of Ukraine, which is why economic sanctions were imposed on Russia. Also, all ties between Russia and NATO have been severed. In the same year, in 2014, fierce clashes began in Lugansk and Donetsk, which are parts of Ukraine where the majority of the population identifies as Russian. Until the beginning of 2022, fierce clashes between the Ukrainian security forces and the militias of Luhansk and Donetsk continued. It is estimated that several tens of thousands of people died in those conflicts, while over two million people fled, mostly to Russia (<https://valenteshop.ru/hr/poteri-uchastvuyushchih-storon-v-voine-na-donbasse/>, 15.09.2022).

The culmination of the NATO-Russia conflict, with a hard-to-estimate further course, will come on February 22, 2022, when Russia militarily attacked Ukraine.



Russia named that act as a „special military operation”, while the UN General Assembly assessed it as aggression (Resolution GAUN, A/RES/ES-11/2, 2022). The resolution on the war in Ukraine was not adopted by the UN Security Council, because there was a danger of a veto by Russia and China. Therefore, an extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly was held at which the Resolution condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine was adopted. That resolution, according to UN rules, is non-binding and has a more political character.

As the war in Ukraine flared up, so did the homogenization of the „collective West”, led by the USA, which condemns Russia and calls for all-out support for Ukraine. Therefore, numerous analysts of international relations are of the opinion that, in essence, the armed conflict in Ukraine is a conflict of wider proportions led by the „collective West” led by the USA with Russia, but also China. So, the creation of the newest world order is on the horizon.

Essentially, the USA has undertaken an all-out campaign against Russia characterized by several key aspects: 1) Homogenization of the Group of Seven Most Developed Countries (G7) in condemning Russia, undertaking sanctions against that country and all-out support for Ukraine; 2) Instructing leading EU countries to impose sanctions on Russia, increase defense spending, as a contribution to strengthening NATO and supporting Ukraine through financial aid, arming and speeding up that country’s path to the Union; 3) Consolidation of US partners on the ground, primarily Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Australia in a kind of economic blockade of China in the Indo-Pacific region, and 4) At the NATO summit in Madrid (June 28-30, 2022) 8 Strategic Concepts were adopted in order Alliance (NATO 2022 Strategic Concept) in which Russia is explicitly named as an enemy, and China is designated as a threatening country. Also, the invitation to Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO was repeated.

In accordance with the subject of this paper, the processes in Europe and the position of the USA and Russia are characteristic. It is evident that the EU’s attitude towards the war in Ukraine is taking place according to the instructions of the USA, where it is particularly highlighted: 1) the EU has introduced 7 packages of unprecedented sanctions against Russia, which cover all aspects of relations between states and peoples, from economic and financial, suspension of trade, bans on flights and all forms of traffic, sanctions in sports and culture, up to attempts to collectively ban Russian citizens from entering the Union<sup>4</sup>; 2) The EU, and especially its leading countries, increased defense expenditures and began military homogenization. crisis situations; 3) EU member states, with a minor exception, along with the USA, became the largest financial donor to Ukraine, but also the largest exporter of weapons and military equipment to that country. The onward delivery plan was approved at the aforementioned NATO summit in Madrid<sup>5</sup> 4) The EU made a decision on the accelerated path of Ukraine to the Union, which caused the indignation of the countries that are „waiting in line”, such as, for example, the countries of the Western Balkans<sup>6</sup>; 5) Under the influence of the USA, Finland and Sweden started the process of joining NATO, which will increase the Alliance to 32 countries, compared to the 27 in the EU.

4 <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/eu-sankcije-rusija/31952457.html>, accessed 20.07.2022.

5 <https://www.glasamerike.net/a/6641536.html>, accessed 20.07.2022.

6 <https://www.dw.com/sr/ukrajina-postaje-eu-candidate-by-accelerated-procedure/a-62140280>, accessed 15.9.2022.

*America remained in Europe, Russia was driven out of Europe, and Germany was brought under control* (by the US). Therefore, all the objectives of the formation of NATO in 1949, as described by the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, as long ago as 1952, were realized. America and NATO are becoming the main „covering power” in the European regional security complex, as the RSC Theory understands it. Therefore, NATO is establishing a new „Iron Curtain” over Europe, from the Atlantic to the Baltic and the Black Sea. It is unclear where the eastern border of that curtain will be, because it cannot be reliably estimated what status Ukraine will remain in.

International relations in the conditions of globalization are shown to be united courts. Thus, the creation of a new „iron curtain” erected by the USA and NATO in Europe will especially affect the processes in the Western Balkans (Western Balkan regional security sub-complex). Considering that all the countries of the Western Balkans, except Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, are members of NATO, Serbia and Republika Srpska, as one of the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will find themselves in a particularly difficult situation. Pressures on Serbia to recognize independent Kosovo and impose sanctions on Russia, if it wants to join the EU, are intensifying and accelerating. On the other hand, support for the unitization of B&H, provided by the so-called of the collective West is intensifying, to the detriment of the position of Republika Srpska.

## CONCLUSION

The European RSC during the Cold War practically coincided with the geographical concept of Europe. In the geopolitical sense, during the Cold War, the superpowers in the European RSC were the USA and the USSR. The organizational forms of the integration of European states, which would later grow into the European Union, did not have a significant impact on the European RSC for two basic reasons: 1) in part of the European RSC, the USSR had primacy and 2) in the other part of the European RSC, NATO ruled, led by foreign countries of America.

Within the European RSC, the Balkan RSC stood out, which is more a geopolitical coin than has its origin in geographical sciences. That sub-complex was, first of all, determined by the conflict situation („powder keg”), from a historical point of view, of the states that make it up. Therefore, the influence in the Balkans during the Cold War was also different under the influence of Russia and NATO. The end of the Cold War led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the USSR, the breakup of the SFR Yugoslavia, the unification of Germany, the formation of the European Union and the survival and expansion of NATO. Russia was pushed to the east.

The European Union, through the Common Security and Defense Policy, as a unique form of introducing hierarchy in the RBK, tried, but failed, to become the sole power covering the European RSC. The Union itself contributed to this, because NATO (USA) survived as one of the main levers of the EU’s defense. The clause on common defense, which was established in the Lisbon Treaty of the EU, was practically canceled by Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Namely, the „old” adversary (Russia) returned, which homogenized not the EU, but NATO. The determination of the neutral EU member states is also on „wobbly legs”, as their membership in NATO is being advocated more and more, with Finland and

Sweden being the closest. A NATO (American) Europe („natoization of Europe”) is being created, in which the EU has lost both its identity and its compass. The cover force of the European RSC (USA) assigned the EU only one task - to „dig a trench” towards Russia, although it is not clear where - on or outside the territory of Ukraine (with or without Ukraine).

There are countless scientific and professional works that prove that the term Western Balkans is not a geographical (scientific) but a geopolitical term. However, research has proven that the Western Balkans is not a correct phrase even in a geopolitical sense, especially not as a regional security sub-complex, which is supported by the following evidence: 1) The borders of the Western Balkan RSC are not clear, that is, there are several views of the countries that comprise the region; 2) The polarity in the WBRSSC is impossible to determine precisely, because: (1) NATO (the USA) has the primary influence, although the EU is committed to becoming the only covering power, (2) in some countries (Serbia and Republika Srpska), a strong influence of Russia is felt, (3) although it is not primarily security-related, China's strong economic influence is felt on the WBRSSC, which also has political connotations when it comes to Serbia and Republika Srpska, and (4) Turkey's influence is not negligible, especially in certain states (in the Federation of BiH, on Kosovo and Albania) and 3) The social construction or form of the WBRSSC is impossible to determine precisely because it is simultaneously a conflict situation and attempts to establish a hierarchy and evidently existing security regimes in certain parts of the region.

The war between Russia and Ukraine, which many analysts see as a conflict between Russia and NATO (USA), will largely change the geopolitical picture of the world, as well as the status of the European RBK, and especially the Western Balkan RSC. In the “iron curtain” that NATO is creating in the European RSC from the Atlantic to the Baltic and the Black Sea, it is evident that Russia will be “expelled” from Europe for a long time. The question is where the eastern border of the European RSC will be determined: 1) with Ukraine (difficult), 2) without Ukraine (possible) or 3) somewhere on the territory of Ukraine (most likely). In this sense, special changes will also take place in the Western Balkan RSC, in which a possible scenario: with the accession of the countries of the region to NATO and the EU, the borders of that sub-complex will gradually change, until only Serbia remains on it, with a similar problem as Ukraine (border redrawing). and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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# EXTERNAL INTERVENTION AND STABILITY IN SOMALIA

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*“the last thing the Horn of Africa needs is more foreign military bases, more weapons, and more European meddling. What we call our ‘strategic relationship’ isn’t about human flourishing; it’s about the EU’s ambitions as a superpower.... And what about the ‘local’ people? None of this benefits them” Clare Daly*

**Abstract:** When external actors intervene in conflict to oust established authority, their interference often prolongs the instability and suffering. This is reminiscent of events in South-Central Somalia and the conflict has dragged for over two decades. Could peace have been established without foreign interference in Somalia? Was the African Union’s (AU) peace enforcement intervention really necessary? To have ignored the realities on the ground and opting instead to usurp the established authority of the Islamic Courts Union (at the request of the west) set the stage for the protracted conflict witnessed today in Somalia. This study argues that the lives lost and the financial burden of a prolonged conflict would have been avoided if the AU had adopted a Pan-African/indigenous approach in dealing with Somalia. While the ICU might have been yesterday, peace in Somalia is dependent on local initiatives to build the peace as exemplified by the evolution and success of the ICU and not some contrived foreign/external process. Thirty years of foreign intervention have shown that these will not achieve peace in Somalia. Process tracing is adopted as the method of analysis for this study.

**Key Words:** *Islamic Courts Union, African Union, External Intervention, Somalia, Local Initiative*

## INTRODUCTION

When external actors intervene in conflict to oust established authority, their interference often prolongs the instability and suffering. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s interference in Libya that Ousted Muammar Gaddafi and made Africa’s Sahel unstable since 2011, and the support of France and Israel for Biafra during Nigeria’s civil war that stretched to 30 months rather than the envisaged few weeks, are good examples. This same pattern has been replicated in South-Central Somalia and the conflict has dragged for almost two decades. Given the intensity of the conflict at the time and the existence of multiple warlords, could peace have been established without foreign interference in Somalia? Was the African Union’s (AU) peace enforcement intervention really necessary and was it the implementation of

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the slogan, African solutions to African problems? Much of what permeates mainstream literature lauds western interference and the involvement of the AU in Somalia's conflict (Segui, 2013; Agbiboa, 2014; Williams, 2014 and 2018). Unfortunately, what extant literature has been largely silent about is that, in order to promote their interest, external actors in Somalia's conflict ignored the realities on the ground and opted instead to usurp the established authority of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) (Cocodia, 2021). This action extended the life of a conflict that was being brought under control, and now sixteen years down the line (2007-2022) there is no end in sight. This study argues that the lives lost and the financial burden of this prolonged conflict would have been avoided if the AU had adopted a Pan-African approach in dealing with Somalia. This would have enabled the ICU deepen stability and achieve international recognition, while also being compelled to abide with global norms to make its authority more acceptable locally and to the international community.

There is no doubt that Somalia was in dire straits as a failed state, but the fact that it was seen as irredentist which made its neighbours (Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia) wary of it, and that several external attempts to impose peace had failed, was more than enough reasons for neighbours and external actors to stay out its affairs until invited to do so, or, until the country could sort itself out as happened in the north of the country with Somaliland and Punt land.

With Somali's being just one people, professing mainly one strand of Islam, and separated mainly by clan distinctions, it could safely be said that what obtains in one area or among a group of Somalis, would likely obtain in others and this is because there are so many similarities collectively. So, if the northern enclaves of Somaliland and Puntland could pull themselves from the brink of failed statehood without foreign intervention, then it was just a matter of time before the south-central areas consisting of the capital Mogadishu and environs, would get its act together. The south-central areas eventually did through the ICU, but Ethiopia was unwilling to have it establish itself as the de jure authority for this part of the country because a stable Somalia was a threat to her interest. Consequently, to break the influence of the ICU, Ethiopia sought to establish governments on behalf of the Somali people, and sold the falsehood to the US and its other western allies that the ICU had links to Al Qaeda. This was untenable to the US in view of its war on terror which was at its height and they backed Ethiopia in pushing out the ICU that had helped create stability in south-central Somalia between 2003-2007. Strangely, this period is seldom accounted for in most western media reports or western literature on conflict in the horn of Africa. Much of the efforts of the ICU at stabilising Somalia have gone unreported or silenced.

This study examines the role of the ICU in Somalia's conflict history with the claim that western and other external interference was not needed in stabilising Somalia, hence their involvement has only served to protract the conflict which was the true agenda behind the interference – to keep Somalia unstable and weak. South-Central Somalia's conflict stalemate, after fifteen years of foreign intervention via a peace enforcement operation reiterates the argument that interventions undertaken to oust established regimes often lead to protracted conflicts (Ianchovichina and Bader, 2018; Denison, 2020; Cocodia, 2021; Downes, 2021).

The ex post facto approach is applied given that the events under analysis have already occurred and the outcome cannot be manipulated by the author (Lee, 1985;



Awokeni, 2019). Data is derived from secondary sources, which has as one of its major flaws, the bias of the authors. This bias is evident in much of mainstream literature as seen in the silence on the gains of the ICU during its brief existence, hence much of the literature consulted were authored by scholars who have provided more complete details of the events in Somalia, and most of whom are Africans. This text adopts the single story analysis propounded by Chimamanda Adichie (2009). This analysis argues that for too long, Africa has been seen through a prism defined by the west. This analysis advocates that it is time African's begin telling their story the way they see their history, which is the way it really is, and not some version constructed by western influence to suit western interests.

## **THE ICU AND CONFLICT IN SOMALIA**

At the end of Siad Barre's 21 years in power, Somalia was a deeply divided nation despite being one people, professing a major religion, divided only by clan affiliations. These clan division became the engine of the conflict that made Somalia a failed state. By the time Barre left power on January 26, 1991, most of the country's institutions, law and order were destroyed and Somalia became a deeply fragmented society (Haims, 2008). Anarchy spread in the country with many clan factions still armed from Barre's legacy, which resulted in wider inter-clan fighting and provided the catalyst for Somalia's descent toward state failure (Townsend, 2012) After Barre's fall in 1991, there were at least 15 attempts to form a government, most of which were contrived by foreign powers and functioned from outside Somalia. In 2004, Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) negotiations led to the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led by Abdullahi Yusuf. The TFG had Ethiopia's approval on the basis that under Yusuf, Somalia will rest its claim to the Ogaden region (Hull and Svensson, 2008) While Ethiopia's actions were in defense of its national interest, it should be understood that based on the tumultuous history between both states, Ethiopia considered a weak Somali state dependent on Ethiopian support as a lesser threat than a strong one (Cocodia, 2018; Moeller, 2009). This propelled Ethiopia to undertake the forceful installment of the TFG. However, due to the caustic relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia, the TFG was deeply unpopular and increasingly isolated nationally, notwithstanding its support from the west, especially the United States (US) (Hesse, 2016)

While the TFG was being formed, the ICU was growing in legitimacy and popularity. As Robrecht Deforche, attests, "considering the failure of secular nationalism, the ICU umbrella successfully united the Somali people under the values of their shared religion (Deforche, 2013: 102)." The ICU had its roots in the Sharia courts which were communal centers of reconciliation and conflict resolution and whose establishment was in 1994. As noted by Ahmed Ibrahim, "the Sharia courts succeeded where others failed because they simultaneously built on known cultural and religious norms, authorities and practices while at the same time pragmatically responding to the demands of the moment (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 148)." He argues further:

The reconciliation efforts of the Sharia courts worked because their reconciliation processes and mechanisms emerged from and built on known local cultural and religious norms, authorities and practices. The Sharia institutions, authorities and discourses that led to the formation of the Sharia courts were indistinguishable from local cultural norms and practices (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 148).

In 2000, the various independent Islamic Courts of South Mogadishu formed a joint Islamic Courts Council. The joined up courts also combined their respective court militias to create the first significant non-warlord controlled military force (Barnes & Hassan, 2007). These court militias (youth wing) were the enforcement arm of the ICU.

Ethiopia's 2006 campaign was the last in a long series of military incursions aimed at degrading Islamist structures in Somalia. These incursions attempted to neutralize among other groups, the coalition of local sharia courts – the ICU. Uncomfortable with the ascendancy of the ICU which was at the expense of the TFG, the TFG president Yusuf made the claim that the ICU had links to international terrorists and was receiving support from foreign forces (Hull and Svensson). This last-ditch attempt was to give the crisis a radically religious connotation that paid off as it drew the attention of the US. So, backed by the US as part of its war on terror, Ethiopia and the TFG pushed the ICU, that by now had been labeled a radical Islamic sect with ties to Al-Qaeda, out of Mogadishu.

It was convenient to tag the ICU a radical Islamic group (Guglielmo, 2011) to justify the intervention, for as noted by Smith (2016), when local groups are on a collision course with the interest of external actors and national governments, a simplistic religiously charged terrorist or jihadist narrative is constructed to delegitimise the ethno-nationalist/nationalist agenda of these groups in order to justify the self-serving intervention of these external actors. Considering the gains made by the ICU in achieving stability in much of south-central Somalia, it is apparent that US and Ethiopian interests mattered more than the well being of Somalis. In explaining the external partisan hostility that greeted the success of the ICU, Barnes and Hassan (2007, p.153) observe that genuine multilateral concern to support the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Somalia was hijacked by the unilateral actions of Ethiopia and the US in line with their own foreign policy agendas. Unfortunately, much of the international community keyed into the actions of Ethiopia and the US due to growing Islamophobia that was fuelled by events of 9/11, and which rested on perceptions that Islam is a violent, aggressive and threatening culture that supports terrorism, is primitive hence is at odds with civilisation (Kaya, 2011).

Considering the failure of international intervention in view of the stalemate between Al-Shabaab and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which is the AU's peace enforcement operation, it becomes pertinent to investigate the dynamics behind the success of the ICU as this would point the path the international community ought to tread if peace in Somalia is sincerely sought.

## **THE ICU, EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE AND (IN)STABILITY IN SOMALIA**

An objective narrative of the period of the ICU in authority portrays a time of peace, fair arbitration of justice and overwhelming support from the people (Ibrahim, 2018; Anzalone, 2016; Deforsche, 2014). These narrative outline the local governance strategies adopted by the ICU that enabled them succeed where numerous international attempts at rebuilding Somalia had failed. The ICU, at the height of its influence had two major factors in its favour: Firstly, it had the support of a fair size of Somalia's top military brass, and this could be easily linked to the second impor-

tant factor of being widely accepted by the Somali people (Guglielmo, 2011). The ICU's role as a fair arbiter in civil cases, its deference to Sharia law, Islamic scholars and clan elders that derive from the culture of the people, provided it with the persona of the people's government. The popularity and growth of the ICU saw war lords align and submit to its authority which enabled access to weapons with which it became powerful enough to apply coercion in the enforcement of the law. In addition, a number of key positions within the ICU were filled by moderates who were even willing to commit to peace talks with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that was contrived by external actors led by Ethiopia that had been an antagonist of Somalia. The ability of the ICU to reconcile erstwhile warring parties/clans and a willingness to address the causes of the conflict (Menkhaus, 2007) enabled the ICU succeed where other attempts at stability had failed. So widespread was the support of the ICU that it received support from Somali diaspora communities in North America (Anzalone, 214)

In contrast to the gains of the ICU authors agree that external intervention never worked in Somalia, and nothing could be more significant in establishing this fact than the fifteen failed internationally sponsored attempts at establishing a government for the country (Namatovu, 2017; Abdullahi, 2018; Malito, 2020; Cocodia, 2021). In the face of these multiple failures, it is surprising that the international community still opted to contrive and impose a government on Somalis and to do this forcefully through the African Union and its peace operation, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The activities of AMISOM has received wide commendation from the international community, scholars and the media, and in the same vein, pro interventionist scholars have been quick to make excuses for their lapses (see William, 2013). However, human rights organisations on the ground hold a different view. The International Refugees Rights Initiative (IRRI) (2017) notes that Somalis see the mission as ineffective and the general perception is that the peacekeepers are there to protect themselves and not the local population. Thus, the public perception toward AMISOM is one of disappointment. Considering the role of the public to the success of building and securing the peace (see Cocodia, 2018), the disconnect between AMISOM and the public (Somali life) explains to great lengths the failure of the mission. Hence fifteen years down the line, and the peace operation is at a stalemate (Namatovu, 2017).

Every group has a right to what works for them. Islamophobia or not, Somalis are entitled to this too, so, even if it is Islamic Sharia, so be it (Somaliland has thrived under Sharia law as its judicial system). Somalia's history has shown that the Islamic laws are woven into their culture, are part of their identity, so cannot not be wished away, but accommodated in whatever context that is implemented, and to which majority of Somalis would accede to. It is necessary to acknowledge along with Shire (2021) that in lieu of the seven year stalemate, it is time for leaders of thought to engage Al-Shabaab in planning for a stable Somalia.

Next is the fact that, the ICU was widely accepted due to its wide cultural and religious representation of the various community leaders in South-Central Somalia. This acceptance extended to its law enforcement youth wing that was fairly representative of the clans, and through its process of getting its members from the youth groups of the clans (Anzalone, 2014). Therefore the ICU evolved from Somalis as a people project in achieving stability and peace, so it easily commanded their loyalty

and cooperation. This was a major reason why, upon its overthrow by the Ethiopian backed TFG which was a foreign contraption, there was anger and tension among Somalis (Abdullahi, 2018) The aversion this bred toward the TFG has ensured that it remains “a marginal presence that is fundamentally incapable of stabilizing the country (Guglielmo, 2011: 110). The stalemate that has been with AMISOM for the past fifteen years in spite of foreign backing reinforces this fact. Leadership can barely survive if the people are not welcoming of it. Suave, mean and powerful as the Leviathan might be, Machiavelli recognizes this fact. The Prince, to be powerful, thrives on the support of his people. Foreign intervention in Somalia has always failed at this, and as the proverb goes, you cannot keep doing the same thing over and over again and expect a different result.

## CONCLUSION

Over thirty years of external intervention in Somalia, the last fifteen of which have seen the AU in the fore, yet the country is still unstable. Despite the amount of money pumped in, the number of lives lost (of Somalis and interveners alike), and irrespective of which group is in charge, and how positive the international media tries to be on the gains of foreign intervention, the situation on ground is still what it is – Somalia remains insecure and a failed state (in reference to its South-Central axis). This paper contends that the era (2004-2006) and actors (the ICU) that the international community has tried hard to ignore, ironically, had the best success story of peace in Somalia’s turbulent history. Logic should then prevail that whatever strategy that was adopted, however these strategies were implemented should be revisited if Somalia is to plot a trajectory to peace.

The ICU may have been ousted, but it vestiges still remain on how it emerged from the people and in Al-Shabaab. If peace is to prevail in Somalia, it is for the international community to encourage the Somali people to evolve their own indigenous style of governance and its institutions, rather than dictate how these processes should go. It is high time that the international community learns that encouraging local initiatives is the most viable way for peace in Somalia. Islamic scholars, community elders, business men and all who culturally are entitled to be part of this process, Al-Shabaab inclusive, should be a part of this process. Peace will be easier attained with Al-Shabaab on board than without them. It is time Africans begin seeing Al-Shabaab for what it truly is and not what the west and its affiliates want us to believe.

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# THE EU, CHINA AND AFRICA: COOPERATION IN THE SPHERE OF SECURITY

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**Abstract:** One of the trends currently observed in world politics is the growing global influence of China and African countries. These actors are beginning to make an ever greater contribution to the formation of a new – multipolar – world. This trend is of particular importance in relation to Africa – a continent that is experiencing permanent political instability and an associated lag in economic development. The main security problems in Africa include armed conflicts between certain groups of the population for access to natural resources; clashes between tribal and confessional communities; the proliferation of Islamic and Christian terrorist groups; electoral crises; piracy. While the EU retains its role as the main trade and economic partner of African countries and also cooperates with the latter in the field of security much more than other international players, China's aspiration to become a global power prompts Beijing to participate more actively in solving security problems of the continent. Although most agreements signed between the PRC and African countries focus on trade, economic and social relations, the growing interdependence between national interests of China and domestic African politics encourages Beijing to reconsider its approaches to interaction with particular African regions. Moreover, since the participation of European states in peacekeeping missions has been gradually decreasing since the mid-1990s, the role of developing countries, including China, in ensuring security on the African continent has steadily increased. Expanding security cooperation in the EU-China-Africa format is a European initiative, but trilateral cooperation is still limited, primarily due to a noticeable difference in the approaches of China and the EU to Africa. Nevertheless, it is gradually being established in the format of joint participation in peacekeeping operations, as well as in the context of the fight against piracy and terrorism.

**Keywords:** *Africa, China, European Union, peacekeeping operations, trilateral cooperation*

## INTRODUCTION

One of the trends characterizing the formation of the modern world order is a noticeable increase in the influence of the so-called. rising powers, especially China, in the international arena, including in the field of security. Meanwhile, meeting the challenges of ensuring security, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, due to their complexity, requires the participation of multiple parties. Africa for many decades was considered one of the main zones of instability on our planet. Howev-

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er, countries of this continent are extremely rich in minerals that other states are in dire need of, and that is why it has become a place of intersection of the interests of EU states and countries with rapidly developing economies – China, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Brazil, etc.

Since the beginning of this century, governments of both Western and rising powers have increasingly come to understand that, firstly, their economic well-being largely depends on overcoming “African instability” that hinders the exploitation of natural resources on the continent; secondly, peaceful cooperation in resolving security issues is more productive than confrontation, and, thirdly, the pooling of material and human resources will help increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and build long-term peace. A result of this understanding has been the expansion of security cooperation between the EU, China and Africa.

The EU was the initiator of interaction between itself and China in Africa, but it was the PRC, being formally a developing country and therefore respecting the interests and sovereignty of the Third World states more than the West, that became the driving force of the transformation of the bilateral format into a trilateral one – “EU – China – Africa”.

The present paper offers an analysis of the nature of interaction between the EU and China in Africa in the field of security.

## **COOPERATION IN BILATERAL FORMATS “EU - AFRICA” AND “CHINA - AFRICA”**

Due to geographical proximity, Africa has not only a rich history of relations with European states, but also common values and interests. The COVID-19 pandemic, climate cataclysms and the migration crisis have shown how interconnected Europe and the Dark Continent are. European politicians perceive many of Africa’s security problems – ranging from the spread of jihadism in the Sahel to uncontrolled migration – as a threat to European stability.

The EU, represented in particular by the former colonial powers (the UK, France, etc.), is Africa’s traditional largest trade, economic and political partner. The key documents defining cooperation between the EU and Africa are the Agenda 2030 (adopted in 2015), Agenda 2063 (2013), and the EU Global Strategy – Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (2016), containing provisions for cooperation in five areas: peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable development; global problems (“The EU and China in Africa,” 2016, p. 11).

In terms of achieving peace, Africa has a difficult relationship with the EU, as for more than two decades the EU has tried to replace the format of direct military intervention in armed conflicts with greater participation in “democracy building”, stressing the link between EU policies on development and on security.

Since 2004, the EU has contributed to African Union (AU) conflict prevention efforts through its African Peace Facility (APF), a fund that provided financing to peacekeeping operations and AU conflict prevention initiatives. Through the APF the EU provided the AU with €2.7 billion for the AU’s conflict prevention efforts. More than 90% of APF funds were spent on funding 16 missions with various AU mandates, from monitoring the ceasefire in South Sudan to fighting Boko Haram in the Lake



Chad Basin. The APF covered the missions' expenses for transport, communications, housing, and medical care, but did not pay for soldiers' salaries, weapons, ammunition, or training. The APF was a stable and relatively predictable source of funding, but in 2021 it was replaced by a new entity, the European Peace Facility (EPF) with a budget of €5 billion for the period from 2021 to 2027, roughly twice what the APF spent between 2004 and 2019. Under the EPF statute, the EU is now able to directly fund African military coalitions and national armies, which had previously been either difficult or impossible due to legal restrictions placed on the APF. The changes in funding arrangements are primarily motivated by Brussels' desire to play a more active role in global politics. In addition, the EU experience in funding peacekeeping missions such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force has shown the need for greater flexibility in the selection of beneficiaries. For instance, it took months for funds allocated to the MNJTF to reach the mission as the money had to go through the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, and this hindered the effectiveness of the operation. Despite the allocation of €55 million to the MNJTF over the 5-year period, starting from the beginning of 2016, there were difficulties with procurement, which the EU attributed to the slowness of the AU, while the AU blamed the bureaucracy in Brussels. As a result, at the beginning of the deployment, in 2015, the MNJTF was left without funds and lacked ammunition, medicines and food ("How to Spend It," 2021). Since 2021, EPF has begun to provide support to the MNJTF bypassing the AU, which not only has sped up the financing process, but also prevented funds from sinking into the pockets of intermediaries.

However, the new approach also has a serious drawback: it could weaken the AU's role in maintaining peace on the continent. In addition, since a significant part of the funds will now bypass the AU, potential beneficiaries outside the control of Addis Ababa may well become tough rivals in the struggle for financial resources.

Meanwhile, when an EU Commission delegation arrived at the AU Convention Center in Addis Ababa in February 2020 to reset their relationship with Africa, the delegates found themselves in a building funded by the People's Republic of China. Indeed, China is an important factor in the EU's Africa policy, and increasingly in the field of security. Recently, EU politicians have faced a new reality – the expansion of the participation of China and Russia in ensuring security in Africa against the backdrop of the withdrawal of a significant part of American troops from the continent. Undoubtedly, African political elites have an interest in ensuring that the continent does not become a battlefield between major powers. But when the EU obstructs their freedom of action by demanding that "democratic" principles and human rights be respected even in times of instability, African states try to use China as leverage to encourage the EU to cooperate in the field of development (Duggan & Hastrup, 2020).

Security issues were at the heart of the EU-Africa Summit held in Brussels on 17–18 February 2022. The focus was primarily on redefining defense efforts, as of the 18 missions and operations deployed by the EU around the world, 11 are in Africa, but the security situation on the continent is becoming increasingly fragile (Brzozowski, 2022).

In turn, China's cooperation with African countries, until recently characterized as "decisive non-interference in the internal affairs of partner countries while maintaining the economic interests of China" (Stahl, 2018; Bartel, 2017), is experiencing a grad-

ual shift towards Beijing's greater involvement in security and peacebuilding issues on the African continent. While the agreements signed by China with African countries remain predominantly economic, the growing dependence of China's success in implementing its trade and economic interests on the vicissitudes of African and, in general, world politics encourages Beijing to step up its activities on a global scale.

In fairness, it should be recalled that China's involvement in the affairs of the Dark Continent has a long history: during the years of the anti-colonial struggle in Africa, China helped many national liberation movements (see, for example: Denisova, 2018; Denisova & Kostelyanets, 2020). However, the modern expansion of the PRC in Africa is largely due to the changing perception of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of its interests at the global level. The shift from the ideological politics of the Maoist era to the development strategy formulated by Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) led to an evolution of Beijing's Africa strategy towards mutually beneficial cooperation. This approach was reinforced by the introduction in 1998 of the "openness" policy, under which, inter alia, public resources were used to invest in key sectors of the African economy and to gradually move hundreds of thousands of Chinese labor migrants to Africa. To date, their number has exceeded 1 million ("Europe, China and Africa," 2016, p. 79).

China's current intense interaction with African countries has been provoked by Beijing's search for the resources needed for its booming economy and for markets for its goods. The expansion of predominantly bilateral economic ties began with the provision by China of multimillion-dollar concessional loans to African countries rich in minerals and energy resources for the implementation of infrastructure projects, as well as for the development of trade and agriculture. The loans were followed by public and private investments in oil production, mining of metals and minerals, etc. While Western investors have avoided investing in the economies of countries experiencing political instability, China has readily seized the opportunity to gain access to resources and markets. Currently, more than 10,000 Chinese firms operate in Africa, and the volume of China's investment in the continent's economy reaches \$300 billion ("What China Is Really Up To," 2019).

However, despite the large-scale provision of assistance to African countries, China has faced a number of threats to its presence on the continent: image risks due to close ties with political regimes whose leaders had a reputation in the eyes of the Western community as rigidly authoritarian and incapable of proper governance (among them, for example, were former presidents of Sudan – Omar al Bashir (1993–2019) – and of Zimbabwe – Robert Mugabe (1987–2017)); business risks arising from political instability; risks faced by Chinese citizens working on the continent in an insecure environment.

The need to protect its economic interests prompted China to increasingly closely cooperate with the AU in ensuring security, both through participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations and through the organization of military-technical training for African peacekeepers. This direction of Chinese foreign policy received an impetus after the adoption in 2012 of the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, which provided for the inclusion of security issues in the activities of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) that had been established in 2000. (Since then 6 ministerial conferences and 8 meetings of the FOCAC have been held, the last one took place in November 2021). True, linking the declared commitment to

ensuring security with the practical participation of China in peacekeeping remains problematic due to Beijing's ambiguous attitude towards some norms adopted by the AU as part of the concept of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

At the 6th FOCAC Ministerial Conference in December 2015, China and Africa committed themselves to implementing the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, according to which the parties began to develop a collective security mechanism and jointly address non-traditional (for example, anti-piracy) security issues. As part of the partnership, in 2016 China provided AMISOM with \$1.2 million worth of equipment and materials – primarily for use in the fight against the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab. In the late 2010s, China began to actively cooperate with the AU in establishing a conflict early warning system, which contributes to more effective protection of Chinese citizens in Africa, and allocated \$60 million in military assistance to the AU (Alden et al., 2018, p. 53).

The PRC is also interested in the arms trade, the volume of which has been increasing due, for example, to the fact that Beijing has occupied a dominant position in the training of military pilots from Tanzania, the Republic of the Congo and South Africa. Particularly close military cooperation has been established between China and Sudan, South Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe.

In the case of Zimbabwe, the peculiarities of the Chinese military presence were particularly visible: here Beijing cooperated with the regime of Robert Mugabe in protecting its own and local commercial interests. The expulsion of Zimbabwe from the British Commonwealth in 2002 and Western sanctions against the odious Mugabe regime prompted the Zimbabwean government to turn to Beijing for economic assistance. The Zimbabwean military, which previously had been firmly oriented towards the UK, did the same. With the help of China, which provided \$98 million, Zimbabwe completed the construction of the National Defense College in 2012; Beijing later provided \$4.2 million in grants for other military projects. Currently, China is the leading supplier of weapons to Zimbabwe, having supplied 139 military transport aircraft, 24 combat aircraft, ground-based radar systems to this country, not counting small arms, ammunition and equipment (Alden et al., 2018, p. 58).

## **CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS**

In addition to the need to protect own economic interests and Chinese citizens, there are other reasons for China's increasing involvement in solving problems of peace and security in Africa. Since many issues discussed in the late 2010s at meetings of the UN Security Council (UNSC) concerned Africa, China, as a permanent member of the UNSC, could not regularly abstain without being criticized either by the West or by Africa. As a result, China's policy has evolved from non-interventionism to supporting UNSC resolutions establishing peacekeeping missions, and then to direct participation in UN missions in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan, although China's peacekeeping activities were initially limited to non-combat functions – provision of technical staff, doctors, engineers and materiel. The situation changed in 2013, when Beijing sent 395 elite military personnel to participate in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); the number of Chinese personnel increased to 403 by 2019 ("MINUSMA," 2019).

In 2015, China sent a 700-strong infantry contingent to conflict-ridden South Sudan to participate in a UN peacekeeping mission. The belief that great power status, the pursuit of which has intensified since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, requires a revision of foreign policy has become widespread in Chinese society. The PRC has increased its material contribution to UN peacekeeping missions 20-fold since 2000 by providing military, technical and medical personnel for missions in Burundi, the DRC, Western Sahara, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mozambique, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Ethiopia and South Sudan. The number of Chinese peacekeepers in Africa reached approximately 3,000 by the end of the 2010s (Alden et al., 2018, p. 55).

In the 2000s – 2010s, China took consistent steps to build up its peacekeeping capability and further integrate its armed and police forces into the multinational peacekeeping system. In 2001, the Peacekeeping Office was established in the Ministry of National Defense of China. Since its first participation in UN peacekeeping operations, China has provided a total (not only for Africa) of more than 30,000 peacekeepers for 29 peacekeeping missions. China sends the largest number of military personnel for engineering, transport and medical assistance among all 115 supplier countries. The growing involvement of Beijing in ensuring international security has reached a new level due to the policy of Xi Jinping, who intends to promote “great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (Alden et al., 2018, p. 51). On 28 September 2015, the Chinese leader surprised the UN General Assembly participants with a promise to create a permanent Chinese peacekeeping force of 8,000 soldiers and officers and provide the AU with \$100 million worth of military assistance to create an African reserve force (Lahtinen, 2018, p. 28).

The growth in the number of Chinese companies and Chinese workers in Africa has exacerbated the security problem and prompted the PRC leadership to move closer to solving this issue in partnership with Western and local partners who had sufficient capabilities and experience in solving it. The death of Chinese peacekeepers in Mali and South Sudan and the kidnapping of Chinese workers in Cameroon also encouraged China to follow this path (Lahtinen, 2018, p. 27). African countries and the EU began to be perceived by China as allies in conducting military operations, providing humanitarian aid and assistance in cases of natural disasters. The restructuring of China's armed forces and a rapid military build-up had previously allowed Beijing to provide security in the “near seas” and create footholds for Chinese naval and air forces away from home. It should be noted, however, that the implementation of some Chinese economic projects may fuel conflicts and exacerbate disputes over access to natural resources – minerals, water, land, etc. – between local communities and between them and foreign, including Chinese, companies involved in corruption and environmental degradation.

One of the factors that pushed China to become more actively involved in peacekeeping was the growth of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, through which Chinese ships reach the African continent. In 2008, China became part of a multinational naval task force off the coast of Somalia, and the regional focus of China's maritime strategy on East and Southeast Asia was superseded by a “far-distance maritime defense” strategy. Dependence on access to natural resources and the need to expand foreign trade have predetermined the growing need to ensure the safety of sea routes on a global scale, which has become especially important in connection with the launch of the One Belt, One Road project, the idea of which was formulated in 2013.

China's participation in late 2008 and in 2009 in a multilateral anti-piracy naval operation in the Gulf of Aden provides insight into the evolution of its defense strategy. A special naval group was sent to the coast of Africa, consisting of three ships of the Chinese Navy, which performed the functions of escorting commercial ships. At first they cooperated with the Russian Navy, but then they participated in anti-piracy exercises with NATO and EU navies. Since December 2008, Chinese ships have carried out about 900 operations to escort more than 6.5 thousand ships, half of which were foreign, and rescued more than 60 ("Chinese navy," 2018).

Due to the lack of agreements with coastal states in the region, ships of the Chinese Navy could not dock for refueling and crew rest. This was one of the main motives for the establishment of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Naval Support Base in Djibouti, which began operating in 2017 and is located at a strategically important point in the Horn of Africa between the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. The base is adjacent to the port of Doraleh, which is owned and operated by China Merchants Holding; its area is 0.5 sq. km, it has the capacity to repair ships and helicopters; about 2,000 servicemen are stationed at the base (Kostelyanets & Okeke, 2018, p. 188-189).

The establishment of Chinese bases in other parts of Africa is also possible, for example, on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, where pirate activities do not stop and where China has extensive economic interests. At the same time, illegal fishing by the Chinese off the coast of West Africa, to a certain extent, contributes to the spread of piracy in the region (Bund & Makocki, 2016).

Beijing's growing role as a major security player in Africa is certainly linked to its mercantilist policy of protecting its economic assets on the continent. However, China's desire to form for itself an image of a great power acting in the interests of the entire world community can be seen as another factor in expanding China's participation in international peacekeeping. In addition, as China's 2019 White Paper on Defense points out, ensuring international security corresponds to China's national interest ("China's growing role," 2019, p. 7).

## **THE NATURE OF THE EU-CHINA INTERACTION IN AFRICA**

The rapid expansion of China's presence in Africa and its constant efforts to modernize the national army began to noticeably disturb the West. The EU was faced with the question: should it try to oust the PRC from Africa or, on the contrary, involve it in resolving security issues on the continent? The second decision was taken, and in response to the growing Chinese expansion, the EU formed a foreign policy strategy aimed at deepening cooperation with China in solving problems of the African continent. Correspondingly, EU policymakers in the mid-2000s initiated concrete interaction between the two sides. A special structure – the EU-China Strategic Partnership – was created. Beijing came under pressure from the West, which called on the Chinese leadership to play a more active role in ensuring peace and security. As a result, the PRC was forced to adjust its policy of non-interventionism and its international status underwent a noticeable transformation. What is particularly noteworthy is China's growing interest in international peace and security mediation. For example, in 2007 Beijing was able to persuade Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to allow EU and AU peacekeeping forces to deploy in the conflict-ridden Sudanese region of Darfur (Kostelyanets, 2014).

The participation of Western countries in peacekeeping operations has declined significantly since the mid-1990s, especially on the African continent. The immediate result was a shortage of military personnel, resources, equipment and aircraft, especially transport helicopters, which markedly reduced the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Against this background, the growing participation in peacekeeping of developing countries – China, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, etc. – has become increasingly important.

In 2008, the European Commission presented its first communication on trilateral cooperation between the EU, China and Africa. However, even a decade and a half later, despite the rapidly expanding commercial and military presence of China in Africa, tangible results of trilateral cooperation on the continent are still not visible, although the importance of economic development and maintaining stability in Africa has increased for both the EU and China.

The effectiveness of interaction between China, the EU and Africa in various fields is largely due to the ability of the parties to adapt to each other's values and interests. Since Africa's dependence on foreign partners in the field of security is obvious, since it is Western governments that mainly finance the needs of peacekeeping missions, the problem of adaptation primarily concerns China and Europe, in whose African policies there are points of both convergence and noticeable divergence. For instance, both the PRC and the EU are striving, at least in their statements, to reduce poverty, to create new jobs, to accelerate the socio-economic development of Africa, to establish peace, security and stability, to promote regional integration, etc. However, discrepancies exist primarily due to differences in approaches to achieving these goals. While the EU conditions its assistance to Africa, including military assistance, on democratization, the protection of human rights, and the establishment of proper governance, China does not set any conditions in its relations with the countries of the continent. The principle of non-interventionism was indeed attractive to Africans and therefore turned into an effective component of China's soft power. In addition, China's relations with Africa can be defined as South-South cooperation.

Meanwhile, the AU has long been considered a "natural" partner of the EU due to the similarity of their administrative structures. However, just as Africa has not reached agreement on many issues among the AU member countries, which are inclined to prioritize national interests, so the EU countries have different positions on the development of the Dark Continent. In addition, Paris, for example, has such a strong influence in French-speaking West and Central Africa that it is not only difficult for China, but also for other European states to operate in these territories. Therefore, it is not surprising that China continues to prefer bilateral relations with member countries of the European Union and the African Union to those with the EU and the AU as a whole, despite the global trend toward regional integration.

The United Kingdom continues to pursue an African policy independent of the EU and adheres to its own approach to maintaining peace, seeking to promote security through funding and training programs for the military. Nevertheless, despite the fundamental and practical differences, London and Beijing have been cooperating on security issues for many years. At the government level, the UK has provided technical and language training for Chinese peacekeepers and police officers at the Chinese Langfang Training Centre. The British non-governmental organization Saf-

erworld and the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, a key center for China's foreign policy, also cooperate closely ("The EU and China in Africa," 2016, p. 23).

While Europe and the West in general pay lip service to the trilateral cooperation between Africa, China and Europe in Africa, forcedly adhering to the principle "if you can't defeat it, join it", in reality they have launched a large-scale media campaign against the Chinese presence on the continent. However, the so-called "tripartite dialogue" established by the European Commission loses its significance against the backdrop of the anti-Chinese agenda of the West, which increasingly qualifies China's presence in Africa as a "new form of colonization" (Bodomo, 2019, p. 117). This is partly facilitated by Beijing's demand from the governments of African countries to behave loyally in the international arena and recognize "one China". The latter in 2022 acquired particular importance due to the aggravation of the military-political situation around Taiwan.

## CONCLUSION

The trilateral cooperation between Africa, China and the EU represents a unique opportunity for the development of Africa as long as interests of all parties are taken into account. At the same time, EU assistance to Africa is mainly aimed at supporting healthcare programs, democratization efforts, cooperation in the fight against terrorism, etc. In turn, China does not impose ideological demands on African countries, and this makes it an attractive donor and partner.

The EU and China have committed themselves to promoting peace and security in Africa and have agreed on potential areas of cooperation that include joint efforts to combat organized crime and counter terrorism. However, despite numerous joint statements, interaction at a practical level remains limited and mainly focuses on maritime security. For instance, since 2011, Chinese naval ships have been accompanying deliveries of humanitarian aid from Europe to Somalia. The exchange of information and coordination between China and the EU is carried out within the framework of the joint initiative to combat piracy – Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE).

Meanwhile, the lack of a clear Africa security policy in both China and the EU hinders the development of mutual understanding and trust needed to build an effective partnership. China's foreign policy formulation and implementation lacks the transparency needed to make its intentions clear to EU leaders. As for the EU, constant tensions among its members on security and defense issues hinder the coherence of its actions (Maher, 2016, p. 966).

So far, the partnership between the EU and China is not sufficiently developed and is being implemented not so much in the format of "the EU – China", but "EU member states – China". China prefers partnerships with individual countries in part because the EU is not a strong peacemaker in Africa. However, as the EU, China and the AU expand their international influence, they begin to make an increasing contribution to the creation of a new multipolar world and the growth of the global economy. In addition, as China expands its presence in Africa and continues to follow a pragmatic approach in foreign policy, practical cooperation between China, the EU and Africa will certainly expand.

The development of trilateral cooperation is hampered by conceptual differences between the EU and China on the protection of human rights and sovereignty, as well as the growing level of competition in the struggle for access to natural re-

sources. Therefore, cooperation between the EU and China in the field of security in Africa remains at the level of aspirations and planning with little tangible results.

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# WESTERN BALKANS AND EU ENLARGEMENT - NEW SECURITY TRENDS

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**Abstract:** The subject of this thesis is the current situation in the process of the western Balkan countries joining the European Union, an undertaking made more complicated by the recent conflict in the Ukraine. Comparative analysis, content analysis, inductive and deductive techniques and case studies are among the methods used in the approach to this topic. Multi-criteria analysis has been conducted on the changed decade-long practice of the process of admission of candidate countries to the EU, the granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova by an accelerated procedure and the relation of these changing conditions to the countries of the Western Balkans. In the matrix of changed conditions for privileged countries, the emergence of new security tendencies is becoming evident. The position of the Western Balkan countries is analyzed in relation to these new developments, with the emphasis on almost impossible mission of fulfilling the conditions that are set before them. The paper is additionally interspersed with the presentation of various researches that have obtained results about this security problem. At the end, concluding thoughts, suggestions, recommendations, as well as a forecast of the development of the problem in the future are given.

The goal of this scientific paper is to point out the numerous obstacles that the countries of the Western Balkans need to overcome in the accession process, as well as to bring to light that the stated intention of joining and candidate status often result in additional pressures and constantly emerging new conditions given by the EU, which for the countries of the Western Balkans produce a path without a certain end.

**Keywords:** *EU, The Western Balkans, security tendencies, integration*

## INTRODUCTION

The countries of the Western Balkans represent a group of countries that more than two decades ago the open possibility of membership in the European Union. All the time, these countries are going through processes various forms of transition and gradual fulfillment of conditions on the way to the European Union. And besides despite all efforts, the road is neither easy nor without setbacks. The causes of such a condition are numerous, partly as the consequence of the internal policies of the candidate countries, and they were helped to a significant extent non-existent policy of the European Union and its member states towards this region.

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Declaratively, the accession process supports democratic reforms in candidate countries and potential candidates for membership, but because of their unwillingness to be in the midst of an internal crisis deals with the process of fundamental reforms in the candidate states, the European Union shifts the center of gravity to the most important issue for her, which is the stability of the region. At the moment, there is no indication that everything member states have a unique view of the speed and desirability of further expansion of the Union, which especially related to the region of the Western Balkans.

Today, the EU is facing numerous internal crises, so there are circumstances in which it is necessary to expands, compared to previous expansions, burdened with numerous problems. Nominally, the Copenhagen criteria are formal criteria for membership that should be met by each a country that intends to become a member of the European Union. They are defined as political, economic and administrative/institutional: 1) stable institutions that are guaranteed democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect and protection of minorities; 2) functional market economy capable of dealing with competition and market pressures in the European to the Union and 3) the ability to assume the obligations arising from membership, including commitment the goals of the political, economic and monetary union.

In practice, in relation to the aforementioned Copenhagen ones, before the countries that want to join Union, far more complex requirements have been set, the number of chapters and reference points is greater, a balance clause was introduced and constant changes to the criteria are made. The process is additional burdened by a multi-year moratorium on expansion and the marginalization of this issue on agenda of the EU, the Union's less focus on the Western Balkans, all while declining support for further enlargement and growing Euroscepticism in member states. The process accession to the EU in the countries of the Western Balkans is at the same time threatened due to the modest economic growth and increasingly pronounced poverty, as well as institutional inefficiency in the implementation of European standards and values, accompanied by a decline in support for joining the EU and accession-related reforms. How to stimulate the processes of European integration and exit end with influences that undermine these efforts in these circumstances, the question is which country The Western Balkans must inevitably be resolved.

The enlargement procedure itself is structured in such a way that it complicates the countries' faster progress in the process approaching the Union. How the states declare about the progress of the candidate country for membership members unanimously, any further step of that progress is subject to blocking by any of those country. Member states often try to resolve bilateral tensions through conditionality its benefit. This behavior of the existing member states of the Union is particularly favorable changed approach to accession negotiations with current candidate states that it implies that the political chapters (for example, chapters 23 and 24 for Montenegro, and for Serbia in addition to these two and chapter 35) are opened first and closed last. This way, the space for arbitrary behavior of the member states of the European Union is large considering fragmentation of the process of accession (and joining) and thus numerous opportunities for conditioning. The European Union today is not the same community it was thirty or more years ago. The number and diversity of members has increased drastically, and at the same time, the scope of the European Union's activities has also increased union dramatically expanded. Discus-

sions about the justification and sustainability of the sequel are getting louder integration according to the previous model of mandatory involvement of all member states in all areas actions of the EU. More specifically, EU officials in contacts with candidate countries talk about support for accession, but in the institutions of the Union they do not make decisions that would undoubtedly support it. In this way, the enlargement process is there, but for the candidate countries it is practically difficult to achieve.

Additionally, the granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova by accelerated procedure, amended is a radical decade-long practice of the process of admission of candidate countries to the EU, which is directly reflects changes in conditions in relation to the countries of the Western Balkans.

On the matrix of changed conditions for privileged countries, new security ones are on the scene tendencies, the position of the countries of the Western Balkans is changing, and in that context it is being promoted an almost impossible mission to fulfill the conditions that are set before them.

### **ENLARGMENT POLICY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF KEY ACTORS- CROSS-SECTION OF THE SITUATION**

It can be concluded that the previous expansion processes were simpler, shorter and with far fewer conditions, and thus the possibility of blocking candidate countries from member countries.

The leaders of the EU and the Western Balkans have repeatedly discussed the future membership of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia. The member states of the European Union have adopted a declaration by which confirm “unanimous support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans”, as well as support “enlargement process”, based on “credible reforms of partners”.

During its six decades of existence, the European Union (that is, the former European Community) were at a crossroads many times, but it has never before been the target of so many at the same time crisis (financial, euro crisis, migrant, Brexit, identity crisis, war in Ukraine, energy crisis) that strongly threaten its foundations. Member States are considering different scenarios future appearance of the European Union, but what is important for the countries of the Western Balkans is where is the question of enlargement in the transformed European Union. Although they come from Brussels assurances that the expansion will not be abandoned, it is obvious that this issue is not currently there on the list of priorities of the Union. Not only because of the many current challenges with which The Union is facing, its determination to consider expansion to the Western Balkans is already on infusion this decline in interest leads to a decline in interest among the countries of the mentioned region are in the process of accession. This further leads to the growth of Euroscepticism in the regionThe Western Balkans has fertile soil.

What about the current problems of functioning of the supranational political framework of the European Union in relation to the enlargement process, the key actors, the European Union, the most important member states, non-members and new political authorities. Achievements so far in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration of the region, and according to the view of the member states, are modest, which

leaves room for new ones conditions, demands, and even pressures towards the candidate states. At the same time, there are real dangers (Kosovo and Metohija, dysfunctional BiH, slow transfer of power in Montenegro, the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis...) that can shake security support for stability Western Balkans. Although the Berlin process revived regional cooperation and confirmed the role of the EU as an international actor who takes care of the security of the immediate environment, short-sightedness of individual national governments of the Union member states has been sending conflicting ones over the last years messages and undermined the confidence of the citizens of the Western Balkans in the realism of the perspective joining the united part of Europe.

European Union. The European Union is a unique actor in the region of the Western Balkans, where since at the beginning of the nineties of the last century applied a wide range of foreign policy instruments: diplomatic and trade measures, financial aid, civil and military missions, as well as enlargement policy, which is its most successful foreign policy tool. It is an undeniable success which the enlargement policy of the European Union had by influencing the transition process of the countries Central and Eastern Europe.

The great crisis of the European Union is more than a decade-long process conditioned exclusively by internal factors reasons. The main driver of the crisis is the difference between the high goals of integration projects and inadequate institutional, legal and political capabilities to achieve these goals (Samardic, 2018). In practice, this difference is expressed in the dysfunctionality of newer integration systems covers (monetary union, common foreign and security policy, judicial and police cooperation) which, as a rule, leads to the dysfunctionality of many areas of the previously achieved degree of integration. Today, the officials of the Union almost uniformly say that the expansion will take place continue after the reform of the Union itself. It is about an unknown long period. Meanwhile, the basic function, and even the content, of the enlargement policy has changed. It doesn't exist purpose is to extend the integration process of the Union to other European countries, because that process itself is uncertain, but to ensure that they remain in the new security and geopolitical constellation a country in the sphere of Western influence and domination. It remains open for candidate countries, otherwise politically unasked, the question: why not revise the process of stabilization and association which should prepare the country for full membership, in the direction of better general adaptation to changed circumstances.

The process of accession, it turned out, contains numerous shortcomings, the root of which lies in itself in the structure of the enlargement policy, as well as in the nature of mutual relations between the European Union and its own member states, on the one hand, and candidate countries for membership, on the other (Radic Milosavljevic, 2017). The process of stabilization and association was created for the countries of the Western Balkans two years ago decade, from the beginning it left room for the European Union to unilaterally, in its own way discretion and needs, defines the conditions for admission. The Union did it most often under the leadership geopolitical and security interests instead of objective criteria derived from of certain policy sectors. This relationship between the Union and its member states, together with weak developed democratic political culture and statehood experience on the part of the countries candidate, led to the unprecedented interference of the

Union in internal political and constitutional issues candidate countries. Obvious arbitrariness in the policy of conditioning, too ambitiously conceived the idea of stabilization and democratic consolidation, the tutelary and hegemonic relationship of the Union towards candidate countries, as well as the now clear prolongation of the process, led to a loss his credibility and fatigue on both sides.

The new EU enlargement strategy of 2018 defined the rule of law issues and civil liberties, infrastructural connection, digitalization, strengthening the common security in relation to the issue of mass refugee waves, the COVID 19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, sanctions against Russia, as dominant in the field of fulfilling formal conditions for the continuation of negotiations and accession to the Union. In official announcements from numerous meetings of the EU - Western Balkans; the word “expansion” is missing more and more often. In this way, the process enlargement becomes more politically uncertain, and the Western Balkans is increasingly defined as a space security concerns, not an area that is desirable and useful to integrate into the EU. Thus the EU reinforces the negative perspective of this space to remain a periphery, a waiting room, an outpost, and the geopolitical game field of large and powerful actors (powers).

Great Britain and the Western Balkans. With the exit from the European Union, Great Britain is in to the process of reconstructing its foreign policy, which until now relied on three pillars of “satellite relations” with the United States of America, the prevailing influence on the countries Commonwealth, and membership in the European Union. Leaving the EU raises the question: what will it be like the new British approach not only to the European Union, but also to Europe as a whole. Britain is right after referendum on Brexit began to emphasize that the terms Europe and the EU are not synonymous, and that she wants to lead a policy of presence in Europe, but not as a member of the EU. This constructs a new region: “Europe outside the EU”, in which the British foreign and security policy sees a possible field of its own intensive action in the immediate future. Given the continued hesitation of the EU to fully integrate the Western Balkans into the Union, British foreign policy has room to appear in the Western Balkans as an external power. By changing the nature of the relationship between London and Brussels, it is possible that the emphasis on slightly different priorities in the process will also change of these integrations.

USA and the Western Balkans. Transatlantic relations are in the process of deep reconfiguration, they are fundamentally changing, but their complete collapse is not to be expected. This process is reflects the position of Southeastern Europe as a whole, and the Western Balkans in particular its politically very unstable part. On the one hand, adopting a new (big) strategy which would significantly limit action in regions that are not of key security importance priorities (eg the Western Balkans) could mean that the United States of America they leave this space to the security coverage of the European Union and its most powerful members, who, faced with their own internal problems, would then with more or less the success of the competition for influence with other regional and global actors such as Russia, Turkey or China. The fact that US President Joseph Biden is talking to the president Ursula von der Leyen of the European Commission expressed strong support for the continuation of the process accession of the countries of the Western Balkans to the European Union, confirms that the USA will continue to be present in the Western Balkans.

France and the Western Balkans. French President Emmanuel Macron called for to the countries of the Western Balkans to have a clear perspective of accession to the European Union, advocating for “a strong and independent Europe” and the new security order “Europe with NATO in relation to Russia. “We must no longer move away from the Western Balkans.” They need to get a clear one from us the prospect of joining the Union within a reasonable time,” Macron said in a speech in the European Parliament, Parliament in Strasbourg. However, he stressed that Europe in the current conditions is not what it is which can receive new members, stressing that changes in the Union are necessary that would make it possible “faster, clearer and more efficient decisions”.

Russia and the Western Balkans. Russia, with its foreign policy, is trying to secure strengthening the country’s position as one of the three most influential actors in contemporary international affairs relations in the changed geopolitical picture of the world, with the USA and China. The basic proclaimed goal Russia’s promotion of trade and economic interests and protection of national security. Russia and in the Western Balkans, it works on the economic cooperation level, but also on the military-technical level cooperation. The most favorable outcome for Russia would be the creation of a group of militarily neutral countries the Balkans, namely the former Yugoslav republics with Serbia in first place. To Europe The Union is seen as part of the global market, with little possibility of self-initiative solves geopolitical problems, for which it relies on the strength of the NATO military alliance and having in see the still uncertain European future of the countries of the Western Balkans, Russia would hereby was a consolidated position in the southeast of Europe. Russia sees Serbia as a country with state-building tradition and integration potential, and which would be cultural and historical closeness, support in public opinion, the unresolved issue of Kosovo and Metohija and uncertainty the European future was a relatively solid stronghold. For Russia, the Balkans are still a zone of geostrategic, political and economic, i.e. national interest. In a more significant case changes in global relations and the eventual collapse of the European Union, Russia would could intensify activities in the Balkans by encouraging the issue of Serbian unification national space.

Turkey and the Western Balkans. Current Turkish foreign policy pays a lot of attention to space Western Balkans. For Turkey, increased influence in this region is a support for stronger rooting its presence in Europe. Turkey’s Balkan activities are aimed at countries with a predominantly Muslim population and countries where a significant number of people live the minority belonging to this religion (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia and Serbia). At the same time, as a key support for the revitalization of Turkish power in these areas, Bosnians and Albanians apostrophize as guardians of Ottoman heritage.

China and the Western Balkans. The region of the Balkans throughout its turbulent history attracts attention global forces. The traditionally interested powers are strengthening their political and economic the People’s Republic of China joined the position at the beginning of the 21st century. Due to the increased inflow of Chinese foreign direct investments in Europe, the European Commission insisted that all tender procedures are carried out transparently and with strict compliance with European regulations union. Seen from this angle, China’s growing role should not pose a threat to integration processes. However, some European leaders expressed

their fear that the presence would China threatens the European Union's efforts to democratize the region.

NATO and the Western Balkans. From the NATO headquarters in Brussels, it is continuously emphasized that the word about the region of strategic importance, and that this organization remains fully committed stability and security of the region by continuing to support Euro-Atlantic aspirations countries outside the Union, especially by preserving and strengthening the presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo and Metohija relations with Serbia. The US intends to respond seriously to the threat of a risk spiral in the certain parts of the region that can be easily confused with the coming anti-Western the influence of Russia, China and Turkey. As the European Union, to all security threats, it responds with a strong reliance on the strength of the NATO military alliance, and the Union's enlargement process itself the countries of the Western Balkans will have the unmistakable seal of NATO's military and political alliance with the dominant role of the USA and the most powerful European countries. While at the beginning of the 21st century USA strive to maintain control over this part of Europe, Russia, China and Turkey appear as new/old rivalries and try to take advantage of numerous unresolved issues of neighborly relations thus with a skillful combination of military-political, economic and cultural instruments for individual countries The Western Balkans offer a strategic foreign policy alternative in the circumstances of the extended period economic crisis and the currently uncertain perspective of European integration.

## **THE COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN BALKANS ON THE ROAD TO THE EU WITHOUT A CERTAIN END**

The European integration of the countries of the Western Balkans is still "on hold". Three are dominant events in the Western Balkans in the focus of EU institutions. These are constant oscillations in the process normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, ending the almost three-decade-long dispute between Macedonia and Greece (ended by the signing of the Prespa Agreement on June 17, 2018). The third event which is the war in Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia which were imposed as a "condition of all conditions". Numerous factors have contributed to the slow Europeanization of the Western Balkan countries: post-conflict societies, weak states characterized by a lack of rule of law, developed organized crime and corruption, illegitimate institutions, weak management capacities, challenging statehood. We will consider how it looks on the example of individual countries candidates and potential candidates.

Serbia and Kosovo. We also link Kosovo to Serbia, because there is no generally accepted position on the status the southern Serbian provinces, as seen by Serbia and some member states of the European Union on one I independent independent states, as seen by the US and most of the member states of the Union, on the other foreign. When it comes to the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, the head of the EU Delegation in Serbia, Emanuel Zofre said that it is important to resolve all open issues, and that Belgrade and Pristina should take advantage opportunity to reach an agreement on the normalization of relations (Žofre, 2022). So, the achievement is mutual an acceptable solution for Kosovo is of key importance for Serbia's EU perspective. Because, EU officials insist on achieving progress in the dialogue.

There are many standing in the way of progress problems, and the most significant ones stand out as the non-implementation of all agreements reached so far party, especially the Brussels Agreement. At the top of the pyramid is the formation of the Community of Serbs municipality, which Serbia insists on, but also mutual recognition, which the temporary ones insist on authorities of Kosovo. Minority rights, freedom of movement, church property, searching for the missing and economic development, complete this list of priorities. World crisis because of Ukrainian-Russian of the conflict additionally complicated Serbia's position on the way to the EU. Serbia voted for the UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion. For that, she received only polite acknowledgments in the form of yes to the Union welcomes this vote, that Serbia remains an important partner of the EU. But, as a candidate country for membership in the EU and a government that prioritizes EU accession, Serbia would have to give its external progressively fully harmonize the policy with the European Union. We want Serbia to be with us us, even in these difficult times, and to comply with EU statements and measures to oppose Russia's obvious aggression, and we welcome all steps in that direction. So, they insist on sanctions against Russia, which is unacceptable for Serbia. Further refusal of Serbia to imposes sanctions on Russia leads to the termination of the negotiation process.

Bosnia and Herzegovina. The event that is currently in focus and on which the EU and the US are working are the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will certainly only confirm the previous negative trends and trends within the country. The reform of the electoral legislation is buried in unrealistic demands ethnic leadership, with no indication that any changes are taking place. That's why the membership perspective will Bosnia and Herzegovina in the European Union will continue to be in the shadow of evident strengthening of influence certain actors, such as the Russian Federation and Turkey. In the latest Report on the progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a number of problems in the functioning of institutions in the country and non-compliance with the law were listed and legal provisions.

Twenty-seven years after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is increasingly an object rather than a subject international relations, primarily thanks to the inconsistencies of the present international ones actors with and without a mandate. As a country that expressed its determination to become a member of the European Union already in the first years after the tragic conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovina for more than two years for decades it has been suffering the consequences of inadequate, ineffective, and often biased action established management structures of the international community (OHR, OSCE, EUFOR, of NATO), which seriously threatens both the integrative processes and the perspective of membership in Union. With the now, albeit unofficially, established international protectorate, that is not the case possible. Essentially, the European Union itself slows down the integrative processes, intensifies them Euroscpticism also damages its credibility and distances Bosnia and Herzegovina from accession.

When it comes to Montenegro, the country that most often qualifies as a leader in to the process of integration of the Western Balkans, along with the deep polarization of society, all the above problems are expressed (Weber, 2019). In Montenegro, for almost thirty years, the same people were at the same time the bearers of reforms and the main causes of the captivity of the state. The only success that Montenegro can achieve to boast of more than fifteen years of negotiations on full membership



in the EU opening negotiation chapters and meeting the technical prerequisites for integration which at the same time, they do not mean building institutions and strengthening the rule of law.

North Macedonia. North Macedonia was the first country in the region to sign Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001, and in 2009 Skopje officially received positive recommendations for the start of accession negotiations. The European Commission put has placed North Macedonia on the list of the 20 greatest achievements of the EU in recent years. Northern In 12 months, Macedonia completed the reforms in their entirety, thoroughly implemented the agreements with Greece and Bulgaria are still an example of cooperation and friendship in the region. Past years the country has switched to a new negotiation methodology, but is still facing a new one unprincipled problems and bureaucratic positions that become a stumbling block for the prosperity of North Macedonia on the way to membership in the European Union. Today, 20 years later, North Macedonia is still in the waiting room of the European Union.

### **FORECASTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE.**

Two decades after the creation of the new approach of the Union for the countries of Southeast Europe, the Process stabilization and association, the very process that provided the perspective of membership and policies enlargement of the European Union have lost credibility. Apart from the general idea that the space of the West The Balkans should be pacified through the stabilization of the political and security situation within and between them countries that belong here, at the time of creating the process it was not clear what exactly it would give implies. In particular, there were political conditions, such as, for example, demands for by returning refugees, in full cooperation with the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, by respecting international agreements, regional cooperation, normalization relations with Pristina. Policies in the sectors of freedom, security and justice are particularly important for the accession of the countries of the Western Balkans to the EU due to the image of the region as a source of instability. From the very beginning, the relationship between the European Union and the countries of the Western Balkans was established as the superior-subordinate relationship instead of the relationship between equal partners. Described maintaining the candidate countries in a semi-dependent position on the European Union is probably one of the biggest negative consequences of the process of association, that is, accession.

The very process of association, that is, accession, therefore, contains numerous shortcomings. Their own the root lies both in the structure of the enlargement policy itself and in the nature of mutual relations The European Union and its member states, on the one hand, and the candidate countries for membership, on the other sides. The reason for this lies in the pronounced dominance of the European Union, which is in a position to at its own discretion, establish or terminate this relationship with arbitrary creation and modification conditions and rules. So, the problem in the relations between the European Union and the associated countries, that is non-member states that are in contractual relations with the Union, lies in their

undemocratic nature of this relationship while significantly limiting autonomy and exerting influence on the constitutional order States.

When it comes to the countries of the Western Balkans, this problem is at its peak. Apart from regulations of community law that are subject to harmonization in the associated states, for countries a number of different, often unacceptable conditions were produced in the Western Balkans. The process of Stabilization and Association created for the countries of the Western Balkans two decades ago, from from the beginning, he left room for the European Union to unilaterally, at its own discretion and needs, defines the conditions for joining and admission. Obvious arbitrariness in politics conditions, an overly ambitious idea of stabilization and democratic transition and consolidation, the tutelary and hegemonic relationship of the Union towards the candidate countries, as it is now but the clear prolongation of the process led to the loss of its credibility and fatigue on both sides (Radic Milosavljevic, 2016).

The attitude, or better to say the slogan, that the European Union has no alternative was used in the domestic to the political space by domestic political leaders, but occasionally also EU representatives, in order to predominantly emphasize the importance of European integration. An alternative to a full-fledged one membership in the European Union and the termination of all relations with it, would lead to the presentation of the candidate state the influence of other global actors, especially Russia and China. Today it is clear that politics conditionality as a key instrument in the European Union's relations with Western countries The Balkans did not produce adequate results. More importantly, because of the way it is structured with the absolute favoring of political stability, with the asymmetric nature of each other relations, together with the objective circumstances in which Europe found itself, began to produce and negative effects in the form of support for undemocratic practices and authoritarian regimes, and so on expansion and accession fatigue (Eriksen & Fossum, 2015). Predictions about a possible date next expansion are not optimistic, but in their attempt to give optimism otherwise obvious stalled enlargement process, the European Commission determined the year 2025 as possible the year of the next accession. Even if the next expansion occurs in the mentioned year, it will be a consequence of the calculation by the member states of the European Union that the costs of enlargement are for the Union smaller than the benefits that would be achieved in that way ("Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 2018).

Just as bad a scenario as early accession would be one in which the enlargement would add up was postponed pending the actual readiness of the candidate for membership. This would mean that the states candidates and potential candidates remain in the status of non-members with the obligation to continue accepting and applying the rules and norms of the European Union without participating in their adoption. On the thus, they would continue a painstaking process with an uncertain and unpredictable end difficulties. This is supported by the examples of numerous exceptions that are current states members of the European Union have made in terms of participation in certain policies of which they are economic and monetary union and the Schengen visa regime, most obviously. Despite all the shortcomings of the process, giving up membership is an unlikely scenario for now.

The Union still manages to convince the countries of the Western Balkans that the "European way" is the only one correct, implying by that full and complete mem-

bership, however, without guarantees in regarding deadlines. There is no doubt that the countries of the Western Balkans have both economic and political interest in participating in certain policies of the European Union, but not the interest to be “forever”. in the waiting room, without any indication of the completion of the accession process.

## CONCLUSION

The countries of the Western Balkans are, each in their own way, on the way to the EU. One European politician is said “either Europe will lend a hand or someone else will do it”, (referring to China, Russia).

EU leaders, with the agreement of leaders from the Western Balkans, adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit are a declaration in which they give unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkans and confirm the commitment to the enlargement process based on “credible reforms of the partners” with an emphasis on the importance of “strengthening the integration and capacity of new members” by itself of the European Union. The European Union has proposed strengthening the security and defense of Western countries of the Balkans in order for the region to strongly join the bloc. This is the moment to “revive the process” EU and that formal negotiations for accession to the bloc begin as soon as possible, said Joseph Borelj (Tanjug, March 14, 2022). Although everyone agreed that the countries of the Western Balkans belong in Europe, the call of some members to give an indicative, if not a fixed, date was not supported countries of the Western Balkans for their accession to the Union.

The new methodology adopted in February 2020 stipulates that no chapter can be closed until the transition criteria are met. The countries of the Western Balkans are opted for a new methodology for accession to the European Union. Possibility of closure perspective of the joint construction of lasting peace in this area, which has been neuralgic for centuries, not a realistic option. For a region affected by the consequences of a decade-long global recession, establishment of strategic influence as an instrument of particularistic foreign policy which ignores the long-term vision of the common future of the countries of the Western Balkans, it may seem attractive, but it is essentially superficial, based on immediate promises and is dangerous substitute for the perspective of a united Europe, no matter how effective it is at the present moment far and uncertain.

The Stabilization and Association process and the enlargement policy in general was until recently perceived as the most successful foreign policy of the European Union, so it is not realistic to expect that the European Union from abandons it or reduces it in any way. Faster exit from long-term and unfavorable of non-member status, for the candidate states it would mean limiting the possibility of arbitrary hegemonic relationship in which they participate as a subordinate party. An approach that would make it possible to candidate countries (and potential candidates) choose the areas in which they would participate in integration, it would increase the degree of their autonomy, which is seriously undermined by the current regime of the process accession. If in this way the possibility of conditioning in political areas, not only would the progress in the technical chapters be unblocked but also made it clear to the candidate states that they are responsible for their own democracy reforms (Radic Milosavljevic, 2017).

In the accession process, the question of differentiated integration in general, and even that one, is mentioned more and more often which would start at the stage of the accession process ([https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white\\_paper\\_on\\_the\\_future\\_of\\_europe\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf)). Such a the integration model would limit a certain number of public policy areas and states in advance they participate (Leruth & Lord, 2015). The most common objections to the idea of differentiated integration in in any of its forms, they refer to the fact that this model of integration is too complex to would work, as well as deepening the differences between member states. It's not good to the methodology for joining the European Union changes when the country is already deep in negotiations, said Tanja Fajon, a member of the European Parliament. According to Fajon (2022), "If the methodology were to change, it would not be good, because the European Union has lost a lot credibility because of it.

With an insight into the diversity, advantages and disadvantages of the model of relations with the European Union<sup>3</sup>, it is possible to open opportunities for accepting the fact that it is with the Union it is possible to build successful and mutually beneficial relationships even without membership as it was until now imagined, that is, through membership in some other form of it. The most important thing is to get out imposed state of non-alternativeness that makes it impossible to make not only penetration into the process of getting closer to the European Union and forming a mutually beneficial and equal one relations, but also to make a step towards the essential consolidation of democracy in this part of the world.

The new geopolitical situation caused by the war in Ukraine may bring perspective, but not accelerated path of the Eastern Partnership country to the European Union. And not even the countries of the Western Balkans they should "due to the situation" expect shortcuts. A new political debate within the European Union expansion is taking place in light of the war in Ukraine and warnings of possible "spill over" Russia's undermining influence on Ukraine's neighbors and the Western Balkans. "The war will increase the pressures to improve the process of joining the Balkans and make these ideas relevant for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, as well as for the six countries of the Western Balkans. In Brussels, they also say that they are aware that the member countries, advocates of joining the Western Balkans, will certainly "use the newly created situation" and seek faster accession of the Western Balkans six. "It can brings new momentum to the reception of the Western Balkans, but the member countries that insist on fulfilling the criteria for joining the EU will continue to do so, regardless of the new geopolitical situation reality", concluded in Brussels. The messages that can be heard from Brussels are that it will not happen enlargement of the European Union for at least the next five years because no country in the Western Balkans has ready for membership.

As a conclusion, it is imposed that the European Union, and especially the member states, do not have harmonized attitudes regarding enlargement. Individually, some of the institutions of the European Union and some of the officials, often emphasize the perspective and commitment to admission, but persistently insist on the list revised and added conditions. The countries of the Western Balkans are committed to accession, but they are deeply buried in the process itself, which receives

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3 Read more in: Gstöhl, S. (2015). Models of external differentiation in the EU's neighbourhood: An expanding economic community?. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 22, No. 6, 2015, pp. 854–870.

new requests from day to day. To everyone their achievements are not seen by giving recognition in the form of shortening the European path, but rather he even extends it. It is persistently requested from Brussels that the candidate states, consistently in every situation follow the European Union, regardless of their individual state interest (eg the request that Serbia impose sanctions on Russia). For now, apart from declarative support, there are no visible indications of the end of the process that will lead to membership, the conditions multiply, the demands are more and more strict, the behavior under often subjected to unfounded criticism. Survival on the road to accession is the ultimate goal for the countries of the Western Balkans, but for now there is no end in sight.

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# CYBERTERRORISM IN AFRICA – EXAGGERATED THREAT OR WORTHY FOE?

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**Abstract:** For many decades, the validity of the concept of cyberterrorism has been questioned. Academics have pondered whether this idea should be regarded as “fact or fancy”. Over time, development, globalization and connectivity have led one to veer towards the thought that this should be fact. However, various challenges are posed: The standalone concept of terrorism is in itself highly contested, and academics have yet to agree on a single definition of the term. Secondly, almost any form of modern threat can in the current age be studied with the added prefix “cyber-”. This raises the question of strategic approaches when combating things like cyberterrorism. The question arises: In how many ways do, and should, these approaches differ from the counterterrorism measures taken against traditional, physical terrorism, and where is a line drawn in the proverbial sand between terrorism, cyberterrorism, crime and cybercrime? In an effort to demarcate the scope and labelling of attacks as cyberterrorism and not necessarily cybercrime, academics have added the element of political motivation and fear to the young and already contested definition of cyberterrorism. This would mean that one of the only aspects differentiating cyberterrorism from terrorism is the use of information technology. This paper questions the validity of the term and threat of cyberterrorism – especially in an African context. With Africa’s limited use and penetration of information technology, the question arises whether this is really a new threat, or simply a natural evolution of the age-old threat of terrorism. Terrorists will always use the latest and best technology and means to their disposal; this research paper aims to understand whether that justifies a completely new concept in African security research.

**Keywords:** *Cyberterrorism; terrorism; African Security; Counterterrorism; cybersecurity*

## INTRODUCTION

When aiming to understand the concept of cyberterrorism and eventually minimize the danger and threat thereof, several aspects of the concept need to be understood. Many years ago, Mark Pollitt wrote on Cyberterrorism and whether it was to be fact or fancy (Pollitt, 1998). Take into consideration the context and timeframe in which Pollitt wrote. In his article, he refers to cyberterrorism as a “combination of two the great fears of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century”. This would refer to the fear of random violent events, and the fear of new technology and more specifically, computer technology. For Pollitt, both of these elements capitalize on the fear of the unknown or something that would happen outside of human control, for Pollitt and his contemporaries technology was to be feared because of its ability to do what used to

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be done by humans – a fear for a loss of control. People believed that technology had the ability to become the master, and humans would be the servant. Luckily for modern research, time is a wise and patient teacher. The politics of fear would still be a relevant method of study when it comes to studying cyberterrorism years after Pollitt's study, but the reasons for fear would be starkly different.

To sufficiently understand cyberterrorism, a certain degree of understanding is needed in terms of terrorism. The concept of terrorism is so disputed and, in some cases, still so ambiguous due to major disagreements on the use of violence for political reasons. Yet, for the purpose of this study, a certain definition, in line with the politics of fear can be used to garner an understanding of terrorism relevant to the context of the research at hand. Because no accepted definition exists, and the legal and academic term "terrorism" is mostly left to the interpretation of states or entities which use the term, the interpretation often changes to the whims of those who use it according to particular interests at particular times (Zeidan, 2004). For the purpose of this study, to minimize ambiguity, a more comprehensive interpretation of AP Schmidt – UN advisor, will be utilized, as it highlights many aspects of terrorism with relevance to the study. The timeframe in which this particular interpretation was published (1983), also provides us with a certain sense of timelessness of the threat of terrorism – be it cyber- or traditional:

*"Terrorism is an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative of symbolic targets) from a target population... Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience[s]), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought."* (Schmidt, 1983)

Within this definition or interpretation of terrorism, a few concepts become clear. Terrorism has always and will most probably always have a definite element of fear and randomness connected to it. This is in line with Pollitt's idea of the fear of the unknown. When studying terrorism, one cannot disregard the victims or targets of terror – whether they are intentional or not. This is also quite relevant to the idea of cyberterrorism – as will be discussed later in this study. Once a general understanding of terrorism and its connection to fear is established, the element of *cyber-*, and eventually cyberterrorism, needs to be introduced, with the similar aim to create an unambiguous foundation upon which this study can be built to assess the validity of the threat and concept of cyberterrorism.

Cyberterrorism and cyber-attacks are often used as umbrella terms to cover a range of activities taking place via the Internet. The prefix "*cyber-*" originates from ancient Greek and roughly translates to the "the art of steering" (Tabansky, 2011). This is in direct contrast with Pollitt's original idea of fear of something which cannot be controlled, as the basic concept of *cyber-* indicates a form of control. The *cyber-* prefix has become a phrase synonymous with modern activities, to distinguish between traditional and technologically driven methods, in this case: traditional forms of physical terrorism or cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism definitions are mostly



based on traditional definitions of terrorism, with the added element of internet technology. According to Victoria Correia attacks can qualify as cyberterrorism if there is a political, social or economic threat to a group, organization or country (Correia, 2022). This definition is supported by other scholars who also suggest that activities leading up to the act, not including physical damage or violence should also be included here (Holt, 2012). Both of these viewpoints include the intent and motivations of terror, albeit cyber- or traditional. As technology should form an inherent part of understanding cyberterrorism and in trying to understand if any type of distinction can and should be made between terrorism and cyberterrorism, a more succinct definition to look at the key characteristics of cyberterrorism is also consulted for the purposes of this study:

*“Cyberterrorism is the premeditated attack or threat thereof by non-state actors with the intent to use cyberspace to cause real-world consequences in order to influence fear or coerce civilian, government, or non-government targets in pursuit of social or ideological objectives. Real-world consequences include physical, psychological, political, economic, ecological, or otherwise that occur outside of cyberspace.”* (Plotnek, 2021).

This definition goes beyond intent and motivation and looks at the perpetrator, motivation, intent, means, effects and the targets or cyberterrorism – much like the elements included in the definition of terrorism as mentioned by Schmidt. Another valuable definition is put forward by Dorothy Denning, professor of computer science - she presented this quite unambiguous definition to the House Armed Services Committee in 2000:

*“Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It refers to unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.”* (Weimann, 2004)

Denning’s definition also considers who cyberterrorism targets, and what would not constitute a cyberterrorist attack. The question that remains is: does the differentiation between terrorism and cyberterrorism constitute an entire concept and topic on its own, or is it merely natural evolution of the terrorism that we have grown to know and fear?

## **THE POLITICS OF FEAR**

The threat of terrorism, and more lately cyberterrorism has grabbed the attention of states and international media houses and the Information Technology (IT) industry. It is a popularized scenario where hackers or computer whizzes would sit in a dark room, behind shining screens and wreak havoc upon the world by typing a few lines of code or pressing a big red button. Most critical infrastructure systems around the world, especially in Western societies are networked through computers, thus the potential threat from cyberterrorism is very alarming. The idea that terrorists could follow hackers’ lead and “break the internet” to disable governments,

disarm armies and launch remote attacks embeds an almost tangible fear in even civilians – never mind state decisionmakers, policymakers and security sectors.

As the internet can easily serve as a multiplier for terrorist operations, it is a well-known fact that terrorist organizations use cyberspace as a form of communication, recruitment, to spread propaganda and to coordinate operations. All of the above-mentioned terrorist-activities do not constitute cyberterrorism, as they are simply operational activities of any terrorist organization, and do not refer to an attack, victims of an attack or the use of IT to attack critical infrastructure, as mentioned in the definitions applicable to this study. To this day, a major cyberterrorism incident, with casualties or injuries has not yet occurred, yet the fear of cyberterrorism is quite real. The United States Institute for Peace even uses the term “Cyberterrorism Angst” and refers to a report, published in 1990, that links American fear to terrorism and computers:

*“Increasingly, America depends on computers... Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb”* (Weimann, 2004)

More recent research supports the fear-inducing aspect of cyberterrorism as well. The Chapman University Survey of American Fears ranked the fear of cyberterrorism as seventh among 88 different fears – higher than terror attacks and terrorism (Onat, 2022). The politics of fear features prominently here as people’s fear of cyberterrorism evolves around people’s consumption of related media content and political rhetoric. Mass media would tend to exaggerate the threat of cyberterrorism due to the newsworthiness and ease with which an audience can relate to the concept of cyberactivity (think back to the analogy of hackers sitting in a dark room, frantically typing code to take over the world). Cybercrimes are more easily related to by the average internet user than traditional forms of terrorism like suicide bombing or radicalized preaching. Here conceptualization once again becomes of paramount importance, as a distinction needs to be made between concepts like “hacktivism” and other cyber activities, and cyberterrorism.

*“Hacktivism,” a term coined by scholars to describe the marriage of hacking with political activism... “Hacking” is here understood to mean activities conducted online and covertly that seek to reveal, manipulate, or otherwise exploit vulnerabilities in computer operating systems and other software. Unlike hacktivists, hackers tend not to have political agendas.* (Weimann, 2004).

There are some additional political factors to take into consideration when looking at the fear of terrorism, and eventually the fear of cyberterrorism. The political nature of terrorism as a crime, and the political nature of cyberterrorism as a crime both have a distinct influence of ideology and in most cases religion. Understanding of political viewpoints and ideologies is critical when analyzing people’s understanding of national security, personal security – or the potential lack thereof. Here a paradigm shift needs to happen where political factors specific to political and individual contexts are taken into consideration. For the purpose of this study, the African viewpoint becomes important. National security, personal security and especially cybersecurity are concepts that are interpreted and understood differently in Africa than in Western parts of the world. Although the *cyber-* prefix is frequently used as a fear-inducing catch-all phrase, the validity of this phrase in Africa should be examined and questioned.

The conjunction of technology – possibly a frightful machine or phenomenon, with terrorism – definitely a frightful phenomenon – guarantees for a fear-inducing weapon to be wielded by those with enough skill and resources to be able to do so effectively. The next question would be, does African terrorist organizations have these skills, and can the *cyber-* prefix be used so freely on the African continent?

## **CYBERTERRORISM IN AFRICA**

Since the 1990's and the end of the Cold War Africa has experienced a strong upward trend in ICT capabilities and technological advancement. Due to availability of markets in terms of a young population, many global investors saw Africa as an investment destination (David, 2020). This has led Africa to undergo a telecommunication revolution for the development of mobile communications within the public and private sectors. According to the International Telecommunication Union database, total mobile penetration has more than doubled in Africa since 2000. Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, DRC and Cote d'Ivoire have more mobile connections than fixed telephone lines (David, 2020). Yet, as digitalization on the continent increases, one would imagine so too does the potential for attacks by cybercriminals, and of course, cyberterrorists.

Before the concept of cyberterrorism in Africa can be directly addressed, I would first like to provide a bit of context about the rise and various views of Information and Communication technology (ICT). Traditionally ICT is merely seen as an extended term for Information Technology (IT), which serves as an umbrella term for communication and the integration of telecommunication, computers, software, and audio- and visual systems that enable users to gain access to information, store the information and send, receive and manipulate it. Still, the value and requirements of effective ICT differ from sector to sector. In the long term it indicates the importance of cybersecurity and offers a view on the growth in value of the understanding of cyberterrorism and research that can assist in understanding various conceptualizations of ICT.

The minimum requirements of ICT or even cybersecurity will differ for different role players: for a government who reach their citizens through ICT, it is an important tool for governance and the government will want everybody to have access. The activist who wants to bring about ideological change, will see ICT as a convenient instrument for mobilization, but will still attach value to anonymity and privacy. The cybercriminal will possibly conceptualize it as a way to spread a certain view and will mainly want vulnerable audiences to have access. At the same time the law enforcers of an oppressive regime will prefer fewer of its citizens to have access, so that they cannot use ICT to embarrass or challenge the government.

Scholars, researchers and policymakers need to apply caution when it comes to the correlation between Africa's acceptance and advancement of technology on the continent and actual cyberterrorism. As mentioned, no actual cyberterrorist attack has been recorded to date, not in first world countries where technological advancement is commonplace, nor in Africa where security lapses and -loopholes in technological infrastructure might more easily be found and exploited.

Terrorists and violent extremists in Africa make frequent use of information technology for various purposes to advance ideological causes. These include: the spread of propaganda, radicalization, the gathering of information, networking,

recruitment, communication and coordination. According to the previously discussed definitions, the use of technology, internet technology and cyberspace does not equate cyberterrorism. These examples are all known uses of communication technology that have been employed by traditional forms of terrorism for decades.

A myriad of researchers have conducted studies on the impact of extremist online content on the radicalization process and terrorist behavior. The high and increasing levels of always-on internet access and the easy production and dissemination of violent and radical content may have radicalizing effects, but as Scriven and Gaudette rightly described it, online radicalization does not happen within a vacuum (Scrivens, 2021). In the African context, with the African reliance on community and kinship, it is important to note that although mobile connection has increased over the last few decades, word-of-mouth and societal influences on radicalization and recruitment cannot be discarded for the shiny new toy of cyberspace.

The issue of conceptualization of cybercrime, cyberterrorism and terrorism remains a central one in this study, as terrorists' use of the internet and other ICT networks could simply be categorized as cybercrime. This classification is based on the fact that it indeed contains malicious online acts, and even has a political motive, but might not disrupt essential or critical infrastructure within the states in which these groups operate. Thus, should the contested definitions of cyberterrorism have a certain "check box" process, where would one draw this unclear line between cybercrime, cyberterrorism and traditional terrorism?

The same criminals who would gain financially by targeting critical infrastructure of an African state, might only have a financial motive, but no political motivation – thus would not be labelled cyberterrorists. If other criminals or terrorists then use the same software or systems to target the same critical infrastructure but with the added political or ideological motivation, the label of cyberterrorist would then be applied.

This sheds light on an ongoing debate within cyberterrorism research regarding whether cyberterrorism acts should result in offline consequences, to be regarded as cyberterrorism. This connects to the politics of fear, as Dorothy Denning states that a narrower conceptualization of cyberterrorism specifies that an attack must be "sufficiently destructive or disruptive to generate fear comparable to that from physical acts of terrorism" (Denning, 2006). The destructiveness mentioned in this definition would refer to harms in the physical world, outside of cyberspace, inflicted upon intended or unintended targets as mentioned in the initial definition as mentioned by AP Schmidt earlier in this article. The other side of the cyberterrorism debate is argued by researchers maintaining that the online impact of cyberterrorism is enough to generate fear and intimidation similar to a physical attack by traditional terroristic means. Holt, in this case, argues that "economic hardship produced by a cyberattack, coupled with fear of the likelihood that it may occur again, could be equal to a physical attack" (Holt, 2012).

While keeping in mind that all of these definitions, contestations regarding definitions and debates are purely hypothetical and speculation, expansive definitions are still employed by states on the African continent. These states are hardly capable of addressing the traditional terrorism threat, and are now expected to adapt, advance and employ counter measures to a threat that is not yet understood by even the most developed countries. Without proper differentiation and interna-

tional agreement regarding what exactly the threat is that these nations are facing, creating effective counter-measures would be a near impossible task. There is no distinction between cyberterrorism, cybercrime and terrorists' use of the Internet, and this leads one to accept that cyberterrorism as a concept loses meaning and lacks the rigor to qualify for intense and in-depth academic study.

## **THE EXISTING DEBATES REGARDING CYBERTERRORISM**

Keeping all of this in mind, the debate about the importance of cyberspace for terrorism – especially from an academic perspective – remains at the forefront of the research question of the validity of cyberterrorism as a relevant and necessary concept.

Traditionally the debate is whether the internet and cyberspace serve as substitute for face-to-face platforms for radicalization and operational functions of terrorist groups. Walter Laqueur provides valuable insight into this view of the debate and maintains that cyberspace and the possibilities it offers does not translate into what he describes as “real power”. It indicates that cyberspace will have a limited effect on terrorism and radicalization. He emphasizes the question mark behind cyberspace by basically claiming that terrorists will always make use of the latest technology available to them, and that audio cassettes were also used in a similar manner to spread propaganda – when that was the latest technological invention (Laqueur, 1999).

Jason Burke, on the other hand, looks at the role of social media in cyberspace and he contends that social media will never replace face-to-face radicalization at a local level (Burke, 2016) (and this is especially relevant to Africa). Burke concedes that the internet and cyberspace do facilitate and ease communication, propaganda, recruitment and donations, but that it cannot be seen as a substitute but rather as an additional and contributing factor.

Then again, Marc Sageman sees the internet and cyberspace as a possible substitute for what he calls “real world” radicalization (Sageman, 2008). He is of the opinion that the internet enables people to create social ties, and gain access to extremist content that changes the entire concept of radicalization. The option of self-radicalization is now offered, where face-to-face contact is not even necessary (the danger here of various interpretations of ideology and propaganda is also increased).

I still don't believe that cyberspace and the potential growth and development of cyberterrorism can be understood as something that takes place either in the “real world” or in cyberspace. I think it is important to understand that as ICT becomes an integral part of our daily lives, a kind of symbiotic relationship develops. Terrorism therefore undergoes a type of transformation and there is a balance to be found between cyberspace and what Sageman describes as the “real world”.

If the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya is used as example: ICT was undeniably used to co-ordinate, plan and execute the attack, but the attack cannot be branded as an example of cyberterrorism. Cyberspace played an indisputable part in the execution of the attack, Al Shabaab tweeted throughout how they were progressing through the mall, several hashtags were created in cyberspace for those who wanted to follow the event, and even the Kenyan government used cyberspace to co-ordinate their reaction to the attack (or mis-co-ordinate it, as a result of overuse or misuse of cy-

berspace and the hashtags mentioned). Hence, Sageman's real world and cyberspace co-operate well to create and sustain terrorism in its newest form.

There is a tendency for research to understand the role of the internet and ICT regarding terrorism in a vacuum. It cannot merely be seen as dichotomous, online or offline. The relationship between reality and the virtual world of cyberspace must be understood and examined at a level where the deeper nuance and connections contribute to the existence of cyberterrorism, and traditional terrorism in general. To contribute to this understanding and eventual analysis, contextual and geographical context must be added. Differing countries have different classifications of critical infrastructure, so the targets of terrorism (be it *cyber-* or traditional) would differ depending on contextual aspects like governments, policies, legislature, infrastructure, cultural norms and even age of the population.

## CONCLUSION

In the 21st century the sudden growth of the internet has permanently changed society and the nature of modern communication. The internet has become part of our daily lives, and it also plays a growing part in the actions of extremists.

Extremist individuals misuse the internet as a means for advertising, recruiting, propaganda, training and communication. Consequently, it becomes increasingly important to study and understand the factors that influence and fuel violent extremist activities. If the internet, online capacity and online activities of individuals can ease the process of radicalization and promote the spread of extremist activities, it becomes essential for academics, state role players and policy makers to have knowledge thereof.

Even so, there are heated debates among contemporary and historic experts and researchers regarding the relationship between violent extremism and the internet. On the one hand it is argued that the internet plays a more important role than face-to-face interaction in the process of radicalization. On the other hand, it is thought that the role of the internet in the radicalization process is minimal and that it receives too much attention. Luckily the academic way of thought moves past the mere dichotomous dispute and it can be argued that the role of the internet remains complex and contested.

For every user, professional or social, ICT and cybersecurity have a set of requirements and guidelines to adhere to, and that is precisely what makes systematic research and understanding difficult.

ICT can simultaneously be the mediator and challenger of safety and good governance in Africa.

Whatever side of the debate receives the most attention, one thing that cannot be disputed is the fact that the internet and cyberspace are utilized by terror organizations in Africa and across the world to advance their cause. The question remains if this is a new phenomenon, or if this is a natural occurrence within terrorism. As these organizations operate more and more like transnational and even international businesses, it is understandable that any resource that will optimize effectiveness will be utilized. Security awareness and effectivity needs to increase in Africa – this will be one of the key determinants of the success of counterterrorism and counter cyberterrorism initiatives on the continent. It is a development that various role-players on the continent have been working towards for centuries, some with more success

than others, and it is a development that hopefully all key players on the continent will continuously strive to better and improve.

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